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 Abstract 
 
Due to the globalisation trend, notable changes have pushed a distinctive interest 
in addressing corporate governance problems; either in emergent economies of Asia 
and Latin America Countries or in the transitional economies that spread over Eastern 
Europe. Further, a series of corporate scandals, in the US and Europe, has undermined 
confidence in both public company executives and the auditors. Formulating effective 
corporate governance measures is a complex task for legislators. 
The purpose of this study is to determine whether corporate governance is seen 
from a broad stakeholder perspective in the Latin American Andean region (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) and also to provide an in depth analysis and 
comparison of the reasons organisations in the region want to implement corporate 
governance principles, whether it is because their want to be accountable to their 
stakeholders or because they want to show their legitimacy. The non-binding OECD 
2004 principles of corporate governance in conjunction with the CAF (Andean 
Development Corporation) will be utilised in the study as an international benchmark.  
The study has generated significant information about the corporate governance 
challenges facing listed companies trading in the Latin America’s Andean region. It is 
hoped that the research results will serve as an aid to better focusing the future policy 
dialogue in the region. It is anticipated in this sense they will facilitate upcoming 
analysis and debate. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 2 
CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
 
Introduction of the research topic   
 
Corporate governance deals with organisations and decision-making structures. One of 
the main objectives is to ensure the efficient convergence of competing interests that are 
affected by company activities. The debate about shareholder interests and other 
stakeholder interests is not recent and the balance between the different groups of 
stakeholders is essential to the long-term viability of organisations. Corporate governance 
is about the reconciliation of otherwise diverging interests. Governance analysis must 
serve as a means to organise, structure and establish an efficient prioritisation of interests. 
This study brings together elements from the corporate governance literature to develop 
and enhance a stakeholder-accountability-legitimacy approach. In doing so, the study 
explains the accountability of organisations to multiple stakeholders with differential 
power, emphasising the importance of structures and processes, and the culture or ethos 
of boards in which multiple stakeholders may have compatible rather than competing 
interests. This thesis continues the effort to achieve a better understanding of global 
corporate governance (CG) structures and mechanisms by looking at the specific 
emerging economies of the Latin American Andean Region (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela). This region is characterised by: underdeveloped financial markets; 
weak legal system; relatively poor law enforcement; and high ownership concentration. 
The extant literature shows that there are significant differences among corporate 
governance mechanisms around the world and that enhancing corporate governance 
remains very much a local effort. Country specific circumstances and institutional 
features mean that global findings do not necessarily apply directly to every country or 
situation. Local data needs to be used to make a convincing case for change. Local 
capacity is needed to identify the relevant issues and make use of political opportunities 
for legal and regulatory reform. Corporate governance thus depends on local capacity in 
terms of data, people, and other resources. 
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This study focuses on stakeholders’ perceptions of corporate governance. Especially 
stakeholders, such as shareholders, managers and other employees, customers, suppliers, 
the government and the community; in general all those who are key respondents 
concerning CG implementation. In order to capture the stakeholders’ experience the 
interpretive approach identified by Burrell and Morgan (1979) is employed in conjunction 
with phenomenology as a paradigm and methodology. Epistemological principles of this 
approach are investigated in relation to the broader interpretive paradigm and its context. 
The research design incorporates the use of: (i) semi-structured interviews with 
Colombian stakeholders; and (ii) a case study of the organisation that is the major 
promoter of corporate governance principles in the Andean Region: CAF. 
 
Throughout the Andean region democracy is under challenge from a wide variety of 
sources – for many different reasons. In Venezuela President Chavez is leaning to the left 
and is nationalising industries, which may reduce the need for corporate governance. 
President Chavez, with the oil money from Venezuela, is also buying political influence 
in other Andean countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia. At the time of this study 
Colombian president was Alvaro Uribe a right wing and the friendliest leader in the 
region towards the US. Corporate governance in Colombia may thus be different from 
Venezuela and other Latin American countries. This gives an interesting context within 
which to examine corporate governance. 
 
Several authors argue that the diversities of countries have a bearing not only on how 
corporate governance standards can be developed, but also on the impact of reforms on 
the overall link between investors and the development of the economy. Chong and 
Lopez-de-Silanes (2007), Cheung and Chan (2004), Cleassens and Fan (2002), Coffee 
(1999, 2001), Pistor and Wellons (1999), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Pistor 2001 
suggest that, since Asia, Latin America or Eastern and Central Europe constitute diverse 
regions in terms of legal tradition, regulatory infrastructure, and economic development, 
credit must be given to this diversity and acknowledge that different jurisdictions may 
adopt different approaches based on their national circumstances. These national traits 
may determine how corporate governance should be fulfilled. 
 
This research examines the extent to which corporate governance developments in the 
region are influenced by the Andean Development Corporation’s (Corpotacion Andina de 
 4 
Fomento – CAF) corporate governance guidelines. Special attention is given to the reason 
why companies decide to adopt corporate governance principles, if at all, and whether it 
is because they are required to be accountable to their stakeholders or want to legitimise 
their operations. The study also looks to whether there is a wide stakeholder approach in 
the Andean region. An analysis of the structures in place to facilitate good practices is 
also carried out, highlighting the strengths and weakness of current corporate governance 
frameworks. 
   
The first set of data was gathered from semi-structured interviews with 21 Colombian 
stakeholders including corporate managers, auditors, regulators, non-executive directors 
and users of corporate documents. This enabled the researcher to get an understanding of 
the way that Latin American companies are dealing with issues in relation to the 
application of corporate governance principles. 
 
The second stage was a case study of CAF that focuses on CAF’s headquarters in Caracas 
(Venezuela) and the regional office in Bogotá (Colombia). As part of the case study, 
documents are gathered and analysed including: the annual reports of 15 companies 
which adopted corporate governance principles as part of a pilot study undertaken by 
CAF; minutes of meetings within CAF; and other official reports. Interviews with CAF 
staff were undertaken in Caracas and Bogotá to understand the difficulties in changing 
corporate practices. Attendance at CAF meetings and seminars were also carried out in 
Bogotá, Quito and Guayaquil. 
 
This research examines corporate governance policies and laws in the Andean Region of 
Latin-America. It covers issues of board structure and compliance, and whether 
companies in the Andean Region implement Andean Development Corporation’s (CAF) 
corporate governance principles as a means of accountability to stakeholders or to 
legitimise their activities.  
 
1.1 Justification of the study 
 
The extant literature shows that notable changes have pushed for a distinctive interest in 
addressing corporate governance problems in the emergent economies of Asia and Latin 
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America and in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe. Further, corporate scandals 
around the world have undermined confidence in public companies.  
 
Motivations for studying developments in the implementation of corporate governance 
principles in the Andean region arose not only from recent local trends but also from the 
researchers’ conviction that rigorous academic studies can have a direct and substantial 
positive social impact and that lessons can be learned from different countries’ 
experiences which can be used for improving public policy design. 
 
The research contributes to knowledge as it adds to an understanding of current corporate 
governance practices in Latin America and provides suggestions to improve the policy 
framework that supports corporate governance in the Andean Region. Good corporate 
governance in a thriving democratic society with a prevalent culture that supports 
economic growth may be a shield against widespread global financial crises. 
 
The results may assist policymakers in the region as they develop market mechanisms in 
both the corporate and financial sectors. Moreover, the study provides feedback from 
stakeholders, regulators, company managers, independent directors, auditors and users of 
company information, about corporate governance in the region as well as generating 
empirical evidence of developments of corporate governance in the region that will be of 
concern to many investors.    
 
This study is particularly important because it is, to the researcher’s knowledge, the first 
investigation of the implementation of corporate governance in the five Andean countries. 
To date no attempt has been made to evaluate the perceptions and opinions of these 
stakeholders about the reasons and expectations of companies from the implementation of 
such practices. This research also provides a rich description of the status of corporate 
governance practices in each of the five Andean countries and expands the limited 
literature of the whole region by applying theoretical and methodological perspectives 
through which the dynamics created by the interrelationship between political, social, and 
economic factors can be understood and evaluated. It is hoped that various stakeholders 
will use the results of the study to further their knowledge of corporate governance.  
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This area is worthy of research due to the growing interest in this issue, and the amount of 
national and international resources channelled by different organisations interested in the 
social development and economic sustainability of the region. In addition the increased 
importance given to transparency and accountability for making company managers 
discharge their responsibilities to stakeholders, with rights to demand disclosure of 
relevant information also attracted the attention of the researcher to the topic.    
 
The findings can be used as a foundation for developing improvements in corporate 
governance in the Andean region as the concluding chapter summarises the key issues 
that might be useful for regulatory authorities in the region. Moreover, the results from 
the empirical research, although limited to the corporate governance context of the 
Andean region, might have wider implications on a worldwide basis. It is hoped that this 
study can enrich an understanding of the regulatory divide and the actions of those who 
implement these principles.        
 
1.2 Research questions  
 
This study focuses on stakeholder perceptions and CAF’s activities in promoting the 
implementation of corporate governance principles in the Andean Region, by explaining 
the features that underlie corporate governance practices and the legal framework in the 
Andean region. In particular, the research looks at the issue of effective independent 
boards; internal control systems; risk management; the integrity of financial reporting; 
transparency; and the disclosure of relevant information all focused on a stakeholder, 
accountability and legitimacy perspective. The study asks the following research 
questions:  
 
1. Is corporate governance viewed from a broad stakeholder perspective? 
 
2. To what extent do companies in the Latin American Andean Region implement 
corporate governance principles to enhance their accountability to stakeholders?   
 
3. To what extent does the implementation of corporate governance by organisations 
in the Latin American Andean region reflect a need to legitimise their activities to 
stakeholders? 
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1.3 Research objectives 
 
Answering the research questions may achieve the following aims and objectives: 
 
• To identify the efforts of the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) in 
promoting the implementation of corporate governance standards by companies 
throughout the Andean Region; 
 
• To identify what is being done by organizations apart from CAF to improve 
corporate governance standards in each Andean country;  
 
• To identify patterns of compliance with corporate governance rules among 
Andean companies;  
 
• To identify the reasons why Andean companies decide to implement corporate 
governance principles in their organisations; and 
 
• To compare and contrast the implementation of corporate governance principles in 
the five Andean countries. 
 
From the available information it has been possible to identify the characteristics that are 
particularly powerful motivators in encouraging the adoption of corporate governance 
standards.  
 
1.4 Structure of the research  
 
The thesis is organised around a series of substantive chapters through which run a 
number of recurrent themes. Together these concepts provide the thread which binds 
together the whole thesis.  
 
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter two is an introduction of the Latin America 
Andean Region; this chapter presents elements of the corporate governance framework in 
Latin America, in particular those relating to the Andean region. Additionally, the chapter 
provides background on: Latin history; culture; politics; and economic development of 
the region. 
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Chapter three examines the literature on corporate governance including studies on 
emerging markets in general, and those of Latin America. The chapter also includes a 
review of the small number of studies on countries in the Andean region. Although these 
studies have a number of limitations, their descriptions help to outline the current 
knowledge about corporate governance in the Andean region and provide a platform upon 
which the current thesis is built. 
 
Chapter four presents the theoretical framework within which the research topic is 
examined; the theoretical framework provides the structure for carrying out the inquiry 
proposed in this thesis. The chapter includes a detailed explanation of the research 
theories chosen, together with explanations about the reliability and validity of the 
possible research results, although the limitations faced throughout the research process 
are documented.  
 
Chapter five describes the research methodology and delineates the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions supporting this study. The current study uses an interpretive 
research paradigm where nominalist ontology is assumed, an anti-positivistic 
epistemology is employed, a voluntaristic view of human nature is adopted, and an 
ideographic methodology is used. In accordance with this research design, the thesis 
adopts a qualitative approach to collect and analyse data.  
 
In addition, chapter five also presents a description of the method of data collection with 
particular emphasis on the activities undertaken by CAF in the promotion of the 
implementation of corporate governance principles by organisations in the Andean 
Region. The qualitative methods adopted for this study are semi-structured interviews and 
a case study. The combination of these two methods is used to address the research 
questions that form the basis of the thesis. Such a mix is desirable so that the limitations 
of one approach are compensated by the strength of the other. In addition, the mix of 
methods facilitates a richer examination of the research objectives being considered. The 
chapter also includes the justification for the methodological approach chosen for this 
thesis to avoid confusion when they are analysed. 
 
Chapter six documents the results of interviews conducted with twenty-one stakeholders 
occupying various managerial, regulatory, academic, and professional positions in 
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Colombia between September and November 2008. The interviewees were asked about 
their views on the development of corporate governance standards in the country and the 
region.  
 
Chapter seven presents an analysis of the findings of the case study, focusing on the 
attitude of company owners, managers, directors, government officials, regulators and 
other stakeholders towards the implementation of corporate governance standards in 
different organisations. This chapter drafts patterns of compliance, and, reviews changes 
due to CAF’s promotion of good corporate governance practices in the region. The 
findings in chapter six and seven are interpreted in the light of stakeholder theory, 
accountability and legitimacy.  
 
Finally, chapter eight provides an overall summary of this work and presents some 
emerging conclusions and recommendations from the research; discusses the limitations 
of the study and explains why these limitations were not addressed in the thesis. 
Additionally, the chapter suggests some avenues for future research and ends with some 
concluding comments.  
 
1.5 Summary  
 
This chapter provides an introduction to this thesis to shed some light on the focus of the 
research and why it is important. In addition, the chapter guides the reader on the 
structure and content of the thesis, and provides a sign post to the direction of the 
research. 
 
The decision about the doctoral research topic was derived from the background of the 
student. The topic was chosen after the interest developed during a master degree 
undertaken at the University of Dundee. This interest was heightened by the fact that 
corporate governance research in the Andean region is limited. In addition, the growing 
interest in corporate governance issues throughout the Andean region facilitated access to 
relevant data for the study. As a result, it is believed that the current study makes a 
valuable contribution to an area which is of immense growing importance.    
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Latin American context and corporate governance 
in the Andean Region 
Introduction 
 
The structure of corporate governance in any country is determined by a wide 
arrangement of domestic factors, including the corporate ownership structure, the state of 
the economy, the legal system, government policies, culture and history. There are also a 
large number of external issues, such as the global economic climate, cross-border 
institutional investment and the extent of capital inflows from abroad.  
 
The basic principles of corporate governance of fairness, transparency, accountability and 
responsibility (OECD, 2004) are relevant all over the world. Promoting corporate 
governance can be especially beneficial to emerging market companies and countries. By 
adopting principles of corporate governance, companies in developing countries can often 
command higher valuations, improve their profitability, and gain better access to outside 
capital than their inefficiently governed peers. At the same time developing countries can 
attract more interest from local and foreign investors and reduce their vulnerability to 
financial crises (Mueller, 2006). 
 
However, applying corporate governance standards is not always easy because of various 
legal, economic and social systems. Nevertheless, many countries and companies are 
taking positive steps towards corporate governance reform, especially as they see how 
improving standards can help them (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003).  
 
This section attempts to sketch the corporate governance developments in Latin America 
and to interpret those developments in the light of some of the common characteristics 
shared by most of the countries in the region. The section introduces a brief overview of 
the Latin American context. It comments briefly on some of the characteristics shared by 
countries in the region including culture and history, poverty and social inequality, 
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political unrest, economic instability and ownership concentration. Finally a summary of 
the chapter is included. 
 
2.1 Common characteristics among some Latin American Countries 
 
Latin America is a diverse region with variations in political and economic systems. 
However, the countries of Latin America are also considered as an entity with common 
characteristics, on matters such as culture, historic, political and social structures, law 
enforcement, economic development and growth, Sharpe and Simoes (1996) comment 
that:  
“Just as cultures differ widely throughout North America due to variations in 
historical development, the same holds from country to country in Latin America, 
and from region to region within countries” (p. 274).  
 
However, the countries of Latin America share the same colonial (Spanish/Portuguese) 
heritage, and thus there are several similarities in their government systems and economic 
policies. This section explores these general similarities that make Latin America distinct 
from other regions of the world, and includes a brief description of those common Latin 
American characteristics which usually affect how individuals conduct themselves and 
which also influence decision-making processes.   
 
2.1.1 Cultural and Historical Settings 
 
From a cultural perspective, Latin America generally includes those parts of the Americas 
where the Spanish or Portuguese languages are spoken, including Mexico, most of 
Central America and South America, and parts of the Caribbean such as Haiti (a non-
Hispanic country with French and some Hispanic cultural influence). 
 
The need to take culture into account in any corporate governance analysis is widely 
acknowledged. It is argued that the legal approach to corporate governance is enriched by 
including evidence about the cultural foundations that underline legal rules of corporate 
governance (Roe, 2001). Large institutional investors find it necessary to adopt culture-
sensitive corporate governance principles for the foreign markets in which they invest 
(CalPERS, 2003). The largest international economic organisations have adopted 
principles for good corporate governance as part of a wider agenda on corporate 
 13 
governance reform, especially for transition economies and developing countries1 (Licht 
et al., 2001). These principles and other policy statements invariably note the need to 
adapt to the economic, social, legal and cultural circumstances of particular countries 
(OECD, 1999). Academic writers constantly mention culture as one of the factors that 
may stimulate or worsen the persistence of existing corporate governance systems 
(Bebchuck and Roe, 1999, 2004; Gilson, 1996; Gourevitch, 2003). Thus, a brief review of 
Latin America’s cultural profile and some of its most noticeable social particulars are 
included in this study.  
Figure 2.1 - Latin American Geographical Regions 
 
Latin American geographical regions: source Wikipedia      
 
The twenty nations of Latin America can be grouped into six sub-regional groups 
(Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, the Andean region, Brazil, and the South 
Cone), based on geography, shared history and cultural affinity, racial make-up and levels 
                                                 
1 These organizations include the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank (BID), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
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of development (see Figure 2.1) and there is some overlap among these sub regions: for 
example between Mexico and Central America. Also Venezuela, Panama, and Chile 
combine aspects of three sub regions, while Costa Rica and Paraguay are each rather 
distinctive in their own right. To understand the context of this thesis it is helpful to 
summarise the 6 regions of Latin America. First Mexico will be discussed; then Central 
America, which includes: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and 
Panama; then the Caribbean Spanish speaking countries: Cuba and Dominican Republic, 
and the French speaking Haiti; the especial attention is giving to the countries in the 
Andean region: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela as this thesis is focus on 
corporate governance developments in this region; finally the two remaining Latin 
American regions are introduce, Brazil and Paraguay and the South Cone integrated by 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. In order to better understand cultural differences an 
similarities through Latin America an outline of the characteristics of each of the six sub 
regions is introduced.            
 
1) Mexico   
 
Mexico is Latin America’s second largest country by population and was third largest in 
size up to the Mexican-American War of 1846 – 1848 when it lost Texas, California and 
New Mexico to the US. Its history over the course of the last century has been profoundly 
influenced by the Mexican Revolution (1910 – 1920), the Twentieth century’s first social 
revolution (Bonfil, 1996). This led to the emergence of a one-party state under the control 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI 2) which ran the country for 71 years until it 
lost power to the opposition candidate, Vicente Fox, of the right wing National Action 
Party (PAN) in the 2000 presidential elections (Schedler, 2004). Under the PRI, and with 
active state involvement in the economy, Mexico was transformed from a backward 
producer of primary raw materials such as minerals, coffee, henequen3, rubber, and cotton 
to one of Latin America’s leading industrial powers (Meyer et. al. 2002). As part of this 
                                                 
2 In 1929, the National Mexican Party (PNM) was formed by the serving president, General Plutarco Elías 
Calles. (It would later become the Partido Revolucionario Instucional (PRI) that ruled the country for the 
rest of the 20th century.) The PRI is typically referred to as the three-legged stool, in reference to Mexican 
workers, peasants and bureaucrats.   
3 Henequen, plant of the family agave and its fibre, third in importance among the leaf fibre; the henequen 
plant is native to Mexico, where it has been a source of textile fibre since pre-Columbian times. Other 
varieties of agave are used to make tequila. Henequen was introduced to Cuba in the 19th century, 
becoming the country’s chief fibre crop by the 1920s. The fibre is sometimes referred to as Yucatan, or 
Cuban, sisal. 
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development strategy, the Mexican identity was promoted drawing on Aztec themes from 
the country’s pre-colonial past while privileging the mixed-blood mestizos over the 10 
percent indigenous population who are legally and economically marginalised (Meyer et. 
al., 2002). The rights of the indigenous people have been actively promoted by Zapatista 
guerrilla group (Lopez and Lopez, 2001). 
 
As a major oil exporter and therefore benefiting from international prices rises in the 
1970s, Mexico enjoyed a guaranteed source of income. However 1982 saw the beginning 
of the international debt crisis when the country announced it could not meet the 
payments to service its huge foreign debt. Since then Mexico has liberalised its economy 
and its interests are more in line with those of its northern neighbour, the US, after 
signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with the United States and 
Canada which came into force in 1994 (Gweynne et. al. 2003).         
 
2) Central America  
 
Some of the countries in the Central America region (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua) bear significant residual influence from the Mayan Indian civilization, 
which began to decline in the centuries before Columbus arrived in 1492. For the first two 
decades after independence from Spain (1821-1839), there was a unified Central 
American Confederation, until it broke apart into five countries. The countries in this 
region, with the exception of Costa Rica, have had a history of political repression and of 
economic marginalisation of the population as the region’s leaders promoted export-led 
agriculture and seized the more productive land from small peasant farmers (Brockett, 
1998). By contrast, in Costa Rica, due to its small population in colonial times and the 
absence of an indigenous people4 who could be taken advantage of a more classless 
system of family farming was developed; this allowed Costa Rica to reach higher levels 
of development in the late twentieth century (Barraclough, 1973, Rueda-Junquera, 1998). 
In Guatemala, the largest state in Central America, the majority of the population belong 
to Quiche indigenous groups. These groups were subjected to suppression through the 30-
year-long genocide war from the 1960s to the 1990s as, in their counter-insurgency 
                                                 
4 Costa Rica is largely European in its racial make-up 
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strategy against guerrilla groups; the military targeted the indigenous population 
(Sarmineto, 1993).  
 
The Panama Canal has dominated the history of Panama and was the cause of its 
declaration of independence from Colombia in 1903 (Slater, 1984). The United States 
actively promoted Panama’s independence; the US maintained control over a 10-mile-
wide canal zone until 2000.  
 
3) The Caribbean5 
 
The region is located southeast of North America, east of Central America, and to the 
north and west of South America. The island nations of the Caribbean exemplify a great 
variety of cultural influences, reflecting the four European nations that colonized them: 
Spain, France, Britain, and the Netherlands. The islands are divided by language6, by 
geography, by politics7 and by colonial history and only in the 1990s did the region’s 
countries begin to find common cause (Richardson, 1992). This was where Columbus 
first landed in 1492 and where Europeans first established settlements (Maingot, 1984). 
Most of the region’s countries only achieved independence in the 1960s and continued to 
maintain close economic ties with their former colonial rulers (Black, 1984). Thus, the 
English-speaking Caribbean countries form part of the ACP (African, Caribbean and 
Pacific) countries that benefited from the Lomé Convention, a series of developments 
with the European Union from 1975 to 2000, which was succeeded by the Cotonou 
Agreement in 2000, due to last for 20 years. Additionally, in 1972, commonwealth 
Caribbean leaders at the seventh heads of Government Conference transformed the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) into the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM) of which a common market is an integral part (Maingot, 1984). Another 
economic oriented strategy that Caribbean political leaders are pursuing is the offer of 
                                                 
5 The Caribbean isles (also called Antilles) are an island chain 2,500 miles (4,020 km) long and no more 
than 160 miles (257 km) wide at any given point. They enclose the Caribbean Sea. Such islands include 
Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Bonaire, the Cayman Islands, Antigua, Cuba, the Virgin Islands, Dominica, 
Hispaniola, Jamaica, Montserrat, Puerto Rico, Saba, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago. At one time, there was a short-lived country called the Federation of 
the West Indies composed of ten English-speaking Caribbean territories.  
6 There are Spanish, English, French and Dutch-speaking countries 
7 The Caribbean is integrated by 17 independent states, British colonies, French and Dutch dependencies 
and Puerto Rico a ‘commonwealth’ of the United States  
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investment incentives in offshore finance, with the aim to capture highly mobile 
international finance capital.    
 
Cuba, the Caribbean’s largest country has suffered isolation since its socialist revolution 
in 1959. The country’s economy depends on the export of a few basic commodities such 
as sugar, bananas, and bauxite-alumina; however in the last decade Cuba has also 
developed a policy that offers incentives to foreign investors by allowing a level of 
foreign ownership in Cuba’s companies, promoting tourism, reorienting state investment 
to enhance product development for global markets, and transforming large state farms 
into autonomous and efficient cooperatives (Brooks, 2007; Leo Grande and Thomas, 
2002).   
 
4) The Andean Region 
 
Geographically, the Andean region is united by the mountainous terrain plus the cultural 
legacy of the Inca Empire. The region stretches from Venezuela on the Caribbean coast, 
through Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru to Bolivia8. Most of these countries were liberated 
by Simon Bolivar9, who dreamed of creating a vast confederation of Spanish-speaking 
countries (Ray, 1984; Fowler, 2002, CIA, 2009). This grouping is also very racially 
diverse – to the north the racial mix is more European, whereas the population of Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Peru, which formed the heart-land of the Inca empire, are largely mestizo 
and in Bolivia, the population is mainly indigenous Quiche and Aymara (Garcia, 1984).  
 
Colombia is the 26th largest nation in the world and the fourth-largest country in South 
America (after Brazil, Argentina, and Peru) with an area more than twice the size of 
France. In Latin America, it is also the country with the third largest population after 
Brazil and Mexico (CIA, 2008). Colombia has one of the largest Spanish-speaking 
populations of the world, and is also one of the largest manufacturers and one of the most 
ethnically diverse countries in South America (Davis et al., 1998).  
 
                                                 
8 Bolivia is the poorest country in Latin America  
9 Simon Bolivar (1783 – 1830) was one of the South America’s greatest generals. Bolivar was born in July 
24, 1783, at Caracas, Venezuela. His victories over the Spaniards won independence for Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. He is Called El Libertador (The Liberator). Bolivar was Upper-class Creole 
(Criollo). 
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Little is known about the various Indian tribes who inhabited Colombia before the 
Spanish arrived. However, it is believed that prior to the Spanish conquest, Colombia was 
inhabited by Chibcha, sub-Andean, and Caribbean people, all of whom lived in 
organized, agriculturally based communities (Stavenhagen, 1997). In 1510 Spaniards 
founded Darien, the first permanent European settlement on the American mainland. In 
1717 they established the Viceroyalty10 of New Granada, which was terminated in 1819 
when the patriotic army gained independence from Spain. The term “New Granada” 
continued to be used in conservative circles especially among ecclesiastics. Today some 
refer to Colombians as Newgranadinos (New Grenadians) (Fowler, 2002). 
 
After a 14-year struggle, during which time Simón Bolívar’s Venezuelan troops won the 
battle of Boyacá in Colombia on Aug. 7, 1819, independence was attained in 1824. 
Bolívar united Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador in the Republic of Greater 
Colombia (1819–1830), but in 1931 he lost Venezuela and Ecuador to separatists. Two 
political parties dominated the region: the Conservatives who believed in a strong central 
government and a powerful church; and the Liberals who believed in a decentralised 
government, strong regional power, and a less influential role for the church. Bolívar was 
himself a Conservative, while his vice president, Francisco de Paula Santander, was the 
founder of the Liberal Party (Fowler, 2002; Lynch, 2006). 
 
Colombia currently suffers from a political-military conflict involving rebel guerrilla 
groups, paramilitary militia, drug trafficking and corruption inside minor towns and some 
cities. The conflict originated around 1964 – 1966, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) were founded and began 
their guerrilla insurgency campaigns against successive Colombian government 
administrations (Ruiz, 2001; Black, 1984).  
 
According to the Guardian (8th June, 2007), record economic growth and a new period of 
relative security seem to be changing perceptions of Colombia around the world – 
Colombia is increasingly being seen as a place to invest and even to enjoy a holiday. The 
publication also mentions that economic growth and Colombia’s business-friendly 
environment have proved an attraction for foreign investors in recent years as investment 
                                                 
10 A district or province governed by a viceroy.   
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has been flowing into the energy, mining, financial and retail sectors. As with the 
majority of Latin American countries, Colombia has a secretive business culture; this 
diminishes the level of disclosure about companies’ financial circumstances, managerial 
disagreements and corporate governance developments (Bernal, 2006). 
 
Venezuela benefited from the oil boom of the early 1970s. In 1974, President Carlos 
Andrés Pérez took office, and in 1976 Venezuela nationalized foreign-owned oil and steel 
companies, offering compensation. However declining world oil prices sent Venezuela’s 
economy into a tailspin, increasing the country’s foreign debt (Salazar-Carrillo and Cruz, 
1994; Giusti, 1999). Pérez was reelected to a non-consecutive term in 1988 and launched 
an unpopular austerity program. Military officers staged two unsuccessful coup attempts 
in 1992, while the following year Congress impeached Pérez on corruption charges. 
President Rafael Caldera was elected in Dec. 1993 to face the 1994 collapse of half of the 
country’s banking sector, falling oil prices, foreign debt repayment, and inflation. In 
1997, the government announced an expansion of gold and diamond mining to reduce 
reliance on oil (Tarver and Frederick, 2006; Salazar-Carrillo and Cruz, 1994; Giusti, 
1999).  
 
Although, Colombia and Venezuela have maintained formal democratic systems since the 
1950s, by the 1990s they had become unable to channel the growing social discontent in 
both countries. This has led to populism in Venezuela under Hugo Chavez that has 
marginalised the country’s traditional parties, and seen growing social conflict in 
Colombia between guerrillas, the military and right-wing paramilitary squads, with the 
United States becoming increasingly involved11 (Silva, 2004). Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia 
have each experienced periods of dictatorship in the 1960s and 1970s; nevertheless they 
were socially progressive. In Colombia, economic development was more carefully 
managed and the country avoided the effects of the international debt crisis in the 1980s; 
however the production and trading of illegal substances has led to problems of 
corruption and violence that are undermining social and political stability (Silva, 2004). 
Peru and Bolivia have problems maintaining sustainable economic growth and social 
development. Bolivia was hit by the collapse of the tin market in 1986 on which its 
                                                 
11 By 2006, the United States had invested $4 billion into ‘Plan Colombia’, the joint U.S.-Colombia coca 
antinarcotics program begun in 2000. 
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economy had long depended (Thorburn, 1994). Ecuador has experienced a period of 
continuous crisis, overthrowing two heads of state under popular pressure in 1996 and 
2000 and adopting the US dollar as its currency in January 2000 in an attempt to stabilise 
its financial system (Silva, 2004).  
 
5) Brazil (and Paraguay)  
 
Brazil is nearly as big as the United States in terms of land area, and is by far the most 
populous country in Latin America, so size alone qualifies it as a separate region. The fact 
that it is the only Portuguese- speaking country in the Western Hemisphere makes it stand 
out even more. The country has a vibrant, fun-loving culture, with more relaxed social 
norms than in Spanish America, where the Catholic Church tends to have a stronger 
influence (Conniff, 1984). 
 
At the end of the twentieth century Brazil was Latin America’s dominant economic and 
political power, transformed from a largely traditional coffee-producing country at the 
beginning of the century to a major world industrial power at its end (Wright, 2003). 
However, the benefits of economic development remain unequally divided (Thorp, 
1998,). The most prosperous parts of the country are in the south while the poorest parts 
are in the north-east. Brazil also displays a wide racial mix in its population, a 
combination of immigrants from Europe and Asia, the descendants of the African slaves 
brought in great numbers during Colonial times, and the small indigenous population, 
largely tribal groups living in the vast interior of the country (Thorp, 1998). 
 
Paraguay can be placed with Brazil as its recent economic past has been influenced by 
Brazilian immigration along the country’ borders although Paraguay has remained cut off 
from is neighbours. After independence in 1813, Paraguay followed a policy of isolation 
and self-sufficiency under its early leaders12, an apparently successful experiment but was 
ended by the War of Triple Alliance against Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, from 1865 to 
                                                 
12 Paraguay under José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (1813 – 1840) and Carlos Antonio López (1841- 1862) 
developed quite differently from other South American countries, the aim of Rodríguez de Francia and 
Carlos López was to encourage self-sufficient economic development in Paraguay by imposing isolation 
from neighbouring countries. The regime of the López family was characterised by strong centralism 
without room for the creation of a true civil society. There was no distinction between the public and the 
private enterprise, and the López Family ruled the country as it would a large property estate. The 
government controlled exports and was extremely protectionist, never accepting loans from the outside and, 
through high tariffs, refusing the entrance of foreign products.     
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1870 in which Paraguay suffered extensive territorial losses to Brazil and Argentina; also 
the Paraguayan population was devastated through war and disease – as many as 1.2 
million people, or 90 percent of its pre-war population was lost (Fowler, 2002; Farwell, 
2001 and Abente, 1984) . Paraguay has a market economy marked by a large informal 
sector13 that features both exporting imported consumer goods to neighbouring countries, 
and thousands of small business enterprises. Paraguay’s largest economic activity is based 
on agriculture, agribusiness and cattle ranching (Skidmore, and Smith 2005; Spoor, 
2000). Paraguay is ranked as the world’s third largest soybeans’ exporter (CIA, 2008). 
Despite difficulties arising from political instability, corruption and slow structural 
reforms, Paraguay has been a member of the trade bloc Mercosur14, participating since 
1991 as one of the founding members (Roett, 1999).    
 
6) The Southern Cone 
 
Chile, Argentina and Uruguay make up the Southern Cone, so-called because of the 
geographical shape of these countries. In terms of both ethnicity and dialect, this 
southernmost part of Latin America lives up to its claim to be the “most European” part 
of the region, as most of the indigenous population from Argentina and Uruguay was 
eliminated after independence (Stavenhagen, 1997). A large proportion of the population 
in Argentina and Uruguay are of Italian descent, while Germans and Basques make up a 
substantial portion of the Chilean population. Paradoxically, despite the economic 
advantages and relative lack of ethnic friction, the Southern Cone has not lived up to its 
promise (Thorp, 1998) as some of the fiercest fighting anywhere in Latin America took 
place in Chile and Argentina during the “Dirty War” of the 1970s and 1980s (Fowler, 
2002).  
 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are well-off in their combination of geography and climate 
and, by the early twentieth century, Argentina and Uruguay showed indices of social 
development better than many developed countries (Bulmer-Thomas, 1994). Under 
president José Battle y Ordoñez (1903 – 1907; 1911 – 1915) Uruguay became the world’s 
                                                 
13 Informal economic activity is a dynamic process which includes many aspects of economic and social 
theory including exchange, regulation, and enforcement. By its nature, it is necessarily difficult to observe 
study, define, and measure. 
14 Mercosur (Spanish: Mercado Común del Sur) Southern Common Market, which is a Regional Trade 
Agreement among Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay founded in 1991. 
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first welfare state. Argentina became a significant industrial power and the incorporation 
of its working class owed a lot to the distributive measures of the governments of Juan 
Domingo Perón (1946 – 1955; 1973 – 1974), who is regarded by many as being 
responsible for the unstable political life of the country since (Fowler, 2002). While Chile 
and Uruguay were democracies for much of the twentieth century, Argentina was beset 
by constant military intervention in politics from 1930 to the mid 1980s. All three 
countries had military dictatorships – Chile and Uruguay from 1973, Argentina from 
1976 – that sought to eliminate the left and to consolidate the elite rule (Thorp, 1998; 
Ward, 1997; World Bank, 2000; Silva, 2004.) overall there is a wide cultural diversity 
amongst the regions which gives a flavour to the challenges of corporate governance in 
the region.      
 
2.1.2 Social Factors  
 
Inequality and poverty are some of the region’s main challenges; according to the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) Latin America is 
the most unequal region in the world (ECLAC, 2005, 2007). Moreover, according to the 
World Bank (2004), nearly 25% of the population lives on less than 2 USD a day. The 
countries with the highest inequality in the region as measured with the Gini index in the 
UN Development Report in 2006 were Bolivia (60.1%), Haiti (59.2%), Colombia 
(58.6%), Brazil (58%) and Chile (57.1%) while the countries with the lowest inequality in 
the region were Nicaragua (43.1%), Ecuador (43.7%), Venezuela (44.1%), and Uruguay 
(44.9%). Notably two of the five Andean countries are at the top (Bolivia and Colombia) 
and two at the low end (Ecuador and Venezuela). One aspect of inequality and poverty in 
Latin America is the unequal access to basic infrastructure. For example access to water 
and sanitation and the quality of these services remains low (Dean, B. 2003; CNMV, 
2006; World Bank, 2007).     
 
In conjunction with the rise of democracy during the early 1980s, the region turned 
towards structural adjustment reforms in the hope of promoting economic growth and 
reducing its high levels of inequality and poverty.  The emergence of a neo-liberal 
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conviction implemented under the Washington Consensus15 supported a systematic 
programme of decreasing state involvement in the economy through trade liberalisation, 
privatisation and reduced public spending in the hope of promoting economic growth 
through the renewal of foreign investment flows to the region (Williamson, 2006).  Due 
to Latin America’s high diversity, however, these neo-liberal reforms have had mixed 
results of successes and failures with some economic policies actually contributing to the 
already high levels of inequality and poverty within the region.  
 
However, some of these problems existed long before neo-liberal reforms were 
introduced; nevertheless, the implementation of neo-liberal reforms appears to have 
aggravated them (Onis and Senses, 2005).  Not only has growth been relatively low and 
highly unstable, but the degree of inequality appears to have increased during the era of 
neo-liberal restructuring. These issues are important, not only for equity and 
socio/political reasons, as growing inequality can lead to social and political tensions and 
in the long run the reversal of reforms, but also because increases in income inequality 
and poverty can be associated with low growth (Perry et. al., 2005). 
 
According to the World Bank (2004) study of 26 countries, five of them in Latin 
America, the main problem for the poor are unemployment, and a link exists between the 
lack of work, violence, drug use and alcoholism. Poor people in general do not trust 
politicians, believe governments are corrupt, and see the Roman Catholic Church as the 
most effective institution in dealing with their problems. These social factors all have a 
bearing in the corporate governance developments in the region.  
 
2.1.3 Political Factors 
 
Change and uncertainty have characterized the region’s political and economic 
environment for decades (Kryzanek, 1995). Coups, guerrilla wars, demonstrations, 
strikes, assassinations and states of siege have all taken place as Latin America has 
struggled with a corporatist and elitist tradition. Kryzanek (1995) describes the many 
                                                 
15 The Washington Consensus is a phrase used since 1989 to describe a relatively specific set of ten 
economic policy prescriptions that were considered to constitute a standard reform package developed by 
Washington, D.C. based institutions such as the International Monitoring Fund (IMF), the World Bank and 
the U.S. Treasury Department, to be applied in countries facing severe economic crisis such as Argentina 
Mexico, and other South American Countries.  
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myths that have filled Latin America’s history books from Bolivia’s 183 governments 
since independence, to Venezuela’s 23 constitutions, to Ecuador’s Jose Maria Velasco 
Ibarra, who completed only one of his five terms in office.  
 
Latin America has been positioned as the third most unstable region in the world in the 
post-war era; political instability has been constant in the region (Goldstone et. al. 2005). 
According to Schatzman’s, (2005) analysis of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 – 
2000, there were 20 coups d’etat, 451 political assassinations, 217 riots, and 113 crises 
that threatened to bring down the ruling government. Only three Latin American 
countries16 were consistently democratic over the 30 year period: Costa Rica, Colombia, 
and Venezuela. The remainder of the countries switched from a democracy to an 
autocracy (or vice versa) at least once. In addition, Foran (2005), and Wickham-Crowley 
(2001) argue that even though the majority of countries undertook democratic reforms in 
the 1980s and 1990s that promoted stability, the region continues to experience political 
instability. In the Andean region against a background of profound structural changes, the 
crisis of political parties as a genuine mechanism of representation has created favourable 
conditions for the development of waves of populist leaders who, through a justified 
criticism of the traditional “political class”, tend to break the elitist political game and its 
customary structures, demanding and creating a new form of representation of their 
interests in the state and new forms of distribution of national income. This has been 
observed in the Venezuela of Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales’ Bolivia, Ollanta Humala’s 
Peru and the Ecuador of Lucio Gutierrez, as well as to some extent in Uribe’s Colombia 
(FT.Com, 2009; Mainwaring, 2006). 
 
Latin America’s politics have their roots in a system called corporatism. Corporatism is a 
system of governing whereby various socioeconomic groups or corporations surround the 
central authority and compete for power and for a place at the governing table (Kryzanek, 
1995). During the days of the Spanish crown, corporations were the established 
aristocracy, the Catholic Church and the military were the conquerors. In this period, no 
democratic process existed; the Crown was all-powerful and authoritarian. This system 
created a closed, exclusive structure, with political and economic inequalities. Even into 
                                                 
16 Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panamá, Perú, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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the contemporary period, the conflict between the traditional elitist corporations and new 
power contenders such as labour unions, student associations, peasant movements, 
political parties, leftist revolutionaries and drug cartels has continued, creating great 
political instability (Kryzanek, 1995); Alesina et. al. (1996) argues that social and 
economic polarisation has driven poor groups to pursue their political and economic 
objectives outside normal channels. This has lead to a higher participation by these 
groups in violent political movements that cause high levels of uncertainty to investors 
and restrict capital accumulation. This political instability may affect the implementation 
of corporate governance differently in the 5 Andean countries.  
 
2.1.4 Economic Factors 
 
Latin America’s current economy is one that is rapidly changing in dealing with the 
effects of its past policies and structures. Wiarda (1995) describes Latin America’s past 
economic structure as mercantilist; this structure began to change in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In mercantilism, according to Wiarda, the state is the driving force behind 
economic growth. The state, rather than the marketplace, mobilizes capital, sets priorities, 
invests, and regulates wages, prices and production. In communism the state has control 
of the economy, and in capitalism, the market has control of the economy. Mercantilism 
occupies an intermediate space in the spectrum of economic structures with communism 
on the left end and capitalism on the right (Wiarda, 1995).  
 
Mercantilism implies that the state owns much of the economy, and it heavily regulates 
prices, production and wages (Wiarda, 1995). Licenses or special permits are required for 
many activities such as starting a business. This system creates an extremely bureaucratic, 
expensive and slow economic process. The legacy of bureaucracy can be traced back to 
the Spanish crown. In fact, the term “red tape” came from the Spanish monarchy’s 
practice of tying petitions in need of attention in red ribbons and storing them in 
chambers awaiting a final decision. These red-ribbon clad petitions frequently remained 
in the chambers for years awaiting action (Sharpe and Simoes, 1996).  
 
Not only was the state the largest generator of production and services in Latin America, 
but it was also the largest employer. These systems created a process whereby people 
were given jobs in exchange for loyalty to the government in power.  
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“The state in Latin America is not a neutral referee; rather, it uses its powers 
to reward its friends and punish its enemies” (Wiarda, 1995, p 115).  
 
Thus, those who were well connected received positive responses to, for example, 
petitions to the state, to requests for licenses to open businesses, or to lobbying to be 
given a monopoly in a sector of the economy. Those who were not well connected or who 
were poor were kept waiting for months or years or were ignored (Wiarda, 1995).  
 
The mercantilist system’s effects are extensive. With economic power highly linked to 
political power; the quest for this power often became extremely violent and severe. In 
Latin America, control of government implied not only political power and prestige but 
also control of the state’s economic resources and the patronage resulting from that 
control (Sharpe and Simoes, 1996). Social scientists, such as the Brazilian anthropologist 
Da Matta (1991) note that laws are abundant and changeable which makes it difficult to 
obey them all; the Peruvian economist De Soto (1989) calls this legal system 
“mercantilist,” and argues that the mercantilist state is bureaucratised and passes laws that 
favour small-interest groups against the interests of the majority.  Pereira’s (2000) term 
for this form of legality is “elitist liberalism,” which is more historically accurate than De 
Soto’s since Latin America’s legal systems took on this distinctive form during the 
nineteenth century, when liberalism was the reigning ideology, rather than during the 
colonial period. 
 
Since the 1990s, Latin American countries have been moving away from mercantilism, 
which supported state-led development through high protective barriers such as trade 
quotas and tariffs, toward market-determined, open economies. Thus, privatisation, which 
includes the selling of many government-owned firms, occurred. Bovenberg and De 
Mooij (1994) found that before economic reforms, corporations could only improve their 
performance through close ties with governments. However, through reforms, efforts are 
being made to create genuine internal competitive advantages by improving technology 
and marketing expertise.  
 
Liberalisation has also taken place, and consequently many trade barriers have been 
removed to allow for more open trade. The North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) was an outcome of this process. Other regional trade agreements such as the 
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Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, CAN) and the Southern Common Market 
(Mercado Común del Sur, Mercosur) have also contributed to the changing economic 
environment in the region, which has led to an economic renaissance in Latin America in 
the 1990s (McCoy, 2002). But, just as Latin America’s economic history has been 
challenged with crises, including the “lost decade” of the 1980s where almost all Latin 
American countries lost ground in the development process, the region continued to deal 
with crises in the 1990s. Consequently, the current Latin American economy is one in 
which the countries of the region are changing and at the same time coping with the 
institutions, infrastructure, and habits that the past system created (McCoy, 2002).  
 
Historically, in Latin America, the state has been paternalistic, providing for its citizens. 
Having operated as the largest employer in the region, the state was depended upon to 
support the countries of Latin America economically. In many countries, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) dominated the petroleum, steel, transportation and insurance industries 
but despite their monopoly status, they frequently operated at a loss (McCoy, 2002). The 
sale of these inefficient enterprises brought enhanced fiscal revenues via income from the 
sale of assets and the reduction in subsidies to public enterprises. But many people have 
lost their jobs or were faced with new sets of rules. Therefore, much social upheaval has 
accompanied the economic restructuring and it continues to run deeper as McCoy (2002) 
notes:  
“…as Latin American leaders gained experience with this first generation of 
economic reform, it became clear that they would have to address far more 
fundamental features of their societies that have long hindered development” (p 
8). 
  
These changes included labour market liberalisation, privatisation of social services 
providers, new regulatory regimes, judicial reform and improving the content and quality 
of education (McCoy, 2002). This change in economic factors and more corporate 
involvement means that corporate governance is vital to help stabilise the economy and 
enable growth to occur. 
 
2.1.5 Law and the Judiciary 
 
Latin America’s constitutional law, which superficially looks much like the constitutional 
law in a consolidated democracy, is very different in Latin America because of the ease 
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with which constitutions can be changed.  It took President Zedillo just one month to 
amend the constitution in Mexico (Vargas 1996).  And President Chávez swore in his 
oath of office that he would abolish Venezuela’s constitution (El Nacional 20 January 
2007). He gained widespread popularity by using a constitutional convention to 
circumvent the power of the opposition, and control Congress and a judiciary that is 
widely seen as corrupt El Pais, 3 December 2007).  There is widespread mistrust of the 
judiciary in Latin America (Hammergren 1998, Prillaman 2000).  President Fujimori 
mounted a popular coup against his own government by claiming, in part, that the 
judiciary was corrupt and removed three justices who voted to uphold a constitutional 
prohibition against running for a third term (Tanaka, 2002).   
 
These constitutional changes reflect the legal systems that fail to resolve disputes in a 
legitimate fashion.  Although Latin America belongs to the civil law family (La Porta et. 
al., 1998), the law is different in Latin America from the civil law nations of Western 
Europe.  The Law is both pervasive and marginalised as there are too many rules and 
their application is uncertain and uneven.  Equality of law is a meaningless abstraction 
since the powerful need not obey the law which is designed primarily to control the 
behaviour of the lower classes (Holston and Caldeira, 1999; Méndez et. al., 1999; Pereira, 
2000).  The wide gap between the formal legal order and the reality of the way the law 
operates has led some scholars to question whether Latin America truly belongs in the 
civil law family given the wide gap between the formal legal order and application of law 
(Garro, 1995; Mattei, 1997). The state of the legal system and the judiciary may make it 
difficult to implement corporate governance. 
 
2.2 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented an overview of some of the Latin America characteristics that 
may help to understand the region business environment, culture, history, and the trends 
and limitations of corporate governance reforms at country level, especially in the 
Andean region countries. Latin America represents a new hope and inspiration for many 
people in the world, as well as social justice campaigners and progressive analysts.  After 
decades of economic failure in the region since the 1980s, rising populist regimes have 
led the way in a search for alternative regional economic models that benefit the poorest 
members of Latin American societies.  As new left-leaning presidents reject the US-
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backed model of free trade in favour of regional versions of commerce and cooperation, 
Latin America is being closely watched in its attempts to build an alternative economic 
model that prioritises pro-poor development, the redistribution of natural resources and 
people-led social change. In this rich mix of cultures, politics, economies, and legal 
systems, this thesis examines corporate governance in Andean context. The next chapter 
continues to develop the background of the research presented later in this thesis by 
introducing a review of previous studies that have examined the implementation of 
corporate governance standards in both developed and developing countries.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Literature Review                             
Introduction  
 
Opinions around the world differ as to what is the best form of corporate governance, and 
the reason why the subject has become such a focus of attention varies from country to 
country. In the US, corporate governance grew in importance as a result of the increase in 
mergers and acquisitions in the 1980s (Holderness, and Sheehan, 1988) and the Enron 
Scandal. In the United Kingdom, after a series of major scandals in the 1980s, the subject 
moved up the political agenda. In France privatised state companies have had to meet the 
demands of institutional investors in France and abroad (Mallin, 2004).  
 
Further, current corporate governance concerns can be related to the emerging markets 
crisis and multinational companies’ failures such as the East Asian financial crisis of 
1997, which saw the economies of several regional nations affected by the exit of foreign 
capital after property assets collapsed which showed the major risks that investors could 
face when dealing with poorly managed companies (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Mitton, 
2002). The lack of corporate governance mechanisms in many countries of that region 
highlighted the weaknesses of the institutions in their economies (Cleassens et al., 2000).  
 
The European Community has also witnessed the failure of big firms such as Partmalat 
and the Royal Ahold (Mallin, 2004). Many Latin American companies, widely-owned, 
family-owned and state-owned, have also reached a point where improving transparency, 
strengthening minority shareholders rights, and defining clear board practices have 
become key for potential growth and competitiveness; this urgency has also been 
reflected in the sanction of corporate governance codes in most of the Latin American 
countries (Capaul, 2003). 
 
In the current debate on governance issues there is the view that the Anglo-American 
style capital market, with its emphasis on the separation of shareholders from the firms 
they invest in, too often results in poor managerial accountability and substantial 
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departures from shareholder value maximisation. In addition, there is now widespread 
awareness that managers may take actions that hurt stakeholders (Charkaham, 1994).  
 
The growing interest in the topic has resulted in a significant increase in corporate 
governance reforms around the world and the manner companies are governed is now 
considered an international issue, with corporate governance codes being developed at a 
national and global level. At the national level there have been developments in the UK, 
issuing the Code of best practice (Mallin, 2004). There also have been reforms in the US 
where compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been a requirement for all listed 
companies since July 2002 (SOX, 2002). Other well known corporate governance codes 
are the South African’s King Reports I, II and III; and the OECD internationally 
applicable code of best practice (Mallin, 2004).  
 
However, issues of governance are approached differently by the fields of finance, 
economics, and management. This literature review section pulls together many of the 
themes currently explored in the corporate governance literature and presents a 
characterisation of the issues, to provide a basis for analysis. The chapter focuses on 
recent studies that examine developing countries, especially in Latin America. Most 
studies on Latin America have concentrated on the more economically advanced 
countries of the region such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Apart from the 
fundamental aspects of corporate governance this literature review also focuses on how 
corporate governance affects corporate performance and management strategic decision-
making. It is expected that if all stakeholders of an organisation see value in corporate 
governance, a positive and helpful attitude by all stakeholders can then be cultivated. 
Research and developments in the western world are also considered even though the 
Latin American environments and culture are not necessarily similar to that of the 
western world where most of the concepts and theoretical frameworks of corporate 
governance originated. First the chapter covers: corporate governance history and 
definitions, followed by the regulatory framework, then codes of best practices and 
guidelines starting with the UK, US, and then other areas, comparisons with the systems 
of other emerging markets, boards of directors, and board committees, an overview or 
risk management and internal controls. Finally, a summary of the general frameworks and 
mechanisms of corporate governance applied through Latin American countries is noted.       
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3.1 Corporate governance history and definitions  
 
Corporate governance is not a universal concept. In fact, the expression is matched in 
Spanish to its literal translation ‘gobierno corporativo’ or in Portuguese ‘governança 
corporativa’, but both terms have a misleading meaning. First, the word corporation 
(Corporate) in Latin American legislation is used to describe a non-profit organisation. In 
addition, both gobierno and governança do not necessary connote the same as corporate 
governance, and in Latin America they have a specific technical meaning granted by local 
doctrine. One of these corresponds to a way of administration for a nation and the 
formulation of laws.  It is argued that the similarity of some words masks important 
differences in meaning, and much of these differences have a lot to do with imperceptible 
features of the legal culture (Zamora, 2004). 
 
Corporate governance has been practised for as long as there have been corporate entities. 
However the study of the subject is less than half a century old. In fact, the phrase 
corporate governance was barely used until the 1980s (Davis et al. 1994; Coffee, 2001a). 
In the 19th century, in the United States, state corporation law allowed corporate boards to 
govern without the unanimous consent of shareholders to make corporate governance 
more efficient (Monks, and Minow, 2004). 
 
In the 20th century, in the aftermath of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, Berle and Means 
(1932) reflected on the changing role of the modern corporation in society; which 
continues to have a profound influence on the conception of corporate governance in 
scholarly debate today (Tricker, 1984). 
 
At its most basic level corporate governance deals with issues that result from the 
separation of ownership and control (Denis and McConnell, 2003) but goes beyond this 
by establishing transparent and responsible relationships between managers and owners. 
The presence of strong corporate governance standards provides increased access to 
capital and thereby aids economic development attracting investors by assuring them that 
the business environment is fair and transparent and that companies can be held 
accountable for their actions or lack thereof, their investments can be protected and 
contracts enforced (Chambers, 2002).  
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According to the World Bank corporate governance refers to the structures and processes 
for the direction and control of companies. It concerns relationships among the 
management, board of directors, controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and 
other stakeholders. Good corporate governance contributes to sustainable economic 
development by enhancing the performance of companies and increasing their access to 
outside capital (World Bank, 2006). In the World Bank’s view, corporate governance 
structures entail rules and procedures for decision-making on corporate affairs. It provides 
the structure through which company objectives are set, as well as the means for attaining 
and monitoring the performance of those objectives.  
 
In an Andean context the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) is supporting the 
application of corporate governance standards in Andean countries and defines corporate 
governance as the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ practices that govern the relationship between 
the board, managers and stakeholders. According to CAF corporate governance practices 
ensure a better use of companies’ resources, enhance transparency, and mitigate the 
problems of asymmetric information (CAF, 2005).  
 
Traditional definitions of corporate governance are narrow, focusing on legal relations 
between managers and shareholders. More recent definitions extend the boundaries of 
governance to consider the role that various stakeholders play in shaping the behaviour of 
organisations. These different ways in which corporate governance is defined generally 
engage the mechanisms by which a company, organised in a corporate limited form, is 
directed and controlled. It usually includes the relationship between shareholders, 
creditors and other stakeholders. Issues of fiduciary duty and accountability are often 
discussed within the framework of corporate governance. A definition which takes 
account of different views is well suited for this review of the literature, which has the 
purpose to further the understanding of commonalities and differences in corporate 
governance practices among the Latin American Andean countries through an analysis of 
corporate governance regulations and elements of the underlying legal framework. Thus, 
a stakeholder approach using accountability and legitimacy is used to frame the empirical 
analysis of the factors affecting the application of corporate governance principles 
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through the Latin American Andean region. This approach accords with Solomon (2007) 
who defines corporate governance as: 
“The system of checks and balances, both internal and external to companies, 
which ensures that companies discharge their accountability to all their 
stakeholders and act in a socially responsible way in all areas of their business 
activities” (p 14). 
 
Corresponding to this broad definition, the objective of corporate governance is to 
maximise the overall contribution of a company to all its stakeholders. Corporate 
governance represents the relationship among stakeholders that is used to determine and 
control the strategic direction and performance of the company. Accountability is a key 
element strengthening corporate governance in a way that provides a transparent 
framework for governing critical decisions, procedures and activities. 
 
However, one major difficulty in discussing corporate governance is that there is 
disagreement as to the goals of corporate governance, and what is the role of companies 
in an economy. Corporate governance models have been classified to two groups. First is 
the agency model which goes back to the influential article of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) who see corporations as consisting of managers who act as the agents of the 
shareholders. A basic concept of this model is that the company belongs to the 
shareholders and must be run in their interests, creating value on their behalf; the 
objective of management is to maximise the market value of the company, and directors 
are only accountable to the owners. This definition is associated with the Anglo-
American view of economies in which there is an active market of control for ownership. 
Counter to this, shareholder approaches are criticized for favouring short-term profit 
maximization at the expense of the long run and undermining the interests of third parties 
other than the stockholders (Handy, 2002).  
 
The stakeholder model of corporate governance sees the company not simply as an agent 
for the shareholders to maximise wealth, but also as an entity with responsibilities to 
other stakeholders, including employees, creditors, suppliers and society as a whole. As 
the interests of stakeholders are diverse, and some times conflicting, a compromise 
between the pursuits of the various interests is needed; this compromise is the role of 
managers (Berle and Means, 1932), and a board, where the different interests may be 
represented, leading to decisions for the overall interest of the company. This 
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stakeholder’s view also includes the social responsibility of the company (Warhurst, 
2001; Zedek, 2006).   
 
The different conceptions have their counterpart in different aspects of corporate law, 
from the composition and election rules of the board of directors, to the disclosure of 
company information, up to the rules that determine the company management and its 
running structure and also mergers, takeovers, and the legal framework of capital markets 
(Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2005). 
 
The next section introduces the characterisation of the normative corporate governance 
model which provides the foundation for the comparative analysis of the adoption of 
corporate governance principles and guidelines through the Latin American Andean 
countries.  
 
3.2 Regulatory Framework  
 
The regulatory framework covers matters such as the legal rights of shareholders and 
others and their ability to be compensated in case their rights are violated. The framework 
includes the protection of shareholders through regulation and through requirements for 
full disclosure of risks. These are just two examples. There are a great number of other 
factors that impact the way a company is controlled, managed and held accountable, and 
many of these factors fall directly in the sphere of regulators.  
 
The existence of an appropriate legal framework has been identified as a fundamental 
element, without it the benefits of attracting investors could be made more difficult 
(Thome, 2000). Furthermore, local codes, statutes and business practices from different 
regions are updated reflecting legal developments achieved in various part of the world. 
Thus some Latin American financial institutions, long used to vigilant regulation, have 
put up little resistance to the reinforcement of corporate governance standards. Colombia 
and even Ecuador are working hard to form better practices. However, Venezuela and 
Bolivia are embarking on a process of forced nationalisation (Zettelmeyer, 2006). 
 
Further, the corporate governance perspectives of both companies and public 
policymakers provide a framework for corporate governance that reflects the interaction 
between internal groups, which defines the relationship among companies’ key players 
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and external forces such as the regulatory framework, the market and the legal 
environment. These two forces together govern the behaviour of company’s participants 
and the issue of corporate governance regulations.  
 
Other important sources of corporate governance are national rules and regulations 
related to the trading of shares involving the public. One fundamental goal of capital 
markets regulation in most countries is to ensure that investors receive adequate 
information about companies and their activities so that they are able to make investment 
decisions and exercise shareholders rights appropriately. As with corporation laws and 
codes, the extent of protection afforded to shareholders by stock markets varies from 
country to country (La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
The principal source of corporate governance in Europe is the legislation of the individual 
European country concerned. Although European Union legislation has an impact on 
certain aspects of corporate governance, it does not have unified corporate governance 
practices to the same extent as under US federal law and regulations, which together with 
stock exchange rules have tended to unify American practices. Thus, there is a greater 
divergence on corporate governance rules among publicly traded European companies 
that there is among their North American counterparts (Conyon, and Mallin, 1997; Maw 
et al., 1994).  
 
In Latin America the effort to strengthen corporate governance and enforcement is a 
desire to enhance the investment climate in the region to the benefit of both investors and 
entrepreneurs. Most countries in the region have lengthy court processes, sometimes 
further dented by lack of judicial expertise. This discourages shareholders from exercising 
their rights to take private actions to ensure that they receive a fair return on their 
investment, knowing that any challenge will take at least two to three years, or even up to 
six years or longer when appeals continue to the Supreme Court (Mirow, 2005). Thus, 
some countries, such as Colombia and Peru, have introduced alternative mechanisms for 
dispute resolution. 
 
Law enforcement for publicly traded companies in some Latin American countries is 
implemented by a securities commission headed by an appointed president. The Chilean 
and Colombian presidents can be removed freely, while greater political independence is 
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sought in Peru by providing fixed-term appointments and a provision that the president 
can only be removed for committing a major offence (Mirow, 2005). At the same time 
most Latin American countries have detailed systems and procedures for ensuring due 
process. Decisions to fine or sanction are taken by the Superintendent-Delegate for 
Investigations in Colombia or in some cases directly to the Superintendent of Securities 
(eStandards Forum, 2009); in Peru an administrative court makes the initial decision, 
which may be appealed to the commission board (eStandards Forum, 2008).  
 
Other suggested mechanisms for dispute resolution include private arbitration as one way 
to achieve more efficient resolution of shareholder disputes. Private arbitration for 
corporate disputes between companies and shareholders is permitted in most Latin 
American countries. Colombia and Peru appear to have promoted the use of arbitration 
for settlement of shareholders disputes more actively (Bedicks and Arruda, 2005). 
 
Accounting plays a central role in corporate governance because it is essential to any 
disclosure regime concerning information about companies’ activities. A sound disclosure 
system is fundamental for the exercise of shareholder rights, for the monitoring of 
corporations, and in providing discipline to management (OECD, 1999). 
 
An effective system of disclosure also requires the participation of organisations and 
individuals with sufficient expertise and a reputation and honesty to evaluate and verify 
the information that to be disclosed. Making investment decisions, shareholders rely on 
these intermediaries who include auditors, credit rating agencies, financial analysts, and 
the financial press. These individuals and organisations are considered the “gate keepers” 
to the financial markets (Coffee, 2002). 
 
Within the limits of law, regulations and the applicable rules of private bodies, companies 
have discretion to shape their own international mechanisms of corporate governance, 
including the terms of managers’ contracts, the composition of corporate boards, and the 
international structure of the company. The degree of discretion varies from country to 
country. The legal mobility of American companies from state to state and the discretion 
given to company directors tend to reflect a basic “enabling approach”, i.e., ‘everything is 
permitted unless it is specifically prohibited’ compared to the greater restrictions on 
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mobility and discretion in Europe and the US that revel a more “mandatory approach”, 
i.e., ‘everything is prohibited unless specifically permitted’ (Coffee, 1999). In order to 
influence the exercise of this discretion, industry groups and individual investors have 
prepared codes, reports and statements of good corporate governance that they have 
presented to, or pressed upon, the management of corporations. In United States, the 
business Round Table, leading organisations of corporate executives, and institutional 
investors, such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) and 
TIAA-CREF, have been active participants in this movement. 
 
3.3 Codes of Best Practice and guidelines 
 
There are a good number of corporate governance codes and standards, which reflect 
differing legal traditions and national practices. It is generally accepted that the Cadbury 
Report (1992) has been of significant influence around the world. During the 1990’s other 
countries have followed with their own codes on corporate governance including the 
Viénot Report (1995, 1999) from France, the King Reports I, II, and III from South 
Africa, (King I, was the first emerging market code), and the OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance (1999) (Bradley et al., 1999).  
 
As with the Cadbury Committee Report (1992), these reports are particularly concerned 
about the potential abuse of corporate power. They call for better structured boards; 
recommend the use of a greater number of outside, non-executive directors; and argue for 
the separation of the role of chairman of the board from chief executive, as well as other 
checks and balances to avoid executive domination of decision-making and to protect the 
rights of shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
 
3.3.1 Developments in the UK 
 
In the UK during the 1990s a number of committees were set up to consider aspects of 
corporate governance. Each committee issued a report with its recommendations. The UK 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury Committee) 
was set up in May 1991 by the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange 
and the accounting profession to address the financial aspects of corporate governance. 
The committee was formed as a result of the continuing concern about standards of 
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financial reporting and accountability, heightened by the BCCI and Maxwell scandals and 
the controversy over directors’ pay.  In 1992, the Cadbury Report was published as the 
first in-depth statement on corporate governance and a model for sound practice 
worldwide, its main recommendations dealing with the division of responsibilities among 
top management to ensure that the decision-making power was not delegated to one 
person. The work of the committee focused on the control functions of boards of 
directors, and on the role of auditors. The setting for the report was to ensure Britain’s 
competitive position by granting freedom to the boards of listed companies to drive their 
companies forward within a framework of effective accountability. The principles on 
which the code is based are those of openness, integrity and accountability. The report 
also introduced the concept of ‘comply or explain’ (Chambers, 2002; Maw et al., 1994).   
 
The Greenbury Report in 1995 focused on the setting and disclosure of directors’ 
remuneration. The Greenbury Committee proposed that the fundamental principles of 
accountability, transparency and performance would be encapsulated in a new code of 
best practice on directors’ remuneration (Mallin, 2004). 
 
The Hampel Report in 1998 made recommendations for further changes, and brought 
together all the previous recommendations and submitted a proposed Code to the London 
Stock Exchange with which listed Companies should comply. Both the Cadbury and 
Greenbury reports were responses to things which were perceived to have gone wrong – 
corporate failures in the first case, unjustified compensation packages in the privatised 
sector in the second place, and both concentrated largely on preventing abuse of power 
(Mallin, 2004). The Hampel report consisted of 17 principles of corporate governance and 
56 conclusions and recommendations and stressed the importance of the ‘comply or 
explain’ rule (Hampel, 1998). Canyon and Mallin (1997) and Weir and Laing (2000) 
illustrate that, regardless of the voluntary nature of the Cadbury Report, British listed 
companies complied with the Code’s recommendations in terms of the separation of the 
CEO and chairman of the board, the percentage of independent directors on the board, 
and the establishment of board committees. 
 
The London Stock Exchange published its ‘Principles of good governance code of best 
practice’, known as the Combined Code on Corporate governance (the Combined Code), 
 41 
in June 1998. The Combined Code is a voluntary code, but is attached to the UK Listing 
Rules so that listed companies in the UK have to comply or explain. With the agreement 
of the Hampel committee the London Stock Exchange introduced a number of changes on 
the committee’s original draft. The Combined Code contains broad principles and more 
detailed specific provisions. After the publication of the Combined Code an amendment 
to the UK Listing Rules was introduced requiring that listed companies had to disclose 
how they had applied the principles and complied with the Code’s provisions in their 
annual report and accounts. Any deviation from the recommended best practice has to be 
stated and explained. The Combined Code general principles and detailed ‘best practice’ 
guidelines for companies relate to the directors and the balance of power on the board, 
directors’ remuneration, communication with shareholders, and financial reporting and 
auditing. 
 
3.3.1.1 The UK Corporate Governance Code (formerly the Combined Code) 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code (previously called the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance) (the “Code”) is the principal set of corporate governance 
principles applicable to listed companies in the UK; responsibility for the oversight of the 
Code rest with the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). The code sets out standards of 
good practice in relation to the board leadership and effectiveness, remuneration, 
accountability and relations with shareholders. On 28 May 2010, the FRC published an 
updated version of the Code, together with a report summarising the outcome of its recent 
consultation process and the main issues that were raised through the review period. The 
Code is to apply to companies with reporting periods beginning on or after 29 June 2010.  
 
The FRC has put forward a series of new principles on the chairperson’s leadership role 
and the skills and independence of non-executive directors whereby such directors should 
spend more time on the job. There are also new principles covering the board’s 
responsibility for, and handling of, risk and proposals to emphasise that performance-
related pay should be aligned to the long-term interests of a company and its policy on 
risk. The current edition of the Code includes two sections. Section 1 is a code for listed 
companies, and Section 2 is a code for institutional shareholders investing in listed 
company shares; pressure is being brought to bear on institutional investors to give more 
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attention to corporate governance issues. The code tries to cover an original concern of 
the Cadbury Report that companies faced with minimum standards in law would merely 
comply with the letter and not with the spirit of the rules17. 
 
There is agreement that the Code and its predecessors have contributed to clear 
improvements in governance since the first code was introduced in 1992. There has been 
also consensus for retaining the current approach requiring listed companies to “comply 
or explain” against the Code, rather than moving to a prescriptive regime reliant on 
legislation and regulation (FRC, 2010). There is relatively little new drafting in the Code, 
However the FRC has achieved a change in tone by promoting Supporting Principles to 
Main Principles. For example, the Chairman’s responsibility for leadership of the board 
and the responsibility on non-executive s to offer constructive challenge are now Main 
Principles, meaning that it will be necessary to state in annual reports how those 
principles are applied. Other matters, such as the need for the board to have a balance of 
executive and non-executive directors have been given less emphasis by being moved to 
the Supporting Principles. No statement is required in the annual report as to how 
Supporting principles are applied. 
 
The new Code re-emphasises the role and responsibilities of the board. The most 
discussed aspect of increased board accountability is a new requirement for all directors 
of FTSE 350 companies to be put forward for re-election by shareholders every year. Yet 
to come is a new Stewardship Code. The Stewardship Code aims to balance the focus on 
the responsibilities of the board by encouraging institutional investors to engage 
constructively with companies. In the meantime, the provisions on institutional investors 
from the combined Code have been moved to the back of the UK Corporate Governance 
Code but will be deleted when the Stewardship Code takes effect.   
 
In relation with compliance with the Combined Code a 2007 consultation paper on behalf 
of the FRC reported that only 33% of listed companies were fully compliant with all the 
Combined Code provisions (PIRC, 2007) but a key provision such as separating the CEO 
from the Chair had an 88.4% compliance rate spread over all the rules, this has not been 
taken necessarily as a poor response; and compliance is rising (Thomas and de la Rama, 
                                                 
17 Para 1.10 of the Cadbury Report 
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2008; Crawford, 2007). Pensions Investments Research Consultants (PIRC), as a leading 
investor body, maintains that poor compliance correlates to poor business performance. A 
difficulty has been the aversion to a ‘one size fits all’ solution, which may not be right for 
every organisation, and that accountability can be achieved through the market, rather 
than the through the law (Sum, 2009). 
 
3.3.2 Developments in the US 
In the United States, corporate governance regulation is not handled by a single body 
acting alone, but instead is derived from a variety of sources at both federal and the state 
levels. Relevant federal law provisions generally apply to those companies which have 
registered securities under the US Security Exchange Act of 1934, and relevant 
regulations are those adopted by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which includes specific corporate governance-related 
provisions and requires detailed rulemaking by the SEC and other bodies such as the 
national securities exchanges, e.g. New York Stock Exchanges (NYSE) and national 
securities associations such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), 
and the listing rules of stock markets on which the companies have their shares listed. 
Furthermore, companies established in the United States must comply with the relevant 
laws and regulations of the state in which they are incorporated. Non-US companies, or 
those which are not incorporated under the laws of any of the US states, possessions or 
territories, and which are trading on a US exchange or market, must follow US corporate 
governance standards to the extent required by the US federal securities laws and the 
relevant rules of the stock market on which the companies’ shares are traded.   
 
3.3.2.1 Sarbanes Oxley ACT, 2002 Provisions  
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), of July 2002, is a major source of corporate governance 
requirements in the United States. It aims to reinforce corporate governance, strengthen 
auditors’ independence, require significant additional public disclosure, and increases the 
scope and severity of liability under the federal laws for public companies, their executive 
officers and directors, auditors’ legal counsel and others. SOX introduces corporate law 
changes relating to financial reporting, personal loans from companies to their directors, 
whistle blowing and the destruction of documents. In addition Sarbanes-Oxley severely 
 44 
restricts the range of additional services that an audit firm can provide to a client. There 
are increased penalties for directors and professionals who have conspired to commit 
fraud.  
 
While the Act lays down detailed requirements for the governance of organisations, there 
are some sections which are considered critical (see Table 3.1), such as Section 302 
(internal control certifications), Section 404 (assessment of internal control) and Section 
409 (real time issuer disclosures). Section 302 instructs that a set of internal procedures 
should be designed to ensure accurate financial disclosure. The signing officers must 
certify that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls and 
have designed such internal controls to ensure that material information relating to the 
company and its consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officers by others 
within those entities, particularly during the period in which the periodic reports are being 
prepared (SOX, 2002) 
 
Table 3.1 – Sarbanes-Oxley Act Sections 302, 404, 409 
 
 302 404 409 
Required: · Quarterly 
certification of 
financial reports 
· Disclosure of all 
known control 
deficiencies 
· Disclose of acts 
of fraud 
· Management 
annually certify 
internal controls 
· Independent 
accountants must 
attest report 
· Quarterly change 
reviews 
· Monitor operational 
risks 
· Material event 
reporting 
· ‘Real-time’ 
implications – 4 
business days for 
report to be filed 
Responsible • CEO 
• CFO 
• Management 
• Independent 
 auditor 
• Management 
• Independent 
auditor 
     Note: this table shows a summary of some SOX sections 
 
SOX Section 404 requires that each annual financial report must include an internal 
control report stating that management is responsible for establishing and maintaining an 
adequate internal control structure, and an assessment of the effectiveness of the internal 
control structure. In addition, registered external auditors must attest to the accuracy of 
company management’s assertion that accounting controls are in place, operational and 
effective. SOX set up a requirement for audit committees to be composed exclusively of 
independent board members and these committees have extensive responsibility for the 
appointment, compensation and supervision of the directors. The Act also aims to 
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promote rules to address conflicts of interest where analysts recommend securities when 
their companies are involved in investment banking activities. Moreover, the external 
control of companies’ accounting was improved, in particular through the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Section 409 is listed within title of the act 
(Enhanced Financial Disclosures) and relates to ‘Real time Issuer Disclosure’. Companies 
issuing shares are required to disclose to the public, on timely basis, information on 
material changes in their financial condition or operations (SOX, 2002).        
 
3.4 Other important developments around the world  
 
In a context of the increasing internationalisation of the world economy, local initiatives 
of development, policies of decentralisation, changes in traditional activities, the creation 
of great geopolitical and economical regional entities, and the strategies of firms’ means 
that the importance of corporate governance is not only limited to Anglo-American 
markets. However, due to conceptual differences in company law throughout the 
international community, each national code has its own peculiarities. The comparative 
literature is rich with descriptions of national corporate governance systems. These 
studies are useful in order to highlight the existing differences between countries and to 
appreciate the historical roots of the different systems (Aguilera, 2008; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003).  
 
Processes such as liberation and internationalisation of economies, developments in 
telecommunications, the integration of capital markets the transformation of the 
ownership structure of companies due to the growth of institutional investors, 
privatisation and rising shareholding activism, have increased the need for more effective 
mechanisms and appropriate incentives schemes to improve corporate governance 
systems (OECD, 2005).   
 
It is argued that countries with effective corporate governance systems become not only 
attractive locations for domestic companies to prosper (World Bank, 2000) and invest (La 
Porta et al. 1998), but also for foreign investors, and as a result promote economic growth 
(Levine, 1999). Effective corporate governance systems support the development of 
internationally competitive companies (Porter, 1990). McKinsey surveys (2000, 2002) of 
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investors’ perceptions indicates that investors report that they are willing to pay more for 
a company that is well governed, other things being equal.  
  
This section describes several regional or national systems of corporate governance in an 
attempt to ascertain a theoretical framework that will provide the basis to better 
understand the corporate governance systems that apply through the Latin American 
Andean countries and to structure the empirical analysis. 
 
3.4.1 The King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 
 
In 1994 the King Report on Corporate Governance published by the King Committee on 
Corporate Governance, headed by the former High Court judge, Mervyn King S. C. and 
was the first of its kind in the country aimed at promoting the highest standards of 
corporate governance in South Africa, the King I was latter updated in 2002. The King 
Report emphasises the importance of qualities that are fundamental to the South African 
culture such as collectiveness, consensus, helpfulness, fairness, consultation, and religious 
faith in the development of best practice.  
 
Increasing internationalisation and globalisation means that investors and institutional 
investors in particular, began to invest outside their home countries. King I advocated an 
integrated approach to governance in the interests of a wide range of stakeholders taking 
into account the evolving global economic environment together with recent legislative 
developments. The King Committee on Corporate Governance developed the King 
Report in Corporate Governance for South Africa, 2002 (King II). King II acknowledges 
that there is a move away from the single bottom line (that is, profit for shareholders) to 
the triple bottom line, which embraces the economic, environmental and social aspects of 
a company’s activities. In September 2009 King Report III was released which has a 
separate chapter on ‘Stakeholder Relationship Management’. 
 
3.4.2 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
 
Another important global development has been the guidelines on corporate governance 
published by the OECD in 1998 (the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development).  The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were originally endorsed 
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by the OECD Ministers in 1999 and it has since become the international bench mark for 
policy makers, investors, corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. The OECD 
principles form the basis for the World Bank’s Review of Observance of Standards and 
Codes.   
 
Under a 2002 mandate from OECD Ministers, the principles were revised to take account 
of recent developments and experiences in OECD member and non-member countries. In 
2004 the revised Principles were agreed by OECD governments. These principles take 
into account the need for improvement in corporate governance following recent 
corporate scandals in a number of countries. Furthermore, jobs and pensions are 
increasingly linked to the performance of stock markets, and both can be endangered by 
the adverse impact of bad corporate governance.  
 
The OECD principles address five main areas: ensuring the basis for sound corporate 
governance framework, including effective regulatory and enforcement mechanisms; 
improving the possibilities for the effective exercise of informed ownership by 
shareholders; enhancing disclosure and transparency, with particular attention to conflict 
of interest; protecting for whistle blowers; and tightening the responsibilities of boards.   
 
3.5 Andean Development Corporation (Corporacion Andina de Fomento - CAF)  
 
In Andean context CAF is a multilateral financial institution that was created with the aim 
of supporting the sustainable development of its shareholders countries and promoting 
regional integration. The formation of CAF began in 1966 with the signing of the 
Declaration of Bogotá by the presidents of Colombia, Chile and Venezuela and by the 
personal delegates of the presidents of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. The Declaration 
contains the wishes of the governments of the signing presidents to achieve economic 
integration and social development for their people. CAF began operation on 8 June 1970 
with its headquarters in Caracas, Venezuela.  
 
CAF was created by the governments of the shareholder states, financial institutions and 
public and private companies. The Corporation has 17 member countries in Latin 
America, the Caribbean and Europe. Its main shareholders are the five Andean Countries: 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. There are “A” and “B” and “C” series 
shareholders with Series “A” shares subscribed by the governments of each member 
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country, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela directly or through an 
institution designated by the government. Series “B” shares can be subscribed by 
governments or public-sector institutions or private entities from member countries. They 
can be subscribed by private entities from member countries, provided the percentage of 
their equity interest does not exceed 49% of the total equity in that series, by shareholder 
country. Series “C” shares are convertible to “B” shares and may be subscribed by legal 
entities or individuals outside the sub region (see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 CAF’s Shareholders 
 
COUNTRY REPRESENTATIVE Type of 
Share 
Ministry of Economy and Public Finance A & B 
Banco BISA S.A. B 
Bolivia 
Banco Mercantil – Santa Cruz, S.A. B 
Ministry of Treasury and Public Credit A & B 
DAVIVIENDA S.A. B 
Colombia 
Corporación Financiera Colombiana S.A. B 
National Corporation of Finance A & B 
Banco de Guayaquil B 
Banco Pacífico B 
Ecuador 
FILANBANCO B 
Ministry of Economy and Finance A & B 
Banco de Crédito del Perú B 
BBVA Banco Continental B 
Scotiabank Perú S.A.A. B 
Peru 
Banco Internacional del Perú S.A.A. B 
Ministry of Planning and Finance A & B 
Banco de Maracaibo B 
Banco del Caribe C.A. Banco Universal (BANCARIBE) B 
Venezuela 
Mercantil C.A. Banco Universal B 
Ministry of Economy and Public Finance C Argentina 
Banco de Inversión y Comercio Exterior, S.A. C 
Brazil Ministry of Planning, the Budget and Administration A 
Chile Development Corporation of Manufacturing C 
Costa Rica Central Bank of  Costa Rica C 
Dominican Republic Secretary of Treasury State C 
Jamaica Ministry of Finance and The Public Service C 
Mexico National Finance, S.N.C. C 
Panama Ministry of Economy and Finance C 
Paraguay Ministry of Treasury C 
Spain Ministry of Economy and Treasury C 
Trinidad & Tobago Ministry of Finance C 
Uruguay Central Bank of del Uruguay A 
Source: CAF Website, information at 15 April 2010   
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The 5 founder countries have 12 additional associate countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Spain, Trinidad & 
Tobago and Uruguay, which are series “C” shareholders; and 15 banks from the Andean 
Region which are series “B” shareholders. In 2005, the Extraordinary General Meeting 
approved an amendment to the CAF Establishing Agreement which permits any Latin 
American country to become a full member of the Corporation by subscribing to Series 
"A" and "B" shares. As a result, Argentina, Brazil, Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay have 
signed agreements for additional ordinary capital. These countries are now eligible to 
become full members of CAF after complying with all the contractual conditions. As a 
financial institution CAF offers product and services such as: short and long term loans, 
financial advisory services, guarantees, equity ownership, treasury services, technical 
cooperation, and, different lines of credit. 
 
CAF has the aim of improving competitiveness and the ability for Latin American 
companies to access financial funds and as part of this CAF has been promoting the 
adoption of good corporate governance practices at regional level. It is believed that 
companies with good governance have the possibility to lower their monitoring costs as 
well as lessen management-related risks. At the same time this may facilitate better terms 
in contracting with their stakeholders (creditors, employees, customers, and suppliers) 
offering greater transparency and accountability. It is also expected that the adoption of 
good corporate governance practices may help the development of the financial system 
and stock market (Sullivan, 2008). 
 
3.5.1 The Andean Corporate Governance Code (ACGC) 
 
The ACGC was issued by CAF in 2006 and notes that corporate governance: 
“…are the formal and informal practices that govern the relations between 
managers and all those who invest resources in the enterprise, primarily 
shareholders and creditors” (ACGC, 2006, p 9).  
 
According to CAF, corporate governance practices assure better use of resources for 
managers; add to better transparency of accounts; and reduce the problems of asymmetry 
of information that characterises the financial markets. Corporate governance practices 
are very important especially when a company wants to access the capital markets 
(ACGC, 2006; Gómez-Zorrilla, 2007). 
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Thus CAF has been working to strengthen corporate governance practices in companies 
located in the Andean Region. During this process strategic alliances have been created 
with regional organisations which act as counterparts in the Andean countries. These 
counterparts are: the Bolivian Stock Exchange (Bolsa Boliviana de Valores - BBV), the 
Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (Confecámaras), the Ecuadorian 
Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Quito – BVQ), Procapitales from Peru, and the 
Venezuelan Executives Association (Asociación Venezolana de Ejecutivos – AVE). 
CAF, in cooperation with these counterparts, has been undertaking programmes such as: 
publishing standards and guidelines on corporate governance for companies; supporting 
forums and events; publishing awareness material; implementing pilot cases of good 
practices in different companies; and funding monitoring and measurement studies related 
to the adoption of corporate governance practices. CAF also offers non-reimbursable 
technical and financial support to governments, companies and members of the academic 
sector engaged in corporate governance related activities. An additional result from the 
partnership between CAF and its Counterparts is the Guidelines for the Andean Corporate 
Governance Code (2006), to offer organisations in the Andean Region a group of basic 
principles that form the foundation for good corporate governance practices.          
 
The guidelines apply to different companies. They include 51 principles, derived from 
internationally recommended standards. Secondary sections are also included such as the 
purpose of making organisations more transparent, more efficient, more competitive, and 
with better risk management. 
 
CAF’s guidelines are derived from the principles issued by OECD established in the 
White Paper (that emerged from the Global Forum of Corporate Governance). However, 
the code also takes in the legal and economic characteristics of organisations in the 
Andean Region and international corporate governance developments such as the Winter 
Report, the Spanish Aldama Report, the Sarbanes Oxley Act and corporate governance 
initiatives from Andean countries such as the framework for a corporate governance code 
(August, 2002) elaborated by Confecámaras in Colombia and the corporate governance 
principles for Peruvian companies (July, 2002) issued by the Peru Security Commission 
(Comision Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores CONVASEV) in Peru.   
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The core of CAF’s corporate governance guidelines cover shareholders’ rights, 
shareholders’ influence in the governance of organisations, disclosure of information and 
transparency, and the responsibilities of the members of the board of directors, the 
guidelines focus on aspects related to the attraction of financial resources and the 
relations between shareholders and management. 
 
The guidelines of the Andean Corporate Governance Code address companies but they 
can also be applied by governments, regulators, and capital market operators. The idea is 
that organisations implement them into their statutes and daily practices as a means of 
making their companies competitive and more attractive to local and foreign investors 
and also as a tool to reduce and control the level of company risk. There are a limited 
number of companies on the stock exchanges of the Andean countries and organisations 
in these countries can be classified in to four classes: (i) Large companies (non-listed 
companies); (ii) listed companies; (iii) conglomerates and limited companies18 and; (iv) 
closed capital companies. The Andean Code is firstly directed at listed companies or 
companies that appeal regularly to the stock market by issuing securities, even if they 
only issue fixed income financial instruments.   
 
Companies can decide whether they want to implement the code’s guidelines. However, it 
is expected that promotion in each country by organisations such as chambers of 
commerce, stock exchanges, regulators, institutional investors, financial analysts, 
commercial banks, media, and aid organisations would increase the number of companies 
implementing these corporate governance principles. CAF’s Corporate Governance 
Guidelines are in line with a “comply or explain” view: this entails that companies that 
decide to implement the guidelines voluntarily need to comply with each principle in the 
code or justify why they are not complying fully. The reasons that a company may 
comply only partially or not comply at all with the guidelines should be included in the 
annual report, or explained in a management report.    
 
3.6 Corporate governance initiatives in the Latin American Andean Region  
In an Andean context, each country has been trying to develop individual schemes to 
improve their corporate governance practices, in most cases with the advice of 
                                                 
18 Limited companies normally have a minimum and a maximum number of shareholders. In Colombia, for 
example, the minimum is two shareholders and the maximum is twenty-five shareholders.   
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neighbouring countries and international organisations such as the Centre for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Examples of these efforts for each of the five 
Andean countries are discussed in the next section. 
 
3.6.1 Bolivia  
 
The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Santa Cruz (CAINCO) has been promoting 
ethical business standards in public and private sectors by hosting training modules for 
business people and monitoring, disseminating, and advocating reforms. 
 
The Bolivian Code of Commerce provides general guidance for commercial activities and 
requires all businesses to keep accounting records. The Superintendence of Pensions, 
Securities and Insurance (SPVS) is the securities supervisor in Bolivia. Its role as the 
supervisor is set out by the Securities Market Law. The Bolivian Stock Exchange (BBV) 
acts as a self-regulatory organisation. The BBV is empowered by the Securities Market 
Law to establish its own internal regulations that govern its activities as well as the 
activities of its members. 
 
In 2002, as an outcome of the privatisation process, the government enacted a law 
specifically for ‘capitalised’ public companies, which covers various aspects of corporate 
governance. In addition the banking regulations include various governance requirements 
for banks and other financial institutions with regard to the creation of audit committees, 
participation of directors on finance committees, regulation of activities of internal 
supervisors and the rotation of external auditors (Capaul, 2003). In early 2003, the 
Bolivian government drafted a bill entitled “Law of Governance of Stock Companies” 
which was presented to the Bolivian congress in November 2003. However, many 
companies expressed their opposition to its content (Gomez-García, 2008). Currently a 
corporate governance code has not been issued within the country. Bolivian companies 
can use CAF’s Andean Corporate Governance Code as a benchmark though. 
 
A Donors Memorandum available on the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 
website points out that the securities exchange is in an early stage of development in 
Bolivia. The Memorandum explains that this is not only due to the small size of 
companies there but also because of an “adverse business culture” that lacks transparency 
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and accountability (IADB, 2006). Overall, there is insufficient publicly available 
information directly addressing Bolivia’s compliance with any principles of corporate 
governance.    
 
3.6.2 Colombia  
 
Colombia is an interesting example of the interplay between legal changes and voluntary 
initiatives based on incentives to attract capital. The country follows a civil law tradition 
various laws mandate the preparation and presentation of annual audited financial 
statements by Colombian companies (Gutiérrez and Pombo, 2005). Large companies, 
listed or non-listed, must have a statutory audit, and the auditor is responsible for 
reviewing business decisions and accounting records. Article 203 of the Code of 
Commerce and Article 13 of Law 43 of 1990 determines the threshold of the annual audit 
requirement. There are additional requirements for reporting to the Superintendent of 
Securities19 for listed companies. Article 20 of Law 45 of 1990 requires the appointment 
of a revisor fiscal20 by all enterprises which are supervised by the Superintendence of 
Banking and the Superintendence of Securities, and more than 20 other laws require 
specific types of enterprises to appoint a revisor fiscal. Article 204 of the Code of 
Commerce contains the procedures to be followed to appoint the revisor fiscal (who 
should be elected by majority vote of the shareholders at the annual general meeting)21.  
 
The Colombian Stock Market (CSM) was founded at the beginning of this decade. In 
2001 the government presented a bill to the Colombian Congress that included corporate 
governance provisions for certain participants of the CSM but the bill was dismissed by 
Congress. The Superintendence of Finance has issued some regulations regarding 
corporate governance and good practice of the securities market, of which Resolution 275 
of 2001 is the most successful. It stipulates that issuers of securities to be held by pension 
                                                 
19 The Superintendence of Securities is the body which oversees the exchange, regulating market 
intermediaries, brokers’ fees, and the financial disclosure of listed companies.  
20 A revisor fiscal in Colombia is a practitioner who performs annual audits, but who is also legally required 
to perform various activities that do not resemble auditing of financial statements. A revisor fiscal is seen as 
a hybrid between an internal and an external auditor.  
21 The law requires an individual public accountant to perform the duties of revisor fiscal and states that no 
person may be revisor fiscal for more than five companies at the same time. If an accounting firm is 
appointed as revisor fiscal, a firm’s partner or employee who is a legally qualified accountant must be 
designated to perform the duties of revisor fiscal, and the rule limiting the number of positions as revisor 
fiscal a qualified accountant can hold still apply. According to the law it is the partner or employee who acts 
as revisor fiscal and not the accounting firm for whom she/he works. 
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funds must incorporate good corporate governance standards, and that these should be 
published by listed companies as a code of practice. Private pension funds hold the largest 
share of national savings in Colombia (Gluski, 2002). However, pension funds focus their 
holdings in government bonds and AAA-rated commercial paper, investing only a small 
proportion of their funds in companies. The Capital-Markets Law aims to strengthen 
investor protection, improve supervision, regulate trading companies and develop the 
market infrastructure. Figure 3.1 includes a framework of the main corporate governance 
rules in Colombia.  
 
Figure 3.1 Main norms regulating corporate governance in Colombia 
 
 
Note: This figures summarises the corporate legal framework in Colombia  
 
 
One of the latest developments has been Law 964 of 2005 (Law 964) which was passed 
on July 8, 2005, adopting some of the provisions of the 2001 bill as well as introducing 
new ones (Bernal, 2006). This new law was inspired by the recommendations set out by 
the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in its Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulations (2003). The purpose of Law 964 is to make sure that 
Colombian listed companies observe international standards to protect investors’ rights 
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and to warrant the fairness, competitiveness, transparency and efficiency of the CSM. 
Law 964 includes progressive provisions (at least by Colombian Standards) relating to 
listed companies and issuers22. Such provisions refer mainly to regulations of the board of 
directors, disclosures of shareholders’ agreements, compliance with financial and 
accounting regulations and legal representatives’ accountability23. Some of the provisions 
of the Law 964 are yet to be regulated and implemented by the government. Some of the 
corporate governance provisions will enter into force up to two years after the publication 
of the law24. 
 
The Colombian Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (Confecámaras) has helped to 
build capacity for director training and corporate governance by creating a National 
Centre of Corporate Governance. The organisation has also developed a ‘Corporate 
Governance Code for Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises’, which establishes corporate 
governance standards for state-owned enterprises, and has gathered support for the 
passage of a new Law on Capital Markets. It has also outlined clear business registry 
procedures and distributed a number of publications on corporate governance in 
Colombia and the Andean region (Sullivan, 2008). Confecámaras has also developed 
corporate governance training modules in partnership with Cali-based ICESI University. 
 
In addition, Confecámaras has worked to combat corruption through private sector 
initiatives. It has held several workshops on ethical standards for doing business, 
promoted ethical codes of conduct, and developed training modules for journalists. It has 
also organized forums on ethical standards in public procurement in several cities in 
Colombia and has taken a leading role in the fight against corruption in the country, 
working with the President’s anti-corruption program (Bernal, 2006). 
 
3.6.3 Ecuador  
 
The legal and regulatory framework for corporate governance in Ecuador is mainly set 
out in the Companies Law, in force since 1964 and most recently amended in November 
                                                 
22 Law 964 defines listed companies as those whose shares are registered on the stock exchange. 
23 A ‘legal representative’ is the CEO or another executive empowered to take binding decisions on behalf 
of the company. 
24 Provisions of Law 964 which will be made compulsory from July 2007, refers to the registration fee 
listed companies must pay to be allowed to trade their shares in the stock market.  (Information taken from 
the Official Diary (Diario Oficial 45.963) published by Confecámaras, 2006.)  
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1999 (BVQ, 2006). All Ecuadorian companies are regulated by this law and are subject to 
the control of the Superintendence of Companies. Additionally the Stock Exchange Law 
applies to listed companies, and other pieces of legislation also include regulations on 
corporate governance, such as the Commercial Code, the Civil Code, the Criminal Code 
and the Law on the Internal Tax Regime.  
 
One recent development which reflects the keen awareness of Ecuadorian lawmakers in 
relation to corporate governance occurred in 2001. During that year, a new program was 
launched for the restructuring of debts in excess of fifty thousand dollars which 
companies owed to financial institutions, with the aim of stimulating the domestic 
economy, among other things. A new set of regulations was issued requiring companies 
whose debts were restructured to observe “a good standard of corporate governance”, 
including adequately protecting minority partners and shareholders. 
 
The National Association of Entrepreneurs (ANDE) aims to promote the economic 
principles of a market process and cover themes on the current economic situation in 
Ecuador, and has hosted competitiveness seminars throughout Ecuador along with a 
national assembly of entrepreneurs. ANDE has begun work on a book based on the 
conclusions of the seminars and meetings under the title Competitiveness and National 
Culture, which it is expected, will include a summary of free market ideas and themes 
concerning necessary reforms in Ecuador. Additionally, the Ecuadorian Institute of 
Political Economy (IEEP)25 promotes a campaign to educate Ecuadorians at all levels of 
society to encourage debate and emphasize more democratic and informed processes of 
decision-making at all levels of government. IEEP produces a weekly television show, 
Tribuna Liberal, and a weekly radio show, Contrapunto Liberal, to discuss the main 
economic and political issues affecting Ecuadorian society. IEEP is one of the only 
sources of this information in the country. Ecuador has not yet developed its own 
corporate governance code; therefore organisations in the country implement the 
principles set out in the Andean Corporate Governance Code.   
                                                 
25 The Ecuadorian Institute of Political Economy, IEEP, is an organization devoted to public policy 
analysis and the dissemination of ideas of freedom in Ecuador. It was founded in 1991 as a private, 
independent, non-profit. IEEP finances its activities through voluntary donations from individuals, 
corporations and foundations. IEEP conducts research related to socio-economic problems that affect 
Ecuador. 
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The Ecuadorian commercial law states that private financial institutions are the only 
private companies required by law to have a board of directors. The board of directors 
must always have an uneven number of members, ranging from between five and fifteen. 
There are also commercial rules against the appointment of a company’s bankers, tenants, 
constructors or suppliers as directors of a company they are related with. Neither may 
public officials, religious leaders, or persons that have not obtained rehabilitation from 
bankruptcy should act as company directors. The term of office for directors should be 
specified in a company’s bye laws. However, it is recommended that the term not exceed 
five years although directors are eligible for re-election.  
 
The enforcement of corporate governance regulations, and particularly those set out in 
Company law, is believed to be effective (Rodriguez, 2003; Sperber, 2007). Stakeholders 
can inform themselves about a company’s operations and challenge acts which may be 
illegal or against a company’s interest. Nonetheless, the current corporate governance 
framework has some shortcomings. For example, there are no measures in place to 
reward or protect whistleblowers, although exposing corporate irregularities is 
encouraged in principle. Summing up, Ecuadorian corporate governance is founded on 
the 52 recommendations of the Andean Code, which as detailed in  section 3.6.1 is based 
on the ‘Corporate Governance White Paper for Latin America’ issued by the OECD 
(2003, 2004).                 
 
3.6.4 Peru  
 
In early 2005 the Apoyo (support) Institute organized a series of roundtable discussions to 
serve as a baseline to drafting a “National Business Agenda” for Peru. The organization 
worked with the El Comercio newspaper and the Peruvian business community to publish 
the results of the discussions (Sullivan, 2008).  
 
Another Peruvian institution promoting corporate governance is the Peruvian University 
of Applied Sciences (UPC), which began to organize a contest among 4,000 Peruvian 
firms to show the best examples of voluntary, private sector standards of corporate 
governance. The contest is designed to raise awareness about the importance of strong 
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corporate governance practices and the benefits to democracy of creating a transparent 
business management framework. 
 
Moreover, the Association of Companies Promoting the Capital Market (Procapitales) 
and Peruvian University of Applied Sciences (UPC) completed a pilot professional 
development program to improve corporate governance practices in Peru. The “Strategic 
Management and Corporate Governance” programme for 20 CEOs and general managers 
of 18 different medium and large sized companies placed emphasis on the benefits of 
transparent management. Due to the programme’s success, at the end of 2005 
Procapitales started to hold on a regular basis a professional development workshop 
series with greater emphasis on case studies. 
 
The Peruvian legal framework is based on civil law. The relevant laws affecting corporate 
governance are the General Companies Law, 1997 (Ley General de Sociedades, LGS) 
and the Securities Market Law, 1996 (Ley del Mercado de Valores, LMV) and to a lesser 
extent the Securities Law, 2000 (Ley de Titulos Valores). The LGS establishes basic 
company forms and shareholders rights. The LMV regulates publicly offered securities, 
financial intermediaries and other market participants, securities exchanges, clearing 
settlement and mutual funds. Two regulatory bodies supervise the financial markets: the 
Superintendence of Banks and Insurance, which also oversees private pension funds; and 
the securities market regulator (National Supervisory Commission of Enterprises and 
Securities – Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Empresas y Valores (CONASEV). 
CONASEV is responsible for surveillance and control of compliance with the LMV and 
the law on Investment Funds and their managers. With respect to issuers, it defines and 
supervises disclosure and enforces certain aspects of the LGS on listed companies. 
 
In 2002, a committee in which both the public and private sector participated drafted the 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance for Peruvian Corporations; this committee was 
under the leadership of CONASEV. The aim was to complement the legal framework 
with voluntary best practice provisions, and to set a national corporate governance 
benchmark against which listed companies could report their corporate governance 
practices. This code includes general recommendations on board organisation and 
functions, as well as the protection of minority rights, independent directors, board 
 59 
committees and disclosure of remunerations in the annual report. 2005 was the first year 
when listed companies were required to “comply or explain” their compliance with 
corporate governance standards in the annual reports. A new version of the code was 
issued in 2009.    
 
3.6.5 Venezuela  
 
The Centre for the Dissemination of Economic Knowledge (CEDICE) issued a survey to 
develop policy and also engaged in an outreach campaign to inform the public, which 
included the publication of a book entitled ‘Street Vendors in Caracas’. Also, the Centre 
for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) partnered with the Business Centre for 
Conciliation and Arbitration (CEDCA) to strengthen the rule of law and enforcement of 
the legal framework in Venezuela by promoting alternative dispute resolution (ADR). As 
a result of these efforts, an increasing number of private contracts in Venezuela now 
include a clause for ADR. 
 
Venezuela, as well as Bolivia and Ecuador, rely on the Andean Corporate Governance 
Code (see section 3.7.1). The country has not yet developed its own code; however, there 
has always been regulation in force that to some extent refers to the corporate governance 
principles issued by the OECD. This regulation is included in: the Commercial Code; the 
Capital Market Law; the General Law of Banks and other Financial Institutions; 
regulations of the National Securities Exchange Commission (CNV); the Civil Code; the 
Civil Procedure Code; and the law of public registration and Notary Offices.   
 
There are also governmental offices empowered to issue rules and oversee companies and 
their management. For example, CNV has, according to articles 2 and 9, paragraph 15 
and 25 of the Securities Market Act (Ley de Mercado de Capitales), competence for the 
promotion, regulation, supervision and oversight of the stock market, including adoption 
of measures for the protection of investors and issuing rules for preventing and resolving 
conflicts of interest. In addition, the Commercial Code and the Stock Market Act provide 
formal requirements for calling and conducting shareholders meetings. Background 
information regarding matters included in the agenda should be available to investors in 
the company headquarters prior to, and during, the shareholder’s meeting.   
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One of the activities at the shareholders’ meeting is the appointment and removal of the 
directors. It is usual to include provisions in the company’s bye-laws granting 
shareholders the right to appoint a certain number of members of the board of directors 
(Garay and González, 2008). Minority shareholders have the right to be represented at the 
board by a member of the company, according to the provisions of the Capital Market 
Law. Equally, a group representing 20% of a company’s shareholders have the right to 
choose a proportional number of board members, although shareholders do not have 
cumulative voting rights to appoint board members. In addition, the Commercial Code 
establishes that the term of office for board members is a minimum of two years and they 
can be re-elected if the company statutes allow it. Similarly, the provision of independent 
board members was introduced by the Rules on Preferred Stock, March 2001; however 
the implementation of the rules is now subject to revision (Garay and González, 2008). 
Additionally, specific committees may be created within the board of directors by 
statutory provisions. Out of it, the by-laws can provide the creation of other special 
committees.  
 
The members of the board have to be loyal to the organisation and conduct company 
business in a transparent manner. They must ensure full disclosure of conflicts of interest 
as well as material facts. Shareholders may use civil legal action to make effective the 
accountability of the board members for any breach of their duties. Shareholders can 
make claims at the CVN when there is a violation of the rules in the Stock Market Law of 
other rules of the matter. However, there are no legal provisions addressing standards of 
performance for the board members. Further, the General Meeting decides how much will 
be paid in remuneration to the board members. 
 
Table 3.3 summarises key corporate governance initiative in the Latin American Andean 
countries. As mentioned above corporate governance in the region primarily relies in 
established laws and regulations; especially commercial law and newly issued market 
laws. Additionally, a common characteristic among the five countries is that the 
committees appointed to issue good principles are integrates by private and governmental 
entities. Only Colombia and Peru have issue their own corporate governance codes, while 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela continue using CAF’s 2006 Andean Code.   
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Table 3.3 Summary of key corporate governance initiatives in the Andean countries 
 
Countries 
 
Corporate governance initiatives 
 
Bolivia 
 
CAINCO (1) – Ethical Business Standards 
BBV (2) – Internal regulations for Listed Companies 
Government – Law of Governance of Stock Companies 
CAF, 2006 – Andean Corporate Governance Code 
Colombia 
 
Code of Commerce – Article 203 and Law 43, Art. 13 – Annual audit 
threshold  
Resolution 275, 2001 – Institutional investors protection 
Confecámaras Code, 2001 – Targeted issuers 
Law 964, 2005 – Market Law 
BVC and Superintendence of Finance, 2007 – ‘Country Code’ for listed 
Companies 
Ecuador 
 
Government, 1964 – Companies Law (amended, 1999) 
                       2001 – Especial regulation restructuring debts in excess of                  
fifty thousand dollars  
CAF, 2006 – Andean Corporate Governance Code                
Peru 
 
Government – 1997, General Company Law 
Committee leaded by CONASEV (3), 2002 – Principles of Good 
Corporate Governance for Peruvian Corporations (last 
updated 2009) 
Venezuela 
 
CEDICE (4) a guide for Street vendors in Caracas 
CIPE & CEDCA (5) – Alternative Dispute Reduction (ADR) 
CNV (6) – Securities Market Law 
CAF, 2006 – Andean Corporate Governance Code 
This table summarises corporate governance initiatives in the five Andean countries. 
(1) CAINCO – Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Santa Cruz 
(2) BBV – Bolivian Stock Exchange  
(3) CONASEV – National Supervisory Commission o Enterprises and Securities 
(4) CEDICE – Centre for the Dissemination of Economic Knowledge  
(5) CIPE – Centre for International Private Enterprises 
     CEDCA – Centre for Conciliation and Arbitration 
(6) CNV – National Security Exchange Commission 
 
3.7 Corporate governance research in Latin America 
 
There has been considerable interest in recent years on the topic of corporate governance. 
Yet, much of the focus has been on corporate governance systems in developed countries; 
much less discussion of corporate governance in developing countries has taken place. 
However, in recent years researchers such as Cleassens and Fan (2002); Singh (2003); 
Allen, 2005; Chong et al.(2003); Kappler and Love (2002); Lubrano, 2002; Johnson, 
Boone and Breach (2000); Fernandez-Arias and Panizza (2000); Wanyama (2006); 
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Bondamakara (2010), among others, have produced research on corporate governance 
matters focusing in emerging markets, predominantly Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 
 
To date research on Latin American corporate governance has been sparse and the main 
literature produced on the subject and related topics through the region and in each 
individual country have been of a descriptive nature. Nevertheless, the studies carried out 
till now offer an insight into the developments, enforcement, and compliance of corporate 
governance rules and principles through the region. 
 
There has been some corporate governance research which is not specifically focused on 
Latin America, however such work provides support to the arguments of some Latin 
American researchers and many researchers from the around the world. This is the case of 
the studies carried out by La Porta et al. in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2006 and the 
Kaufmann and Kraay study published in 2002. Focusing on different corporate 
governance topics, some regional papers have been published such as those by Capaul 
and Fremon, 2001; Capaul, 2003; Lefort and Walker, 2005; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 
2007; Garay and Gonzalez 2008 among others. At an individual country level there are 
several empirical studies from Brazil and Chile, there are also papers about Argentina, 
Colombia and Mexico, although the data used for the last three countries is relatively 
poor (Lefort, 2003). 
 
The general issues found in the Latin American corporate governance literature are: 
cultural; social; conglomerates, financial market development, and political instability; 
ownership, identity and structure; institutional investors; board practices; and disclosure 
practices. 
 
Corporate governance assessments in Latin America conclude that countries fail to 
enforce their laws, rules and regulations consistently and evenly. Litigation is expensive, 
uncertain, lengthy and burdensome. Private civil litigation is not a very common practice 
(Gil, 1999). Experiences where shareholders have attempted to hold directors or 
managers liable are atypical (Gil, 1999). If fraud has been committed, it is the 
government or the regulator that initiates procedures (Clark, 2004). These partly explain 
why practices such as self-dealing and insider trading are widespread and often go 
unpunished, although in theory, stiff penalties apply (Cruces and Kawamura, 2005). Latin 
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America has in recent years embarked on a notable process of political, economic and 
legal reforms. The administration of justice in particular has been singled out as 
inefficient, if not corrupt, inaccessible to most, and largely irrelevant to the needs of 
modern economies, and thus in need of fundamental change (Dodson, 2002). Of the five 
Andean countries only Colombia has passed corporate law reform in the last 30 years 
(Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes 2007). Evidence suggest that countries in the region have 
opted for changing securities laws, which has been proved easier as it represents  less 
political conflict. The downfall of this approach is that it is less beneficial to SMEs as 
they have less possibility to access capital markets (Reyes, 2007).   
 
Aside from macroeconomic considerations, a perception of poor enforcement is one of 
the most important factors contributing to lack of the development of local capital 
markets. Research from Millstein (2003) concludes that attracting investment requires 
protecting investors. Investors’ protection requires both sound laws and their effective 
enforcement; the practice of enforcement is at least as important as the framework of 
legislation. Scholars such as La Porta et al. (2000) have found that countries that better 
enforce legal rights tend to have more developed financial markets regardless of their 
laws. It is suggested that there is a link between governance and compliance with the law; 
and that governance is not something that exists separately from the law and it is 
inappropriate to unhinge governance from the law (Reyes, 2007).    
 
Capaul (2003) argues that weak corporate governance adversely affects the investment 
process and ultimately the private sector’s ability to contribute to economic growth. In her 
study about corporate governance in Latin America, Capaul concludes that corporate 
governance only produces results if it is undertaken in conjunction with other structural 
measures that promote a conducive investment climate; for Capaul those structural 
measures are: competition, creditors rights, a flexible labour  market, social safety and 
education opportunities. 
 
Some studies consider the impact of corporate governance in attracting capital flows to 
the area. For example, Chong et al. (2003) argue that the implementation of good 
corporate governance through the region has reduced the volatility of the region’s 
economy. The authors conclude that clear, established rules are critical for the well 
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functioning of markets, and for Latin America in particular; the introduction of the Brady 
bond exchange mechanism following the debt crises of the1980s was a very influential 
factor in the adoption of corporate governance rules26. 
 
Furthermore, there are many other researchers supporting the benefits of adopting 
corporate governance standards. For example, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999, and 
2000) found that countries that better enforce legal rights tend to have better developed 
financial markets regardless of their laws. Also, Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2007) 
conclude that appropriate company-level corporate governance is linked to a lower cost of 
capital, better company valuation, and performance and dividend payments across 
countries. With evidence from Mexican companies Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes (2006) 
reached the same conclusion; firms benefit from improving their corporate governance 
standards. 
 
Corporate governance affects firm value, market liquidity and the organisation of 
industries, in a context of weak shareholders’ protection. Cueto (2009) found that in an 
environment of low protection for minority shareholders, and large ownership 
concentration, market participants impose a discount value of firms in which voting rights 
of dominant shareholders exceed the cash-flow rights. However, investors prefer a 
dominant shareholder such as a corporation or a family group member rather than an 
institutional investor or a government agency. Such preference may obey to managerial 
expertise and efficiency and enhance access to markets. Results from Nenova’s (2003) 
study suggest that the stock market discount is lower when other corporations and family 
groups assume monitoring roles similar to that of creditors.  
 
The role of ownership structure as a corporate governance mechanism is another issue 
widely researched in emerging economies. A common denominator among Latin 
American publicly traded firms is the high degree of ownership concentration. Families 
                                                 
26 Brady bonds are dollar-denominated bonds, issued typically by Latin American countries in the 1980s, 
named after US Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady. Brady bonds were created in March 1989 in order to 
convert bonds issued by mostly Latin American countries into a variety of new bonds after many of those 
countries defaulted on their debt in the 1980’s. At that time, the market for sovereign debt was small and 
illiquid, and the standardization of emerging-market debt facilitated risk spreading and trading. In exchange 
for commercial bank loans, the countries issued new bonds for the principal and, in some cases unpaid 
interest. Because Brady bonds were tradable and came with some guarantees, in some cases they were more 
valuable to the creditors than the original bonds.  
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are the main owners, even among the largest companies (OECD, 2003). A cross-country 
study of 49 countries by La Porta et al. (1998) measured the ownership of the three 
largest shareholders in the ten largest private non-financial firms (Table 3.4 provides a 
summary with information related to Latin American countries). In this study Mexico and 
Colombia had the second and third highest concentration of large shareholders of all 
countries that were surveyed (after Greece). Brazil ranks as number ten and Peru number 
12 out of 49.  
 
Table 3.4 Ownership concentration: Latin America 
 
 
 Source: adapted from La Porta et al., 1998. * include as reference 
 
Often control is in the organisational form of a conglomerate or business group, defined 
as group of firms that are related to each other through ownership relations and controlled 
by a local family, a group of investors or by a foreign company. Data on Latin American 
ownership is either nonexistent or difficult to acquire. The OECD’s (2003) White Paper 
on Corporate Governance systematically compares ownership structures of the countries. 
For example, in Colombia the majority of firms are owned by the largest five owners, the 
boards are reportedly small. In a survey about Venezuelan firms, 50% of the companies 
surveyed, majority ownership was in the hands of a single owner and most active firms 
(those that issue ADRs27) are mostly domestically owned.  
 
                                                 
27 An American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a negotiable certificate issued by a US bank representing a 
specified number of shares of anon-US Company that trade in the US financial market. ADR are 
denominated in US dollars, help to reduce administration and duty costs that would be levied on each 
transaction. 
Place among the 
companies 
surveyed 
Country Ownership by three largest 
shareholders of the 10 
largest private non-financial 
firms 
1 Greece* 0.67 
2 Mexico 0.64 
3 Colombia 0.63 
10 Brazil 0.57 
12 Peru 0.56 
17 Argentina 0.53 
22 Venezuela 0.51 
27 Chile 0.45 
47 Ecuador No data 
49 Uruguay No data 
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Additionally, empirical studies look at the effects of political instability investigating the 
relationship between instability and economic growth. For instance, Alesina et al. (1996), 
in a sample of 113 countries from 1950 to 1982, analyse the determinants of political 
instability together with per-capita GDP growth and find that instability has a large 
negative effect on growth rates. Also, Barro (1991) finds that instability negatively affects 
growth and investment and argues that property rights are not enforced in politically 
unstable environments. It is argued that political instability in Latin America may have 
been one of the major reasons why countries in the region have low levels of human 
capital (Maloney, 2002). However, Fedderke and Klitgaard (1998) argue that there is no 
empirical evidence to suggest that instability lowers human capital accumulation. 
Nevertheless, a direct effect on the accumulation of capital political instability can have 
negative effects on the policymaking environment and governance in general. Butkeiwicz 
and Yanikkaya (2005) argue that:  
“Governments in politically unstable and polarised countries are more likely 
to adopt inefficient or sub-optimal policies, including the maintenance of 
inefficient tax-systems, higher current government consumption, or the 
accumulation of larger external debts, which, in turn, adversely affect long-
rung economic growth” (p. 631). 
   
Chief executives who are politically vulnerable are less likely to undertake necessary, but 
unpopular economic reforms (Bekefi and Epstein, 2006). Similarly, Kaufman and Kraay 
(2002) argue that good governance has a positive effect on per-capita income growth, and 
that one of the components of governance is low political instability28. 
 
Another issue worthy of consideration is the importance of institutional investors as a 
source of finance. In 2000, pension funds, insurance companies, and mutual funds held 
about one-quarter of total central government debt in emerging markets. By 2005, the 
share of government debt held by these institutional investors had grown to almost one-
third of all central government debt (IMF, 2006). Within Latin America, the country with 
the largest presence of institutional investors is Chile with Brazil someway behind 
followed by Colombia (Table 3.5).  
 
                                                 
28 Kaufman and Kraay define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which the authority  is 
exercised, the process by which governments are elected and monitored, and the capacity of the government 
to effectively formulate and implement sounds policies” (p. 176)  
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Although institutional investors are important for the functioning of a country’s domestic 
government debt market, they are not a homogenous group with similar investment 
objectives. Pension funds and life insurance companies have a predictable funding flow 
and fairly predictable liabilities for long periods of time. As a consequence, they have a 
long-term planning horizon and look for assets that generate a stable flow of real income 
(Kiguel, 2006). 
Table 3.5 Assets of Institutional Investors 
(Percentage of GDP) 
 
 Insurance 
Companies 
Pension 
Funds 
Mutual funds 
and investment 
companies 
Total 
Advanced 
economies 
45.40 50.40 47.20 143.00 
Argentina 4.60 12.00 1.00 17.60 
Brazil 2.80 14.80 28.40 46.00 
Chile 19.90 59.10 8.80 87.80 
Colombia 1.00 10.30 23.30 34.60 
Mexico 1.70 5.80 5.80 13.30 
Peru 2.20 11.00 n.d. n.d 
Latin American 
Average 
5.37 18.83 13.46 39.86 
Source: Kiguel, (2006); for Brazil, Associação Brasileira Das Entidades Fechadas de Previdencia 
Complementar (ABRAPP), available at http://www.abrapp.br. 
Note: All data are for 2003, with the exception of data for insurance companies, which refer to 2002. n.d. = 
no data. 
 
Institutional investors are less important in emerging markets, but the growth of their 
assets has been very rapid, from 18 to 30% of GDP over the 1997 – 2003 periods. This 
rapid growth in the assets of Latin American institutional investors is mainly due to the 
creation of private pension funds that took place in Latin American countries in the mid-
1990s (Kiguel, 2006). Institutional investors should be encouraged to vote and engage 
with companies, or require their agents through mandates to vote and engage. This may 
ensure that governance best practices are more consistently applied. 
 
A system of corporate governance exists within a political, legal, historical, and cultural 
framework and many of the shortcomings in the actual governance practices derive from 
peculiar legal traditions (Grandori, A., 2004). Corporate scandals, involving a high 
incidence of improper activities of managers expropriating the resources of firms at the 
ultimate expense of shareholders have prompted awareness, re-examination and scrutiny 
of some corporate governance practices and also considerable interest in empirical 
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research on the effectiveness of various corporate governance institutions and 
mechanisms. The next section looks at the principal current requirements and how they 
have evolved in order to provide the legal framework within which a board of directors 
operates. Also, an attempt to review extensively the literature and empirical research 
addressing the composition, role and effectiveness of board of directors is made.  
 
3.8 The Board of Directors  
 
In relation to a company or other formal organisation, a director is an officer who works 
for the company, charged with the conduct and management of its affairs (Blair, 1995). A 
director may be an inside director – a director who is also an officer or a promoter or both 
– or an outside, or independent, director. The directors collectively are referred to as a 
board of directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Normally, the board appoints one of its 
members to be the chair of the board of directors (Hart, 1995). Directors are elected or re-
elected at the annual meeting usually by one-year terms, conditions are often imposed by 
law concerning the minimum size of the board, the minimum number of directors to be 
elected annually, and the maximum number of classes or maximum terms (Hart, 1995). 
Removal of directors during the course of their term may occur for reasons caused by the 
shareholders or by the board itself if there is a provision in the bylaws or articles of 
incorporation that confers such power to them (Kay and Silberston, 1995). The functions 
of a director involve a fiduciary duty such as the duty to act within the scope of their 
authority and to exercise due care on the performance of their corporate tasks (Hart, 
1995). Directors are in control of other people’s property and their powers are derived 
primarily from statute; boards of directors have been defined as the governing body of a 
company, elected by shareholders (Blair, 1995).  
 
Investor confidence in public companies is essential to the functioning of the capital 
market in today’s economic environment; this is one of the reasons, why corporate 
governance practices have been developed around the world to assist board of directors in 
the exercise of their responsibilities and to serve the best interest of their company and its 
varied stakeholders. These practices are intended to serve as a flexible framework within 
which boards may conduct their business (Kay and Silberston, 1995). 
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The board of directors must be aware of the importance of good corporate governance as 
a means of addressing the interests of the company’s shareholders, employees, customers 
and community. The board should also recognise that ensuring that its company 
maintains good corporate governance practices should be an ongoing process (Keasey 
and Wright, 1993). Over the years, however, a complementary perspective sees board of 
directors in a systematic way, within a network of relations with the most influential 
actors of organisations’ environment (Mintz, 2005; Grandori, 2004; Child and Rodrigues, 
2003; Levine, 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  
  
The primary responsibility of the board of directors is to protect shareholders’ assets and 
ensure that they receive a sound return on their investment (Hart, 1995). In some 
European countries such as Germany, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, the 
directors feel that it is their primary responsibility to protect the employees of, a company 
first and the shareholders second. In these social and political climates, corporate 
profitability takes a back seat as the needs of workers are considered more important 
(Blair, 1995; Jones, 1995). 
 
The board of directors is the highest governing authority within the management structure 
at any publicly traded company (Denis, 2001). It is the board’s job to approve the 
company’s strategy, select, evaluate, and approve appropriate compensation for the 
company’s chief executive officer (CEO), evaluate the attractiveness of and pay 
dividends, recommend stock splits, oversee share repurchase programs, approve the 
company’s financial statements, and recommend or strongly discourage acquisitions and 
mergers (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2000). 
 
Other duties of the board may include policy-setting, decision-making, monitoring 
management’s performance, or corporate control (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998). The 
board of directors is normally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the 
statutes of many companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have 
any influence over the makeup of the board; normally individual shareholders are not 
offered a choice of board nominees among which to choose, but are merely asked to 
rubberstamp the nominees of the board (Hill, 1995). Another point to consider is that, 
frequently, members of the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations, which 
some see as a conflict of interest (e. g. Perris et al., 2003).   
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Directors must exercise their powers for a proper purpose. While in many instances an 
improper purpose is readily evident, such as directors looking to further their own 
interest, such breaches usually involve a breach of the director’s duty to act in good faith. 
Greater difficulties arise where the director, while acting in good faith, is serving a 
purpose that is not regarded by the law as proper (Hutton, 1995). 
 
Even though there are differences, boards share a common objective to safeguard and 
enhance stakeholders and especially shareholders’ investment by effective oversight of 
management activities. A board’s activities includes reviewing the development and 
execution of strategies, selecting and reviewing the performance and compensation of the 
chief executive and senior management, and ensuring transparency of communication and 
disclosure of financial and non-financial information, including establishing an effective 
audit process. In addition to undertaking all these activities a key challenge for the board 
is to create a sound culture that allows the principles of corporate governance to thrive 
(Carver, 1997).  
 
The structure of boards varies by country and region of the world. For example, publicly 
traded firms in Europe may have two or three tiered boards. However, there is no need to 
adopt a system of two-tier boards to ensure desirable corporate governance. A single 
board may perform just as a well as two- or multi-tired board (Analytica, 1992). Different 
stock exchanges have different rules governing the powers of directors (Francis, 1997). 
These different regulatory regimes produce significant differences in the management 
discretion of firms, such as the requirement to have audit, remuneration and nomination 
committees, methods of electing or appointing directors, new share issues, establishing 
employees share plans, changing auditors, merging with another firm or changing the 
corporate contract or place of incorporation. The voting rights of shares and the 
percentage required to change control and capitalisation may also vary according to each 
firm, stock exchange, place of incorporation or national laws and regulations. Next are 
discussed some of the most commonly used board committees used by companies; the 
audit committee, the nomination, the remuneration committee, and corporate governance 
committee.  
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3.8.1 Board Committees 
 
The Board appoints Committees to help carry out its duties. In particular, Board 
Committees work on key issues in greater detail than would be possible at full Board 
meetings. Each Committee reviews the results of its meetings with the full Board. 
Companies in compliance with the UK Combined Code, the OECD corporate governance 
principles will have an audit committee, a remuneration committee and a nomination 
committee. CAF’s Andean Corporate Governance Code (ACGC) in addition to the above 
mentioned comities also recommends companies in the Andean region to have among 
other committees a corporate governance committee. Aside from that, companies will 
need to exercise their discretion to determine whether further board committees are 
appropriate (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
3.8.1.1 Audit Committee 
 
The primary function of the Audit Committee is to assist the Board of Directors  in 
fulfilling its oversight responsibilities with respect to financial reports and other financial 
information provided by the company to its shareholders and others by carrying out duties 
such as ating as an independent and objective party to monitor the Company’s financial 
reporting process and internal control system; oversee the integrity of the financial 
statements of the company; monitor the compliance by the Company with legal and 
regulatory financial requirements; evaluate the independence, qualifications and 
performance of the Company’s independent Auditors; and oversee the performance of the 
Company’s internal audit function, among others (Spira, 2002). 
 
For US companies the audit committee should be composed of not less than three 
members of the Board. All members of the Committee shall have a working familiarity 
with basic finance and accounting practices, and at least one member shall meet the 
qualifications of an “audit committee financial expert,” as defined in Item 401(h) of 
Regulation S-K promulgated by the SEC (SOX, 2002). The Andean Code (ACGC, 2006, 
Provision 40) estates the Audit committee should be integrated by minimum three 
‘external directors’, maximum five; however is the board who ultimately should 
determined the number of directors in each committee. In the UK the Corporate 
Governance Code states: 
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“The board should establish an audit committee of at least three, or in the case 
smaller companies’ two, members, who should all be independent non-
executive directors. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of 
the audit committee has recent and relevant financial experience” (Para C.3.1).    
 
3.8.1.2 Remuneration Committee 
 
The primary purposes of the Remuneration Committee are to discharge the Board of 
Directors’ responsibilities relating to the evaluation and compensation of the 
Corporation’s Chief Executive Officer (the “CEO”) and other senior executives, and to 
produce an annual report on executive compensation for inclusion in the Corporation’s 
proxy statement in accordance with applicable rules and regulations. The Committee also 
makes recommendations to the Board regarding succession planning and development for 
senior executive positions as needed (Institute of Directors, 1999). 
 
The Committee should have at least three members (ACGC, 2006). Committee members 
may be appointed by the Board from among its members and may be removed by the 
Board at any time. Each member of the Committee must satisfy such criteria of 
independence as the Board may establish and such additional regulatory or listing 
requirements as the Board may determine to be applicable or appropriate. Accordingly, 
each member must qualify as a “non-employee director” under rule 16b-3 of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and may not be part of a compensation 
committee within the meaning of SEC Regulation S-K and may not be eligible to 
participate in any of the compensation plans it administers (SOX, 2002). Members of the 
Committee should be suitably knowledgeable in matters pertaining to executive 
compensation.  
 
The UK’s Corporate Governance Code states that the board should establish a 
remuneration committee of at least three, or in the case of smaller companies two, 
members, who should all be independent non-executive directors’ (Para B2.1). The 
remuneration committee should make recommendations to the board, within agreed terms 
of reference on the company’s framework of executive remuneration and its cost and 
determine on specific remuneration packages for each of the executive directors, 
including pension rights and any compensation payments. 
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3.8.1.3 Nomination committee 
 
The main task of the nomination committee is to propose candidates for election to the 
board of directors, including the chairman. The nomination committee must take into 
consideration the various rules on independence of the board in relation on the company, 
its senior management and major shareholders. In years in which election of auditors are 
held, the nomination committee may also propose candidates for election of auditors, base 
on the preparations carried out by the Audit Committee of the board (KPMG, 2002). The 
UK’s Corporate Governance Code promotes a proper, thorough, and clear procedure for 
the appointment of new directors and states ‘there should lead the process for board 
appointments and make recommendations to the board. A majority of the members of the 
nomination committee should be independent non-executive directors’ (Para A.4.1). The 
chair of the committee may be the chair of the company or an independent non-executive 
director. 
 
3.8.1.4 Other Committees 
 
Board may appoint other committees, such as Corporate Governance Committee whose 
primary purposes is to monitor compliance with corporate governance standards; to 
identify individuals qualified to become Board members; to recommend to the Board 
director nominees for election at the annual meeting of shareholders or for election by the 
Board to fill open seats between annual meetings; to recommend to the Board committee 
appointments for directors; to review and make recommendations to the Board regarding 
non-employee director compensation; and to develop and recommend to the Board 
corporate governance guidelines applicable to the organisation (ACGC, 2006). 
 
The Committee may have at least three members (ACGC, 2006). Committee members 
may be appointed by the Board from among its members and may be removed by the 
Board at any time. Each member of the Committee must satisfy such criteria of 
independence as the Board may establish and such additional regulatory or listing 
requirements as the Board may determine to be applicable or appropriate. Members of the 
Committee should be suitably knowledgeable in matters pertaining to corporate 
governance (ACGC, 2006). 
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The Finance Committee, which primary purpose is to review the organisation’s financial 
policies, strategies and capital structure and take such action and make such reports and 
recommendations to the Board of Directors as it deems advisable (ACGC, 2006). The 
Committee may have at least three members. Committee members may be appointed by 
the Board from among its members and may be removed by the Board at any time. 
Members of the Committee should be suitably knowledgeable in matters pertaining to 
corporate finance. The actual number of members shall be determined from time to time 
by resolution of the Board (ACGC, 2006). 
 
Some companies also establish a Risk Committee as part of their risk management 
framework to ensure adequate risk measurement and management of the company’s 
exposure to risk. This committee is normally headed by a Chief Credit Officer who may 
appoint other officers or establish other sub-committees as required for effective risk 
management and governance, including risk measurement, risk monitoring, risk control 
or mitigation, and risk reporting. However, the directors are ultimately responsible for 
oversight the company’s corporate risk governance process; the risk committee assists the 
board of directors in overseeing and reviewing information regarding the company’s risk 
management and also may be in charge of the  development of policies, procedures, and 
practices employed to manage the risks faced by the company (ACGC, 2006).     
 
3.9 Other corporate governance features  
 
The aim of this section is to provide an overview of issues such as internal controls, risk 
management, and corporate governance in SMEs, family-owned business and stated-
owned enterprises.  
 
3.9.1 Internal Control Systems and Risk Management 
 
A widely accepted definition is that internal control systems are procedures or policies 
implemented by an organisation’s board of directors, audit committee, management, and 
other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of the organisation achieving its 
objectives (Bishop, 1991). Moreover, the executive management is directly responsible 
for implementing the overall strategy and policies decided by the board, and for all 
activities of a company, including the operation of the internal control system. However, 
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management at different levels may have different internal control responsibilities, 
depending on the characteristics of the company (Clarke and Chanlat, 2009). For 
example, the chief executive may have responsibility for all aspects of executive 
management, and is accountable to the board for the performance of the company and the 
implementation of the board strategies, policies, including policies on risk and control 
(COSO, 2004). The chief financial officer (CFO), who may also be a qualified 
accountant, may be involved in processes such as the establishment of a company’s 
objectives and strategies, developing and preparing company budgets and plans, and 
analysing the performance of the whole company, not only the financial aspects, but also 
from the perspective of its operations and compliance. As such the CFO may be a central 
point of management control (Clarke, 2007).   
 
Good systems of internal control may help a company to achieve its objectives of 
profitability and minimise loss of resources. Internal controls cannot, however, change a 
weak management system or provide absolute assurance as to the reliability of financial 
reporting (Clarke et al., 2008; Clarke, 2004).   
 
3.9.2 Corporate Governance in SMEs and Family-owned businesses 
 
Some of the participants at a forum on corporate governance in Latin America sponsored 
by the IMF agreed that corporate governance is relevant for smaller family business 
although it is more relevant for SMEs than for microenterprises. However, the benefits 
that corporate governance brings to a company’s sustainability are not completed 
understood by all SMEs and more promotion of the issue is needed (Fomin, 2007). It is 
also argued that corporate governance is an important element in the success of SMEs and 
family-owned businesses. SMEs are fundamental for the economic growth of emerging 
economies as they are a major source of employment and contribute towards the gross 
domestic product (Banham, 2005). It is therefore very important that the corporate 
governance practices for SMEs are enhanced by assurance that appropriate monitoring 
occurs and all necessary procedures for the implementation of the standards are in place. 
 
The definition of corporate governance originated in the large business environment and 
its application to Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are less explored (Coulson-
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Thomas, 2007). However, SMEs are engines of economic growth and play an important 
role in creating employment for rural and urban population in many nations (Banham, 
2005). Family businesses vary from small and medium-sized companies to large 
conglomerates that operate in multiple industries and countries. Many family businesses 
have a very short life span beyond their founders’ and the majority of family-owned firms 
do not survive the third generation of ownership (Treksten et al., 2005). This is often the 
consequence of lack of preparation of the subsequent generations to handle the demands 
of a growing business. Family businesses may improve the odds of survival by setting the 
right governance structures in place and by starting the educational process of the 
subsequent generations as soon as possible. While most frequently attention is given to 
corporate governance in large business environment, the impact of changing roles of 
board members for organisations of all kinds should not be ignored (Treksten et al., 
2005). Esquivel (2007) has pointed out that governance should be related not only to 
corporations, but also as a family system of governance, “which takes into consideration 
the structures of ownership groups as well as the structure of the firms” (p 1). Others such 
as Dodero (2007) also agree with this view, stressing the need to create a corporate 
governance culture that considers a company’s needs and the family structure. Equally, 
Gomez-Zorrilla (2007) states that creating a governance culture is very important, and 
that programs to train individuals in corporate governance issues throughout the region 
may help to strengthen the knowledge of governance and family organisation rules to 
help to generate demand for these issues. Gomez-Zorrilla also suggestes that one way to 
spread the understanding of corporate governance issues among SMEs, is to engage 
institutions such as banks, other financial institutions and business associations. 
 
While organizational size and the overlap of management and ownership add complexity 
to governance in an SME context, SMEs are largely unfettered in their decision-making 
role; the owner/manager has the freedom to take decisions which is important in the 
rapidly changing environment of today. However, without input from a well structured 
board, SMEs may not always see strategic opportunities (Brunninge et al., 2007). The 
capacity for entrepreneurial action is an advantage that SMEs do not want to sacrifice to 
improve corporate governance (Coulson-Thomas, 2007) and especially since corporate 
governance in large organisations is challenged by the need to add capacity to innovate by 
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their managers. SMEs already enjoy the motivational aspects that large businesses are 
trying to emulate (Gomez-Zorrilla, 2007). 
 
The accountability and empowerment of management are aspects of corporate 
governance embedded in the organisation of many SMEs, particularly those where the 
owner is involved in the day to day operations. Conversely the responsibility to a broader 
range of stakeholders can become a challenge to SMEs as owners/managers/directors are 
involved in their activities. Equally, consideration of the interests of employees, clients 
and suppliers, as well as the broader community when making decisions, has not always 
been the situation in SMEs; consequently, the potential benefits of strategic direction and 
growth have not always been realised (Coulson-Thomas, 2007). The application of the 
broader definition of corporate governance to SMEs, in particular to the responsibility to 
a broader range of stakeholders, has much to offer to the viability and growth of SMEs, 
especially the relationship with providers of finance. Equally, SMEs face significant 
challenges in relation to the incorporation of responsibilities to an expanded group of 
stakeholders. However, SMEs have emerged as a dominant economic force and there are 
significant potential benefits available by successfully addressing specific aspects of 
corporate governance (Coulson-Thomas, 2007; Brunninge et al., 2007).    
 
3.9.3 Corporate Governance in State-Owned Enterprises  
 
In many counties, State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) still represent a substantial part of 
GDP, employment and market capitalization (Gómez-Ibáñez, 2006). Moreover, SOEs are 
often prevalent in utilities and infrastructure industries, such as energy, transport and 
telecommunications, whose performance is of great importance to broad segments of the 
population and to other parts of the business sector (Dewan, 2006). As a result, 
governance of SOEs may be important to ensure their positive contribution to a country’s 
overall economic efficiency and competitiveness. It is also argued that good governance 
of State-Owned Enterprises is an important prerequisite for economically effective 
privatisation, since it will make the enterprises more attractive to prospective buyers and 
enhance their valuation (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003; Gómez-Ibáñez, 2006). There 
is also the case of countries that are reforming the way in which they organise and 
manage their state-owned enterprises and have decided that the adoption of corporate 
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standards is a good route (Estrin, 1998; OECD, 2004, 2005, 2007; UNDP, 2007). 
Additionally, it has been noted that corporate forms can provide greater political 
insulation for SOEs and transfer greater autonomy on their boards (Wong, 2004). 
 
Because of their special nature, SOEs may have a large list of potential stakeholders 
beyond employees, creditors and other SOEs. Mandates to particular consumer 
communities, to encourage environmental protection, or to address social injustice are 
very much the norm. However, SOEs do not necessarily do a better job in meeting these 
commitments. For example, there are a number of reported cases where SOEs pollute 
more heavily than comparable private sector enterprises (World Bank, 1991). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) noted that state enterprises, managed by powerful government bureaucrats 
pursuing political agendas, fail on two counts: they do not achieve social objectives and 
their inefficiencies are expensive to the public. To be effective SOE obligations should be 
made as explicit as possible, understood by all parties, and implemented in such a way as 
to allow the board adequate autonomy in directing the enterprise. They should also be 
realistic: a SOE that is asked to do everything may find it difficult to accomplish anything 
(Dewan, 2006; Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2003). 
 
3.10 Linking Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
 
Today companies operate in an environment of intense media, investor, regulator and 
public scrutiny. The financial scandals of recent years have created a significantly more 
constrained regulatory environment. At the same time, increasing public and stakeholder 
concern about social and environmental impacts of business practices is forcing 
companies to come to terms with a much broader set of interests and explanations. These 
concerns have motivated a debate regarding the degree and nature of convergence 
between corporate governance and corporate social responsibility (Kolk, 2008; Mitchell, 
2007; Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Zedek, 2006; Deakin, 2005, Orlitzky et al., 2003).   
 
It is expected that CSR will function as a built-in, self-regulating mechanism whereby 
business would monitor and ensure its adherence to law, ethical standards, and 
international norms (Matten and Moon, 2004). Businesses should embrace responsibility 
for the impact of their activities on the environment, consumers, employees, 
communities, all other members of the public, and any other stakeholder. Furthermore, 
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business should promote the public interest by encouraging community growth and 
development, and voluntarily eliminating practices that harm the public, regardless of 
legality (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Essentially, CSR includes the public interest into corporate 
decision-making, and honours the ‘triple bottom’ line: People, Planet and Profit (Gray et 
al., 1987; Brown et al., 2006). 
 
The practice of CSR is subject to much debate and criticism. Proponents argue that there 
is a strong business case for CSR, in that corporations benefit in multiple ways by 
operating with a perspective broader and longer than their own immediate, short-term 
profits (Carroll, 1999). Critics argue that CSR distracts from the fundamental economic 
role of businesses; others argue that it is not more than window-dressing; others yet argue 
that it is attempt to pre-empt the role of governments as a watchdog over powerful 
multinational corporations (Whetten et al., 2002; Zambon et. al., 2005). Corporate Social 
responsibility has been redefined throughout the years. However, it essentially an aid to 
an organisation’s mission as well as a guide to what the company stand for and will 
uphold to its customers (Snider et al., 2003; Zedek, 2006).   
 
Increasingly companies see CSR as an essential component of good corporate 
governance, from a point of view of risk management, transparency and sustainable long-
term value creation. This is an expanded notion of corporate governance and one that 
goes much further than the compliance orientation given in corporate governance codes 
(Zedek, 2006). Equally, for some, corporate governance is becoming more broadly 
defined to include ethical considerations, a result of a number of significant governance 
oversight failures. In this regard good governance is primarily about values rather than 
rules; corporate governance is going beyond the traditional core governance functions to 
incorporate the value dimension. Part of the governance process is determining what kind 
of corporate citizen the company seeks to be; CSR is taken as a part of this exercise 
(Smith, 2003; Melé, 2008).      
 
3.11 Summary 
 
Corporate scandals involving improper activities of managers expropriating the resources 
of organisations at the expense of stakeholders has prompted an intense re-examination 
and scrutiny of existing corporate governance practices and has generated considerable 
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interest in empirical research on the effectiveness of various corporate governance 
institutions and mechanisms. This chapter is an attempt to provide a survey on the fast-
growing theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance issues, providing 
some light on the major points of consensus and dissent among researchers regarding the 
nature and effects of the conflicts of interest between managers/owners and other 
stakeholders, and on the effectiveness of the set of available external and internal 
disciplining mechanisms.  
 
The literature examines the efficacy of alternative structures of ownership and the boards 
of directors and various other governance structures. On the one hand there is increasing 
evidence of the failure of certain governance structures to control and motivate managers 
to increase company’s performance. On the other side the empirical evidence to date is 
not conclusive on giving the most favourable governance structure or sufficiently 
complete to include all major determinants of good corporate governance. 
 
This chapter also includes discussions about and the context of different legal frameworks 
and corporate governance codes, differences between large companies and SMEs, 
governance in new environments (companies and economies) versus stable environments, 
in state-owned enterprises and the changing environment affecting corporate social 
responsibility.   
 
Having introduced the research, defined the research questions, looked at the background 
of the Andean region, and presented the literature review, the next chapter is devoted to 
establishing the theoretical framework within which the study took place. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Introduction 
 
 
This chapter outlines the selected theoretical framework based on stakeholder theory, 
accountability theory and legitimacy theory as foundations for exploring and expanding 
the developments in the implementation of corporate governance principles in the Latin 
American Andean region.  
 
The chapter is divided in six main sections followed by a summary. The first section 
focuses on the definition and role of theory. Sections two, three, and four discuss 
stakeholder, accountability and legitimacy approaches respectively, together with their 
limitations, and attempts to ascertain their suitability as a theoretical framework for the 
present study. Section five discuses the combinations of the three theories; section six 
outlines why this approach is considered to be the appropriate lens through which the 
research presented in this thesis is designed and interpreted; and section seven 
summarises the chapter.    
 
4.1 Definition of theory  
 
There are many theories that can be used in a thesis and there are different explanations of 
what represents a theory. According to Chambers (1972): 
“A theory is a well ordered set of statements about classes of things and classes 
of events which are in some way connected in our experience of them” (p. 138).   
 
Also, the American Heritage Dictionary of English Language (2009) includes the 
following definition of theory: 
“A set of statements or principles devised to explain a group of facts or 
phenomena, especially one that has been repeatedly tested or widely accepted 
and can be used to make predictions about natural phenomena”. 
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According to these definitions the main objective of a theory is to provide a coherent set 
of rationally derived principles that serve as a frame of reference for evaluating and 
developing practice and discussing related concepts and designing a framework around 
the structure of these concepts and how they are put together. A theoretical framework 
interrelate the theories involved in the research questions. Problems cannot be articulated 
except within a conceptual system. Researchers are unable to investigate problems from 
all perspectives at the same time; this is why a logical structure or theoretical framework 
needs to be constructed. Through this, researchers construct a perspective or a set of 
lenses which allow them to view the problems (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Selecting the theories for a study is important to consider, especially when economic 
transactions are influenced by cultural concerns, business related alliances, trade, 
vocational, family, social and political networks that are important in Latin America and 
elsewhere (Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985; Analytica, 1992; Hollingsworth, Schmitter 
and Streeck, 1994; Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1997). 
 
The theoretical framework for this study focuses on the theories related to the formal 
structure of corporate governance including roles and procedures. Most theories of 
governance come under the perspective of efficiency (Jensen, 2001; Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003); where the function of a governance mechanism or, more generally, a 
governance system is to contribute to the efficiency of the firm. Thus, mechanisms such 
as the board of directors, or allowing hostile takeover bids ensures a better discipline of 
managers, and contributes to the increased efficiency of a company by creating more 
value. However, different theories focus on particular interpretations of efficiency, 
emphasising that organisations are more than means to produce goods and services; they 
are also social and cultural systems. As such, these theories argue that those organisations 
and their stakeholders not only seek to compete for resources or economic rewards but 
rather seek legitimacy (Suchman, 1995) and accountability. In an effort to provide a more 
solid foundation for accountability and legitimacy this study sets out a comprehensive 
model, particularly focusing on accountability and legitimacy as stakeholder 
characteristics that directly affect resource flows to organisations, rather than resting on 
the traditional theories of governance such as agency or political theory.    
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This study employs a theoretical framework of stakeholder theory together with 
accountability and legitimacy. The aim of this study is to deduce, from the examination of 
voluntary and mandatory corporate governance polices, the effects of these policies on 
company accountability and legitimacy dynamics to stakeholders. The research and 
analysis are undertaken from a perspective of an organisation concerned with strategic 
actions involving the necessary conditions of regulatory and voluntary compliance as 
components of organisation legitimacy. This chapter points out the generally-agreed 
assumptions behind the theories, and indicates why these propositions are more important 
than others and which can be verified empirically. An expanded discussion of 
accountability, legitimacy and stakeholder theory follows.  
 
4.2 Stakeholder theory 
 
Stakeholder theory identifies and models the groups that are stakeholders of an 
organisation, and describes and recommends methods by which management can give 
due regard to the interests of those groups (Freeman 1984). A corporate stakeholder is a 
party who affects, or can be affected by, a company’s actions. The stakeholder concept 
was developed and championed by Edward Freeman in the 1980s; it has gained 
acceptance in business practice and in theorising relating to strategic management, 
corporate governance and business purposes. 
 
Stakeholder theory provides a suitable theoretical framework to analyse the relationship 
between business and society from a suitable development viewpoint, since it emphasises 
values such as participation, inclusion and mutual dependence (Wheeler et al., 2003). 
Studies suggest that strengthened stakeholder relationships can result in significant 
competitive advantages in the form of trust, reputation and innovation (Freeman and 
Phillips, 2002; Rodriguez et al., 2002; Godfrey, 2005). However, stakeholder theory can 
only explain how to identify and engage with stakeholders for specific collaboration. In 
order to align stakeholders’ interests and create long-term value, organisations have to 
develop, apply and maintain the necessary management competences and capabilities to 
deal with stakeholder concerns over time.  
 
Corporate governance focus on stakeholders was associated in the early 1990s with 
progressive corporate law views (Mitchell, 1995), and more generally, with 
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communitarian positions (Etzione, 1996). In defining stakeholder theory, Clarkson (1995) 
states that a company:  
“…is a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host 
society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the 
firm’s activities. The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its 
stakeholders by converting their stakes into goods and services” (p. 322). 
 
This view is supported by Blair (1995) who suggests that the goal of directors and 
management should be maximising total wealth creation by the firm. The key to 
achieving this is to enhance the voice of, and provide ownership-like incentives to, those 
participants in the firm who contribute or control the operations of a company and bring it 
into line in the interests of all stakeholders. Consistent with Blair’s view, Porter (1992) 
recommends that US policy makers should ‘encourage long-term employee ownership’ 
and promote board representation by significant customers, suppliers, financial advisers, 
employees, and community representatives. Porter also argues that companies should aim 
for long-term owners and give them a direct voice in governance.  
 
Additionally, there is wide agreement that the corporate governance framework should 
include mechanisms that encourage the participation of stakeholders in the long-term 
future of the business. Further, stakeholders should have access to relevant information to 
be able to have an effective involvement in the company affairs (Deegan and Gordon, 
1996). Equally, Hill and Jones (1992) have built on the work of Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) to recognise both the implicit and explicit contractual relationships in a firm to 
develop ‘Stakeholder–Agency Theory’. The interdependence between a firm and its 
strategic stakeholders is recognised by the American Law Institute (1992) which has the 
view that modern companies rely on different groups with whom they are associated such 
as employees, customers, suppliers, and members of the community in which companies 
operate. Stakeholder theory, thus, suggests that overlooking these other stakeholders is 
unwise or imprudent and/or ethically unjustified. To this extent, stakeholder theory 
participates in a larger debate about business ethics (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; 
Phillips, 2003).  
 
The activities of business organisations impact a wide range of stakeholders, and 
interactions between a business and some of its stakeholders are governed by legal 
contracts or statutory regulation (Gray et al., 1996). Other interactions are likely to be 
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subjected to informal social contracts where stakeholders are affected by company 
operations (Donaldson, 1989; Gray et al., 1996). Under such contracts, whether formal or 
social, companies are liable to the stakeholders affected to take certain actions. As 
companies may be subjected to conflicting demands they might face a series of mutually 
exclusive social, environmental, economic and ethical responsibilities (Gray et al., 1996). 
These conditions make it necessary for companies to adopt mechanisms to decide which 
contractual responsibilities they will attend to, and which they will ignore.   
 
However, decision-making with respect to stakeholder relationships is not easy. Tradeoffs 
between company interests and stakeholders’ interests as well as those between or among 
the interests of different stakeholders involve the allocation of benefits and burdens 
among human beings and, hence, moral questions. Hendry (2004) explains this situation 
by arguing that managers face two sets of conflicting alternatives about how to act, one is 
to follow traditional morality and execute their obligations and duties with honesty and 
respect, fairness and equity, care and assistance; or follow the market morality and act in 
their own self-interest. 
 
Nevertheless, self-interest is often related to the exercise of power, which can be 
exploited for both managers and stakeholders. Willer et al. (1997) argue that stakeholders 
with power have the potential to increase favourable outcomes for themselves, while self-
interested organisations with power over stakeholders may apply it with impunity. But 
when these organisations are confronted with stakeholder power, which may originate 
from resources that are, for example, concentrated or tightly controlled or are essential to 
operational performance, organisations have no choice but to deal with their stakeholders 
demands. There is also the case where companies respond to stakeholders to enhance 
their legitimacy, which some scholars consider in essence a moral phenomenon 
(Suchman, 1995). Legitimacy is discussed later. 
 
Companies will normally fulfil those responsibilities that originate from legal contracts or 
regulations; otherwise they will face certain legally defined penalties (Gray et al., 1996). 
However, there may be stakeholder groups, indirectly affected by companies’ actions, but 
are not recognised as stakeholders; their informal rights may be not recognised or may be 
left unaddressed. Companies may tend to prioritise the interests of those stakeholders that 
 87 
exert the greatest economic power and influence over their businesses (Gray et al., 1996; 
Adams, 2002).    
 
A stakeholder approach can assist managers by promoting an analysis of how their 
company fits into its environment, how its standard operating procedures affect 
stakeholders within the company. Freeman (1984) suggests, for example, that each 
company should fill in a ‘generic stakeholder map’ with specific stakeholders. General 
categories such as owners, financial community, activist groups, suppliers, government, 
political groups, customers, unions, employees, trade associations, and competitors would 
be included using this map and managers would make decisions by considering the 
impact of each choice on specific stakeholder groups. As the company changes over time, 
and as the issues change, the specific stakeholder map will vary. 
 
Stakeholder analysis generates knowledge about individuals and organisations through a 
process of study and investigation. It is expected that a stakeholder analysis will provide 
the tools to uncover the perceptions and concerns of all those with a stake in an 
organisation’s behaviour. Stakeholder theory was chosen to give focus to the discussion 
within this study; it is used to determine the legitimate interest and rights of various 
stakeholders, and utilise these as a way of determining corporate and managerial duties 
toward stakeholders. 
 
4.3 Accountability theory  
 
Accountability acknowledges that social actors take responsibility for their actions and 
decisions, and the policies of their organisations including the administration and 
governance encompassing the obligation to report, explain and be answerable for any 
resulting consequences (Gray, 2002).  
 
Organisations normally respond to the need for accountability to their stakeholders by 
creating mechanisms such as formal reporting relationships, performance evaluations, 
employment contracts, performance monitoring, reward systems including compensation, 
disciplinary procedures, and personnel manuals. In addition to these formal mechanisms, 
organisations support several informal sources of accountability. These include group 
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norms, corporate cultural norms, loyalty to an individual’s superior and colleagues, and 
also respect for customers (Milne and Patten, 2002). 
 
Definitions of accountability tend to turn around two explicit subjects. One subject 
concerns the context of whom and what is involved in a given situation and the second 
subject involves the notion of an evaluation and judgment activity in some form (Adams, 
2004). Accountability is not a universal concept. In fact, this word is known only in 
English, with all the connotations it entails, prevails primarily in English-speaking 
countries. There is not a Spanish word for accountability, the term is broad and imprecise, 
“accountability” (“rendición de cuentas”) is used as a synonym of obligation to respond 
to something, responsibility and control. It refers to the invocation to good governance, 
transparency and legitimacy of public power party. It is central to the discussions on fraud 
and scandal in the public and private sectors (Cutt and Murray, 2000). Rosenn (1993) 
notes that many English juridical terms, developed for the Common Law legal system do 
not, have Spanish equivalents because some concepts do not exist within the Civil Law 
tradition. Reaching a sound analysis of accountability and corporate governance therefore 
centres on having a proper understanding of the concept of accountability. 
 
Thus, accountability involves an actor or agent in a social context who potentially is 
subject to observation and evaluation by some audience, including one’s self. There are 
also standards, or expectations against which the agent’s behaviour is compared, which 
could result in the belief on the part of the agent that he or she may need to answer for, 
justify or defend decisions or behaviours. In addition, there are possible outcomes for the 
agent, i.e. sanctions, rewards, or punishments that can be implicit or explicit. Further, the 
focus is in the conduct of the behaviour of the agent, and arguably the agent is able to 
control his or her own behaviour. Milne and Patten (2002) argue that the purpose of the 
accountability mechanisms put in place in organisations is to deal with agents in control 
of their own behaviour.         
 
Accountability constitutes a part of a large repertoire of governance norms. The types of 
power covered by norms of governance vary greatly. They range from long-term 
positions of power held by the state or state organs, to holding a public office. This 
continuum goes on to holding an executive office in a corporation and to situations that 
allow for opportunistic behaviour (Boatright, 1999). These situations occur, for instance, 
 89 
during sequential performance of contractual obligations, or when performance is 
unobservable or unverifiable and is the core feature of the agency relationship (Demirag 
and Tylecote, 1992).  
 
The obligations owed by a party who is accountable may vary considerably with 
individual circumstances, even within the same country (Blagescu, et. al., 2005). 
Although similar in principle, the accountability of elected politicians differs from that of 
civil servants. These types of accountability differ from the accountability of corporate 
executives, and so forth (Zedek, 2006).  
 
There are several models of accountability which can be used to understand the nature of 
accountability relationships. For example Vangel and Huxham (2003) suggest a model 
used in government circles of representative accountability, which emphasises the 
obligation of representatives to their constituencies. This model is often applied to public 
sector actors who are expected to be democratically accountable to voters or their elected 
representatives. A second model, which is widely used in the business world, is principal-
agent accountability, which focuses on motivating agents to achieve the goals of their 
principals. From this perspective, the major challenge is to design incentives that will 
keep the agents faithful to their principals’ interest. Principal-agent accountability 
emphasises the fiduciary responsibilities of agents and economic and legal incentives to 
encourage agents to act for principals (Child and Rodrigues, 2003). Violations of contract 
accountabilities can be enforced through the legal system with legal or financial 
sanctions. A third model focuses on creating mutual accountability to bring together 
members through shared values, aspirations and unite to responsibility for achieving 
them. Sanctions for violating expectations are social and rational, so relationships and 
trust become essential elements in the construction and implementation of share analysis 
and plans. Mutually accountable relationships require developing a shared understanding, 
respect, trust, and mutual influence (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). They may require more 
time and energy to create and they are more difficult to maintain across large number of 
participants than agency contracts or representative mandates (Vangel and Huxham, 
2003).   
 
Accountability relations involve specific relationships and expectations, which are more 
subject to direct influence by organisations than legitimacy perceptions. Blagescu (2002) 
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analyse the accountabilities of intergovernmental organisations, multinational 
corporations and cross-border civil associations and generates some core accountability 
mechanisms (for example, clarifying rules, roles and responsibilities) which are the 
starting points for accountability management strategies with both internal and external 
stakeholders.  
 
The concept of accountability has been defined in many ways, not all of them compatible 
or mutually reinforcing (Koppell, 2005). This research focuses on accountability as a 
responsibility to answer for particular performance expectations to particular stakeholders 
(Fry, 1995).  
 
4.4 Legitimacy theory  
 
Legitimacy can be defined as the aspect of governance that validates institutional 
decisions as emanating from the right processes. The primary source of legitimacy lies in 
the involvement of those impacted by a decision in the decision-making process leading 
to it. The concept of legitimacy refers to perceptions by key stakeholders that the 
existence, activities and impacts of organisations are justifiable and appropriate in terms 
of social values. For example, according to Lindblom (1993):   
“Legitimacy is a condition or a status which exists when an entity’s value 
system is congruent with the value system of the larger social system of which 
the entity is a part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists between the two 
value systems, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy”. (p. 2) 
 
Legitimacy is lost or gained in the eyes of stakeholders, and different stakeholders may 
differ considerably in their standards and perceptions of the legitimacy of a particular 
organisation. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as: 
“A generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). 
 
Legitimacy is a generalised status rather than specific to particular instances (Deegan, 
2002). While organisational legitimacy may be maintained in spite of isolated breaches of 
normative expectations, it cannot be sustained without a history of regular observance of 
norms and values. Individuals evaluate an organisation based on their perceptions or 
assumptions about similarities between their values and an organisation’s values. This 
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implies that an organisation may deviate from expectations and still maintain legitimacy 
if the relevant audience are not aware of the deviation. Additionally, the individuals’ 
values, norms, and beliefs against which organisations’ actions are measured are the 
result of the social constructions of these norms by, and within, the referent audience, and 
between different audiences (Deegan and Unerman, 2006).  
 
The need to align management’s values with social values was identified by both Deegan 
(2002) and O’Donovan (2002). The annual report is often used as a tool by management 
to signal its reaction to the concerns of particular stakeholders. The underlying 
assumption is of a social contract between society and organisations, supported on the 
conception that companies only exist because society has provided them with the means 
to do so, legitimising their operations, and therefore, they have obligations to society.  
 
Corporations may be concerned about their legitimacy as institutions that seek to play 
credible and accepted roles in society. Institutional legitimacy can be grounded on 
regulatory, normative or cognitive bases (Deegan and Rankin, 1996). Corporations may 
gain regulatory legitimacy by conforming to rules and regulations, such as meeting state 
standards and procedures for organisational reporting. They can build normative 
legitimacy by exemplifying values and moral obligations, such as economic expectations 
providing needed finance for specific projects, supporting researchers, or delivering safe 
goods and services. Corporations may also gain cognitive legitimacy by aligning their 
activities with shared meanings and definitions that define ‘the way things are’. Many 
civil society organisations recruit well-known trustees and follow the reporting and 
system of government of well-regarded agencies to enhance their own credibility. From 
this perspective, organisations might emphasize different bases for their institutional 
legitimacy, depending on the extent to which their fields of operation have well-defined 
rules and regulations, shared values and moral perspectives, or widely-held meanings and 
explanations for how the world works (Deegan, 2002).  
 
In the same way, organisational legitimacy can be based on a regulatory normative or 
cognitive basis (Scott, 1990). Legal legitimacy is derived from compliance with legal and 
regulatory requirements, such as meeting company law provisions or adopting corporate 
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governance principles. Moral legitimacy is related to moral or ethical values and norms, 
also to a view of a better world (Lindblom, 1994). 
 
An organisation’s survival can be threatened if society perceives that it has breached its 
social contract. As a result, entities may be controlled to some extent by community 
concerns and values (Brown and Deegan 1998). Values change over time, and reporting 
entities need to respond to that. Successful legitimation depends on entities convincing 
society that a congruency of actions and values exists. For example, management may 
react to public concern over corporate actions by increasing the level of corporate 
disclosures in their annual reports if they perceive that their legitimacy has been 
threatened by public concern (Brown and Deegan 1998). 
 
Thus, managers may look toward relevant audiences and work on securing their 
legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). Disclosures in corporate reports are one way of illustrating 
organisational responsibilities. By producing reports that communicate positive 
organisational efforts, managers not only defend sound practices, but may also cultivate 
moral legitimacy by creating good-faith efforts to be socially responsible.  
 
The main objective of this study is to provide evidence of the key determinants that 
influence companies’ decision to implement corporate governance in their organisations. 
Legitimacy theory, accountability theory and stakeholder theory are is used to focus this 
research; to be used as a lens to find out and explain the factors that influence 
management’s decisions on the adoption of corporate governance standards.  
 
4.5 Interaction of accountability, stakeholder and legitimacy theory 
 
Legitimacy and accountability are related and influence each other. Companies’ 
legitimacy can be enhanced by clear lines of accountability to appropriate stakeholders, 
and accountability can be clarified and improved through attention to a company’s bases 
for legitimacy. Businesses are primarily accountable to their shareholders. However, 
diverse stakeholders make conflicting accountability demands.  Dealing with different 
accountability demands may be very difficult, and where stakeholders have different, or 
contradictory interests, being fully accountable to all of them is unfeasible. Thus 
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legitimacy and accountability may constitute a challenging problem for companies 
(Unerman and O’Dwyer, 2006). 
 
Legitimacy reflects generalised perceptions of an organisation by actors in their 
environment. These perceptions may be influenced by management strategies that align 
organisational goals and activities to fit societal expectations or reconstruct societal 
expectations to fit the organisation. Accountabilities describe focused expectations that 
are held by specific organisational stakeholders. It is suggested that improving 
accountability to appropriate stakeholders can strengthen organisations’ legitimacy by 
clarifying the interest they serve and how abuses can be controlled (Blagescu, 2002; 
Clark, 2005). 
 
While the literature on governance has grown rapidly in recent years, little progress has 
been made on either explaining changes in governance patterns or measuring 
effectiveness. While some work has been done on important elements relating to these 
topics, there is a need for a simple conceptual model to link them together more clearly. 
This research looks at such a model, building on earlier work relating to important 
concepts such as accountability and legitimacy. Accountability refers to the “condition in 
which individuals who exercise power are constrained by external means and internal 
norms” (Koppell, 2005), while legitimacy is viewed as having valid, socially acceptable, 
and trustworthy authority. Governance, accountability and legitimacy can be linked in a 
series of interconnected relationships that feed back to one another. In this way, changes 
or emergent weaknesses in the governance system result in a loss of the system’s 
accountability to a particular audience. This loss of accountability, if prolonged and 
serious, then results in a loss of the system’s legitimacy among that audience, which 
consequently seeks whether to change the governance system and its level of 
accountability, or construct an alternate system altogether (Grant and Keohane, 2005). 
 
Companies can be affected by stakeholders, who in efforts to exert control over the 
company can indicate how acceptable or unacceptable the company’s actions have been 
(Rao, 1994). When stakeholders consider that some of a company’s actions are 
unacceptable they can react in ways that can be a threat to that company’s stability. It is 
argued that companies’ reaction to this specific situation depends on the level of 
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stakeholders’ activities and the extent to which the threat focuses on issues that are seen 
as core to the company structure (Devers, Dewitt and Belsito, 2005). Friedman and Miles 
(2002) make a distinction between stakeholders whose goals are compatible and 
stakeholders whose goals are incompatible with those of the organisation. Freeman 
(1984) defines a stakeholder as:  
“…are any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organisation’s objectives” (p. 46). 
 
Other characteristics of stakeholders suggested by the literature are their status and 
familiarity, their influence and their interpretation of events and responses to those events 
(Ginzel, Kramer, and Sutton, 1993); some stakeholders can be more influential than 
others. Harrison and St John (1996) and Clarkson (1995) have a similar view and identify 
stakeholder influence as a function of the company strategy and contractual relationships, 
respectively. The degree of this influence, however, is determined by the relative 
importance of these stakeholders.  
 
Mitchell et al. (1997) provide a framework of stakeholder influence and activism that 
includes important arguments from the stakeholder and impression management 
literature29. Their framework advocates that stakeholders will be influential mainly when 
they are powerful, legitimate and make important claims on the organisation. 
 
4.7 Summary  
 
Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. An important part of corporate 
governance deals with accountability, fiduciary duty, disclosure to shareholders and 
others, and mechanisms of auditing and control. In this sense, corporate players should 
comply with codes to the overall good of all constituents. Another important focus is 
economic efficiency, both within the company, such as the best practice guidelines, as 
well as externally, such as national institutional frameworks. In this economic view, the 
corporate governance system should act not only in the interest of shareholders, but also 
all the other stakeholders. 
 
                                                 
29 Impression management theory refers to ways in which people in a company or other related environment 
present an image of themselves; generally this is done in way that lead others to evaluate the individual 
positively.   
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The main objective of this study is to explore the efforts of the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF) and other organisations to promote the implementation of corporate 
governance practices by companies through the Latin American Andean region and to 
identify the reasons why Andean companies decide to implement corporate governance 
principles in their organisations. It is important given the aims to carefully consider the 
theoretical issues relating to the adoption of corporate governance principles by 
organisations and select a foundation for the work that fits the context and purposes of the 
research appropriately. For this reason the research has adopted a theoretical approach 
which extends accountability and legitimacy to stakeholders. The study assumes that 
companies have to account for the legality and appropriateness of their activities taking 
into account the effects of those activities in all company’s stakeholders. The interaction 
between theory and empirics provides an advantage in facilitating not only understanding 
the empirical observation of the phenomenon under investigation, but also possible 
developments to the theoretical core (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1995). This claim has been 
exemplified through a review of a range of studies that have adopted such a theoretical 
framework through undertaking empirical research in several areas.     
 
 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Methodology and Research Methods 
 97 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Methodology and Research Methods 
Introduction  
 
This chapter describes the ontological, epistemological and methodological principles that 
are organised into four paradigms proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979); those 
paradigms constitute the domain within which research is conducted. A section describing 
the research design, the method of research and methods of data collection used in the 
thesis are also included in this chapter. Especial emphasis is given to the use of case 
studies, defining them, and justifying their appropriateness in terms of the type of 
questions posed. In addition, the chapter considers some of the limitations of the research 
methods chosen and explains how they may be mitigated in this study. The final section 
provides a brief summary of the chapter.  
 
5.1 Methodological issues and assumptions 
 
Methodology is a research strategy that translates ontological and epistemological 
principles into guidelines that structure the research process. The two major and most 
popular forms of research are qualitative and quantitative research. But clearly they can 
(and often are) combined. In particular, assumptions that the researcher holds regarding 
the area under discussion (ontology), will affect the way in which the knowledge about 
the subject can be obtained (epistemology), and this in turn can affect the way in which 
the research will be conducted (methodology) (Hopper et al., 1987). Methods, on the 
other hand, are instruments employed in the collection and analysis of data. 
 
The selection of the most appropriate research methodology is dependent on the nature of 
the phenomenon being researched (Tomkins and Groves, 1983). The ontological 
assumptions are concerned with the essence of the corporate governance phenomenon, 
and involve nominalism-realism differences (Laughlin, 2004). The dichotomy is whether 
the social world is or is not external to the individual; the normalist-researcher makes 
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sense out of unstructured matters. The realist, however, sees the real world as separate 
and independent of the individual researcher.  
 
In addition to the ontological-epistemological dimensions there is methodology which is 
the process of doing research and involves the methods used to analyse and learn about 
the social world, this takes into account the ideographic and nomothetic views of the 
participants (Laughlin, 1995). These views concentrate on whether the methodology 
analyses subjective accounts obtained by taking part or getting inside the research area as 
an ideographic method or whether the methodology is through the nomothetic method 
that tests hypotheses in a scientific way.   
 
Under certain ontological assumptions the scientific method could be appropriate (Abdel-
Khalik and Ajinkaya, 1979). Nonetheless, the scientific method is considered not 
appropriate for research based on other ontological assumptions where more subjectivist 
ways of gaining knowledge about the subject of the research are needed. Tomkins and 
Groves (1983) argue that naturalistic methods are needed. Nevertheless, there are also a 
range of possibilities and the appropriate methods need to be selected according to the 
particular ontological assumptions of the researcher.  
 
Moreover, for the purpose of this study it may be sufficient to recognise that ontological 
assumptions are considered in discussing the research methodology. It is also important to 
consider that corporate governance researchers have the tools to formulate and investigate 
research problems according to the rules of scientific methodology such as: the 
identification of a problem, the accumulation of relevant data, and the empirical testing of 
hypothesis; thus, applying the same kind of research techniques to inquiries in corporate 
governance as they are being utilised in other areas of knowledge (Kothari, 2001).    
 
Like every other social science, this research is based upon assumptions about the nature 
of social science and the nature of society. The way in which the study is conducted may 
be conceived of in terms of the research philosophy subscribed to, the approach that has 
been applied by Burrell and Morgan (1979) to organisational analysis which differentiate 
between four theoretical paradigms: the functionalist view; the interpretive view; the 
radical humanist view; and the radical structuralist view (see Figure 5.1). 
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Paradigms are sets of propositions that explain how the world is perceived; they contain a 
worldview, a way of exploring the complexity of the real world, telling researchers and 
social scientists in general ‘what is important, what is legitimate and what is reasonable’ 
(Guba, 1990).  
 
Figure 5.1 Four views for the analysis of social theory 
 
Radical Change 
                    Radical humanist Radical structuralist 
 
 
         Subjective View       Objective view 
 
 
         Interpretive      Functionalist 
 Order    
Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979 – Four sociological paradigms 
 
Moreover, the four paradigms define four different notions of the social world supported 
upon distinct theoretical assumptions regarding the nature of science and of society 
(Chua, 1986). 
 
5.1.1 The Functionalist Approach  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) used the term ‘functionalism’ which combines an objectivist 
view of the world with a concern for regulation. Functionalists regard society as a single 
system of interrelated elements, with each element of social life serving a specific 
function, and the role of the researcher is to discover the nature of those functions. Such 
work starts from an objective view of society, regards human behaviour that is 
generalisable as deterministic, uses empirical observation and a positive research 
methodology. It is concerned with effective regulation of the basis of objective evidence. 
 
In the functionalist paradigm, the goal is replication in the service of theory testing and 
refinement; data should be collected and analysed in such a way that another researcher 
collecting and analysing similar data under similar conditions will find similar results, 
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thus helping establishing the veracity of the theory. Theory development, although very 
desirable by researchers, is seldom practiced. The usual approach is deductive, using prior 
theory as a foundation for the development of testable hypotheses. These goals are based 
in the ontological assumption of objectivity – the world exists independently of those 
serving it, thus there is an objective reality that can be accessed – and the epistemological 
legacy of positivism, and are most often achieved through the methodological traditions 
of quantitative data collection and statistical analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). The 
functionalist perspective is mostly regulative and pragmatic in its basic orientation, 
concerned with understanding society in a way that generates useful empirical knowledge 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980). 
 
5.1.2 Interpretive research  
 
Interpretive research is based on the belief that a deeper understanding of a phenomenon 
is only possible through understanding interpretations of that phenomenon from those 
experiencing it. It places the emphasis of explanation in the subjective consciousness of 
the social participants instead of the objective observer (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Under the interpretive paradigm, general rules and external rules of society do not exist 
and the aim of social research is to investigate the meanings and interpretations of social 
actors in specific situations. Because of the highly subjective nature of the interpretive 
research, studies tend to be small in scale and emphasis is placed on the validity and 
insight of the research, rather than simply the outcomes or results (Preston et al., 1992). 
 
The ontological aspect of interpretivism holds that social reality is the result of 
interactions between actors in real social contexts. The social world, according to the 
interpretive paradigm, cannot exist outside of the independent minds of social actors. It is 
argued that in the process of understanding the social world, interpretive researchers try to 
make sense of the social character of daily life (Roslender, 1992). Burrell and Morgan 
(1979) state that: 
“The social world is no more than the subjective construction of individual 
human beings who, through the development and use of common language and 
interaction of everyday life, may create and sustain a social world of 
subjectively shared meaning” (p 260). 
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Given this view of social ontology, the experience of actors in any social context must 
then be nominalist; a process of subjective interpretation rather than a physical perception 
of the ‘real’ material world. 
 
Epistemologically, the interpretive approach is anti-positivist in nature. Given that the 
social ontology is highly subjective, the epistemology is likewise highly relativistic and 
exclusive to the actors directly involved in the social activities. Knowledge and 
understanding can only be obtained by having the same frame of reference as the actor; 
consequently, such knowledge is distinctly subjective to the actors’ reality (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979).   
 
Methodologically, the interpretive concept takes an ideographic approach to the study of 
society. As opposed to a nomothetic approach to methodology, Interpretivism requires a 
more detailed and thorough analysis of the social situation. An ideographic approach 
requires having knowledge and complete analysis of the subjective account of the actors 
or situation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
 
Interpretivists regard that human behaviour as highly voluntaristic in that they each 
choose the paths they take and the decisions they make. This is centred on the belief in 
autonomy and freewill (Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Macintosh and Scapens, 1990). 
Drawing on the interpretivist assumption of a subjective reality, it would follow that the 
individuals are, within that self-constructed reality, free to act out their desires and as they 
wish. There is no predetermined life path (Denzin, 1983; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; Ahrens 
and Dent, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln and Guba, 2000).  
 
Interpretivism has been identified as the paradigm most closely allied with this study, as 
the researcher’s interest is primarily subjective and qualitative in nature. The researcher’s 
appeal to the interpretive paradigm is based on the possibility of conducting a more 
intimate type of research, which will allow not only observing and learning about a given 
situation but also to become part of it in the sense that the researcher’s knowledge will 
become closely aligned to that of the actors themselves. It is expected that this kind of 
connection may lead to more meaningful research for both the researcher and the research 
subject. Besides, the interest is to conduct observational and personal interviews types of 
research. These are typical of the interpretive paradigm and allow for the greatest 
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acquisition of situational understanding. While this type of research will be limited in 
breadth, it would be deep in substance and meaning.        
 
At this point it is necessary to acknowledge the importance of quantitative and objective 
types of research, these means of explanation and answers only touch the possible truth. 
For the study of objects and phenomena outside of human social realities, positivist 
methods work well. However, when studying human social interactions, the 
unpredictability of human consciousness and by extension free will, creates too many 
variables for the researcher to believe that nomothetic methods can provide all the 
answers. The dichotomies between fact and truth are very important.  They are also likely 
the primary motivating factor for choosing an interpretive paradigm. Facts are irrefutable. 
They can be proven time and time again without fail. Facts are derived from positivist 
epistemologies. They can be methodical and pure; absolute in their time. They give no 
regard to condition or circumstance. Facts are codifications of the physical universe 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  
 
Truths, on the other hand, are proven and disproven every day. Often based in fact, truths 
are the humanistic extension of facts. They are subjective and emotional, dynamic yet 
simple. Truths take facts and combine the totally of the environment, situation and 
unverifiable subjectivity of the individuals or things involved. A truth as a fact is 
encapsulated by life and that life is different for everyone thus the truth of a fact can be 
unique for each person (Berg, 1995).  
 
By subscribing to the interpretive paradigm, the researcher expects to see the truth in 
every situation and simply focus on the facts. Having this subjectively grounded 
understanding in the difference between truth and facts allows the researcher to construct 
research questions with the precise understanding of the methodology and goals for this 
study. According to the subject of the research, the distinction of finding facts versus 
finding truths has been beneficial to both guiding and maintaining the research objectives.      
 
Despite the high level of detail and meaning provided for when conducting the research 
within the interpretive paradigm, there are a number of inherent restrictions that might 
inhibit its overall usefulness. The primary deficiency of interpretive based research seems 
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to be the paradigms lack of widely applicable facts. Yet, as because of the level of 
subjectivity in interpretive epistemologies, any results derived from its research might 
only be applicable to very specific social conditions of that research. Meaning, that may 
not be possible to take the results and apply them to other situations because they are 
subjective truths and not objective facts. However, these facts may have redeeming 
qualities that allow generalisation, when is considered as an alternative the depth to which 
explorations are conducted and description are written, resulting in enough details for the 
reader to grass the peculiarities of a given situation.   
 
5.1.3 Radical Humanist and Radical Structuralist 
 
The radical humanist paradigm, like the interpretive paradigm, clarifies how reality is 
socially shaped and socially sustained, but links the analysis to what it is described as the 
“pathology of consciousness”, by which individuals become captive within the reality 
they create and sustain (Tinker, et. al., 1982).  
 
The contemporary radical humanist critique focuses life in industrial societies. 
Capitalism, for example, is viewed as totalitarian; that capital accumulation shapes the 
nature of work, technology, and language. The radical humanist is concerned with 
discovering how humans can link thoughts and actions and try to change the world order 
(De George, 1995).  
 
The radical structuralist paradigm definition is similar to that of the radical humanist as 
it also points to a view of society as a likely dominant force. However, it is linked to a 
materialist conception of the social world, which is defined by concrete ontological 
structures. Reality is seen as existing on its own account independently of the way in 
which it is perceived by people in everyday activities. This view of reality brings tensions 
and contradictions which inevitably lead to radical change in the system as a whole. The 
radical structuralist is concerned with understanding these tensions and the way in which 
those with power in society seek to hold others in check through different means of 
domination. Special attention is placed on the actions taken to overcome that domination 
(De George, 1995). 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) use the terms ‘radical structuralist’ and ‘radical humanist’ to 
distinguish between: research which views society as shaped by social structures; and 
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research that puts the individual at the centre of the picture and views society as the 
creation of individual social factors. 
5.1.4 Alternative approaches  
 
Each of these four paradigms defines the grounds of opposing modes of social analysis 
and has different implications for the study of organisations. As mentioned above the 
methodology reflected in this thesis is, in principle, within the “interpretive paradigm” of 
Burrell & Morgan (1979), which emphasises “subjetivistic” (instead of “objectivistic”) 
and “regulation” (rather than “radical change” approaches to social inquiry). The 
interpretive approach of research is used to make sense of human action and the meanings 
attached to issues in their everyday contexts (Chua, 1986). The interpretive approach 
examines how the research subjects develop their meanings, rather than the researcher 
interpreting those meanings (Denzin, 1983). The act of interpretation, to explain the 
meaning of something, lies at the heart of this approach, where interpretation is seen as a 
necessary condition for creating understanding (Denzin, 1983; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991; 
Ahrens and Dent, 1998). 
 
The Burrell and Morgan framework makes available a practical outline and a 
categorisation of research; but it does not recognise other necessary research 
methodology features. Laughlin (1995, 2004) uses the Burrell and Morgan framework but 
avoids the subjective-objective dimension and builds a three-dimensional framework, 
which he names, theory, methodology and change.  
 
The change dimension is similar to Burrell and Morgan’s approaches to society. 
However, Laughlin sees change as a continuum for which he creates three levels: low, 
medium and high. Researchers who think that only a low level of change is needed are at 
ease with the status quo. Those who are in the middle are open to the possibility for 
change, however they do not reject automatically the status quo position. And those who 
want a high level of change are not happy with the status quo and are of the view that 
society needs to be changed. Laughlin’s methodological dimensions are concerned with 
theorization and methodology that include the researchers’ experiences and difficulty of 
generating theories in the research process itself (Laughlin, 1995).   
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Additionally, researchers such as Chua (1986) focus on classifying research based on 
different basic beliefs about knowledge, physical and social reality, and the relationship 
between theory and practice. Scholars such as Morgan and Willmott (1993) use the term 
‘New accounting research’ that centres on the social and reflexive nature of the world and 
criticise research practices that lack an empirical base.  
 
Another feature that has been developing over the past decades is the tendency to use 
different methodological approaches characterised by increased variety in research. The 
functionalist and quantitative based research is becoming the dominant (Ryan et. al., 
2002; Baxter and Chua, 2003), but there are growing trends of research integrating 
theories and/or methods commonly linked to different paradigms (Modell, 2005; Hoque, 
2006). By expanding the view of the roles of companies, such research has the potential 
to generate important insights into the issues of theory testing (Lewis and Grimes, 1999). 
However, the idea of combining the aspects of more than one paradigm has faced 
resistance from scholars defending the idea of ‘paradigm incommensurability’ such as 
Burrell and Morgan (1979). This position argues that specific theories and methods have 
irreconcilable philosophical assumptions such that they cannot be combined in a 
successful and philosophically justifiable manner.  
 
As mentioned above, the paradigmatic standpoint of the research in this thesis is the 
interpretive paradigm. The interest of the research is in the subjective reality of actors 
involved in different aspects of the implementation of corporate governance standards. 
Thus, an interpretive approach was needed in order to understand the social world of the 
organisations and human activity systems being studied. Additionally, the study seeks to 
acquire an understanding of the subjective experiences of individuals in these human 
activity systems, including individuals’ consciousness and subjective perceptions as 
proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). Adopting an interpretive approach also 
addresses qualitative issues aimed at producing the understanding of social contexts and 
social processes of the organisations into which the study has been conducted. The next 
section describes the research methods used in this thesis.    
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5.2 Research Methods 
 
Methodology is concerned with both the detailed research methods through which data 
are collected, and the more general philosophies upon which the collection and analysis 
of data are based. The focus of this part of the chapter is to describe the central concepts 
related to research methods. First, definitions of the methods used are introduced, 
followed by the description of the research design and the methods of data collection, 
then, a summary of the chapter is included.  
 
Quantitative and qualitative research are two different ways of conducting research and 
the choice between them should be made in terms of their appropriateness in answering 
particular research questions. Moreover research, whether quantitative or qualitative, has 
to be based on underlying assumptions about what constitutes ‘valid’ research and which 
research methods are appropriate. In order to conduct and/or evaluate research, it is 
important to know these assumptions (Hirschheim, 1992).  
 
Qualitative methods are designed to help researchers understand people and the social and 
culture contexts within which they live. Kaplan and Maxwell (1984) argue that the goal 
of understanding a phenomenon from the point of view of the participants and their 
particular social and institutional world is lost if textual data are distilled down and 
quantified. 
 
Quantitative research can be seen as linked to positivism and to the practices of the 
natural sciences. The influence of positivism results in inductive and deductive accounts 
of the research process (Godfrey-Smith, 2003). Qualitative research drives from, and has 
been stimulated by, traditions that are different from a positivism orientation. The chief 
characteristics of qualitative research relate to phenomenology which provides a way of 
viewing social and cultural phenomena. This includes developing a description of an 
individual or setting, analysing the data for themes or categories, and making 
interpretations or drawing conclusions about its meaning personally and theoretically, 
stating what has been learned, and offering further questions to be asked (Wolcott, 1994). 
Less emphasis is placed on the need to develop objective methods of study and more on 
the value of seeing the world through the eyes of those being studied. Examples of 
qualitative methods are action research, case study research and ethnography. Qualitative 
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data sources include interviews and questionnaires, documents and texts, and the 
researcher’s impressions and reactions (Silverman, 2000).   
 
Although most researchers do either qualitative or quantitative research work, some 
researchers have suggested combining one or more research methods in one study called 
triangulation (Lee, 1991; Mason, 1996; Mingers, 2001). For instance, Miles and 
Huberman (1984) give an empirical example where methods such as interviews, 
observation, collecting documents and recording are combined.  
 
Evaluation design alternatives lead to reflection of the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of quantitative and qualitative data. Qualitative methods permit the researcher to study 
selected issues in depth and detail. Approaching fieldwork without being constrained by 
predetermined categories of analysis contributes to the depth, openness, and detail of 
qualitative inquiry. Quantitative methods, on the other hand, require the use of 
standardised measures so that the varying perspectives and experiences of people can fit 
into a limited number of predetermined response categories to which numbers can be 
assigned. The advantage of the quantitative approach is that it is possible to measure the 
reactions of a great many people to a limited set of questions, thus facilitating comparison 
and statistical aggregation of data. By contrast, qualitative methods typically produce a 
wealth of detailed information about a much smaller number of people and cases. This 
increases understanding of the cases and situations studied but reduce generalisation 
(Bryman, 2004, Creswell and Miller, 2000). 
 
This thesis investigates corporate governance developments in Latin America, especially 
those of the Andean region. Despite an increase in awareness of the need and benefits that 
companies achieve by adopting good corporate governance practices, compliance with 
the recommendations is still very low across the region (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 
2007). The aim of this study is to look at the extent of the adoption of corporate 
governance principles in the Latin American Andean region, especial focus is towards the 
reason companies decide to adopt the principles, whether it is because companies are 
required to be accountable to their stakeholders or also because the companies are in need 
to show their legitimacy.   
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The empirical data in this study was gathered using a qualitative research method. It is 
believed this to be the best choice in this specific study because the research problem is 
complex to its nature. The governance standards to be adopted are many, detailed and in 
some cases difficult to understand. In addition, valuation is often made with subjective 
choices and preferences. The author therefore deems it necessary to come close to the 
source of information to be able to fully grasp the processes and choices made. 
Furthermore, closeness was needed to sort out the possibilities and problems the adoption 
of corporate governance brought to the stakeholders. In addition, it is the author’s opinion 
that the choice to focus the study on regulators, company managers, independent directors 
and other company stakeholders enables deeper understanding of corporate governance. 
 
5.2.1 Interviews  
 
The first empirical piece of work involved interviews. The interview is a method of data 
collection in which the researcher asks a participant a series of questions relevant to the 
topic of the research. The function of the interview is to gain particular information from 
the participants; information which may be about their beliefs, their attitudes, their 
knowledge and experiences: whether it is considered to be relevant to the purpose of the 
research (Silverman, 2006). The aim is to collect the information with a minimum of 
distortion. 
 
The interview is probably one of the most used methods in qualitative research. It is also 
a flexible research tool (Breakwell, 1995). It can be used at any stage of the research 
process: during the initial phase to identify areas for more detailed exploration and/or to 
generate hypotheses; as part of a pilot study or validation of other instruments; and as the 
main mechanism for data collection. Interviews can also be combined with other 
approaches in a multi-method design which may incorporate, for example, questionnaire 
measures or observation (Dunne, 1995). 
 
Interviews can take a variety of forms depending on the type of data required to inform 
the research question being asked, as well as on the availability of resources. For 
example, in structured interviews the researcher prepares a set of questions with fixed 
wording and tries to obtain answers to these questions without deviate from the 
prearranged format. This facilitates the data analysis as there will be comparable 
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categories for each respondent, and the researcher can analyse what each respondent says 
as an answer to each question and compare and contrast their responses (Silverman, 
2006).    
 
Contrarily, the use of unstructured interviews allows researchers the possibility to address 
a given number of topics, but there is not a set question for the interviewee. The questions 
and their order are not fixed and are allowed to develop during the interview process. 
Every subject may focus on a different aspect of the topic in question, and as a result data 
from individual subjects may not be comparable (Silverman, 2006). But, such data 
provides in depth information in great detail. Breakwell (1995) points out that the level of 
examination in unstructured interview may be the same level as that present on structure 
interviews since both are dependent on the knowledge and skills of the researcher. There 
are also disadvantages such as expending too much time on the edges of the subject, the 
danger of losing control of the interviewee, and diminishing of reliability when using 
non-standardised approaches to interview each respondent (Mason, 2002). 
 
A type of interview which incorporates elements of quantifiable fixed-choice responding 
and the facility to explore, and probe in more depth, certain areas of interest are semi-
structured interviews. This type of interview benefits from the advantages of both 
approaches: easier to analyse and quantify but also to provide more in-depth information 
where necessary (Mason, 2002; Silverman, 2006).  
 
Interviewing, as any other research method, is also open to a number of biases and 
shortcomings; one of them is the difficulty of achieving reliable and valid results. 
Nevertheless, quantification and objectification of data obtained from interviews are a 
powerful means to remedy this and help the researcher to maintain objectivity right 
through the research process (Mason, 2002). 
 
Semi-structured interviews were used rather than structured interviews or unstructured 
ones as it was believed semi-structured interviews provided the appropriate means to 
enquiry on corporate governance research, also the decision was been taken considering 
the resources available, methodological standards and preferences, and the type of 
information sought, which were determined by the research objective.       
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As a part of the empirical work, semi-structured interviews and protocol were developed. 
The interview questionnaires are contained in Appendix 5.1 Because of the methodology 
adopted, and in order to obtain the viewpoint of stakeholders in the Andean Region, it 
was decided that semi-structured would be employed. Interviews were used with the 
purpose of collecting personal observations and reflections from the participants on the 
process of implementation of corporate governance principles in particular the reasons 
from adopting them. Those interviewed consist of 21 stakeholders in Colombia including 
corporate managers, auditors, regulators, accountants and other company stakeholders. 
The choice of semi-structured interviews has been also informed by previous corporate 
governance research; for example, Gendron and Bernard (2004), Hannah (2003), Cohen, 
Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2002, Wanyama, 2006, Bondakamara, 2009) employ semi-
structured interviews in their studies of accountability and corporate governance.  
 
Using an ‘interview guide’ or list of questions and topics that need to be covered during 
the conversation, usually in a particular order, a semi-structured interview allows the 
interviewer and respondents engage in a formal interview. Nevertheless, although the 
interviewer follows the guide; there is the possibility to pursue topical trajectories in the 
conversation that may wander off from the guide as appropriate.  
 
In addition, using a flexible format allows the use of predetermined questions, but with 
the possibility to modify based upon the researcher’s perceptions of what seems more 
appropriate. It was possible to change the order of questions and give explanations when 
needed; particular questions which seem inappropriate with a particular interviewee were 
omitted, and additional ones included. Additionally, as different categories of people were 
interviewed, separate questions were used for each category of stakeholder (see Appendix 
5.1).  For example, as the study is about corporate governance, semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with company managers, auditors and other stakeholders some questions 
in the different guides may overlap, but each guide was tailored to obtain information 
specific to the category of participant being interviewed.    
 
The interviews were tape recorded when it was possible; however, during the interviews, 
brief notes were also taken to aid the researcher; the interview data includes as well the 
interviewer’s notes documenting observations about the interview content, the participant 
and the context. The researcher explained the purpose of the interview to the participants 
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within the broader context of the research study. In addition the necessary assurance 
about confidentiality was given to all participants. 
 
5.2.2 Case study 
 
Conducting the a case study were some tasks that needed to be carried out by the 
researcher these tasks include: preparation for data collection, performing direct 
observations, conduct interviews, distributing a survey questionnaires, gathering available 
documents and attending pre-programmed corporate governance related events in the 
Andean region. In case studies it is recommended that the data collection process should 
be treated as a design issue as this enhances the construct and validity of the study, and 
the external validity and reliability (Yin, 2003). 
 
Additional data was gathered from documents such as historic information about the 
organisation, financial statements of the 15 CAF pilot companies, information published 
in these organisation’s web pages and any other document obtained from the 
organisation’s officers. Permission for the use of documents was obtained whenever was 
necessary to collect acquired information that was not publicly available but was learned 
through observation and the interviews. The case study took as its subject a financial 
development entity whose activities were studied using a variety of data collection 
techniques and methods that allows a more rounded, holistic, study and a complete 
account of regulatory processes. The aim was to provide a rich detailed portrait of a 
particular phenomenon, the effect of the implementation and compliance with corporate 
governance regulations throughout the Latin American Andean region. 
 
Yin (2003) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry that 
“investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context;” where the 
boundaries between a phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident and where 
multiple sources of evidence are used. Yin suggests that when choosing case study sites 
researchers should consider a theoretical phenomenon rather than statistical 
generalisations, as the focus of the study. He compares a case study with experimental 
research. Using case studies it is possible to collect data from multiple sources, including 
documentary evidence, interview data, direct observation, and participant observation.  
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The use of mixed methods of research is becoming a common practice and an increasing 
number of academic writers seek to justify combined methods.  
 
Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small number of cases offer no 
grounds for establishing the reliability or generality of findings (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; 
Becker, 1998). Others feel that the intense study of the case biases the findings 
(Donmoyer, 2000). Some dismiss case study research as useful only as an exploratory 
tool (Alasuutari, 1995; Ryan et al., 2002). Against these scholars such as Chua (1986), 
Tinker (1980), Hopper et al. (1987) have questioned the use of positive or scientific 
methods in research, arguing that these methods fall short of accounting for real events 
and the subjectivity of social practices. Researchers can use the case study research 
method with success if carefully planned and crafted to study real-life situations, issues, 
and problems. Reports on case studies from many disciplines are widely available in the 
literature (for example: Anderson et al., 2002; Modell, 2005; Modell and Lee, 2001). 
 
There are a number of advantages in using case studies. One of them is that the data is 
most often conducted within the context of its use (Yin, 2003) that is, within the situation 
in which the activity takes place. The case study in this thesis is interested, for example 
on the reasons why an organisation implements corporate governance. To explore these 
motivations, the researcher, must observe how functions in the related matter are 
performed within the organisations own environment. This would contrast with 
experiments, for instance, which deliberately isolate a phenomenon from its context, 
focusing on a limited number of variables (Stake, 1995).  
 
Another advantage of case studies is that they allow for both qualitative and quantitative 
data. Some observational research studies that involve repeated observations of the same 
items over long periods of time, for instance, rely on qualitative data from journal 
writings which give descriptive accounts of behaviour (Yin, 2003). Yin also cautions 
researchers not to confound case studies with qualitative research, he also notes that “case 
studies can be based … entirely on quantitative evidence” (Yin, 1984, p 25). An 
additional advantage of case studies is that they produce detailed qualitative accounts 
which not only help to explore or describe the data in real life environment, but also help 
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to explain complexities of real life situations which may not be noticed through 
experimental research (Yin, 2003).   
 
Despite these advantages, case studies have received criticisms. Yin (2003) mentions 
some types of arguments against case study research. For instance, case studies are 
accused of a lack of thoroughness. Examples of this are those case studies where the 
researcher allows equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the 
findings and conclusions. Another criticism is that case studies do not provide a basis for 
scientific generalisation since they use a small number of subjects and some conclude 
with only one subject (Tellis, 1997). An additional disadvantage of case studies is that 
they are often labelled as being too long, difficult to conduct and producing a large 
amount of documentation (Yin, 2003).  
 
Interpretive research rests on the assumptions that access to reality is through social 
constructions such as language, consciousness and share meanings. Interpretive studies 
generally attend to understand phenomena through the meaning that people assign to 
them (Walsham, 1995). Interpretive research does not predefine dependent and 
independent variables, but focuses on the full complexity of human sense making as the 
situation emerges (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994).  
 
Positive research, however, assumes that reality is objectively given and can be described 
by measurable properties which are independent of the researchers and their instruments. 
Positivist studies generally attempt to test theory, to increase the predictive understanding 
of phenomena (Yin, 2003). Positivists normally seek evidence of formal propositions, 
quantifiable measures of variables, hypothesis testing, and the drawing of inferences 
about a phenomenon from the sample to a stated population (Straub, Gefen and 
Boudreau, 2004). 
     
Case studies entail detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of events or 
conditions and their relationships over a continued period of time (Stake, 1995). 
Researchers have used the case study research method for many years across a variety of 
disciplines. Social scientists, in particular, have made wide use of this qualitative research 
method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the 
application of ideas and extension of methods (Adams, et al., 2006). 
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In this thesis CAF is the focus as the organisation working through the region 
highlighting the benefits a company may achieve when adopting sound corporate 
governance practices. To obtain the empirical data the researcher first spent some time at 
CAF’s headquarters in Caracas (Venezuela) as well as at the regional Office in Bogotá 
(Colombia).  
 
Second, information published by PROCAPITALES30 is analysed which contains 
interviews with 24 Peruvian directors and provides information relevant to the analysis of 
corporate governance developments in the Andean region. In the PROCAPITALES’ 
interviews the directors explain the meaning of corporate governance, the reasons for the 
implementation of the principles in their companies and the benefits expected from the 
implementation.  Additionally, a description of the sources of information about the 
activities taking place in Bolivia is taken from the Bolivian Stock Exchange (Bolsa 
Boliviana de Valores – BBV) as it relates to the implementation of corporate governance 
practices. 
 
Third, information is extracted using document analysis from the annual reports of some 
of the 15 companies that took part in CAF’s pilot study31. CAF has used the experiences 
of the companies that took part in its pilot study to support and promote the 
implementation of the LCAGC in companies located in the five Andean countries. 
 
Fourth, the information analysed above is supplemented with data gathered by the 
researcher who attended conferences, seminars, forums and workshops in these Andean 
countries that focused on corporate governance related issues. Information is taken from 
the presentations that were made by experts in the field of corporate governance at these 
sessions. Data is also taken from publications collected at the events attended or 
documents received from the participants.   
 
Fifth, the analysis also includes the results of a survey conducted during one of the events 
attended by the researcher. A questionnaire was distributed to the participants at the 
                                                 
30 PROCAPITALES (Association of Capital Market Developers) is a Peruvian business association 
dedicated to the promotion of private investment. 
31 It was not possible to optain the annual reports of three of the fifteen companies that were included in 
CAF’s pilot study. Additionally, for three of the companies in the analysis were accessed only annual 
reports for two of the four years period covered by the document analysis. 
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event, asking their views on some key corporate governance issues (see Appendices 6.1 
and 6.2). The survey was carried out to gain an insight into the knowledge and 
understanding of the developments of the topic of corporate governance in the Andean 
region among the attendants at the event. Next short descriptions of two methods, 
document analysis and survey which were used as part of the case study, to complement 
the data gathered through interviews carried out with CAF’s staff, directors from 
organisations acting as CAF’s counterparts and company directors from organisations that 
took part on CAF’s pilot study. Equally, data gathered from interview performed by 
PROCAPITALES with Peruvian stakeholders. 
 
5.2.2.1 Documents  
 
Documents may be treated as a source of data in their own right; they can be an 
alternative to interviews, questionnaires, or observation. The term document covers a 
wide variety of different sources, from personal documents, such as diaries and 
photographs to official documents of the state or private sources, such annual reports, 
mass media outputs, and virtual outputs such as the Internet. There are also different 
approaches for evaluating data extracted from documents; content analysis, semiotics and 
hermeneutics (Scott, 1990; Lee, 2000).   
 
As other methods of social research, content analysis is a documentary method that aims 
at a quantitative and/or qualitative analysis of the context of texts, pictures, films and 
other forms of verbal, visual or written statements. This analysis may be related to forms 
of communication, intentions of the communicator, arguments, text style, the audience 
and motives, attitudes or values. Scholars, for example have study corporate governance 
issues focusing in documents such as annual reports, company’s internal communications, 
auditors’ reports, and general assembly minutes (Gibbs, 2001). 
 
In document analysis the focus is on description, identification of trends, frequencies and 
inter-relationships, and, sometimes statistical analysis. Examples of document analysis 
are: basic analysis producing summaries of factual information or biographical research; 
and secondary analysis (Lee, 2000). Scott (1990, p. 6) suggests four criteria for assessing 
the quality of documents, including: authenticity, related to genuine origin of the data; 
credibility which refers to data which is free from error; representative, this means the 
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data represents the source it is expected to represent; and meaning, in other words the data 
is clear and comprehensible.  
 
Many documents relevant to the case study were collected during the course of the study. 
The validity of the documents was reviewed so as to avoid incorrect data being examined 
(Yin, 2003). A variety of documents collected include: letters, memoranda, other 
communications, agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings and other written 
reports or events, and administrative documents such as progress reports and other 
internal records. 
 
In addition to the analysis of the documents gathered during the fieldwork this study 
includes further empirical research consisting on the document analysis of data gathered 
from documents such as annual reports, minutes of meetings and other official reports, 
also used to get a better understanding of the way Andean companies are dealing with 
accountability and legitimacy issues in relation with the application of corporate 
governance principles. Here the focus of the analysis is on description, identification and 
sometimes statistical analysis.  
The main source of data for this part of the study is taken from the financial statements 
and other company reports and information, for the period 2005 – 2007, of the annual 
reports of the 15 Latin American companies which adopted CAF’s corporate governance 
guidelines as a part of its pilot study.  
2005 was established as the starting point of research for all companies as this was the 
year before the pilot study began; this is done to gain an understanding of how the 
companies reported before they implemented the corporate governance guidelines.  
 
The analysis of documents, in this case financial and non-financial annual reports was 
focused on the meaning and interpretation of the text rather than trying to measure 
objectively specific attributes of the text contents. Through this method it was expected to 
be able to identify and describe the main content of the data, chronologically, 
thematically or otherwise. 
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5.2.2.2 Surveys  
 
A survey is a means of gathering information about the characteristics, actions, or 
opinions of a group of people. Surveys include cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
using questionnaires for data collection (Babbie, 1990, 2001). On cross-sectional designs 
all measures are taken over short period of time. Longitudinal designs use of repeated 
measures on one or more variables over an extended period of time where the main focus 
is on trends occurring over this period.   
 
A survey is one commonly used method of conducting scholarly research. The broad area 
of survey research encompasses measurements that involve asking questions of 
respondents. A ‘survey’ can be anything from a short paper-and- pencil feedback form to 
an intensive one-to-one in-depth interview; or can be a written document that is 
completed by the person being surveyed, an online questionnaire, a face to face interview, 
or a telephone interview. Surveys also provide convenient way of gathering information 
from a large or small population (Silverman, 2000).   
 
In general, surveys are methods of data collection in which information is gathered 
through oral or written questioning. Oral question is known as interviewing32; written 
questioning is carried out through questionnaires, which can be handed to the respondents 
personally by the researchers in their homes, at work, a training venue, or any other place; 
they are returned to the researcher after completion. These are known as self-administered 
or self-completion questionnaires (Bryman, 2004). 
 
Questionnaires are highly structured methods of data collection. Their advantage over 
interviewer-led methods is that they are cheap, particularly if they can be group-
administered. Even postal questionnaires could be cheaper than the use of interview 
schedules; in addition, an investigation by questionnaire may be conducted more rapidly 
than by any other highly structured data-collection method (De Vaus, 2002).  
 
                                                 
32 Interview also employs a form of questionnaire in a format of an interview guide, since such guides are 
often as rigid and as standardised as questionnaires, the discussion presented in the interview section in this 
chapter is also pertinent to questionnaires. Hence this part of the chapter will introduced the study of 
questionnaires in a general manner, concentrating in questioning rather than on strictly questionnaires. 
 118 
Based on the literature referred to in chapters two and three, a questionnaire survey was 
used to take advantage of a unique opportunity to get information from those stakeholders 
whose companies are considering implementing the Andean Corporate Governance 
Guidelines or have just started their implementation. The aim of the explanatory, cross-
sectional survey was to find answers to questions such as: 
(a) What does corporate governance mean for the participants? 
(b)  How have corporate governance developments affected their organisations? 
(c) Why have their organisations decided to implement the Andean Corporate 
Governance Guidelines (ACGG)? 
(d) What do they expect from the implementation of the ACGG 
(e) What are participant’s views on some of the potential benefits of ACGG? 
 
These questions were aimed to answer the three research questions for this research. 
Specifically, whether the respondent believe corporate governance in the region is seen 
from a stakeholder perspective and also whether the adoption of the principles is because 
organisations want to show their accountability towards their stakeholders or/and 
legitimate their activities.  
 
Surveys suffer from problems in research design, sampling procedures, and data 
collection. There are weak in capacities such as: survey type, mix of methods, 
representative samples, and response rates. A cross-sectional study it is believed to be the 
most appropriate in this case as there are limitations which would difficult the use of a 
longitudinal study.  
 
The data was gathered using questionnaires (Appendix 6.1 and 6.2) developed by the 
researcher to reflect recent developments and corporate governance concerns specific to 
the Latin American Andean region. The questionnaires were distributed to all the 
participants at the Corporate Governance Forum hold by Confecámaras in Bogotá 
(Colombia) 24 November 2009. The researcher was able to collect 80 completed 
Questionnaires. These corporate governance events are mainly training activities which 
are targeted to managers, auditors and other company stakeholders in the Andean Region 
and which are aimed to enhance the knowledge on the corporate governance guidelines 
issue by CAF.  
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The main body of the questionnaire includes the questions to be answered. In order to be 
effective, special attention was given to the content, structure, wording, and format to 
adhere to basic rules of questionnaire construction as this is the part that enabled the 
researcher to collect the data required for completion of the study (Foddy, 1992). A 
summary of the sources where data for this study where gathered is included in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Sources of evidence 
 
 
ACTIVITY 
 
DESCRIPTION 
 
Case Study 
 
 
11 Interviews  
CAF’s staff – 4 CAF Officials 2 Based in Caracas’ Head Office (one of them a Peruvian 
national) 
2 Based in CAF’s office in Colombia 
   4 Officials from CAF’s   
Counterparts  
2 from Colombia (Comfecámaras and BVC*) 
1 from Ecuador (BVQ) 
1 from Venezuela (AVE) 
   3 Directors from CAF’s Pilot 
Study Companies 
2 from Ecuador (NIRSA and Ecoelectric) 
1 from Colombia (Mac) 
 
 PROCAPITAL’s Interviews   
   
 24 video recorded interviews 
with Peruvian directors 
 
Included directors from two of the companies that took 
part in CAF’s Pilot Study 
 
 
Documents: Annual Reports 
 From CAF’s 15 Pilot Companies 2005 2006 2007 Total 
   2 companies from Bolivia 1 1 1 3 
   3 companies from Colombia 1 3 3 7 
   3 companies from Ecuador 2 3 3 8 
   5 companies from Peru 3 4 4 11 
   2 Companies from Venezuela 2 2 2 6 
Total annual reports analysed 9 13 13 35 
 
 
Other Documents:  
 
Publications received from some of the interviewees 
or gathered at events attended 
Responsibility Sustainability 
(Magazine) July & September 
2008    
It is a quarterly publication offering solutions to 
comprehensive communications concerns and projects 
through responsible and sustainable business practices 
 
Baseline Design – Final Report – 
MIF (Fomin), IADB, BVQ - 2007    
Presentation of the empirical evidence collected through a 
survey with a sample of Ecuadorian organisations   
 
The Return of the Left and the 
Future of Reform in Latin 
America – CIPE - 2008 
A collection of different articles describing the current 
political situation throughout Latin America 
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Supply & Demand: Development 
of Corporate governance 
Practices. BVQ, IADB – 2007 
An analysis on the current trend in the implementation of 
corporate governance principles in Ecuador  
Legal Perspectives on Corporate 
Governance in Colombia, 
Confecámaras, CIPE - 2007 
The aim of the publication is to contribute to the study of 
corporate governance related laws and regulations in 
Colombia 
Successful Experiences of 
Corporate Governance in the 
Andean Region – Confecámaras 
CIPE – 2007  
This is a summary of some of the efforts undertaken by 
different organisations supporting the implementation of 
corporate governance in the Andean region  
“Codigo Pais” Colombian Code 
of Corporate Governance – 
Superintendence of Finance - 
2007  
It is common effort as it gathers public and private sector 
actors to get to a unified code with the consensus of 
everyone. It also gathers all previous voluntary 
recommendations. However, it does not intend to unify 
the existing standards. 
 
 
Manual of Corporate 
Governance practices for closely 
held companies – CAF – 2006   
 
The manual is addressed to companies, whose shares, 
unlike those publicly held companies do not trade freely in 
stock markets, either because their shares are held by a 
small number of persons or because they are subject to 
restrictions that limit their transferability. Closely held 
companies normally include family-owned companies, 
private investor-owned companies, joint ventures, and 
privatised companies. 
Analysis of CAF Andean Code of 
Corporate Governance in the 
face of Ecuadorian Company 
Law, BVQ – 2007 
An analysis of the need to implement corporate 
governance practices in Ecuador, especially the adoption 
of the Andean Code taking into account the existing 
regulation in that Country. 
 
Guidelines for an Andean Code 
on Corporate Governance. CAF 
– 2006 
CAF’s corporate governance recommended standards, 
which are to some extent based in the OECD principles 
Corporate governance: What you 
should know as the employer  
The aim is to bring corporate governance issues to non-
specialists. The intention is to show that the subject is not 
academic or complicated. On the other hand, it refers a 
series of guidelines from common sense and experience. 
Case studies of good corporate 
governance practices – IFC, 
OECD – 2005  
Includes a summary of the corporate governance 
implementation process in a group of Latin American 
organisations  
White Paper on Corporate 
Governance in Latin America, 
OECD – 2004 
Using the OECD corporate governance principles as a 
conceptual framework for analysis and discussion, the 
'white paper' examines the importance of good corporate 
governance for the region, considers the trends and 
individuals characteristics and make recommendations for 
the Latin American committee, also set priorities for 
reform 
 
In search of good directors: A 
guide to the formation of 
corporate governance in the 21
st
 
century, CAF – 2003 
 
It is a compilation of corporate governance related articles 
written by academics, international consultants and 
company directors.   
Principles of Good Corporate 
Governance for Peruvian 
Companies, CONVASEV – 2002 
 
The document is recommended to be taken as a good 
practice guide and its implementation as evidence of clear 
capacity for self-determination and self control.  
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Challenges for the New 
Millennium in Latin America: 
Competitiveness, Sustainable 
development and Second-
generation reforms, CAF - 1998 
It is a compendium of the vision on three key issues in the 
current debate in the region: the challenge of sustainable 
development, the challenge of competitiveness and the 
need to emphasize in the equilibrium between different 
forms of financing companies.  
 
Videos 
Good Corporate Governance: 
Professional Management Award 
PROCAPITALES 
Introduction of PROCAPITALES Peruvian corporate 
governance contest and the interviews with 24 company 
directors 
Commitment to Good Corporate 
Governance: POCAPITLES & 
UPC Contest 
Introduction of corporate governance meaning and the 
importance of the adoption good practices by Peruvian 
organisations  
Corporate Governance in 
Ecuador: BVQ  
A summary of recommendations making the case for the 
implementation of corporate governance in Ecuador 
 
Events 
Workshop -Training CG Advisers Speakers: Francisco Prada (Risk Analysis and 
Empresarial Practices); Edgar Suarez Ortiz (Director at 
Suarez Asociados) 
Strategies for Efficient local 
Development 
Speakers from OECD, CAF and the Colombian National 
Planning Department (DNP)   
 
Why Corporate Governance? 
 
Speakers: Francisco Prada (Risk Analysis and 
Entrepreneurial Practices at the Colombian 
Superintendence of Companies); Juan Carlos Herrera 
(CEO Corporation CREO) 
Effective Administration for Family 
Businesses Seminar 
Speakers: Kurt S. Schulzke (Professor of Commercial 
Law and Accounting); Urko Lopez (Lecturer at 
Mondragon University); Gaia Marchisio (Lecturer at Milan 
University) 
Corporate Governance in Family 
Business 
Development, structure and corporate governance in 
family-owned businesses. Among the key speakers there 
were Hernando Ruiz Lopez (acting Colombian Finance 
Superintendent) and Egenio Marulanda (Confecámaras 
Chairman)   
International Seminar about 
Postgraduate Education 
Speakers: Carlos Caballero Argaez (Universidad de los 
Andes (Principal), Cecilia Maria Velez (Colombia 
Education Minister), Andres Bernasconi, Dorothy 
Zimberg, Francisco Miranda, Adriana Jaramillo, David 
Johnstone 
 
International Corporate Governance 
Seminar  
Speakers: Christine Helliar (Dean School of Business, 
University of Dundee); Patricio Peña (Chairman’ BVQ); 
Sonia de Paola Gadmann (CEO AVE) 
Workshop -Training CG Advisers Speakers: Alejandra Ospina Giraldo (CEO, 
ComprometeRSE);  
 
Survey 
Questionnaire distributed among 
the attendants at the 
International Corporate 
Governance seminar 80 
answered questionnaires were 
received 
The respondents to the questionnaire were: 
42 consultants 
22 business persons 
 5 students  
11 others (including those with more than one activity 
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Interviews 
 
   21 Colombian individuals The interviewees were divided in four Groups: 
G1 – Company directors (4) 
G2 – Regulators (4) 
G3 – Independent non-executive directors & Auditors (4) 
G4 – Others (including academics, journalist, investors,    
and other users of company information) (9) 
This table outlines all the data sources used in this research  
 
 
5.3 Summary 
 
This chapter sets out the research methodology and methods supporting the current study.  
The way in which the described methodological approach can be linked to the context and 
concerns of this research has been explored in this chapter. Yet, despite the complexity of 
each of the paradigmatic approaches, there is the feeling that the researcher perspective 
relates closely to the interpretive paradigm. Additionally, there is confidence in that 
viewing the social world as a subjective creation between social actors is the correct 
approach for this doctoral research. This is also important considering that the study is 
qualitative in nature. Therefore this approach will make possible to draw a more complete 
understanding and subjective truth from the research project. This discussion is followed 
by an overview of the research methods which will be used during the investigation. 
Qualitative research methods were used as these will allow the thesis to present a 
comprehensive study into corporate governance in the Latin American Andean Region 
which probes to be issues currently under-researched in the academic literature.  
 
The questions raised with the interviewees were based on the literature review which 
included an identification of the corporate information needs of stakeholders. The case 
study used different methods of data collection to gather additional evidence. Both these 
research methods provided in-depth insights on attitudes and perceptions of respondents 
to a range of issues that straddle corporate governance and institutional investment issues 
in the Latin American Andean region. The results from the interviews with Andean’s 
stakeholders are employed to add to the case study results. Consequently, the findings for 
this study are believed to be more detailed than previous studies which have typically not 
elicited the views of related individuals about the issues being investigated. The next two 
chapters analyse the findings of these semi-structured interviews and the case study.     
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
Semi-structured Interviews  
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the views of Colombian experts to investigate whether 
organisations in the Andean region are implementing corporate governance principles 
because they want: (i) to engage with their stakeholders; (ii) be accountable to all their 
stakeholders; or (iii) show the legitimacy of their activities.  
 
The interviews were conducted over a period of three months, during which twenty-one 
semi-structured interviews were completed. The interviewees were selected with the 
intention of having a group of individuals with the background and experience necessary 
to contribute to the research with authoritative knowledge and interesting perspectives 
relevant to the implementation of corporate governance in the Andean region or at the 
country level; for this reason officials from the organisations in charge of the 
development of corporate governance standards in the region were contacted. Another 
motivation was to speak to regulators, company managers, independent directors, auditors 
and outsiders such as lecturers, investors, journalists and students. In particular the 
interviews concentrated on: (i) general corporate governance issues such as corporate 
governance structure, definitions, attitudes towards corporate governance, board of 
directors’ structure; (ii) stakeholders’ roles in shaping corporate governance; (iii) 
accountability towards stakeholders; and (iv) the legitimisation of corporate practices. 
The data gathered through the interviews was analysed in the theoretical context of 
stakeholders, accountability and legitimacy as laid out in Chapter Four. The method used 
is in line with Creswell’s (2003) approach of using interviews to collect data under 
phenomenology; this data may then be used to describe and interpret a cultural and social 
group. This chapter is complemented by the analysis of information gathered through the 
case study presented in Chapter seven which introduces the developments of corporate 
governance in the Andean region based on the support of the implementation of corporate 
governance principles given by the Andean development corporation (CAF).  
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides details about the interviewees; 
section 6.2 discusses the impact that the 2001 Resolution 275 has had in the development 
of corporate governance in Colombia. Section 6.3 introduces general corporate 
governance from a stakeholder perspective. Section 6.4 presents the interviewees’ 
corporate governance definitions, including the attitude towards corporate governance 
and issues on whether the corporate governance principles should be voluntary or 
strengthened by regulation. Section 6.5 introduces issues about the adoption of corporate 
governance by SMEs and family-owned business. Section 6.6 discusses corporate 
governance in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) versus non-SOEs. Section 6.7 Discuses the 
overlap between CSR and corporate governance. Section 6.8 Introduces corporate 
governance structure, including issues such as board of directors; the need for 
independent directors; remuneration policies; internal controls and risk management; and 
auditors appointment. Section 6.9 summarises and concludes the chapter.  
 
6.1 The interviewees    
 
Twenty-one interviews were conducted in two major Colombian cities, Bogotá and Cali. 
The choice of Bogotá and Cali was premised on the sizeable industrial, commercial and 
service sectors in these cities as evidenced by the significant presence of corporate 
organisations, state-owned enterprises, investors, and representative offices of foreign 
organisations. These interviewees were chosen in the two above mentioned cities and 
were selected because they had a great deal of knowledge about, and experience of, the 
corporate governance implementation process, primarily in Colombia but also at the 
regional level, as the majority of them had taken part in activities undertaken by 
international organisations such as CAF, OECD, CIPE, and BID, helping companies in 
the Andean region make informed decisions when they choose to implement corporate 
governance. For example, the regulators interviewed included officials at the 
Superintendence33 of Finance, which is the organisation which overlooks financial 
institutions in Colombia; there were also officials at the Superintendence of Companies 
which overlooks companies in other sectors of the Colombian economy. An official from 
                                                 
33 Superintendence is governmental offices in charge of the administration of a specific bureaucratic 
function. For example the function of the Superintendence of Finance was to deal with the state expenses. 
This sort of organisation is dated from the French ‘Ancient regime’ or the government before the French 
revolution. The term Superintendence is commonly used through all Latin America. 
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one of the Colombian Chambers of Commerce was also interviewed as these 
organisations are some of the principal promoters of corporate governance principles by 
Colombian companies. Several interviewees were contacted following recommendations 
from those who had already been interviewed. Additionally, some interviewees were 
invited to participate after meeting them at events attended by the researcher. Most of the 
interviews lasted between three quarters of an hour and one hour, two of them lasted one 
and a half hours. Most of the interviews were conducted during the working day at the 
interviewees’ offices and recorded with the interviewees’ consent. Two interviews were 
conducted at a coffee shop outside working hours; this made it difficult to tape these two 
interviews. All the interviews were carried out in Spanish. 
 
The interviewees for the whole study (Interview Chapter and Case Study Chapter) were 
grouped into seven categories. The first four categories are used to group the individuals 
whose interviews are discussed in this chapter (see Table 6.1); these four groups are: G1 
Managers and CEOs; G2 Regulators; G3 Independent board directors and auditors; and 
G4 outsiders including academics, investors and other users of organisations’ financial 
and other information. The remaining three categories are integrated for individuals 
whose views are discussed in Chapter seven, they are as follows: G5 CAF’s Staff; G6 
CAF’s Counterparts; and G7 Managers from CAF’s Pilot Study Companies. The 
interviewees were assigned codes, so that their identity would remain anonymous. A 
summary of the interviewees’ background information is provided in Table 6.1. This table 
shows some of the characteristics about the interviewees. Their gender (male (M), female 
(F)); function (which relates to their employment position); the size of the organisation 
they work for; the economic sector to which the organisations belong; and the interviewee 
group as explained above. 
 
A review of the information presented in Table 6.1 revels that a majority of the 
interviewees (80%) hold a senior position, thus their views should offer thoughtful 
insights about the implementation of corporate governance principles in Colombia. The 
table also indicates that there is not a big difference among male and female interviewees 
(9 women and 12 men) and that most interviewees (85.8%) are employed in large 
organisations; two of them (9.5%) are from small firms; and only one is from a medium-
sized organisation.   
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Table 6.1 Interviewees  
Note: This table shows some of interviewees’ characteristics, their job title, gender distinguishes male (M) 
from female (F) interviewees, function relates to their occupation, the size, and the economic sector in 
which the organisation is categorised. The interviewees were also grouped in four categories: G1 Manages 
and CEOs, G2 Regulators, G3 Independent Directors, Auditors and Accounting Firms, and G4 Users, 
Academics and Investors. 
(1) EEB – Empresa de Energia de Bogotá (Bogotá Electricity Supplier); (2) RSE, is the Spanish for CSR.   
 
The inclusion of a high number of outsiders (42.8%, of those interviewed) is justified by 
the degree of understanding these individuals have about corporate governance issues, as 
they are people who have hold different positions at diverse business organisations. For 
example, the lecturers are all directors of research and consultative offices within their 
organisations. Furthermore, some of them have been members of government committees 
Interviewee Gender Function Organisation 
size 
Sector Group 
A1 F Director EEB (1) 
Foundation 
Large Electricity 
transport 
G1 
A2 F Shareholders 
liaison officer  
Large Telecom G1 
A3 M Director RSE (2) Large Finance G1 
A4 F CG Director  Large Manufacture G1 
A5 F Director of RSE &  
Communications  
Large Business 
association 
G1 
A6 F CEO RS Magazine  Medium Media-Journal G1 
A7 F Ex- Company 
Director 
Large Financial 
Institution 
G1 
A8 F Judicial Vice 
President  
Large Chambers 
Commerce  
G2 
A9 M CG Supervisor N/A Regulator G2 
A10 M CG Supervisor N/A Regulator G2 
A11 M Director CG 
program 
Large Governmental 
Institution 
G2 
A12 M Audit Director Small Audit firm G3 
A13 M Independent 
Director 
Large Business 
advisor 
G3 
A14 M Independent 
Director 
Large Companies 
association 
G3 
A15 M Independent 
Director 
Small Business 
advisor 
G3 
A16 F Senior lecturer Large Higher 
education 
G4 
A17 M Senior lecturer Large Higher 
education 
G4 
A18 F Senior lecturer Large Higher 
education 
G4 
A19 M Senior lecturer Large Higher 
education  
G4 
A20 M Senior lecturer  Large Higher 
education 
G4 
A21 F Post-graduate 
Student 
Large Higher 
education 
G4 
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set up previously in the country to develop corporate governance principles. Another key 
point to mention from the tables is that amongst the interviewees are three individuals (in 
G3) who combine appointments as independent non-executive directors at some 
organisations with full-time or part-time employment as academics, advisers, or directors 
at different organisations. Equally, the post-graduate student had recently completed her 
dissertation examining corporate governance issues in Colombia, and it was expected to 
gain some insight about her experience undertaking this kind of study in the country.   
 
To conduct the interviews, a semi-structured interview questionnaire was used that 
included questions of be asked to all the interviewees and then five specific group 
questions addressed to individuals in each group. These questionnaires were designed to 
give some direction to the interviews and to ensure that all relevant information was 
gathered; copies of the questionnaire with versions in English and Spanish are included in 
Appendices 5.1 and 5.2. Although the questionnaires gave a focal point to the interview 
process, it was possible to encourage interviewees to discuss more openly their views, 
experiences, perceptions and opinions regarding the implementation of corporate 
governance in the Andean region and in particular in Colombia. The questionnaire was 
divided into five sections. The first section asked some background details about each 
interviewee. The second section of the semi-structured questionnaire was aimed to find 
out to what extent the interviewees were aware of developments in the implementation of 
corporate governance principles in Colombia. In order to examine Colombian 
stakeholders’ understanding of corporate governance the interviewees were free to 
express their definitions of corporate governance; equally interviewees’ views about 
setbacks, improvements, benefits and any other issues affecting the adoption of corporate 
governance in the country were asked. Section three aimed to find out the interviewees’ 
views about particular corporate governance issues, such as the board of directors, board 
committees, internal control and risk management. The fourth section included questions 
about stakeholders’ roles influencing corporate governance in their organisations. Finally 
section five included questions asking whether companies adopted corporate governance 
principles to show accountability to their stakeholders and/or to legitimate their activities. 
 
It is important to note that, although a questionnaire was used to conduct the semi-
structured interviews, the respondents were given the freedom to speak freely about the 
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issues and expand their responses in the way they considered appropriate. Moreover, 
several of the interviewees expanded their responses using information taken from books, 
magazines, articles or leaflets, written in some cases by themselves or consulting their 
laptops, during the interviews and justifies the degree of detail of the data obtained at the 
interviews.   
 
6.2 Corporate governance developments in Colombia  
 
According to all of the interviewees, the private sector has played a key role in the effort 
to implement corporate governance practices in Colombia. The interviewees noted 
programs coordinated by Confecámaras and the Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC) to 
promote corporate governance have had a great impact. Both programs have received 
technical assistance from international institutions such as the Andean Development 
Corporation (CAF), the Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), Inter American Development Bank (IADB), and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Different 
activities, mostly jointly held by some of the above mentioned organisations, have been 
used to support the implementation of corporate governance standards at different 
companies.  
 
Interviewees A13 (Independent director) and A20 (senior lecturer) summarised corporate 
governance practice in Colombia as the product of many factors, and that these practices 
are cemented in four corporate governance codes: the Confecámaras Code34 (2001), 
targeting listed companies; the SME Code of Corporate Governance (2003) issued by a 
committee formed by Confecámaras and the Ministry of Commerce, which is addressed 
to small and medium enterprises; the Andean Code (first version, 2005) issued by CAF, 
targeting listed and non listed companies in all Andean Countries; and the new Colombia 
Corporate Governance Code (Country Code) – ‘Codigo País’ (May 2007) issued by a 
committee formed by the Superintendence of Finance and a group of private 
organisations, addressed to listed companies. According to them the development of 
corporate governance codes in the country has been strongly influenced by regulations 
                                                 
34 This code was written for a private sector committee integrated by: Asofondos (National Association of 
Pension Funds); BVC; Spencer Stuart; Universidad de los Andes; ICESI; Universidad Externado de 
Colombia; Bogotá and Cartagena Chamber of Commerce; Revista Dinero; KPMG; and Confecámaras.   
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specifically: Law 222 (1995); Resolution 275 (2001); Law 795 (2003); Law 964 (2005); 
and Decree 3923 (2006).  
 
Equally, Interviewees A13 (Independent director) and A16 (senior lecturer) noted that the 
first corporate governance standard in Colombia originated in the 1971 Commercial 
Code, modified in 1995 by Law 222, that mandated some practices of corporate 
governance in the legal framework; all of these compulsory rules govern both Colombian 
public and private companies. According to Interviewee A20 (senior lecturer), the most 
relevant rules for corporate governance are: (i) standards defining directors’ duties; (ii) 
the compulsory mechanisms for the election of boards of directors ‘couciente electoral’; 
(iii) rules for disclosing financial and non-financial information; (iv) distance voting; (v) 
protection of institutional investors; and  (vi) parent-subsidiary rules. 
 
Interviewee A12 argued that regulations, laws or voluntary codes may help to create an 
effective business environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing 
countries such as Colombia. Private-led initiatives preceded and even shaped public laws. 
From the information provided by the interviewees it can be inferred that they rank rules, 
principles and corporate governance standards according to their knowledge and 
experience. For example the corporate governance rules listed by Interviewee A20 above, 
focus on a narrow view, as those rules are basic in the relationship between management 
and a company’s owners or shareholders.    
 
According to all the interviewees the Colombian Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce (Confecámaras) has been a leading organisation encouraging the 
implementation of corporate governance in the country. At the beginning of 2001, 
Confecámaras supported by CAF, IFC, CIPE and OECD, started to promote the OECD 
Principles of Corporate governance in Colombia and Interviewees A8 (regulator) and 
A12 (auditor) mentioned that the objective was to create an awareness of the importance 
of corporate governance for the economic development of the country.          
 
Interviewee A13 (Independent director), noted that in May 2001 Colombia adopted a 
systematic approach to encourage corporate governance in the capital markets. All the 
regulators believed that the legal approach given by Resolution 275, June 2001 has both 
strengths and weaknesses. One of the advantages is that the introduction of corporate 
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governance requires a shared responsibility between investors, companies and 
supervisors. 
 
Some aspects of Resolution 275/2001 deal with the protection of stakeholders’ rights as 
the principal government objective was to ensure that companies seeking to attract 
investment from pension funds were governed in a way that the funds invested were not 
at risk. Additionally companies wanting to attract investment from pension funds opted to 
comply with the regulation as a sign that they were creditable to receive funds from 
institutional investors. This is to say companies may be abiding by resolution 275 to show 
their legitimacy to one particular stakeholder – institutional investors. 
 
However, Interviewee A7 (Ex-company director) noted a positive aspect of Resolution 
275 and argued that it did not establish guidelines of what was considered  “good” 
governance practice and that the broad language used made every practice acceptable. 
She also pointed as the requirement to include the governance provisions in company by-
laws resulted in some company corporate governance codes consisting merely of a long 
description of these by-laws or just duplicated corporate law. In this respect companies 
may adopt corporate governance provisions just to be seen as legitimate organisations 
when in fact they may not really care about corporate governance in practice.     
 
According to an independent director (Interviewee A13) and a senior lecturer 
(Interviewee A20) at the end of 2001, in response to resolution 275, Confecámaras, 
formed a private sector committee to establish a general benchmark code on corporate 
governance; both A13 and A20were members of that committee. The code was based on 
the OECD Principles and included practices taken from developed country legal systems. 
Interviewee A8 (regulator) described the building of the Confecámaras’ code in the 
following terms: 
“The inspiration came directly from CIPE; they knew the importance of 
having a best practice code to promote corporate governance. The challenge 
was creating a consensus within the private sector because the concept of 
governance was completely unknown. Resolution 275 created at that time a 
negative reaction in some Colombian business associations; for this reason it 
was agreed with the Superintendence of Finance that the government should 
not be part of the committee to create the code”.     
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Interviewee A13 (independent director) explained a program by BVC and IADB at the 
end of 2002 to strengthen corporate governance and the Colombian Capital markets. He 
noted: 
“The objectives were to improve disclosure of financial information and 
establish more effective requirements for corporate governance of all firms 
that traded on the Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC)”. 
 
Since then the BVC has played a leading role in the promotion of corporate governance 
within listed companies. The BVC plays a regulator role and as such the regulators 
interviewed promote corporate governance only within a narrow approach as the BVC is 
the entity that oversees listed companies in the country; therefore rules are addressed 
primarily to the relationship between managers and shareholders who are not involve in 
the daily running of the company they have invested in. For listed companies 
accountability is also mostly from board members to shareholders according to 
Interviewees A9 and A10. Nevertheless, the BVC recently has been promoting the 
implementation of corporate governance in all sorts of companies independently, whether 
listed or not.      
 
According to Interviewees A13 (Independent director) and A20 (senior lecturer), the new 
Securities Market Law (Law 964), created a complete set of corporate governance rules 
and Interviewee E6 (regulator) stated: 
“Once the Securities Market Law was approved, in June 2005, the required 
step was to create a governance standard for the elements that were not 
included in the law. Resolution 275 lacks establishing a benchmark and the 
approach of corporate governance requires more cultural developments and 
market incentives…..It was realized that a ‘comply or explain’ system could 
help the regulator to achieve two important objectives: create consensus within 
the private sector through the development of a best-practice code, and 
encourage the self-regulatory vision of corporate governance in the market”.       
 
Interviewee A16 (senior lecturer) agreed with this view and declared:   
“It was a step forward to promote voluntary implementation in the capital 
market and create awareness within the investor community about the 
importance of corporate governance. Resolution 275 helped to open the 
discussion and analysis about corporate governance, and this assists 
companies to understand the benefits of implementing best practices”.  
 
Interviewees A8, A12, A13 and A17 mentioned that, six years after the successful 
introduction of Resolution 275 in 2001, the economic and political environment for 
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corporate governance had changed as it was then necessary to adapt the model to the 
economic realities of the Colombian capital markets. For these reasons a new committee 
was formed and this committee issued the actual Colombian corporate governance code 
named ‘Codigo Pais’ – The Country Code. Interviewees A9 and A10 (regulators) identify 
the Country Code as a common effort between the government and the private sector as 
Interviewee A10 explains: 
“The Country Code was conceived as a document that gathered a series of 
voluntary recommendations accorded by consensus and it was intended not 
only to unify the different standards of the market, but to really elevate them, 
in order to eliminate asymmetries created by past regulation that only make 
obligatory these measures to companies wanting to receive investment from 
institutional investors [Pension Funds]. The Colombian experience 
demonstrates that the elaboration of standards in a consensus-building fashion 
generates the necessary conviction and commitment among target 
organisations”.          
 
Interviewee A13 (Independent director) explained that the model chosen was ‘comply or 
explain’ and is organised in four chapters and includes forty-one practices. Interviewee 
A16 (senior lecturer) mentioned that the document required a long process of negotiation 
and intense work from the Superintendence of Finance that led the process by the 
committee. The Superintendence received help from CAF that hired an international 
consultant and publicised the results of the document.  Interviewee A13 (Independent 
director) explained: 
“The code is mainly based on practices included in the Andean Corporate 
Governance Code issued by CAF in 2006. However, during meetings, every 
committee member presented arguments and proposed new practices to adapt 
the Country Code to Colombian realities. Special consideration was given to 
other national codes, such as the OECD White Paper on Corporate 
Governance in Latin America, as well as country experiences of Mexico, Peru, 
Spain and the UK”. 
 
The Country Code is voluntarily adopted by securities issuers, who report their adherence 
to its measures. However, in the case of non compliance with any practice, companies do 
not have to report their reasons. Interviewee A20 (senior lecturer) described three 
elements of the code: 
 
(i) It is completely voluntary; every company can adopt its own model of 
corporate governance using the code; 
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(ii) The Superintendence of Finance requires companies to make annual public 
disclosures of their corporate governance practices 
 
‘Explaining’ is voluntary; there is no obligation for companies’ to report reasons for non 
compliance with any of the practices. However, the disclosure requirement is supposed to 
create a strong incentive to improve corporate governance practices by Colombian 
securities issuers. 
 
The Colombian Código País, unlike other corporate governance initiatives in the country 
is aimed at a broader group of stakeholders, and not just to the relationship between 
managers and owners. The document refers to three kinds of relationships that may be 
addressed by the principles: the relationship between managers and shareholders; 
majority and minority shareholders; and the organisation and its stakeholders. Equally, it 
is expected that the corporate governance structures of companies will generate 
accountability, responsibility ant transparency; and at the same time promote ‘stability, 
security and truth’.  Therefore, it is possible that, there are those who still believe that 
corporate governance is about managers and owners only and not wider stakeholders. 
However, the most recent corporate governance approach in Colombia is supporting a 
broad focus with accountability to all stakeholders; also organisations are advised to 
adopt the principles if they want to legitimise their activities. Nevertheless, most of the 
interviewees agree that a change of culture is needed to achieve this new corporate 
governance approach.       
 
6.3 Stakeholders’ perspectives 
 
Company supervisors, among others, in the country have started to recommend the 
adoption of corporate governance to all kinds of companies; the focus has moved beyond 
listed companies and has taken an approach close to a stakeholder view; in most cases 
this is accepting the idea that shareholders are just another stakeholder group. 
Interviewees also suggested that companies have the intention to show accountability to a 
wider range of stakeholders. According to Interviewee A8 (regulator), Colombia has 
generated a great awareness of what it means to implement Corporate Governance 
principles, and today many organisations have decided to add such guidelines in addition 
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to listed companies and entities under the supervision of the Superintendence of Finance, 
which have a legal obligation to do so. 
 
The supporters of a more inclusive approach to stakeholders of an organisation 
(Interviewees A1, A3, A13, A15, and A21) regard shareholders as just one of a number of 
important stakeholders groups such as employees customers, suppliers, government and 
the local community, that have a financial interest in, and are affected by, that company’s 
success or failure. According to Interviewee A13 (Independent director): 
“In the same way that a company owes especial duties to its investors, it 
equally has different duties to various stakeholders groups”  
 
Likewise, Interviewee A3 (company director) and Interviewee A15 (Independent 
director) mentioned that organisations and their managers have a special obligation to 
ensure that the shareholders receive a “fair” return on their investment; but organisations 
also have special obligations to other stakeholders, which go above and beyond those 
required by law. Interviewee A15 also stated that if there is a conflict of interest between 
the shareholders and stakeholders, the demands of some of them must be scarified in 
order to fulfil basic obligations to other stakeholders.  
 
Generally, most interviewees agreed that the corporate governance framework should 
include mechanisms to encourage the participation of stakeholders in the long-term future 
of organisations. To achieve these, stakeholders need to be aware of their rights and 
responsibilities. This is evidence of a broad view of corporate governance in engaging 
stakeholders, and making them aware of their rights to hold organisations accountable 
and to demand legitimacy. Accordingly, Interviewee A17 (Senior lecturer) pointed out: 
“Stakeholders have the power to demand certain behaviours of companies in 
matters such as environmental issues, labour rights, responsible investment 
and the supply of safe products and services”.  
    
From the view expressed by a group of interviewees (A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A13, A14, 
A17, A20 and A21) it is possible to infer that they show some agreement with the idea 
that organisations are increasingly called to take into account the concerns of a wider 
group of stakeholders that may be affected by the organisations’ activities; this to some 
extent answers the first research question of whether corporate governance is viewed 
from a broad stakeholder perspective. It also accepted that stakeholders have a legitimate 
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interest in the organisation’s business and products because they have a statutory 
requirement to do so on behalf of the public good. This is a signal of the trend to engage 
stakeholders in corporate governance, and also seeing the implementation of good 
practices as a way to give legitimacy to the activities of a company. Equally, this refers to 
the third research question of whether organisations in the region implement corporate 
governance because they want to legitimate their activities. This view agrees with 
Mitchell et al. (1997) who defined legitimacy as the extent to which an organisation’s 
relationship with its stakeholders is socially accepted and expected.  
 
6.4 Corporate governance factors  
 
Corporate governance has been defined in many different ways around the world, and it is 
no different in the Andean region. In this section the evidence from the interviewees is 
provides definitions that range from a narrow view to a much broader approach to those 
who even take a CSR focus. For example, this section shows that some interviewees 
concentrate narrowly on owners’ concerns and give little attention to legitimacy or 
accountability to stakeholders. Others focus not just on owners, but also on the interests 
of other stakeholders such as creditors, investors, analysts, auditors, and corporate 
regulators. Such wider concerns reflect a stakeholder approach. In addition, other parties 
may be involved in corporate relationships such as unions, trade associations, government 
and even political groups reflecting a stakeholder focus and the importance of a company 
having accountability towards all stakeholders. These interviewees have more a CSR 
focus and for them company accountability and legitimacy towards stakeholders is very 
important.  
 
A7, A8, A9, A12 interviewees purely repeated Cadbury (1992) and defined corporate 
governance as the system by which companies are directed and controlled. For example 
Interviewee A7 (regulator) stated: 
“Corporate governance should not be seen just as a compilation of best 
practice recommendations for having healthy companies, or for making it 
possible for a company to go public, or to help organisations have the best 
international standards. Corporate governance is the set of rules through which 
a company is directed and controlled, either individually or within an 
economic group”.  
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A group of interviewees (A1, A2, A3, A5, A12, A15, A17, and A20), agreed that 
corporate governance covers the general set of principles, customs, regulations, habits, 
and laws that determine the manner in which a company should be run but with a broad 
focus. For example Interviewee A15 (Independent director) gave the following definition: 
“Corporate governance is the set of rules and practices that govern the 
relationship between the managers and shareholders of organisations, as well 
as stakeholders like employees and creditors; it contributes to growth and 
financial stability by underpinning market confidence, financial market 
integrity and economic efficiency”.   
 
Interviewees A1, A3, A5, A15 and A20 focus on the processes used to direct and manage 
the business and affairs of a company to provide an explanation about corporate 
governance and its implementation. This focus is narrower corporate governance view 
where greater importance is given to shareholders. 
 
According to Interviewees A9 and A10, who are both regulators, better corporate 
governance may result from effective accountability, which introduces discipline to 
management and facilitates the exercise of shareholders’ rights. Officially, managers are 
held accountable for their performance, at least at the end of each year. They must submit 
an annual report to the General Assembly. The report should detail the stewardship of the 
business from a legal, economic and administrative point of view. Interviewee A9 
mentioned that is for the Assembly to approve the report. The Superintendence of 
Finance needs to ensure that the process of accountability is developed. A narrow 
corporate governance view is mostly shared by regulators; they generally believe that 
companies are primarily accountable to their shareholders or owners. 
 
Interviewees A6, A16, A18, and A20 believe that corporate governance provides a 
structure that works for the benefit of every one concerned by ensuring that a company 
adheres to acceptable ethical standards and best practices as well. Interviewees A1, A3, 
A6, A17, A18, and A21 also added that the governance framework is there to encourage 
the efficient use of resources and to require accountability by management to align the 
interest of individuals, companies and society. The incentive to companies, and to those 
who own and manage them, to adopt corporate governance standards is that these 
standards may help them achieve their corporate aims and to attract investment. The 
incentive for the adoption by state-owned enterprises is that these standards may 
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strengthen the economy and discourage fraud and mismanagement. Viewed as such, 
corporate governance represents a centre upon which companies’ actions and the 
collection of stakeholder interests can be balanced. Also some consideration is showed of 
the rights of other stakeholders. For example, Interviewee A15, an Independent director, 
provides the following explanation:    
“The implementation of principles, rules or standards for the management of 
companies, allows the scope of its corporate objectives and its ongoing 
evaluation to provide a platform for protecting investors. It is a set of 
mechanisms and tools available to the directors of a company enabling them 
to maximize corporate and shareholder value. Corporate governance 
recognises and makes possible the exercise of the rights of shareholders, 
investors and others with an interest in the company, and establishes duties 
and responsibilities of boards in the attainment of such rights”.  
 
Equally, Interviewee A20 (Post grad student) defined corporate governance as:  
“The internal system set by the shareholders to manage and control their 
company with transparency, objectivity, professionalism and fairness, to 
protect and increase successfully, over time, the value of their investment and 
protect their shareholders. In short, it is the act of taking morally responsible 
rules to increase the value of their investment, without abandoning other 
sources of success, and their stakeholders”. 
 
Additionally, Interviewees A3, A5, A12, and A15 mentioned the relationship between 
corporate governance and social responsibility issues. Interviewees A3, A5, A6, and A18 
argued that corporate governance and CSR can be dealt with together. For example 
Interviewee A18 (senior lecturer) mentioned that a company may have a well formed 
programme in place, which would probably take care of most CSR issues. Equally, 
Interviewee A5 (company director) expressed her view about corporate governance as 
follows: 
“It is a subject of growing interest in the world and new in the region, good 
corporate governance practices can contribute to increased competitiveness 
may also be important for mobilising financial resources and development of 
clusters. The growing attention to other business-related agents such as 
suppliers, customers, community, etc. is taken also as a bridge to implement 
corporate social responsibility”. 
 
The definitions given by the interviewees showed a constant pattern where the regulators 
generally expressed a narrow view, seeing corporate governance only related to 
owners/shareholders and their managers and possibly extended just to include minority 
shareholders. There is also the view of company directors who have a wider corporate 
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governance focus as they included all company stakeholders in their corporate definition. 
There are also those who have CSR focus, their view also includes the social 
responsibility organisations have towards their all stakeholders; this group includes 
company outsiders, specifically those Group (4) who are academics, students and 
investors, also some independent and company directors share this view. 
 
The breakdown of issues that featured most prominently in the definition of corporate 
governance given by the interviewees is shown in Table 6.2.  
 
Table 6.2 Summary of issues used to define corporate governance 
 
No List of issues No of 
interviewees* 
% 
1 Provides a way to discharge a company’s social 
responsibility.   
 
12 
 
57.1 
2 The disclosure of relevant information and protection of 
minority shareholders. 
 
11 
 
52.4 
3 Recognises and makes possible the exercise of 
stakeholders’ rights. 
 
10 
 
47.6 
4 Formal and informal that govern a company 9 42.9 
5 A set of mechanisms and tools for decision-making 
available to the directors of a company. 
 
8 
 
38.1 
6 Transparency and accountability to stakeholders. 7 33.3 
7 The set of rules through which a company is directed and 
controlled. 
 
6 
 
28.6 
8 The act of taking morally responsible rules to increase the 
value of shareholders’ investment without abandoning the 
interest of company’s stakeholders.  
 
6 
 
28.6 
9 A way to enhance company’s legitimacy  5 23.8 
10 A platform for protecting investors. 4 19.0 
Note: this table summarises some of the statements used by Colombian interviewees to 
express a meaning for corporate governance.  
 
*No of interviewees correspond to the number of the individuals within the 21 who took 
part in the semi-structure interviews that mention each specific issue the percentage 
correspond to the proportion of those who mention the issue in relation to the 21 individuals 
interviewed. 
 
These issues are broadly consistent with the definitions of corporate governance, 
stakeholders, accountability and legitimacy introduced in chapters 2 and 4, and suggests 
that interviewees’ notions on these issues are consistent with widely held views of 
corporate governance from a stakeholder perspective; a mechanism for discargig an 
organisation’s social responsibility; and that corporate governance should promote 
disclosure and transparency. Essentially, the views of the majority of the interviewees 
reflect the incorporation of social responsibility into the corporate governance framework, 
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attempting to develop organisations’ strategies that meet the approval of companies’ 
stakeholders and commitments to organisations’ responsibility and accountability.   
 
6.4.1 Attitude towards corporate governance 
 
Interviewees A3, A8, A15, A17, A18 and A21 mentioned that one obstacle to the 
implementation of corporate governance standards was the culture of non-disclosure by 
individuals. According to Interviewee A3 (Company director) people do not believe they 
must disclose information about their businesses, even if it is non-confidential 
information, Interviewee A3 mentioned: 
“This occurs in all areas, for example individuals wishing to have good 
practices if told they are required to submit a report even said that they will be 
graded according to the report content and characteristics, they are not 
interested because there is not a culture to meet standards this also makes it 
difficult for attracting foreign investment to the country. Thus, it is advisable 
to adjust cultural issues first”.  
 
Equally, Interviewee A19 (Senior lecturer) argued: 
 
“I believe that Latinos have a culture very difficult for these issues and this 
especially for the Andean countries where I think the issue is complicated”.  
 
However, Interviewee A6 (Company director) mentioned that there are some companies 
that have a culture of transparency, and the market is pushing in that direction, and this 
will raise company values (share values) based on the consistency of its management, and 
the adoption of best practices. Similarly, Interviewee A4 (Company director) stated: 
“The market should be responsible. In Colombia we need to have responsible 
consumers, which in turn will serve as a control for organisations to be 
accountable. In other words to have good corporate governance, it is the 
market or the consumer who ultimately rewards organisations who act 
responsibly, those organisations whose management have good practices”. 
 
According to Interviewees A1, A3, A4, A8 and A14, awareness on the need to implement 
corporate governance practices in Colombian companies has grown over the last few 
decades, and the issue is now much better received. Colombia, as with other Andean 
countries, possesses a unique set of corporate governance and market characteristic such 
as: a predominance of conglomerates and highly-concentrated, family-based ownership 
structures and the domestic capital market being at an early stage of development. This 
poses a challenge to attracting investors and elevates the importance of governance 
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practices such as ensuring that minority shareholders are confident enough to invest in 
listed companies by enhancing the protection of their rights and interests. Stories of 
successful privatisations linked with good corporate governance, such as the case of 
ECOPETROL, were brought up by the interviewees.  
 
Interviewees A3, A6, A12, A13, A16, A17 and A21 mentioned the importance of the 
work of those promoting good practices in the country and in the Andean region. There 
have been diverse efforts to convince companies and individuals to engage with all their 
stakeholders and the importance of accountability and legitimating organisations 
activities. In this regard, Interviewee A17 (regulator) pointed out: 
“In Colombia the culture to hold companies accountable does not exist. 
Currently there are some initiatives to make individuals aware of their rights; 
the aim is to provide tools and training to the final consumer to learn to look 
for companies that meet certain standards such as environmental and social 
protection, respect employees rights, obey the rules, pay in time their dues, 
prepare to disclose information and so on”. 
 
The current knowledge and interest in corporate governance has expanded, contrary to the 
situation in 2001. At that time, according to Interviewees A2, A7, A12, A13 and A20 
there were no codes of corporate governance in the Colombian market and the concept of 
corporate governance was unknown to the majority of company managers. Interviewee 
A2 (Company director) noted that the first corporate governance survey in 2001 asked 
companies about their practices to find the extent to which they complied with 
international corporate governance standards; it showed that the average company scored 
just 34 out of 100. Interviewee A13 (Independent director) argued that the 2001 survey 
showed some good features such as CEO and chairman duality, board size and board 
independence; but it showed that more diffusion of the topic was needed. Larger firms 
were the most enlightened on the subject, however, their practices were not ideal, but at 
least they had a corporate governance code, board committees, and audit function. 
Further, there was a reaction to the scandals of large corporations such as Enron, Parmalat 
and WorldCom, among others as Interviewee A13 expressed:  
“These scandals increased people’s mistrust in companies; so many times 
humanity only learns after looking at painful episodes. Anyway here in 
Colombia, little by little, at a rather slow pace, corporate governance practices 
are getting through to the business sector”. 
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Equally, circumstances external to the country are contributing to achieving a change in 
stakeholders’ mentality as Interviewee A5 (company director) mentioned: 
“Stakeholders do not press [for better governance] because we are not 
accustomed to do it, but gradually, as a result of globalisation pressures, 
interest groups are learning from those in other parts of the globe”. 
 
6.4.2 Voluntary versus mandatory corporate governance codes 
 
Regarding the willingness of organisations to adopt corporate governance some 
interviewees argue that a significant part of the Colombian corporate governance system 
is built upon voluntary standards. Colombia, like most Latin American countries, uses a 
‘comply or explain’ mechanism. Basic corporate governance rules (such as elect annually 
a board of directors, the election of board member should be done under specific rules, 
the board should elect a chairperson, and others) contains both mandatory and voluntary 
provisions, but a second layer of corporate governance legislation is premised only on 
voluntary compliance (such as having a corporate governance code, independent 
members on the board, board committees, among others). According to Interviewees A7, 
A12 and A18 this requires appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and institutional 
foundations. A variety of factors, including business law and accounting standards can 
affect market integrity and overall economic performance. Regulators need to be aware of 
legal and institutional impediments to sound corporate governance, and to take steps to 
promote the effective foundations for corporate governance where it is within their legal 
authority to do so. Interviewee A18 (senior lecturer) reflected this view when he stated 
that:  
“Corporate governance is a dimension of regulation and / or self-regulation 
which has an effect on access to capital and financing, but also affects 
relations with other stakeholders”.   
 
Likewise, Interviewees A11, A14, A16, and A20 argued that more than regulations, laws, 
or voluntary codes, enforcement is important in creating an effective business 
environment and good corporate governance, at least in developing countries and 
transition economies. Equally, interviewees maintained that a framework was needed to 
help explain the impact on corporate governance when rules are not enforced, and what 
can be done to improve corporate governance in weak enforcement environments. For 
example Interviewee A20 (senior lecturer) pointed out that: 
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“The Challenge of the new code, as in most emerging economies, is related to 
enforcement and how to accommodate new initiatives with pre-existing 
regulations. The new model of corporate governance should strengthen the 
Colombian capital markets, bring in new issuers to the market and facilitate 
local and international investment”.   
 
In relation to the regulatory framework, Interviewee A10 (Independent director) 
explained that in Colombia the private sector has played an active leadership role with the 
regulator with voluntary codes that are ‘self-regulatory’ frameworks that are better 
accepted when designed by those who help to implement them. Thus, the private sector is 
positioned as the main actor since a regulator-led code might generate reluctance from the 
companies concerned. In this respect Interviewee E1 (company director) pointed out: 
“The code is a very good document that reflects the working conditions and 
commitments to society, but there is no entity or authority enforcing 
compliance, and the only one who can come to claim any breach is the 
shareholder”. 
 
According to Interviewee A9 (regulator), in countries such as Colombia amid a pattern of 
concentrated ownership structures where majority shareholders have significant influence 
on boards and may extract private benefits at the expense of minority owners corporate 
governance should aim to protect shareholders rights, enhance disclosure and 
transparency, facilitate effective functioning of the board and provide an efficient legal 
and regulatory enforcement framework. This narrow corporate governance focus is 
addressed with a mix of company law, stock exchange listing rules and self-regulatory 
codes.   
 
Nevertheless, a ‘comply or explain’ approach adopted in Colombia differs to some degree 
from the system used in others parts of the world. As explained by Interviewee A8 
(regulator), the current Colombian corporate governance code prescribes a ‘voluntary 
explanation’ model in which a company may merely answer “no” if it does not 
implement a specific measure. Companies are asked to disclose whether they comply or 
not with each of the measures of the Code. If they comply with the measure they are 
required to provide an explanation describing the manner and mechanisms by which 
compliance is ensured. If they are not complying with the measure, companies do not 
have to explain why. Interviewee A13 (Independent director) pointed out that, in this 
case, the active involvement of the private sector in the process of issuing a code led to 
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the consensus of the voluntary approach, but the fact is that companies can choose to 
disclose or not where it complies or departs from the code’s recommendations.  As 
mentioned above the decision to voluntarily adopt corporate governance has been 
influenced by dimensions such as ownership issues, capital structure, and market 
requirements. Voluntary mechanisms allow organisations to decide individually regarding 
their individual needs and give them flexibility to adjust to best practices and new 
developments. Interviewees A1, A3, A4, A7, A10, A13, A16, A19, and A21 agreed that 
voluntary governance recommendations should go beyond the minimum legal and 
regulatory requirements by providing guidance on issues for which it is not possible to 
regulate, or to be more oriented toward companies not covered by the law. Interviewee 
A7 (researcher) pointed out that:  
“There should be a special emphasis on enforcement aimed to facilitate a real 
implementation for companies and improve the level of information required 
to assess corporate governance issues for investors, rating agencies and the 
media”.  
 
Interviewees A7, A9, 10, and A11 talked about the extent to which Colombian companies 
voluntarily adopt corporate governance standards, and pointed out that ownership 
structure, investment opportunities, and external financing are influential determinants of 
governance practices and that the strength of their influence depends in part on the 
country’s legal environment. For example interviewee A10 (regulator) mentioned: 
“Corporate governance faces a big problem, as there is not a strong 
enforcement system on corporate governance standards, companies can decide 
what standards to comply with and what not to. This is why we are trying to 
sell to organisations under the Superintendence supervision the idea that even 
though corporate governance principles are not compulsory, complying with 
them may be beneficial for the company. And if a company does not comply 
it might be punished by the market. For example, customers may choose to be 
associated only with those organisations that apply good corporate governance 
practices. The risk rating agencies are now reporting those with good 
corporate governance and those without”. 
 
Mandatory rules may offer stronger protection to stakeholders, especially investors, but 
they are inherently inflexible and not appropriate for all companies. Voluntary rules, on 
the other hand, raise questions of compliance. The explanation for non-compliance with a 
code provision must be reasonable. The regulators interviewed recognised that non-
compliance may be justified in particular circumstances if good governance can be 
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achieved by other means. A clear and well-founded explanation which supports actions to 
enhance the long-term value of the company should be acceptable to stakeholders.  
 
Others, such as Interviewee A7 (Ex-company director), argued that a partially-enabling 
governance regime, and particularly one with mandatory rules for listed companies and 
voluntary for any other organisations, is likely to yield high levels of compliance, and 
awareness of the good parts of the system is needed. She pointed out: 
“I think for listed companies it must be mandatory, for other companies it 
must be voluntary. I think the important thing is the awareness among 
businesses of the benefits it brings to adopt corporate governance practices. 
But I think that more legislation is not necessary, as I believe there is 
sufficient legislation in terms of reporting information, it would be better to 
undertake a campaign to raise awareness or change the culture”.  
 
Interviewees A3, A4, A15, and A19 believed that banks can also effectively enforce 
corporate governance standards in developing economies, such as Colombia. After family 
and friends, local banks are often the primary source of capital for businesses in 
developing countries. As a result, lending institutions may have their own requirements 
much like stock exchanges. In this respect interviewee A15 (Independent director) stated:   
“I would say that there should be a law or guideline for financial institutions 
to carefully analyse and monitor corporate governance, since they are the 
largest source of financing for entrepreneurs, this will make most businesses 
implement these practices, and would work better than if more regulations 
were introduced. Just as the Superintendence of Finance monitors financial 
institutions, the Superintendence of Companies should monitor companies 
through the banks”. 
 
According to Interviewees A1, A3, A12, A13, A14, A15 A20 and A21 companies in the 
country are voluntarily adopting corporate governance standards and this may be seen as 
management strategies to legitimate their activities. There also those mandatory corporate 
governance issues which companies need to comply with if they want to maintain their 
legitimacy. It is also suggested from the literature that has used legitimacy theory 
(Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975; Ashoforth and Gibbs, 1990; DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; 
Deegan, 2002) that companies could adopt voluntary corporate governance mechanism to 
manage stakeholders’ perceptions or in response to, or anticipation of, threats from 
stakeholders or the public to the company’s legitimacy. 
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6.5 Corporate governance in SMEs and family-owned businesses  
 
An additional constraint has been posted by the high number of small business and 
family-owned business in the country. Interviewee A8 (company director) cited that 
SMEs generally take the form of private companies owned by small number of 
shareholders, and often have less than 50 employees. Such companies are usually family-
owned run by family members where the authority and power are normally held by an 
individual usually the major shareholder. For that reason the owners commonly consider 
themselves as running their personal properties. Other common characteristics of SMEs 
are dealing with particular family issues, including dispute resolution and succession 
planning. Promoters of corporate governance implementation have been supporting the 
adoption of good principles by SMEs. However, some interviewees questioned whether 
owners and managers of SMEs are prepared to implement corporate governance in their 
organisations. Interviewee A14 (Independent director) mentioned that many business 
owners and directors of small and medium seized companies, as well executive and 
management teems  question why they opt to choose to introduce new systems and 
internal rules which impose limits in the way they do business. Nevertheless, several 
interviewees believed that corporate governance plays an important role for SMEs, and 
governance frameworks determine the capacity of small firms to raise capital. Other key 
benefits to SMEs include better and stronger system of internal control and 
accountability, transparency, strategic vision through participation of outside experts on 
the board, allowing the owner to focus more on strategic directions and expansion of 
business than day to day operations, and the ability to attract better managers. 
Interviewees also mentioned that corporate governance can be viewed as a mechanism to 
mobilise and combine resources and competences. 
 
However, Interviewees A2, A15 and A19 argued that because there is not a culture of 
group ownership in the country and that most Colombians are individualist, the adoption 
of corporate governance by SMEs face different challenges, such as a lack of awareness 
of the significance of corporate governance structures, and if there is awareness, there is 
wide spread aversion to adopting these practices because of the high cost of 
implementation. For example Interviewee A15 explained:   
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“The government and some entities have suggested that SMEs, instead of 
borrowing money from banks and speculators, should seek resources in the 
capital market by issuing convertible bonds or shares. This opening up of a 
company is not going to be easy because the SME entrepreneurs are closed 
minded persons who prefer to borrow from banks and not to allow other 
shareholders to participate in their companies. For this there is much 
scepticism that such a strategy will work in Colombia”. 
 
Equally, Interviewees A7 and A16 argued that the capital structure plays a very important 
part the decision to implement corporate governance; because, for a businessperson who 
owns a majority stake, there is no incentive to implement corporate governance because 
most Colombian businesses have a closed capital structure. They are limited liability 
family businesses controlled by a majority shareholder. In Colombia over 90% of 
businesses are small and medium enterprises most of them family-owned businesses. For 
example, Interviewee A7 (Ex-company director) mentioned: 
“Corporate governance is promoted for different types of companies, partly 
because very few companies are listed on the stock exchange and issues such 
as disclosure and structure of boards pose some difficulties due to the size and 
number of listed companies; but the large number of family businesses in the 
country means they are important in the role they play in the economy. 
Corporate governance has been expanded to family businesses, as I said, 
because of the country’s corporate structure”. 
 
According to Interviewee A4 (Company director) the activities promoting corporate 
governance practices are explaining to people what it is about and showing the benefits to 
companies and stakeholders; these are the factors that really change attitudes towards 
corporate governance. Interviewee A4 mentioned that, today, more than one hundred 
thousand employees in her company had heard about corporate governance, knew what it 
was about, and that, even though they may not be directly involved in the subject, they 
are no longer intimidated by the subject. She explained: 
“At first there were some difficulties, the issue was too exotic for a company 
which was not obliged to implement it, and a company basically of 
technicians and operators, with operation centres in many parts of the country. 
These centres are very particular in their culture, and to sell to them corporate 
governance rules, shareholder protection for minority investors, rules of 
transparency, code of ethics, ways of disclosing information, and the need to 
disclose that information, and the way to interact with our stakeholders 
seemed particularly difficult”. 
 
Obviously, the above relates to the broad view of corporate governance that is seen as 
way to engage with all the stakeholders of a company. Within this focus it is important to 
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consider the extent to which organisations ought to take the interests of others in their 
decision-making processes. It has been suggested that stakeholders’ claims cannot be 
ignored by an organisation, as ignoring them does not serve the organisation’s interests 
and for some stakeholders interests are thought to form the foundation of corporate 
strategy itself. It is also argued that engaging with stakeholders shapes strategy around 
certain moral obligations to stakeholders.  
 
Another additional issue mentioned by Interviewee A8 (regulator) is that Confecámaras, 
CIPE and CAF have been very important in changing the views that companies have 
about corporate governance, and in helping raise organisations’ corporate governance 
standards. The Superintendence of Finances and the Superintendence of Companies both 
have offices in charge of overseeing corporate governance issues; Confecámaras and 
BVC have programs exclusively working on corporate governance. These factors have 
resulted in both private and public sector stakeholders understanding the benefits of good 
governance. Equally, Interviewee A21 (postgraduate student), mentioned that the 
diversity and large number of non-listed companies and SMEs in the country made it 
difficult to obtain any statistics on the impact of the SME code, but that, some analysis 
showed that important progress had been made in corporate governance in family-owned 
business. Interviewee A11 (regulator) also described the situation: 
“Over the last few years, some companies have started implementing practices 
to improve their governance. Regarding family-owned businesses, which are 
most Colombian companies, several family protocols have been adopted. In 
the Superintendence of Companies, it is seen as a trend that is changing 
significantly the relationships between business, family and equity holders”.   
 
Interviewees A2, A5 and A12 mentioned trade conditions as a limitation to the 
development of corporate governance in Colombia, whereby commercial partners abroad 
do not pressurise companies to comply with the country code.  As Interviewee A15 
(Independent director) explained:   
“Another thing that makes it difficult is that most of the exports of 
manufactured goods are to Venezuela, and Venezuela is well below Colombia 
in corporate governance standards. Normally Venezuelan customers only 
make minimal requirements on the compliance of corporate governance 
issues, and exports to the U.S. and Europe are more in commodities where 
demand is related to social responsibility or human rights issues than to 
corporate governance”.  
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Another important issue mentioned by the Interviewees A1, A7, A16 and A20 is the 
benefit that the country obtains from corporate governance such as a strengthened 
economy, Interviewee A7 (Ex-company director) noted that it can also be a tool for socio-
economic development, and Interviewee A1 (Company director) stated: 
“The benefits following the implementation of corporate governance practices 
are reflected in the improvement of the quality of the information presented to 
stakeholders. Stakeholders require measures to be implemented within the 
organisation to ensure compliance with requirements. These have helped to 
improved operational performance, establish controls, and enhance general 
knowledge of a company”. 
 
Overall, there appears to be a similar attitude towards the issue of corporate governance 
in Colombia. Most of the interviewees agree that there is a positive attitude towards the 
implementation of corporate principles, not just by listed companies, but also by family-
owned businesses, SMEs, and state-owned enterprises. However, there are also different 
views about the relationship between corporate governance and CSR. Equally, the 
interviewees have suggested that there are companies wanting to implement corporate 
governance principles these reasons range from a desire to engage with stakeholders, to 
be accountable to company stakeholders and/or to legitimate company’s activities.  
 
Referring to the 2003 Corporate Governance Code for SMEs, interviewees A8, A7, A13, 
and E21 mentioned that the objective of the SME Code was to create basic tools for small 
and medium companies to help them formalise their own corporate governance systems. 
More than just creating a benchmark for corporate governance, regulators focused on 
understanding the governance problems in SMEs and in offering mechanisms to solve 
them. In addition accountability to a broad range of stakeholders such as creditors, 
suppliers, customers and employees is also promoted. 
 
6.6 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) versus non-SOEs  
 
All the interviewees suggested that the principles of corporate governance apply equally 
to all organisations. However, private companies (listed or non-listed), which are subject 
to a common statutory framework and share similar objectives, legal and managerial 
structures, and external reporting responsibilities are basically different from State-Own 
Enterprises (SOE). SOEs are subject to an array of different legislative requirements and 
are significantly more diverse in term of their structure, scope and objectives. Attitudes 
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about state-owned enterprises have changed especially in energy, telecommunications, 
and utility industries. Interviewee A1 (Company director) mentioned that the dominant 
idea was that the government’s role was not to run business directly but to create 
conditions that foster growth of  businesses. It was contended that reliance on market 
forces would improve efficiency and bring in private investment which would in turn 
create greater economic growth. The result was a wave of privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises and the opening of a number of otherwise reserved sectors to private 
enterprises.           
 
Interviewees A1, A2, A3, A4, A7, A8, A10, A16, A18, and A20 also believed that SOEs 
have to satisfy a more complex set of political, economic and social objectives than a 
commercial company, and are thus subject to a different set of external constraints and 
influences. Equally, SOEs face more challenges than private companies, as they usually 
cannot have their boards or management removed by a takeover or proxy contest, and 
they cannot go bankrupt. In addition, they may have very low-cost subsidised loans. 
Thus, the incentive for board members and managers to maximise the value of the 
organisation is reduced. Also, performance may be hindered by political interference, 
poorly defined non-commercial objectives and absence of transparency. For example, 
Interviewee A8 (Regulator) mentioned:  
“It is recommended that corporate governance is not exclusive to the private 
sector; its implementation must begin in state-owned organisations. They, in 
my opinion, are the most urgently needed. Because obviously for private 
companies the first objective is to generate profit, or generate wealth. State 
entities are formed to provide a social service, serving the community, etc. 
and efficiency may be achieved through good corporate governance 
practices”.  
 
Interviewees A1, A4 and A20 also suggested that when organisations take into account 
the interests of a range of stakeholders, not just the state as owner, that organisations 
resources are used efficiently. The interviewees, equally, pointed out that those holding 
public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit 
themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.  
 
The literature suggests that this focus on a wider range of stakeholders, and even more in 
the case of the Colombian economy where markets and institutions are not perfect and 
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competitive, can lead to a better allocation of resources than the narrow view (Zedek, 
2006).   
 
Interviewees A1, A2, A3, A6, A13, A16, A19 and A21 also agreed that the government 
has taken into account suggestions to strengthen corporate governance. Two SOEs were 
constantly mentioned by the interviewees as good examples of organisations adopting 
corporate governance in the country; ECOPETROL an oil exploration and refining 
company, and ISA (Interconexion Electrica, the country’s biggest electricity transporter). 
These two organisations have strengthened their corporate governance standards after the 
government decided to sell just over 10% of the capital in both companies to private 
investors. The interviewees also mentioned EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellin) the 
organisation running utilities in the county of Medellin, Colombia’s second largest city. 
Medellin’s local government has signed an agreement that allows Medellin’s majority 
owner to sit at EPM’s board of directors; however, the major owner only has voice on 
board decisions. This is different from the boards of other utility organisations around the 
country where majors have a voice and additionally are allowed to vote on board 
decisions. Most of the interviewees believe that corporate governance helps to remove 
cronyism and favouritism, instead of facilitating an open exchange between the private 
sector and the government.  
 
Interviewee A2 mentioned that a company in the Communications Ministry, which is the 
majority shareholders, has given up to its right to the highest number of seats on the board 
for directors in exchange of having a greater number of independent directors.   
 
There are also a good number of other governmental organisations in the country that are 
following the trend of strengthening their corporate governance structures. Some 
interviewees suggested that this is a response to stakeholder groups’ pressure for more 
transparency. Some organisations have expanded their operations to neighbouring 
countries, therefore are accountable to wider group of stakeholders. There are also 
organisations such as EMCALI, a utility company, which is trying to recover from 
bankruptcy, a long period of bad administration and corruption, and the current political 
administration decided to adopt corporate governance principles in order to regain its 
constituency trust and legitimacy. It may be assumed that corporate governance is being 
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used to achieve legitimacy for the activities of the organisation. The interviewees’ views 
in this case are in line with Phillips (2003) arguments about managerial attention being 
given to legitimacy claims from stakeholders, who are morally justified by the 
responsibility that managers have to protect the interests of their organisations and their 
legitimate stakeholders.               
 
6.7 Overlap of CSR and Corporate governance  
 
Another issue pointed out by Interviewees A3, A4, A6, A16, A7, and A18 was the 
increasing worries about the impact of companies’ activities on society. They cited that 
many companies have created so called corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
programmes that balance their operations with the concerns of external stakeholders such 
as customers, unions, local communities and governments. Social and environmental 
consequences are weighed against economic gains as companies must be aware that 
sound corporate governance practices are important in order for them to be considered 
ethical and socially responsible businesses. Many interviewees argued that the corporate 
governance agenda and the corporate social responsibility agenda are linked by the issue 
of ethics. Companies and governments want the public to believe that organisations are 
ethical but do not want new legal backing for tighter ethical behaviour. This focus is 
supported on the idea that organisation activities are judged to be the right thing to do. 
Also those activities are accepted by society. Interviewees believed that good business 
means more than just successful new product development and strong financial 
performance; commitment to the highest ethical standards is equally needed. By doing the 
right thing and operating with integrity and transparency, organisations build and 
maintain credibility and trust with their stakeholders. This, according to Suchman (1995) 
awards ‘moral legitimacy’ to the activities of an organisation.  According to Interview A4 
(Company director) “this may legitimate an organisation’s existence”. The focus of 
corporate governance is that of CSR, with the demand for organisations to be transparent, 
apply ethical standards and for justify company activities. Interviewee A3 (Company 
director) illustrated some of these issues such as:  
“The assumption is that corporate social responsibility, as well as being a 
duty, is something that a company can benefit from. This is not to be good, or 
being charitable, or be loved. If social responsibility is not achieved then the 
community might not be happy with the company, this makes it very difficult 
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to develop business objectives. So what is projected to be socially responsible 
as well as fulfilling a company’s obligations might generate a profitable 
enterprise”. 
 
It is clear that not always altruistic grounding will render legitimacy as Interviewee 
A4 also described the meaning of the issue for her organisation: 
“We began corporate governance implementation in 2004 and it has been 
nearly four long years around the issue of structuring, dissemination, 
implementation and internalisation of corporate governance. The other issue 
that parallels corporate governance, and many times people ask if it is part of 
corporate governance or whether corporate governance is part of it, is 
corporate social responsibility and today we already have a responsible 
structure for monitoring and disseminating all parts of our corporate social 
responsibility and what we think explains how is tied to corporate 
governance”.  
 
Interviewees A7, A9 and A10 agreed that organisations have a social responsibility, but 
that this should be distinguished from corporate governance, and that it was important for 
stakeholders to be aware of that. Interviewee A7 (company director) adopted a narrow 
view and explained: 
“I think those are two very different topics, social responsibility is a very 
important issue; but it is not the definition of corporate governance. I believe 
that corporate governance issues are related to disclosure, protection for 
minority shareholders, having independent members on the board; for me it is 
more to do with administration and information disclosure, CSR, to me is 
another matter”.  
 
Equally, Interviewee A15, an Independent director, believed that the misunderstanding on 
how people are dealing with the two issues are due to the speed that these issues are being 
introduced and in many cases there is not sufficient importance given to illustrate to 
people the meaning and implication of each issue separately, Interview A15 stated:     
“The information has been mishandled; it has been done so quickly that it has 
resulted in many people misunderstanding the issue. The media do not know 
very well to what it refers”.  
 
Some argued that companies may not be accountable just by behaving in a socially 
responsible way. For example, some interviewees believed that it took more than CSR for 
an organisation to be seen as a responsible company. These interviewees considered that, 
at minimum, organisations require a blend of business ethics, corporate governance and 
CSR policies to meet the accountability expectations of the public. For example 
Interviewee A1 (company manager) mentioned: 
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“Some people think that corporate governance is about transparency and 
accountability but, for us, it is the umbrella that protects the whole issue of 
social responsibility because it is from there that we begin to determine what 
is going to be our behaviour towards all our stakeholders”. 
 
As an indication of the preference for a wider corporate governance approach which 
includes accountability and legitimacy, company directors mention the increasing interest 
in CSR issues, this as a consequence of the rising demand for accountability and growing 
pressure put on businesses to be more transparent in their actions to society and the 
environment. Among the interviewees there is also same agreement that these pressures 
are coming from sources such as: greater stakeholder awareness of corporate social and 
environmental behaviour; direct stakeholder pressures; and an increased sense of social 
responsibility.   
 
6.8 Corporate governance structures  
 
To answer the research questions it is necessary to understand the issues surrounding 
corporate governance, this requires an understanding of the ways in which companies are 
structured, how they are run, and how responsibilities are distributed among all the 
stakeholders involved. Equally, to evaluate the legitimacy of company activities it is 
important to know whether organisations are run ethically and efficiently. From a 
stakeholder approach, corporate governance has to do with the relationship between, 
directors, company management and stakeholders. In this arrangement, directors oversee 
management to advance the interests of all stakeholders.  
 
6.8.1 Board of directors and board size 
 
The interviewees defined the board of directors as the governing body of an organisation, 
elected by shareholders to represent their interests in managing the company. Especial 
importance was given to the way board members are elected. Board legitimacy may be 
strengthened through a selection, nomination or election process that ensures board 
members will have no interest other than those of other stakeholders. Elected board 
members may derive their legitimacy from a transparent election process and proof of 
their independence. There is some agreement that board members should be independent 
from management and from all significant shareholders, and represent the interests of all 
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stakeholders. Truly independent board members will keep company management focused 
on the interests of stakeholders. Equally, the majority of interviewees seem to be aware of 
the idea that a board which includes members who are truly independent is more likely to 
be vigilant about the information disclosed and to replace quickly underperforming 
directors. It is also argued that board members should have two essential characteristics: 
legitimacy and credibility. The legitimacy is derived from their independence from 
management and commitment to stakeholders. The credibility centres on the board 
members collective expertise relevant to the specific issues and challenges of the 
organisation.     
 
In general, interviewees believed that at the heart of every organisation is a board of 
directors in charge of the direction, supervision and control of the company’s affairs. But 
they had different views about the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors. A 
view, shared by the majority of the interviewees, is that a board of directors is a group of 
people legally charged with responsibility for governing an organisation. Boards are also 
in charge of providing continuity for an organisation by setting up its strategy and legal 
existence. Equally, boards represent the organisation’s point of view in relation with its 
products and services and promote them.  Most of the interviewees believed that the 
board is primarily responsible to the company’s owners or shareholders. However, they 
also shared the view that the board of directors’ responsibility extends also to other 
stakeholders such as employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and government offices. 
Only few interviewees expressed the view that boards are exclusively accountable to 
shareholders or company owners.     
 
Regarding the board of directors’ size, some interviewees believed that large boards are 
better for company performance because they have a range of expertise to help make 
better decisions, and also may post a stronger opposition to a controlling CEO. However, 
some thought that a smaller board of directors functioned more effectively than a large 
board, as smaller boards have a greater participation by each board member, more 
effective and efficient decision-making and greater individual accountability.  
 
The interviewees also explained the way board members discharge their accountability.  
For example, Interviewee A1 (company director) explained for her company:   
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“The board is accountable to shareholders through an annual report to the 
Annual Meeting of shareholders. Also, because of the changes that the 
company has been through due to the privatisation of part of its capital there is 
a special auditor who reviews these reports and submits an annual special 
report to shareholders on audit work”.  
 
However, although annual reports are used to discharge accountability interviewees 
argued that the true value of this measure is not clear if those reports are not actually read. 
Most directors do not use alternative methods to account for their performance to their 
stakeholders. Moreover, they simply comply with the law in preparing their annual report, 
often producing poor quality reporting. As a result, the role of annual report and the 
degree of accountability of many company directors may be questioned. However, 
according to some interviewees, a good number of organisations are recognising the 
importance of company reports as a means to disclose company information, thus in 
addition to disclosing factual information, annual reports may be serve as public relations 
function. This, to some extent, is in agreement with the idea that the annual report is an 
important document in terms of the construction of an organisation’s social image 
(Neimark, 1992).    
 
Another issue mentioned by the majority of the interviewees were the limitations on the 
number of boards of which a director could be a member35. No director may serve on 
more than five other public company boards as explained by Interviewee A15: 
“Restrictions on board membership is five, no one can be an external director 
on more than five companies. But the limitation is only for listed companies, 
for non-profit companies there are no limits, closed capital companies are not 
required to have a board, therefore there is no limit”.  
 
The majority of the interviewees agreed that the board of directors is typically central to 
corporate governance. In relation to the need to have well structured boards, some 
interviewees argued that corporate governance and, in particular, the board of directors 
matters for corporate performance, market capitalisation, and to increase the value of the 
shares of a company, and also to improve the country’s welfare. Interviewees A1, A4, 
A8, A10, A13, A15 and A20, cited that the board’s directors act on behalf of investors 
who hold administrators accountable for the performance of the company.  
 
 
                                                 
35 Market Law (Law 964, 2005) 
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6.8.2 Independent non-executive directors 
 
Interviewees A4, A8, A10, A13 and A14 indicated that they are aware of the importance 
of having independent board members. The ‘Country Code, The Andean Corporate 
Governance Code, and the Colombian regulation such as Law 964/2005, and the 
Commercial Code, recommend that organisations have at least a proportion of 
independent board members. Interviewee A13 quoted:  
“The legitimacy of the board of directors flows from the nomination and 
election process of independent board members”. 
 
Interviewee A14 pointed out the significance of a well structured board including 
independent members as he explained:   
“It is difficult to see a company grow orderly without strategic planning, or 
not having an appropriately structured board. But the board does not work if 
it’s the same people doing the same things. Therefore it is necessary to have 
independent members”.  
 
Further, the interviewees indicated that the board of directors should have a good number 
(if possible the majority) of directors who meet the criteria for independence required by 
the corporate governance regulation36. The nominations committee, or the organ designed 
to do it, should assess the candidates elected to be part of the board and recommend to the 
board those candidates who meet the requirements to be elected at the next Shareholders’ 
General Meeting.   
 
Equal attention is given by the interviewees to the characteristics needed to be an 
independent board member; in Colombia these characteristics are stated by law. As 
Interviewee A10 (regulator) explained: 
“The parameters in the Law 964 are very strict, to get an independent person, 
the level of independence required by the rule, it is sometimes difficult to get 
the appointment of the right person. To the supervisors, this rule has been 
beneficial, having these independent members on the boards increases the 
flexibility in the management and control of the organisations; some family 
businesses include an independent member on their board, independent 
members raise the management of organisations to a new level, and set the 
entity to work differently. However, a few organisations are uncomfortable 
with this; some of them have commented on their concerns to the supervisor 
in terms such as: including an individual who is independent requires a lot, 
and makes us more effective, meet our goals and greater achievements. The 
                                                 
36 Law 964, 2005, Chapter 2, Article 44 stated that the board of directors of a listed company at least 25% 
of its members should be independent non-executive directors.   
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difficulty lies in finding someone who knows the subject and it is truly 
independent”.  
 
The emphasis on independent directors arises from the idea that such directors will keep 
company management focused on the interests of stakeholders. A board that includes 
members who are truly independent of mind is more likely to be vigilant about the 
reliability of information provided to financial markets and to interested stakeholders in 
general. It is also believed that only legitimate boards may assert their authority over the 
management of an organisation. Having independent members on the board of directors 
may be taken as evidence that organisations implement corporate governance principles 
because they want legitimate their activities. In the case of Colombian listed companies, 
they should comply with established rules that mandate the inclusion of a determined 
number of independent directors on their boards; in this way conforming to the countries 
legislative framework, companies gain legitimacy. There are also companies which 
include independent directors on their boards voluntarily; this may be seen as something 
which is appropriate and right to do. Adhering voluntarily to regulations organisations 
may effectively secure the possibility to be seen as legitimate businesses which are 
consistent with suggested rules. In Colombia, SOEs especially, tend to provide a fuller 
picture of performance rather than just a financial one. This may be because their 
performance is poor or because they wish to divert attention away from other financial 
issues such as mismanagement, undue use of funds or concerns such as improper hiring 
of employees, prohibited involvement in politics and misuse of corporate assets among 
others, all which raise questions about legitimacy. Lindblom (1994) asserts that 
legitimacy concerns provide a motivation for increased social disclosure by organisations 
that are potentially affected by these concerns. Additionally, organisations are interested 
in creating, and maintaining a good image, which may be beneficial in furthering 
manager’s and politicians’ personal interests.            
  
6.8.3 Board Committees 
 
According to Interviewees A9 and A10 (regulators) the proper performance of the board 
requires the establishment of specialised committees integrated by some of its members to 
facilitate detailed analysis of certain issues that, due to their nature, are of great 
importance for the company. These committees act as a filter and reinforce the objective 
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analysis of the decisions that correspond to the board. Interviewee E10 (Independent 
Director) mentioned that it is considered good corporate governance practice to have the 
existence of at least one audit committee comprised of independent board members and a 
nominating and compensation committee. 
 
Interviewees A1, A8, A11 and A12 agreed that the primary function of the audit 
committee is to assist the board of directors in fulfilling its responsibilities with respect to 
financial reports and other financial information provided by the company to its 
stakeholders. Further, the audit committee should be responsible for ensuring that the 
company’s financial statements are accurate use fair and reasonable estimates. Normally, 
the board members select, hire, and work with an outside auditing firm. The firm 
nominates a Revisor fiscal, who is the individual who actually performs the audit work.  
One of the advantages of having an audit committee is cited by Interviewee A11 
(regulator) when he said:    
“Audit committees are much more important in our particular economy; they 
may answer all internal control issues against risks related to money 
laundering. Audit committees may help to strengthen the company’s internal 
control measures aimed at the organisation’s customers, suppliers, and to all 
whom the company is representing; all of this is to prevent getting involved in 
dealing with illegal money”. 
 
The existence of an independent audit committee is recognised internationally as an 
important feature of corporate governance. According to some interviewees, most 
companies with an audit committee have decided that this committee needs to have at 
least three members and that all the members of the committee should have a working 
familiarity with finance and accounting practices. Also audit committee members should 
meet any independence requirement under corporate governance rules.    
 
Interviewee A8 (regulator) mentioned some of the results of a 2008 survey carried out in 
the country by the Superintendence of Companies whereby 15.8% of companies had an 
audit committee, 9.7% had a nomination and remuneration committee, 5.9% had a 
corporate governance committee, and 11.4% had other committees.  
 
6.8.4 Remuneration policies 
 
A number of the interviewees mentioned that normally a compensation and remuneration 
committee sets the base compensation, stock options awards and incentive bonuses for 
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company’s executives, including the CEO.  Interviewee A11 (regulator) argued that 
executive compensation schemes may not play the same role in decision-making as it 
does in firms with a more disperse ownership structure given that the controlling owners 
can hire and fire managers at their own discretion. Furthermore, Interviewee A14 
(company director) mentioned that controlling shareholders may typically have many 
other means to reward themselves. According to some interviewees disclosure of 
executive schemes is nevertheless a good thing, even when they are not the key 
motivating force in managerial decision-making. Compensation committees, in their 
capacity as committees of the board, have overall responsibility for evaluating officers 
and directors’ compensation plans, and for overseeing company disclosures relating to 
such compensation plans, policies and programs. In relation to the issue of compensation 
for key company personnel Interviewee A11 (regulator) cited:   
“Regarding the remuneration policy for key executives, an issue in closed 
companies where a high concentration of capital held by the majority 
shareholder and minority shareholders are kept out of the management of the 
business; frequently these minority shareholders are at a disadvantage on 
everything related to remuneration, fees, salaries, and so on. In a 
Superintendence of Companies survey only 47.2% companies answered that 
they had a compensation policy for the CEO and key executives”.  
 
Interviewee A8 (regulator) also talked about the results of the same 2008, 
Superintendence of Companies survey and cited that 49.5% of the companies that 
answered the questionnaire said they provided information about the remuneration of key 
personnel in their annual report.  
 
Remuneration issues are related to those of disclosure, which is covered next. The idea is 
that organisations have a nomination and remuneration committee in charge to deal with 
these issues in a transparent manner. Having coherent, fear and transparent remuneration 
policies may help to maintain the legitimacy of company activities.  Discussing the 
reasons why organisations want to disclose information helps to understand the reasons 
why companies want to implement corporate governance. For this particular study it is 
important to find out: whether it is because they want to be accountable to all their 
stakeholders or because they want to legitimate their activities.  
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6.8.5 Disclosure of information 
 
According to the expressed by the interviewees, organisations’ disclosure policy is a way 
to engage with their stakeholders, discharge their accountability and also to show the 
legitimacy of their activities. The majority of the interviewees believed that companies 
disclosed information in accordance with the legislation and market regulation and also to 
comply with accounting norms. Similarly, the disclosure approach taken by organisations 
may be affected by informal rules which often are a result of cultural norms. A number of 
interviewees believed that disclosure plays an important role in corporate governance. 
However, according to Interviewee A2 (company director), the way information is 
communicated surrounding a company’s corporate governance is even more important. 
She stated that companies need to make information readily accessible and focus their 
efforts on providing clear, concise messages in a transparent manner.  
 
Another issue mentioned by the interviewees is that companies of different sizes and 
capital structures faced different demands by stakeholders seeking greater disclosure and 
more transparent explanations for major decisions. Organisations need to maintain their 
stakeholders trust. Many interviewees believe that developing an information disclosure 
policy is an important step taken for companies that want to engage with their 
stakeholders. Effective maintenance of, and appropriate access to, accurate and complete 
information and records enables those with the right to know to see what has been done, 
how and by whom. This enables them to hold accountable those charged with the 
management of the organisation, the conduct of processes and the delivery of outcomes. 
For example Interviewee A10 (regulator) explained this process as follows: 
“Disclose relevant information is a way to legitimate organisation activities, as 
accurate information, enhance stakeholders understanding of the organisation 
itself”.  
 
According to some interviewees companies can symbolically manage legitimacy through 
voluntary disclosure of relevant information. Through corporate disclosure, organisations 
communicate to all their stakeholders that they are abiding to the terms of established 
rules and thus achieving the legitimacy necessary for their continual survival. In relation 
to this, Interviewee A2 (company director) pointed out: “The foundation of the structure 
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of corporate governance is disclosure”. Interviewee A3 (company director) extended this 
further to say:      
“Good governance can be regarded as a collection of practices that an 
enterprise should have. Good governance goes along with social responsibility 
but above all with companies’ sustainability, and sustainability is the direct 
access to well informed consumers, not having good practice might force an 
organisation to disappear”.  
 
In addition, Interviewee A19 (senior lecturer) mentioned that corporate governance is the 
mechanism established by a company to be much more transparent to all its stakeholders. 
Further, Interviewee A17 (senior lecturer) argued that “Good corporate governance is a 
guarantee of seriousness and respect”. He also mentioned that: 
“Some companies implement corporate governance practices to manage their 
relationship with their stakeholders, this policy is aimed to creating a 
transparent business and to show a good attitude at regulatory and control 
authorities, within the parameters set by the government”.  
 
Organisations employ a variety of communication mechanisms in their attempts to reach 
and engage with a wide range and large number the stakeholders. The internet is one of 
such mechanisms which have been seen as useful because of the large number of 
stakeholders who can potentially be reached and because of the interactive 
communication facilities embodied within it. In the case of stakeholder engagement it is 
also believed that through the internet stakeholders’ dialogue may contribute to 
company’s ethical, social and economic responsibilities. A clear obstacle to such 
activities, more than the number of companies that use the internet to disclose company 
information, is the sort of information that companies make available. To address this 
CAF has recommended companies in the Andean region to use their Web page as an 
essential disclosure tool. Interviewee E8 (regulator) cited again the results of the 
Superintendence of Companies’ survey that companies grade the importance of having a 
website as: 56.2% for large companies, 42.7% for medium-sized companies, 28.3% for 
small companies, while only 15,5% of micro-companies see it as important to have a 
Web page. According to Interviewee E8 as companies grow they start to use such tools. 
However, the website content, and specifically whether the company’s Web page 
includes aspects of interest to corporate governance, the survey results shows that most of 
these pages have things like the mission and vision of the company, 6.7% of them have 
the statutes, 5.2% of the companies have their corporate governance code, 3.3% have an 
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annual corporate governance report, and 5.7% have basic financial information and 
management reports. For Interviewee A11, a surprising finding was that only 6.1% of 
companies use their Web page to call for the General Assembly of shareholders.  
 
Interviewee A11 mentioned that while some companies, particularly the larger ones use 
web pages, the content within these pages must be improved, and should be considered at 
the country level and for all kinds of organisations as web pages are useful tools for any 
organisation. Interviewee A21 argued that companies are able to use, to manage or 
manipulate some stakeholders in order to gain or maintain support which is required for 
its survival. This may be taken as the importance given by organisations to the disclosure 
of information in the process of legitimising company activities.  
 
6.8.6 Internal controls and risk management 
 
All the interviewees shared the view that board of directors have overall responsibility for 
the organisation’s system of internal control and risk management and for reviewing their 
effectiveness.  Also a number of interviewees believed transparency and accountability 
are key requirements to corporate governance; companies must attempt to strengthen 
management oversight and supervision taking into account the perspectives of non-
executive directors and external auditors. At the same time companies must develop their 
internal control framework with respect to information disclosure for executives and 
employees to ensure accountability. Interviewee E9 (auditor) went on to say that internal 
control procedures are policies implemented by the board of directors, audit committees, 
management, and other personnel to provide reasonable assurance of an organisation’s 
achievement of its objectives related to reliable financial reporting, operational efficiency, 
and compliance with laws and regulations. Internal auditors are personnel within an 
organisation’s who test the design and implementation of an entity’s internal control 
systems and the reliability of its financial reporting. In this respect internal control and 
risk management systems include processes where different company bodies interact. 
Interviewee E7 (regulator) explained it as follows: 
“Management control is an important point within the corporate governance to 
the Superintendence [of Finance]; as it is the organisation of the 
interrelationship between governing bodies. For example, the CEO is 
reporting to the board, this board at the time reports to the General Assembly, 
there are also acting various committees. This means that different bodies are 
 164 
passing information to each other, management bodies to control bodies. We 
as the supervisory body look at the management control from the point of 
view as it were an internal audit report”. 
 
The regulators cited the system of internal control, which was defined as a process, 
performed by a company in order to provide reasonable security for the fulfilment of the 
organisation objectives. Company management have responsibilities including the duty to 
manage the company efficiently and economically and to establish and maintain 
appropriate systems of internal controls and risk management.  
 
According to most of the interviewees many companies now included in their annual 
report information on risk management and material risk factors, such as its certification 
on internal control for the Revisor fiscal (information about the Revisor fiscal is given in 
the next section). Interviewee A10 (regulator) described corporate governance risk as:  
“A cross-risk that is touching all other risks an entity faces. An independent 
risk with endless components; this means that when assessing corporate 
governance we can also see how the entity is dealing with the credit risk. Not 
looking at figures but it is analysed as the organisations’ operational risk 
management. The supervisor looks at the decisions taken by the board when 
solving problems, such as the flaws brought up by the internal auditor; what 
corrective measures were taken by the board to solve that problem; what did 
management; what did the company’s control organs, what decisions were 
taken by the General Assembly of Shareholders. On this way is how we 
conceptualise corporate governance”.  
 
Risk management is very important within the concept of corporate governance. 
According to some interviewees companies normally deal with their risk within a 
framework that includes accountability, internal control and auditing. Interviewees A12 
(auditor) and Interviewee A20 (senior lecturer) also explained the importance of 
evaluating a company through a corporate governance risk. Interviewee E9 pointed out 
that: 
“There is a simple conclusion, when an entity has weak corporate governance, 
this entity may be more exposed to other risks, such as market risk, and its 
financial risk might grow seriously. Because when no corporate governance 
rules are applied properly, other risks are also being neglected”.  
 
As having an external assessment is a voluntary practice some companies have decided to 
have additional evaluation by external independent bodies or individuals as it was 
mentioned by Interviewee A4 (company director): 
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“The company now is assessed by an external organisation, this allow us to 
show to our stakeholders how we are applying corporate governance standards 
and more important that the assessment is done by an independent evaluator”.  
 
However, some interviewees argued that the use of internal control systems and risk 
management is not a common practice among all companies. They mentioned that 
companies, for reasons such as size or capital structure, are not prepared to expend time 
and financial resources on these issues. According to some interviewees some companies 
simply do not control their company’s risk because they are not aware of the benefits 
these practices may represent to their organisations. In relation to this Interviewee A15 
(Independent director) pointed out: 
“Regarding the internal control and risk management, some companies the 
only they have are some risk certifications issued by financial entities, for 
example, as these certifications are required by law. The risk in credit or 
financial risk is measure by banks or credit providers. But companies do not 
have an internal risk manager. – ‘Medium and large companies are the only 
ones that can enjoy this luxury, in the country our entrepreneurs still very 
primitive’ -. All this is due to the culture of evading responsibilities, many do 
not pay taxes, do not met the obligations to their workers, conceal assets, have 
double accounting records; therefore, they do not see the need to develop an 
internal control system or manage company risks”. 
  
An additional view to the internal control and risk management is that they show their 
stakeholders that they are accountable and transparent. For example Interviewees A21 
(postgraduate student) cited: 
“Transparency in the operations of a company is related to a behaviour that 
can cope with public scrutiny, with more responsibility, values and ethics. 
Risk management decreases risk, it may create more value for customers, 
suppliers, employees and other stakeholders. Similarly, selection of talented 
employees according to the needs of the company; external economic 
assessment [legitimacy] from institutional investors, as well as more formal 
forms of professional control; it may result in more chances of success; 
although this has not been proved”.  
 
From the above statements, it can be inferred that individuals are aware that the 
board has overall responsibility for the organisations’ risk management and system 
of internal control and for reviewing its effectiveness and that this review should be 
done through the audit committee. However, mostly due to the size of the 
companies and also to ownership concentration, not many companies have 
developed a system of internal controls and risk management within their 
organisations; thus it may be fact difficult to hold management or company 
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directors accountable. Nevertheless, those companies using an external risk 
assessment may use them as a way of legitimating their activities. The above 
evidence helps to understand the weaknesses and difficulties faced by some 
organisations implementing mechanisms to be accountable to their stakeholders.  
 
6.8.7 Auditors appointment 
 
The function of auditors is to obtain and evaluate evidence regarding statements about 
economic actions and events to ascertain the extent to which they correspond with 
established criteria, and to communicate with interested users. It is expected that auditors 
in the fulfilment of their functions should play a significant role in establishing good 
governance. This is important because of the increased reliance by stakeholders in 
auditors. In Colombia audit work is performed by the Revisor fiscal. Interviewee A20 
(senior lecturer) provided an explanation about the Revisor fiscal a figure created by the 
Colombian Commercial Code, combining the functions of an external auditor with those 
of what is known in Mexico as a comisario and in Brazil as the conselho fiscal. The 
Assembly General Meeting nominates the Revisor fiscal, whose duties include among 
others the certification of the quality of internal controls defined broadly, including 
processes and operations. There is an inherent conflict of interest in that the Revisor fiscal 
gives the company instructions and then audits their execution. Interviewee A10 
(regulator) pointed out the significance of the figure of a Revisor fiscal for Colombian 
companies as he quoted:  
“The Revisor fiscal is an essential part of corporate governance structure, as 
they are part of the business mechanisms for internal control, management and 
accountability and report through the income statements, etc. at the end of 
each financial year”. 
 
All the interviewees also mentioned that companies can rely on external auditors to assess 
the quality and effectiveness of its internal control system, including compliance with 
accounting standards. The presence of an external auditor is seen as a good corporate 
governance practice that reinforces the external controls of the entity. In relation to this 
Interviewee A1 (company director) pointed out: 
“A very important issue is the control through the external auditor. It is a good 
monitoring exercise on the activities of the company; this is a good filter that 
ensures compliance and good relations between the company and its 
stakeholders”. 
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Another issue considered important in relation to the role of external third parties 
involvement in companies control systems, was mentioned by Interviewee A10 
(regulator). Some Colombian companies are under the obligation to appoint a Policy 
Controller; the main function of a Policy controller is to establish procedures to ensure 
compliance with laws, regulations, statutes, and in general all the regulations and internal 
measures of good corporate governance, codes of ethics, good conduct and business 
transparency which are related to the activities of the organisation. Equally, the 
comptroller must report and document policy to the board the irregularities that may 
affect the healthy development of the company. This figure is compulsory for 
stockbrokers, but its use in other financial institutions is seen as a good practice. 
 
Recently, auditors have been trying to introduce an initiative to improve decision-making 
processes and especially activities relating to the resolution of conflicts and related party 
transactions. Interviewee A12 (auditor) explained such activity as follows: 
“Auditors are trying to introduce in the companies they audit manuals of 
conduct and ethics  for dealing with third party interests, this to make sure 
decisions are not taken lightly, and also as a way of ensuring independence of 
committees when making decisions, especially those related to transactions  
which may present a conflict of interest. However, it can be said that 
developments in that area still very incipient”.  
 
Much emphasis is placed on auditors in the context of corporate governance because in 
most cases, auditors will be the first person to spot corporate wrongdoing. This is due to 
the nature of the auditing function and the purpose of auditing company accounts. It can 
also be a case of only being one person who is aware of the exploitation besides the 
wrongdoers. Thus in many cases the auditors may choose not to detect the wrongdoing at 
the expense of their duties and obligations. It is expected that an audit would provide a 
high level of assurance about the accountability of the management and directors of 
company. Therefore, the role of auditors is very important in protecting the rights and 
interests of stakeholders. 
 
6.9 Summary       
 
This chapter reports the research findings from the semi-structured interviews conducted 
with key Colombian individuals. An important finding from the interviewees indicates 
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that there have been a good number of activities promoting and supporting the 
implementation of corporate governance principles in Colombia during the last decade. 
The findings show that the private sector, international organisations such as CAF, CIPE, 
IFC and IADB, and some Colombian associations such Confecámaras have been very 
influential in the development of corporate governance in the country.  
 
Evidence gathered through the interviews agrees with the available literature in that there 
is no precise definition for corporate governance. A narrow view sees governance as a 
term describing the way managers handle their responsibilities to owners or shareholders, 
whilst the wider view sees corporate governance as an organisation’s relationship to 
society, often confusing corporate governance with corporate social responsibility.  
 
Most of the corporate directors interviewed seem to be sympathetic with the broader role 
for stakeholders. This is peculiar, considering the high proportion of SMEs, the number 
of family-owned business and the level of ownership concentration in the country. There 
are also those who have a narrow view and, who also agree that company managers 
should render their accountability to shareholders. There are also others with a CSR 
focus; these normally see a close association between corporate governance and corporate 
social responsibility, and believe that companies are accountable to all their stakeholders; 
additionally, they think that organisations implement corporate governance principles to 
legitimate their actions.  
 
In particular, those performing the regulator roles are the ones who normally have a 
narrow corporate governance view, probably because their obligations are the regulation 
and overseeing of the economic activities of listed companies and all financial 
organisations listed or non-listed in the country. Regulators usually have a corporate 
governance definition based on the relationship between managers and shareholders or 
company owners and therefore deem companies accountable primarily to their owners. 
Independent directors and most of the company directors tend to have a wider view about 
corporate governance; they believe good practices should be applied to an organisation’s 
relationship with all its stakeholders, rather than just its owners. Equally, for this group of 
people companies are accountable to all stakeholders affected by, and who are able to 
affect, company activities. They also advocate campaigns aimed at having stakeholders 
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able to claim their lawful rights and to hold organisations accountable. This implies the 
active involvement of internal and external stakeholders in organisational decision-
making. Participation mechanisms include regular consultation with stakeholders or 
including stakeholders’ representatives on boards of directors. Participation must allow 
for change; it has to be more than acquiring approval for, or acceptance of, a decision or 
activity. Underpinning this is the principle that stakeholders have the right to contribute to 
decisions that affect them. Organisations wanting to engage with their stakeholders must 
be prepared to share information, listen to and learn from stakeholders with the goal of 
building understanding and trust on issues of mutual interest. 
 
Additionally, there has been a rise in the country for issues related to social responsibility 
and some of the supporters of corporate governance are also promoting the idea of having 
social responsible companies, and tend to take a CSR approach to corporate governance. 
Those taking this approach believe companies are accountable to all stakeholders. The 
also find that governance mechanisms such as having independent board members, 
disclosure of relevant information, being transparent and ethical may be sufficient to 
show an organisation’s legitimacy. The legitimacy of an organisation is an issue when the 
stakeholders have the ability to influence the success or failure of that organisation at 
various levels. For example, stakeholders are able to affect the organisation’s license to 
operate, eroding levels of trust of that organisation. One of the objectives engaging 
stakeholders in the organisation’s governance is to generate a better understanding of 
stakeholders’ perspectives on key issues and, consequently, build relationships with key 
individuals. It is also suggested a better relationship with stakeholders may provide a 
more stable environment for society and business. In addition it is believed that 
stakeholder engagement can build trust in the organisation, and enhance the social licence 
to operate, which at the same times a key issue in organisation legitimacy.        
 
Some interviewees view corporate governance as dealing with mechanisms by which 
stakeholders of an organisation exercise control over corporate insiders and management 
such that their interest is protected. Indeed, most company directors believe that 
stakeholders’ relationship is an important element of an organisations’ success. 
Stakeholders primarily include investors, managers and employees, customers, suppliers 
and business partners, and local communities. Regulatory and supervisory bodies, civil 
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activists, and fair trade commissions are also involved in setting and enforcing rules on 
corporate conduct for the protection of investors. Media attention might also influence 
politicians, controlling families and management, who are concerned about their 
reputations, to implement corporate governance practices, laws and policies.  
 
For the majority of the interviewees the central focus of corporate governance is the 
structure of the board of directors. In general, companies are moving to structure their 
boards with more independent directors, and organise them around committees 
overseeing management, remuneration and auditing. These factors are indicators of good 
corporate governance and thus make organisations more attractive to investors and 
legitimate in the eyes of customers and suppliers.   
 
It has also been stressed by some interviewees that countries and companies may continue 
to exhibit local characteristics because different countries have followed varying patterns 
of economic development; a complex mix of historic, legal, political and economic 
factors shapes each country’s corporate landscape.  
 
An issue that needs to be highlighted is that corporate governance in Colombia relies a 
great deal on the country’s legal framework as many of the corporate governance 
standards are derived from laws, decrees, and other rules issued by the government. For 
example, Colombian law sets out how board members are nominated, who may be an 
independent external director, and the appointment of the Revisor fiscal. 
 
The interviewees also mentioned other important issues that need to be considered as a 
central part of corporate governance such as the need for managers or owners to give 
reasons for their conduct, responsibilities and authorities granted, in other words to be 
accountable for actions and decisions taken. In addition, matters such as the importance 
of being transparent, morally responsible, and voluntary disclose information, are also 
highlighted by the interviewees, and supports the view that companies are interested in 
showing that their activities are desirable, proper or appropriate within the norms dictated 
by regulators or constructed by society. To some extent, there is agreement that 
companies implement corporate governance principles to show their legitimacy. 
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Additionally, the majority of the interviewees agree in the need for a well structured 
board of directors, with the necessary number of independent directors and conforming to 
at least the three basic board committees: the audit; nomination and remuneration; and 
corporate governance committee. 
 
Overall, it has been argued that corporate governance should provide a framework of 
adequate protection to the interests of stakeholders and reinforce fiduciary responsibilities 
of those vested with the authority to act on behalf of the stakeholders. The governance 
framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require 
accountability for the management of those resources. At the same time with the growing 
interest in corporate social responsibility issues, regulators and promoters have been 
supporting the adoptions of additional standards; meaning that corporate executives have 
had to wrestle with how they balance their commitments to the organisation’s owners 
with their obligations to an ever-broadening group of stakeholders who claim both legal 
and ethical rights. The aim applying the new standards is to align as nearly possible the 
interest of individuals, organisations and society. Corporate governance encourages 
companies and those who own and manage them to achieve their corporate objectives 
through a more efficient use of resources. Moreover, the corporate governance framework 
should recognise the rights of stakeholders as established by law. Evidence collected 
through the interviews also suggested that managers recognise that to be effective in 
establishing and maintaining mutually beneficial relationships with stakeholders, they 
must understand and negotiate the many environmental influences on the organisation 
that impacts its survival. It is also know that organisational survival depend not just on 
material resources and technical information, but also in the organisation perceived 
legitimacy.  
 
Table 6.3 presents a summary of the findings from the interviews and that can be used to 
answer the three research questions. In general the interview findings suggest that there is 
not a broad stakeholder perspective; the interviewees also acknowledge the weaknesses 
and difficulties faced by Colombian organisations validating their accountability 
mechanisms. Equally, the evidence gathered shows the importance which is given to the 
adoption of corporate governance standards by organisations in the country as a way for 
indicating the legitimacy of company activities.  
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Table 6.3 Summary of the Interview Findings 
 
 
Interviewees 
Groups 
RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 
G1: Managers and 
CEO’s 
 
There is the desire to 
engage with all the 
stakeholders of an 
organisation, but it is 
not easy 
 
 
Accountability 
according to the law is 
primarily toward 
shareholders 
 
 
The voluntary adoption 
of corporate 
governance standards 
enhances company 
legitimacy 
 
G2: Regulators 
 
Promoting standards 
according to the law 
and this relates only to 
shareholders 
 
Accountability  is 
primarily due to the 
organisation 
shareholders   
 
Conforming to the 
country’s legislative 
framework companies 
gain legitimacy  
 
G3:Independent 
Board of Directors 
and Auditors 
 
Wider stakeholder 
perspective, however 
acknowledge that is 
difficult to engage with 
all the stakeholders of 
an organisation  
  
 
Concede that 
accountability should 
be to all company 
stakeholders, but  the 
reality is different  
 
Organisations gain 
legitimacy having 
independent director in 
their boards 
 
G4: Outsiders – 
Academics, 
Investors and other 
users of company’s 
information 
 
 
What it is needed is to 
change the 
individualistic culture  
 
In order to extend 
accountability beyond 
the shareholders other  
stakeholders need to 
know their rights 
 
Acknowledge of the 
importance of having a 
good image (legitimacy) 
for an organisation 
This table summarises the evidence gathered from the interviews with Colombia stakeholders and which 
helps to answer the three research questions: 
• Research Question 1 (RQ1) – Is corporate governance viewed from a broad stakeholder 
perspective? 
• Research Question 2 (RQ2) – Is corporate governance implemented to enhance accountability to 
stakeholders? 
• Research Question 3 (RQ3) – to what extent corporate governance is adopted to legitimate 
company activities?     
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
Case Study Results 
 
Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the findings of a case study of CAF and documents the 
developments in the implementation of corporate governance principles by organisations 
in the five countries of the Andean Region. In particular this chapter analyses the ways 
that companies of all sizes, public or private, in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela are implementing the Guidelines for the Andean Corporate Governance Code 
(Lineamientos para un Codigó Andino de Gobierno Corporativo - LCAGC) developed by 
the Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento - CAF). This 
chapter also aims to answer the three research questions: whether (i) corporate 
governance is viewed from a broad stakeholder perspective; (ii) companies in the region 
decide to implement corporate governance principles because they want to be accountable 
to their stakeholders; and (iii) they want to legitimate their activities. 
 
The chapter starts with a description of the information sources used in the case study. 
First, data was gathered through interviews with three groups of people (see Table 7.1): 
(i) CAF employees; (ii) officials of organisations in the region known as CAF 
counterparts, who have supported the implementation of corporate governance principles 
in each country of the region; and (iii) directors of companies that took part in a CAF 
pilot study. A second source of data was interviewees realised by PROCAPITALES, one 
of CAF’s counterparts in Peru. Third, information was also gathered from annual reports 
from companies that took part in a CAF pilot study. Fourth, a mini survey was distributed 
among the participants at a conference attended by the researcher. Fifth, information also 
can from speeches on related issues given key speakers at events attended by the 
researcher. Additionally, data was obtained from corporate governance literature received 
from those interviewed or published from regulator and others promoting the 
implementation of good practices in the Andean region.      
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This descriptive section starts with details of the interviewees and their organisations. The 
results are then presented by starting with the views concerning CAF’s activities aimed at 
developing and improving corporate governance in the region together with an 
introduction of other issues affecting the implementation of the principles in the Andean 
countries. This is followed by a discussion of definitions of corporate governance that 
exist and the interest that corporate governance has generated in individual countries or at 
a regional level. The views of the interviewees regarding whether corporate governance 
should be voluntary or if there is a need for more regulation are then noted. In addition, 
views about the adoption of corporate governance standards by SMEs, family-owned 
business and SOEs. Additionally issues related to the overlap of CSR and corporate 
governance is also discussed.  
 
The next section examines the results on particular issues related to corporate governance 
such as views on the board, how board of directors members are elected, who must or 
may be a member of a board, the need for independent directors, the board’s structure and 
functions, rules by which it should be governed, how board meetings should be held, and 
views on board committees. It also includes opinions of the systems needed to manage 
internal control and risk management and auditors appointment. The analysis focuses on 
understanding stakeholders’ roles in shaping the implementation of the principles of 
corporate governance, to whom and how companies or management are accountable and 
the desire by companies to legitimate their operations as a factor in their implementation 
of corporate governance principles. 
 
7.1 Information sources 
 
As mentioned above, the data for the case study was collected using a number of different 
methods; it was expected that using more than one method would provide sufficient and 
relevant information to allow a comprehensive analysis of the developments in the 
implementation of corporate governance practices in the Andean Region. The research 
focuses on the activities undertaken by CAF to promote the implementation of good 
practices in the region. It is noteworthy that a large majority of the sources of information 
for this study were in Spanish. For example, all the interviews, including those taken from 
PROCAPITALES were carried out in Spanish, equally much of the collected documents 
including financial statements are in Spanish; only a small number of companies’ annual 
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reports are in English.  At the events attended only a few speakers presented their talks in 
a language other than Spanish. All necessary translations were made by the researcher. 
Next are introduced details of the sources of information used in this case study. 
 
7.1.1 The Case Study interviews   
 
Case study interviews were conducted with 11 individuals related to the Andean 
Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento – CAF), see Table 7.1. Four  
of the respondents are CAF employees (B1 – B4); these executives perform their tasks in 
either the main office of the Corporation which is located in Caracas (Venezuela) or 
regional offices based in the capital cities of each of the shareholder members of CAF. 
 
   Table 7.1 Interviewees for Case Study 
 
Interviewee Function Country Organisation Gender Group 
Panel A: CAF Employees 
B1 Manager Colombia CAF M G5 
B2 Manager Colombia CAF M G5 
B3 Manager Venezuela CAF M G5 
B4 Manager Venezuela CAF M G5 
Panel B: CAF Counterparts (1) 
C1 CG Project Director Colombia Medium-Sized M G6 
C2 CG Project Director Colombia Large Company F G6 
C3 CG Project Assistant  Ecuador Large Company F G6 
C4 CEO Venezuela Medium-Sized F G6 
Panel C: CAF Pilot Companies (2) 
D1 CFO Colombia Large F G7 
D2 CEO Ecuador Large M G7 
D3 CFO Ecuador Large M G7 
Note: This table shows some of the characteristics about the interviewees. Function relates to their 
job title, the country where there are based, the size of the organisation they work for, and gender 
distinguishes male (M) from female (F) interviewees.  
G5 CAF’s Staff, G6 CAF’s Counterparts and G7 Individuals from organisations that took part in 
CAF’s Pilot Study; (G1, G2, G3, and G4 are used to group interviewees in Chapter six) 
(1) The two medium-sized companies are private associations which are run with some degree of 
state support but at the same time are independent of government intervention. 
(2) Interviewees D1 and D2’s companies are manufacturing organisations 
         Interviewee D3’sCompany belongs to the fishing sector   
 
The information obtained from the interviewees is particularly important as one of them 
was a CAF employee when CAF first recognised the importance of implementing 
corporate governance principles in companies of the region; the remaining CAF staff 
members are responsible for key areas in the corporate governance project not only at an 
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individual countries level but also regionally. Another four interviewees are employees of 
entities that act as CAF’s counterparts in the region (C1 – C4), who are responsible for 
promoting corporate governance at their country level; most of these activities are 
supported financially and technically by CAF. The remaining three interviewees are 
directors of companies that participated in CAF’s pilot study (D1 – D3); the three 
companies are large family-owned businesses two in Ecuador and one in Colombia.  
 
From this group of people it was possible to obtain important information on corporate 
governance, due to the respondents’ familiarity with the process of the development of 
corporate governance, its implementation and the evaluation of practices to date. 
 
7.1.2 PROCAPITALES Interviews  
 
The above interviews exclude Peru because an exclusive survey had already been carried 
out in that country by PROCAPITALES. Under its initiative to promote the 
implementation of corporate governance practices CAF chose PROCAPITALES as its 
counterpart in Peru for a project with the objective of implementing best practices 
throughout the Andean region. This project includes the preparation of an action plan for 
disseminating corporate governance concepts and principles in the Andean region, the 
preparation of the Andean Code of Corporate Governance, and the implementation of the 
pilot program on corporate governance practices within five Peruvian companies.  
 
In 2006 PROCAPITALES and the postgraduate school of Universidad Peruana de 
Ciencias Aplicadas (UPC – Peruvian University of Applied Sciences) set up a 
competition which rewards Peruvian companies that are committed to change and to meet 
the principles of corporate governance. 
 
The program began with a breakfast meeting where issues related to good corporate 
governance practices were presented to the management of those companies interested in 
participating in the competition. All the competition’s activities have been supported by 
CAF (Andean Development Corporation), CIPE (Centre for International Private 
Enterprise), the Peruvian Association of Pension Funds, and El Diario el Comercio (a 
Peruvian Newspaper). The competition assessed companies that demonstrated a 
commitment to good corporate governance based on transparency and business ethics as 
factors of value creation. As a general reference the “Principles of Good Governance for 
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Peruvian Corporations”37 were used. However, the evaluation included additional aspects 
to those reported in that document. Ernst and Young worked as technical advisor to 
develop the technical elements of the measurement of best corporate governance practices 
in use locally and globally. The competition awards prizes to those the companies which 
demonstrate outstanding performance in categories such as:  
 
(a) Better treatment of shareholders: Good corporate governance should protect 
shareholder rights and ensure fair treatment for all. In this regard, it measured equitable 
treatment of the company to its shareholders and its dividend distribution policies. 
 
(b) Better Board of Directors policies: The Board should play a significant role in the 
development and review of the company’s strategy and overseeing business operations. 
Therefore, the policy evaluated election of directors, the existence of special committees 
within the Board and the policies of management control and empowerment to the 
management. It also evaluated the definition of stakeholder roles and the board of 
directors and managers.  
 
(c) Information transparency: The quality of information and communication affects the 
ability of company management, shareholders and stakeholders for making appropriate 
decisions. This was assessed on whether the information regarding all material issues of 
the company were presented in a precise, accurate and regular way. It was also awarded 
on the creative and proactive dissemination and presentation of the legal, financial and 
operational matters of the companies. 
 
(d) Managerial structure and risk management: Management must have a defined 
structure and processes to identify and analyse the relevant risks, both internal and 
external, to achieve the objectives of an organisation. 
 
(e) Behaviour with the internal and external environment: The contest also considered an 
evaluation of the integration and active engagement with employees, suppliers, customers 
and the community. 
                                                 
37 Document prepared by the Association of Banks (ASBANC), the Lima Stock Exchange (BVL), the 
National Supervisory Commission for Companies and Securities (CONASEV), National Confederation of 
Private Business Institutions (CONFIEP), Centre for Capital Markets and Financial (MC&F), Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF), the Association of Capital Market Developers (PROCAPITALES) and the 
Superintendence of Banking and Insurance (SBS) 
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Prizes were also given to companies with the best: annual report; website as a 
communication tool to the market and to stakeholders; creation of shareholder value; 
corporate governance in state-owned enterprises; corporate governance in companies that 
do not have a public offering of securities; corporate governance in financial and micro 
enterprises; and better corporate governance in family businesses. Table 7.2 presents a 
description of the 24 Peruvian company directors from the organisations that took part in 
the first corporate governance contest organised by PROCAPITALES.  
 
Table 7.2 Peruvian Directors interviewed by PROCAPITALES 
 
 FUNCTION SECTOR TYPE 
E1 CEO Manufacturing Medium - Family controlled 
E2 Chairman Insurance-Pension Large - Listed  
E3 CEO Agro-Industry Medium - Close controlled 
E4 CEO Manufacturing Large - Listed 
E5 CEO Financing Medium - Listed 
E6 CFO Financing/Banking Large - Listed 
E7 CFO Financing/Banking Large - Listed 
E8 CEO Manufacturing Large - Close controlled 
E9 CFO Mining Large - Listed 
E10 Chairman Fishing Medium - Family controlled 
E11 Chairman Manufacturing Large - Listed (1) 
E12 CEO Utilities Supplier Large - Close controlled 
E13 CEO Electricity Generator Large - Listed 
E14 CEO Wholesale Large - Listed 
E15 CEO Financing Large - Listed 
E16 CEO Construction Large - Family controlled 
E17 CEO Financing/Banking Large - Listed 
E18 CEO Wholesale Medium - Close controlled 
E19 CEO Healthcare Large - Listed (2) 
E20 CEO Pensions & welfare 
funds 
Large - Listed 
E21 CEO Utilities Supplier Large - Listed 
E22 CEO Services Large - State controlled 
E23 CFO (3) Mining Large - Listed 
E24 Marketing 
Director  
Services Large - Listed 
Source: PROCAPITALES video, Corporate Governance Competition, 2006 
Note: This table shows some important characteristics about the individuals interviewed by 
PROCAPITALES, function relates to their job title, sector the organisation economic activity, and type 
to the size and capital structure. All the interviewees are males.  
(1) One of the seven companies that integrated CERVESUR Corporation; (2) American based 
subsidiary company; (3) CFO and Relationship with shareholders Director   
 
The contest’s organisers are convinced that the commitment to good corporate 
governance based on transparency and corporate ethics leads to success for all the 
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organisations whose governing bodies make a real commitment to change to guide 
companies to comply with these principles. In interviews conducted by PROCAPITALES 
the directors expressed their views on good practice and what they expected to gain from 
their participation in the competition. The answers of the interviewees are part of the 
information analysed in this case study. 
 
7.1.3 Corporate governance in Bolivia: Information sources  
 
Gathering data about the corporate governance developments in Bolivia was particularly 
difficult due, in particular, to the political and economic struggle presently undergoing in 
the country. This issue was also raised by CAF staff at the interviews. However, enough 
information to provide an insight about the implementation of corporate governance in 
Bolivia was obtained from sources such as the publications by the Bolivian Stock 
Exchange (Bolsa Boliviana de Valores – BBV), which is CAF’s counterpart in Bolivia. 
Also reports from CAF’s programs in Bolivia such as “the training and diffusion of 
corporate governance in Bolivia”, project undertake with the cooperation of BBV, the 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce of Santa Cruz (Bolivia) and some Bolivian 
Universities. Information was also taken from “the implementation of a corporate 
governance code for the insurance industry in Bolivia” project run by the Bolivian 
Association on Insurers (Asociación Boliviana de Aseguradores – ABA). In addition 
there was information available from a newspaper interviewee to Alejandro MacLean, 
ABA’s Chairman (El Diario 22/09/2008); recordings from a speech and articles written 
by Miguel A. Nabil, Bolivian’s Superintendent of Finance; in addition web publications 
by the Bolivian’s Superintendence of Companies; and Annual Reports from Bancosol, a 
Bolivian company which took part in CAF’s pilot study. 
 
7.1.4 Documents – Annual Reports, from CAF’s Pilot Study Companies  
 
Part of CAF’s action plan focuses on the dissemination of corporate governance 
principles in the corporate sector of the five Andean countries Guidelines were first 
formulated for an Andean Code on Corporate Governance (LCAGC, based on its name in 
Spanish). Then it created a network of local partners that includes the Bolsa Boliviana de 
Valores (Bolivian Stock Exchange), Confecámaras (The Colombian Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce), Bolsa de Valores de Quito (Quito Stock Exchange – Ecuador), 
 181 
PROCAPITALES (Peru) and the Venezuelan Association of Executives (AVE). Next, 
CAF’s corporate governance standards were implemented as part of a Pilot Study in 
fifteen companies located in the five Andean countries, as shown in Table 7.3. 
 
Table 7.3 Companies in CAF’s Pilot Study 
 
No Country Company Industry Type 
1 Bolivia Bancosol Banking Large - Listed 
2 Bolivia Tahuamanu SA* Food and 
Beverages 
Medium - Listed 
3 Colombia Seguros Bolivar Insurance Large - Listed 
4 Colombia Mac SA Manufacturing Large - Family Controlled 
5 Colombia  Coéxito SA Wholesaler Medium-Family Controlled 
6 Ecuador Banco Solidiario Banking Large - Listed 
7 Ecuador  Ecoelectric Manufacturing Medium-Family Controlled 
8 Ecuador NIRSA Fishing Large - Family Controlled 
9 Peru Copeinca SA Fishing  Large - Listed 
10 Peru El Comercio* Media Medium-Family controlled 
11 Peru  Bolsa de Valores de Lima Stock Exchange Large - Listed 
12 Peru Ajegroup - Grupo 
Embotellador Atic 
Beverages Large - Family Controlled 
13 Peru Graña y Montero SAA Construction Large - Listed 
14 Venezuela Banco Caribe Banking Large - Listed 
15  Venezuela Electricidad de Caracas Services Large - State-owned 
(since 06/2007) 
*Tahuamanu SA and El Comercio were excluded from the analysis due to difficulties in obtaining relevant 
information 
Note: This table shows some characteristics about the 15 companies that took part on CAF’s Pilot study, 
showing where the companies are incorporated; their names; the industry of their economic activity; type 
of company; and size and capital structure.    
 
Document analysis using the companies annual reports for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007 
is used to investigate how companies report the implementation of corporate governance 
principles and how the adoption of principles affects the way these companies are 
managed and controlled. Annual reports from companies that took part in CAF’s pilot 
study are included in the analysis. Two companies had to be excluded from the analysis 
due to difficulties in obtaining their annual reports, resulting in a final sample of thirteen 
companies. The analysis reports the frequency of certain elements of corporate 
governance in the annual reports. 
 
7.1.5 Events  
 
Taking into account the importance of events such as conferences, workshops, forums 
and training breakfasts as a means to promote and train companies in the practices of 
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corporate governance, the researcher attended a number of events organised by CAF’s 
counterparts; some of these events were also sponsored by CAF. Generally, the events 
aim to provide an updated analysis of the current situation, emphasising the lessons 
learned in the process of reforms and implementation of effective corporate governance 
practices, both in family businesses, state-owned enterprises, and listed companies. 
Usually prominent local and international speakers are invited to these events. The 
audience contains members of the local business community and neighbouring countries 
as well as academics, students and local and national government representatives.  Details 
of events attended are provided in Table 7.4   
 
Table 7.4 List of Events Attended 
 
No. Country Organiser Topic Date 
1  
Colombia 
Supersociedades Workshop -Training CG 
Advisers 
05/09/2008 
2  
Ecuador 
Quito Stock Exchange Workshop -Training CG 
Advisers 
11/09/2008 
3  
Colombia 
DNP, LEED and CAF (1) Strategies for Efficient 
local Development 
     16/09/2008 
4  
Colombia 
Supersociedades  Why Corporate 
Governance? 
           17/09/2008 
5  
 
Colombia 
La Republica Effective Administration 
for Family Businesses 
Seminar 
07/10/2008 
6  
Colombia 
Universidad Minuto de Dios Corporate Governance in 
Family Business 
     05-06/10/2008 
7  
 
Colombia 
Universidad de los Andes International Seminar 
about Postgraduate 
Education 
12/11/2008 
8  
Colombia 
Confecámaras International Corporate 
Governance Seminar  
25/11/2008 
(1)DNP – Colombian Planning Department 
    LEED – Local Economic and Employment Development (OCDE) 
    CAF – Andean Development Corporation 
Note: This table shows a list of the corporate governance events attended by the researcher. 
 
Information gathered at these events enriches the analysis with relevant data provided by 
key speakers as well as the material used in their presentations. It also enhances the 
analysis with information given by business persons who attend the events and who 
shared their experiences of the process of implementing corporate governance standards 
in their organisations.  
 
The events’ speakers included academics, managers, researchers, experts, and officials 
from regulatory organisations in the countries of the region. Entrepreneurs shared their 
experience in implementing corporate governance practices. 
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Additionally, data has been gathered from documents provided by some of those 
interviewed or collected at the events attended. These documents include business and 
academic publications and instructional booklets produced by CAF. The results of a 
survey on the implementation and compliance with corporate governance practices at a 
country level are also included. 
 
7.1.6 Survey  
 
Building on the collaboration with one of the organisers of an event attended by the 
researcher, a questionnaire survey was distributed to the event’s participants and eighty 
completed questionnaires were collected. Among those who participated in the survey are 
consultants, business people, managers, directors, and students. Table 7.5 shows the 
proportion of those who answered the survey for each category. 
 
Table 7.5 Survey respondents 
 
ACTIVITY No. % 
Consultants 42 52.50 
Business Persons 22 27.50 
Other 16 20.00 
TOTAL 80 100 
Note: this table shows a description of the individuals that answered the mini survey 
carried a out by the researcher at the Confecámaras, International Corporate governance 
Seminar, Bogotá (Colombia) 25, November 2008.  
 
A copy of the questionnaire is included in Appendix 7.1 and 7.2. The form consisted of 
seventeen questions in three sections, the first section asked the respondents to indicate 
their occupation; the second section has ten questions that invited the respondents to 
express their opinions about general concepts of corporate governance, such as the 
definition, benefits expected from implementation, accountability and legitimacy that 
could be achieved if an organisation applies the principles; as well as questions about 
CAF’s activities promoting good practices in the region: The third section contained six 
questions about the structure of the board and management and of conflicts of interest. 
Respondents answered the questions using a 1 to 5 Likert-scale, where a 1 meant strongly 
agree and a 5 strongly disagree. The findings from all these information sources are used 
in the following sections to establish the context of corporate governance in the Andean 
region. 
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7.2 CAF's role in improving corporate governance in the Andean region  
 
CAF has two dimensions. First, it is a development bank whose founder shareholders are 
the five Andean countries. One of its objectives is to lend money and, as a development 
bank, it has to develop its own operations and also support technical cooperation 
programs. Second, CAF is committed to sustainable development and regional 
integration. Part of CAF’s profits each year are devoted to enabling CAF to grow and to 
be able to lend money as a financial intermediary in the five countries; some of these 
profits are dedicated to investment programs that are intended to support a variety of 
issues such as public policy, environmental issues, social issues, and competitiveness. 
Within the competitiveness programs are technical cooperation programs and, integrated 
with this, is the support of corporate governance developments, and the program to 
promote the implementation of good corporate governance practices in the Latin 
American Andean Region. This includes activities such as supporting programs by CAF’s 
counterparts, governance institutes and others to train corporate governance consultants 
strengthen board of directors’ competencies and enhance the leadership skills needed to 
build business capacity and promote economic growth. CAF also guides the 
implementation of corporate governance codes and has developed software for measuring 
compliance with internally accepted standards. CAF’s aim is the dissemination and 
reinforcement of best practices of corporate governance in the region to develop optimal 
levels of competitiveness and contribute to the strengthening of the Andean financial 
markets. This may also help organisations to understand that corporate governance is 
about the relationship with all their stakeholders and therefore be accountable to all of 
them. Also a well managed organisation may project a good image to its stakeholders. 
 
CAF issued the Guidelines for the Andean Corporate Governance Code (LCAGC) in 
2005. LCAGC has been widely disseminated in different forums since it was issued, and 
has been recognised in international venues such as multilateral agencies’ Roundtables on 
Corporate Governance in Latin America, organised by the OECD, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Global Corporate Governance Forum (GCGF), in 
locations such as Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico DF, Santiago de Chile and Lima. 
LCAGC is divided into five sections: (i) Rights and Equitable Treatment for 
Shareholders; (ii) The General Assembly of Shareholders; (iii) The Board of Directors; 
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(iv) Financial and Non Financial Information; and (v) Settlement of Disputes (a brief 
summary of the Andean Code in included in Appendix 1.1). These areas are covered in 
fifty-one measures which introduce ninety-five recommendations (provisions) which 
serve as best practice for guiding the process of implementing corporate governance in 
the region, but at the same time recognise existing information asymmetries, legal 
frameworks and the depth of financial markets in each country. 
 
CAF's effort in promoting the implementation of corporate governance principles has 
helped people to know more about the topic. However, not everybody has given the same 
importance to corporate governance matters, as interviewee B4 pointed out: 
“There are still many who believe that this is just a fashion or that the issue 
does not affect them. Thus, many think that they already have good corporate 
governance and that they do not need to invest energy, time and money to put 
something on paper that they are already doing”.  
 
Instead of imposing codes on countries, CAF is working with local partners in every 
country, relying on local knowledge as an approach to reform. A list of CAF’s regional 
partners can be seen in Table 7.6. CAF Counterparts in each country identify their own 
corporate governance needs and adopt standards to reflect local realities and challenges. 
First an assessment is done by CAF by consultation with these local partners, to decide 
what they want to do, and what can be done. As each country is different from the other, 
different initiatives are proposed for each country. For example, in Peru CAF is 
supporting the competition run by PROCAPITALES, which is one of CAF’s counterparts 
in that country. Additionally, CAF supports Peruvian regulators updating the country’s 
corporate governance code. CAF is also keen to see the implementation of corporate 
governance principles in Venezuelan and Colombian state-owned businesses. In addition 
due proportion of family-owned and small business in the Andean countries, CAF issued 
the Corporate Governance Code for Closed Capital Companies. Indeed, CAF’s 
counterparts are running different activities to support the implementation of corporate 
governance principles by SME in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela.    
 
Additionally, CAF, in conjunction with its local partners, governments, businesses and 
members of the academic sector involved in corporate governance offers non-
reimbursable technical and financial assistance for the realisation of related corporate 
governance activities. Specifically, CAF’s programs include the following activities: 
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• Conceptual contributions, such as writing and publishing standards and guides on 
corporate governance for companies.  
• Design forums and events, and publication of material.  
• Implementation of pilot cases of good practices in different types of companies.  
• Monitoring and measurement studies related to the adoption of good corporate 
governance practices. 
 
Table 7.6 CAF partners and local projects 
 
COUNTRY ORGANISATIONS LOCAL PROJECTS 
 
Bolivia 
 
Bolivian Stock Exchange (BBV) 
 
 Workshops and seminars 
 Journalist Workshop 
 
Colombia 
 
Confecámaras 
Colombia Stock Exchange (BVC) 
Superintendence of Finance 
 
 Workshops and seminars 
 Case studies 
 Reports and brochures 
 
Ecuador 
 
Quito Stock Exchange (BVQ) 
 
 Workshops and seminars 
 
 
 
Peru 
 
PROCAPITALES 
UPC- (Peruvian university of Applied 
Sciences) 
CONASEV – (National Commission 
Overseeing Securities Firms) 
 
 Workshops and seminars 
 Case studies 
 Reports and brochures 
 Competition 
 Supervision 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
AVE- (Venezuelan Association of 
Executives)  
 
 Workshops and seminars 
 
Note: this table shows a description of CAF’s counterparts in the Andean region and some of the activities 
these organisations run with CAF support.       
 
According to interviewee B4, CAF’s partner in Bolivia has always been the Bolivian 
Stock Market (Bolsa Boliviana de Valores - BBV), with whom some work involving the 
insurance sector has already been done. However, there have been some recent 
difficulties with BBV to identify any new projects, but it is likely that CAF may sponsor 
an event, such as a workshop or conference. CAF are also looking to work with 
universities to help build degree programs that include corporate governance education. 
 
The Colombian Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Colombia - BVC) is one of CAF's 
partners in Colombia. According to Interviewee B1, the two organisations traditionally 
have worked together in the development, issue, and implementation of corporate 
governance principles. Confecámaras (The Colombian Confederation of Chambers of 
Commerce) is also CAF's partner in dissemination forums, rather than in the 
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implementation that CAF normally has with other counterparts such as BVC and the 
Colombian Superintendence of Finance. 
 
In Venezuela, Interviewee C4 notes that the emphasis is on family businesses, and CAF 
has agreed with its partner the Venezuelan Association of Executives (AVE) to hold 
workshops for SMEs using existing material such as its corporate governance guidelines, 
and assessment software which aims to support companies interested in assessing their 
corporate governance practices. In addition, AVE is currently developing an academic 
program with particular emphasis on corporate governance for SMEs. CAF also offers a 
software application, which allows them to obtain a diagnosis and identify priority areas 
for action. The application allows a user, knowledgeable or not of corporate governance 
to see the extent of compliance with a given corporate governance standard contained in 
the Andean Corporate Governance Code. The corporate governance evaluation software 
is now used for companies in the Andean region, and is also used as the basis on self-
evaluation questionnaires distributed by regulators such as the Superintendence of 
Companies in countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. Companies using 
this may be doing so for accountability purposes or for legitimacy of their activities. 
 
CAF's partner in Ecuador, the Quito Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Quito -BVQ) 
has been delivering corporate governance workshops with support from the Multilateral 
Investment Fund (MIF) as outlined by Interviewee C3. CAF has complemented this effort 
by supporting a research centre in the field and has structured training courses in 
universities on the topic of corporate governance. In addition BVQ, through an initiative 
called the ‘Good Corporate Governance Program’ in Ecuador, has agreements with nine 
universities to include subjects in their curriculum which will serve to develop the skills 
of students to apply principles of good governance in companies. This program is 
sponsored by the Quito Stock Exchange (BVQ), the MIF, and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (BID). An international consultant, IAAG38, has prepared the 
academic basis of these courses. 
 
                                                 
38 IAAG - Consultoría & Corporate Finance is a firm specialised in Strategic Consulting and Corporate 
Finance. IAAG focus are emerging countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia, working 
in programs sponsored and financed by Multilateral Agencies as well as advising the private Sector and 
Government Agencies. 
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In general, according to interviewee B2, CAF’s efforts have been particularly well 
received by companies as they have started to realise what the topic of corporate 
governance is about. More companies are showing an interest and some have decided to 
take part in the implementation programs. The diffusion of corporate governance 
principles has been disseminated through forums, conferences, workshops, and lectures in 
colleges and universities, as noted by Interviewee B4. The programs have had very good 
participation rates, and many companies have participated. Entrepreneurs are invited to 
present their own situations in relation to the issue of corporate governance. Large 
companies that have implemented corporate governance principles under CAF's pilot 
study such as the Electricidad of Caracas, and Bancaribe in Venezuela, MAC in 
Colombia, or Banco Solidario in Ecuador have also presented their experiences several 
times at corporate governance events. 
 
CAF’s working partners that act as local counterparts in the Andean countries have also 
been able to share their ideas about the financial supervision and regulation of companies 
as noted by Interviewee B3 and are able to apply CAF’s recommendations in accordance 
with their country’s internal regulations; as Interviewee B3 suggests: 
“Andean guidelines are a set of recommendations. However, companies have 
to comply with their country’s law. For example, in some cases, it is 
recommended that shareholders cast their vote in a General Meeting even it 
they are not present at the Meeting, which is known as ‘a remote vote’, this is 
to allow for greater access to decision-making. But there are some cases 
where the regulation of a country does not allow remote vote – for example, in 
Colombia. Therefore, this is a recommendation that cannot be used 
universally”. 
 
According to Alfredo Ibargüen39, it is important that the regulatory framework, while not 
explicitly ruling on the mandatory nature of certain international practices, at least does 
not prohibit the adoption of standards of corporate governance For example, in Colombia, 
the electoral quotient system to choose members of the board makes the appointment of 
independent members difficult. In Ecuador electronic voting in Assemblies is not a 
recognised medium. Thus, implementing corporate governance practices need to vary to 
accord with the regulatory framework. Thus, the consulting work on corporate 
                                                 
39 Alfredo Ibargüen, is a consultant for the Spanish organisation IAAG, which has been working with CAF 
in the development, implementation and training on corporate governance issues in the Andean Region. The 
remarks were made at the Quito Stock Exchange Workshop, ‘Implementation of Effective Corporate 
Governance Practices’, Guayaquil (Ecuador); 11 September 2008. 
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governance is particularly important, to provide alternatives to allow for the absence of 
specific practices. Interviewee B1 also suggests that: “It is not easy to choose guidelines 
that suit a particular country and its economy best”.    
 
According to interviewee D1, to roll out corporate governance at country level: 
“CAF’s intention is that the countries of the Andean Community adopt a code 
of good governance. To arrive at this code of good governance businesses need 
to adopt the model of corporate governance promoted by CAF and then jump to 
a country code of good governance”. 
 
In general, it is acknowledged through the region that there is a high degree of acceptance 
of the Corporate Governance guidelines, the Andean Corporate Governance code, issued 
by CAF. For example among the respondents to the survey mentioned in section 7.1.5 
above, 89.3% agree that CAF is helping with the implementation of good corporate 
governance (CG) standards. However, as shown in Table 7.7, 20% of those grouped in 
others expressed some disagreement to the view that CAF is helping with the 
implementation of corporate governance in the Andean region.  
 
Table 7.7 CAF Corporate Governance implementation 
 
CAF is helping CG implementation 
Respondent 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
 
 Entrepreneur 42.1% 26.3% 15.8%   15.8% 100.0% 
  Adviser 52.5% 27.5% 12.5% 7.5%   100.0% 
  Student 33.3% 50.0% 16.7%     100.0% 
  Other 30.0% 50.0%   20.0%   100.0% 
Total 45.3% 32.0% 12.0% 6.7% 4.0% 100.0% 
Note: This table reports the questionnaire survey results given out at an event in Colombia 
 
Equally, as shown in Table 7.8, 90.8% of the survey respondents feel that CAF’s 
Corporate Governance Guidelines are beneficial to companies and stakeholders. 
However, the entrepreneurs are the ones who showed more disagreement with this view it 
is not known why these entrepreneurs attended the event as they were both sceptical of 
CAF’s code and its implementation. 
 
CAF’s activities have included the publication of brochures and other literature; 
awareness seminars; conferences; forums; training workshops for consultants, family 
entrepreneurs, and journalists; training for managers; documenting cases; and contests.  
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Table 7.8 Benefits of CAF’s Corporate Governance Guidelines  
 
CAF's CG Guidelines are beneficial 
Respondents 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree 
Total 
 
 Entrepreneur 40.0% 35.0% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
  Adviser 52.5% 32.5% 10.0% 5.0%   100.0% 
  Student 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%     100.0% 
  Other 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 10.0%   100.0% 
Total 47.4% 34.2% 9.2% 6.6% 2.6% 100.0% 
Note: This table reports the questionnaire survey results given out at an event in Colombia 
 
7.3 Other issues affecting corporate governance development in the region  
 
Other issue that may impact the implementation of corporate governance in the Andean 
regions is that of politics. The political situation in the Andean region is particularly 
troubled, with a lasting turbulence that originates from government ideology and the style 
of the presidents of the countries that lead to expectations for constant change in the rules 
of the game as policies go along with who is in power. There are also other factors to be 
taken into account, such as the sudden nationalisation of companies (Bolivia, Venezuela), 
apparent restrictions on the freedom of information (Venezuela), and the constant 
uncertainty in the political relations between countries. It is therefore difficult to establish 
the impact of these issues on the corporate governance programs as highlighted by 
interviewee B3:   
 “…there is concern about the actions of rulers. This is the situation of 
individual countries, and might cause some distress among companies, but in 
the medium and long term, companies need to work on issues that are important 
to them, such as corporate governance, which is an issue that has not yet had 
much diffusion and it is possible that has become less important and has 
attracted less attention than other things that are happening in the environment”. 
 
In Venezuela, for example, a very important initiative has been the formation of 
cooperatives, which have been assigned resources but are often unable to generate a profit 
or create value (Interviewee C4). This creates a sense of frustration because sometimes 
the recipients of the funds do not have the tools or capacity to efficiently use those 
resources for the benefit of the community. These organisations have been formed as 
cooperatives in an ‘anti-capitalist ideal’. Therefore, it would be preferable if some of 
these resources were channelled to give people education and training to help them 
succeed in these organisations, or any other types of business. Interviewee B4 believes 
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that training on dealing with good corporate practices may help Venezuelan cooperatives 
in reaching their objectives as this interviewee stressed: “….at the end of training and 
governance, tools are needed in all scenarios”. 
 
Additionally, the current political turmoil has affected the interest in corporate 
governance in most parts of the region; the concern of shareholders, directors and 
management has been directed by a feeling of urgency to issues not necessarily related to 
the management of their businesses. Companies may need to change quickly, as those 
who survive are those that adapt with greater speed and versatility to the structures in 
which they have to act. According to interviewee B1:  
“Corporate governance is seen as a shield for the turbulence cause by the 
political trends in the region that could jeopardize business structures. Through 
the implementation of corporate governance practices, companies are in a better 
position to accommodate the turn of the political leadership of a country”. 
 
Political trends in the Andean region countries may affect, in one way or another, the 
economy at both a regional level and an individual country level. This, in turn may be 
reflected in standards and practices related to the management of the business, and from 
this study it appears that corporate governance practices are touched in some way by 
these trends. This is evidenced in the analysis of the annual reports. For example, in the 
opening paragraph of the 2006 report to shareholders, the Chairman of Seguros Bolivar (a 
Colombian company that took part CAF’s Pilot Study) expressed his view about recent 
events in that matter:   
“It is important to refer to the processes of governments with a leftist trend in 
Bolivia, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela although this has not 
prevented Colombia continuing with a quite satisfactory relationship with these 
countries in political, economic, social and cultural aspects”. 
  
A year later, in the reporting year 2007, Seguros Bolivar Chairman declared:   
 
“Affairs, at some point came under strain with countries like Ecuador, but the 
Colombian government maintained a line of searching for building international 
relations in political, economic, social and cultural [dimensions]. 
Disappointingly, this year ended with the unfortunate weakening of bilateral 
relations with the government of President Hugo Chavez, as a result of the 
demonstrations of the Venezuelan president against President Álvaro Uribe 
Vélez (Colombia), during the mediation made by President Chavez on the 
release of hostages by FARC. Venezuela confirmed its decision to stay outside 
of the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) as a manifestation of the 
differences between the two countries” (p 5). 
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Another example of the effects of political trends in the region and the actions of regional 
political representatives is the Venezuelan electricity supply company that was one of the 
companies that took part in CAF’s Pilot Study. As noted in the 2007 Annual Corporate 
Governance Report of Electricidad de Caracas, a publicly held utility supplier until the 
end of 2006, its nationalisation process was completed at the end June 2007: 
“Nationalisation led to regulatory compliance to controls of State institutions, 
processes that we have been adapting very successfully. The learning curve has 
been exceptional; our units are currently guarantors of the appropriate use of 
public funds. At present, since nationalisation, ‘the new’ Electricidad de 
Caracas reinforces these activities through the progressive adaptation of the 
principles of corporate governance for the state-owned character which the 
institution now has” (p 2). 
 
According to the interviewees, current regional political trends affect the development of 
corporate governance with both right wing and left wing leaning governments. However, 
corporate governance is not necessarily incompatible with a right or left leaning 
philosophy; state-owned, private and public companies should all be transparent, produce 
reliable results and be efficient. None of these attributes are incompatible with a left or 
right leaning government as Interviewee C4 believes:  
“What happens is that it is a matter of opinion, but in any case, corporate 
governance is an issue that is outside of an ideological concept, whether 
economic or political; corporate governance is transparency, accountability, 
efficient management and available resources of all kinds. It is necessary in 
whichever system”.  
 
Equally, interviewee B4 mentioned: 
 
“I do not believe the issue of corporate governance is at all incompatible with 
one of a right or left leaning ideas, because it may be an entirely public 
organisation or a private company that should want to be transparent and must 
produce results and want to say that its results are reliable, and must be 
professional, none of these attributes are incompatible with the left or right. The 
left has some ideas of state-owned or state actor, but it favours state-owned 
enterprises as efficient generators of a states’ value”. 
 
There was some agreement amongst the interviewees that nationalisation and 
privatisation processes could affect the attitude towards corporate governance. However, 
it is important to be prepared to adapt corporate governance systems to meet the 
circumstances of companies at a specific time, and most considered the corporate 
governance of a privately-owned company to be similar to that of a publicly-owned 
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company. When a company is nationalised there is the need to develop practices to 
address particular issues; for example, the role of the state as owner, and there is also the 
need to provide a clear mandate to the board of directors, who will be in charge of not 
simply generating the highest possible value, but must also demonstrate compliance with 
clear social objectives. An example of this situation is given by interviewee C4 pointing 
out that: 
“The Venezuelan government has a clear socialist orientation, openness, and 
distribution of resources in a specific way; it also needs to plan very well to 
where it directs its resources. Institutions that receive resources should be 
equipped with adequate tools to make efficient use of the resources allocated 
because these are assigned to be productive, so organisations can continue to 
grow, occupying space at national level, so corporate governance is as valid in 
communism or capitalism or in any system. The handling of resources is not an 
ideological issue but when used well, all the country might grow”. 
 
According to interviewees B1, B4, C1 and C4, this may be why there is no resistance to 
corporate governance in left leaning countries. In Venezuela, because of the political 
situation new laws are issued fairly frequently and procedures must be adapted all the 
time. However there is a positive change in attitude, even by the government, because the 
National Securities Commission (CNV, for its name in Spanish), the government 
organisation that supervises the securities markets in Venezuela, has been involved in 
ongoing activities aimed at the development of corporate governance, and one of its 
strategic objectives is to open the securities markets for small businesses, something it 
calls ‘the democratisation of capital’. 
 
Equally, it is the opinion of Interviewees C1, C2 and C4 that the political trends in the 
region affect the implementation of corporate governance principles. The recent 
Venezuelan situation is an example. Due to the current president’s socialist attitude it is 
very difficult for companies to have their own company objectives - especially for public 
companies or state-owned companies, as the president recognises that there are many 
needs among the population such as health care for the community; all organisations have 
to take these into account. For instance, the state-owned oil company PDVSA, whose role 
is to explore and extract oil, has to give subsidies to the poor, and import food to 
distribute if the president says that PDVSA should do so. These are additional targets for 
organisations and this makes it more difficult for firms to achieve their corporate 
objectives. Further, as the state is less strict in measuring companies’ performance, it may 
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be that a company is not operationally viable. However, where the poor are benefiting 
from a company’s activities it may not be expected to explain any operational failures. 
Interviewee B3 also pointed out that most people recognise that companies need to be 
efficient from a financial point of view in order to provide social benefits. If companies 
lose their capital they will not have enough resources to invest. At the same time this 
makes it very difficult to achieve poverty alleviation and improve the social condition of 
people. Therefore, companies must be economically efficient; but the political climate 
may affect the way companies are seen. Some interviewees, such as D2 in Ecuador, 
evaded talk about the political trend undergoing in his country at the time, saying:   
“The company is not involved in the crisis and is constantly working for our 
country, further consolidating its leadership, increasing its international 
presence and it is an example of social responsibility”. 
 
Additionally, the annual reports of the one of the companies that took part in CAF,s pilot 
study show how after nationalisation the structure of the board was changed resulting in 
the reduction of the number of directors, affecting especially the proportion of 
independent directors. 
 
Conversely, when a state company is privatised, institutional practices must be developed, 
for example, shareholders’ meetings must be regulated, and it must be ensured that 
internal and external audits are of the best quality, also there is the need to develop certain 
procedures for the operation of the boards, such as consideration of the establishment of 
an audit committee and, depending on the size of company, other committees that may be 
needed; as indicated by interviewee B4:   
“Corporate governance should be a topic discussed when there are changes from 
one system to the other, and it should be considered in both private and public 
sectors. Therefore, it does not matter whether an organisation is public or 
private”. 
 
In the Andean region, the adoption of corporate governance principles is clearly 
advancing, although not necessarily at an overwhelming pace as sometimes the process 
falls by the wayside due to waves of privatisation or nationalisation and people need to 
deal with other things. For example, Mario Marcel40 in his speech about the role of 
                                                 
40 Mario Marcel, Manager at the Office of Institutional Capacity and Finances (BID), Speech at the 
conference – Strategies for Efficient Local Development, held by the Colombian Planning Department 
(DNP), the Local Economic and Employment Development (LEED) and CAF, Bogota, 16-09-2008.   
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multinational organisations in helping local authorities to fulfil their responsibilities and 
on achieving development for their communities expressed his view on macroeconomic 
issues, such as the revaluation of currency, when people may not be thinking about softer 
technologies such as improving management. Day to day there may be different 
immediate challenges, such as dealing with high inflation and export restrictions. 
However, in macro-environments that have become more relaxed, or where there is a 
need for additional capital injections, people can become more concerned about issues of 
corporate governance or corporate social responsibility. 
 
Further, according to interviewee C2 “good corporate governance may well help to 
protect the capital of state-owned companies from the abuses of politicians”. For 
example, this could be the case in Colombia where EMCALI41, a utilities company, 
which has not yet implemented corporate governance principles, is experiencing 
particular difficulties. The administration has identified corporate governance measures to 
be implemented and it is hoping that these measures will help the company to be more 
efficient and sustainable. A very different case is EPM (Empresas Publicas de Medellín), 
a state-owned organisation, where the mayor and the councillors are committed to ensure 
the sustainability of the organisation. During his period in office, the mayor has 
responsibilities similar to a listed company CEO and stated: “EPM is one of the best 
examples of the impact that the implementation of corporate governance has in a state-
owned company”. It is also the view of other participants such as interviewee A3, who 
argues that corporate governance should be maintained regardless of the owner, whether 
private or public. The only difference sometimes is that in the case of the state sector it is 
not clear as to who is the owner; whether a ministry, an autonomous institution, or a kind 
of holding company. There are different patterns, with some particularities for state-
owned enterprises, but there are standards of corporate governance for this type of 
business and there should not be any differences in their objectives. In the same way, 
Interviewee B3 considers that anyone who says that the discussions on changes to the 
constitutional law that take place in the Ecuadorian Constituent Assembly will not affect 
                                                 
41 Empresas Municipales de Cali – EMCALI is a utilities company from the second largest city in 
Colombia. On April 2000, due to cumulated losses, the Superintendence of Public Services ordered its 
intervention. As part of management efforts to strengthen the organisation, and facing is return to the 
Municipality’s control EMCALI requested CAF’s technical assistance to implement Good Corporate 
Governance Principles. 
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even small entrepreneurs is not recognising the existence of permanently active 
communication among individuals. In particular, Interviewee C3 noted:  
“….the discussion of political affairs in Ecuador has influenced, for better or for 
worse, the development of the Good Corporate Governance Program, which is 
conducted by the Quito Stock Exchange, with financial support from the 
Multilateral Investment Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank”. 
 
Finally, according to Eugenio Marulanda (Confecámaras President), the most appropriate 
exit from the tremor of the Latin American political map is an alliance between both the 
political and private sectors. Marulanda believes that this is something which left and 
right wing governments are doing. He thinks that the private sector should re-think the 
politics of Latin America in light of the current situation. Nothing is achieved by building 
solid companies if these have to operate in fragile environments. Marulanda’s idea is that: 
“We need management and business leaders committed to the public, to ethics 
and politics. Corporate governance is only viable after authentic partnerships 
between public and private sectors have been reached”. 
 
7.4 Corporate governance factors  
 
The work that CAF and its counterparts are doing shows a growing interest in 
implementing the principles governance. Before heading into an assessment of corporate 
governance developments in the Andean region it is important to understand the meaning 
of the concept in the area and how it can affect growth and development. Corporate 
governance is often viewed as the relationships and structures that determine corporate 
direction and performance. The relationship among stakeholders such as owners, 
managers, creditors, employees, customers, and suppliers can be critical. Corporate 
governance frameworks often depend upon the regulatory, legal, institutional, and ethical 
environment of an organisation.   
 
The views of some of those who were interviewed to some extent are comparable to those 
who responded to the survey carried out by the researcher. The survey results show that 
most respondents (73.4%) believe that corporate governance is about the relationship 
between the board and management; 68.1% of the entrepreneurs, 73.2% of the advisers, 
83.4% of the students, and 80% of others expressed this view (Table 7.9). These results 
are additional indications that a good number of the participants in this research regard 
corporate governance from a narrow view.  
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Table 7.9 Corporate governance and the relationship between the Board and 
management 
 
CG is about Board & management relationship 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 22.7% 22.7% 22.7% 13.6% 18.3% 100.0% 
  Adviser 24.4% 26.8% 22.0% 19.5% 7.3% 100.0% 
  Student 50.0% 16.7% 16.7%   16.7% 100.0% 
  Other 30.0% 20.0% 30.0% 20.0%   100.0% 
Total 26.6% 24.0% 22.8% 16.5% 10.1% 100.0% 
 Note: This table reports the questionnaire survey results given out at an event in Colombia 
 
A similar number 70.9% of the survey respondents see corporate governance as the 
system by which the activities of a company are managed and controlled (Table 7.10). It 
is important to notice that 31.9% of the entrepreneurs do not agree with the view that 
corporate governance is about the relationship between the board and management.  
 
Also 54.6% of these entrepreneurs do not agree with definition of corporate governance 
as the system by which the activities of a company are managed and controlled (Table 
7.10). It can be concluded that from the answers given that entrepreneurs do not wish to 
relinquish their control that easily.  
 
Table 7.10 Corporate governance and system by which the activities of a 
company are managed and controlled 
 
Management & Control 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 27.3% 4.5% 13.6% 27.3% 27.3% 100.0% 
  Adviser 34.1% 31.7% 12.2% 12.2% 9.8% 100.0% 
  Student 16.7% 50.0% 16.7%   16.7% 100.0% 
  Other 30.0% 40.0% 20.0% 10.0%   100.0% 
Total 30.4% 26.6% 13.9% 15.2% 13.9% 100.0% 
 Note: This table reports the questionnaire survey results given out at an event in Colombia 
 
In addition, several of the interviewees highlight that corporate governance is about both 
formal and informal practices, with the latter having greater importance since companies 
in the region are usually involved in activities of an informal nature. Informal practices 
persist because interpersonal trust compensates for a popular distrust of financial 
institutions. Informality is also commonly associated with corruption and the absence of 
the rule of law which works against the foundations of good practices as informality may 
allow people to bend practices to their advantage. This may be why interviewees B1 and 
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B2 stress the word ‘informal’ when they say that corporate governance should include 
both formal and informal rules. Formal activities consist of set rules, organisational 
procedures and structures. According to interviewee C1, in some companies, such rules 
must be strictly followed but in others “it may be little more than an empty formalism”. 
Equally, practical experience shows that no company is ever completely rule-bound; 
instead, companies usually present some mix of both formal and informal arrangements. 
Accordingly, Interviewee B1 recommends:  
“….when attempting to legislate for a company and to create a formal structure, 
it is important to recognise informal practices in order to create workable 
procedures”.    
 
Equally, Interviewee B2 stated that: 
 “Corporate governance is the set of formal and informal rules – and I stress the 
word informal in developing countries – that regulate a dual relationship, the 
relationship between managers and owners on the one hand and the relationship 
between majority and minority shareholders on the other hand. This is to say 
that all companies have a form of corporate governance, because all of them 
have a way in which the owners are related to the administration, or which 
relate majority and minority shareholders, and to the extent that this is true, you 
can say whether companies have good business practices or have bad practices”. 
 
Interviewees A4, B1, B3, B4 and C4 generally believe that standards of corporate 
governance should extend beyond just the relationship between managers and owners to a 
broader group of individuals affected by a company’s activities. Also Patricio Peña, Quito 
Stock Exchange’s President, defines corporate governance as: 
“The set of ‘institutions’ that govern relations between management and those 
who invest resources in companies such as partners, shareholders, creditors and 
suppliers”. 
 
Interviewee B3 goes a bit further defining it as: 
“The formal and informal practices that govern relationships within the 
company and all its stakeholders including shareholders, the providers of 
finance, suppliers, employees, customers, government, and any other entity that 
requires or relates to the company.” 
 
These definitions are based on the view that successful companies are those that 
recognise that they have responsibilities to a range of stakeholders. The process of 
engagement creates a dynamic context of interaction, mutual respect, dialogue, change, 
and groundwork for transparency and accountability. Moreover, such diverse 
stakeholders make competing accountability claims, as noted by interviewee B1:  
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Corporate governance is “how decisions are made and how accountability is 
discharged”. 
 
And by interviewee C4: 
 
“Corporate governance is transparency, accountability, and access to basic 
information….attention to interest groups or stakeholders”. 
 
Interviewee B1 recognises the importance of accountability within corporate governance 
processes when he pointed out that: 
“Companies should have both a code of conduct and transparent processes with 
clear accountability towards their stakeholders, not only to the majority and 
minority shareholders, but also the responsibility towards the community, 
creditors, government and civil society in general this reduces the risk for 
investors that want to get involved with that company as this could ultimately 
mean that companies may have lower costs of capital, as they have better 
decision-making processes”  
 
Further, some participants acknowledged that companies are today faced with a wide 
array of challenges that mean that senior executives and managers need to be able to deal 
with issues including greater accountability, changing strategies, corporate governance 
codes, workplace ethics, stakeholder consultation and management. This reflects what is 
stated by Salvador (2007)42 in her study, about the progress on the adoption of corporate 
governance principles by Ecuadorian companies, she points out that: 
“Good Corporate Governance is a new tool to reduce, and in many cases solve, 
management problems of companies; it is also used to project stronger corporate 
responsibility in the global economy” (p 6).  
 
According to the results of the survey as noted in section 7.1, 85.9% of the respondents 
agreed to some extent that compliance with corporate governance principles makes it 
easier for company management to be accountable to all their stakeholders, which 
answers research questions 1 and 2, (Table 7.11).         
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The survey was carried out by Maria Soledad Salvador a BVQ’s (Quito Stock Exchange) official. The 
project was financed by the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank (BID). The survey was 
undertaken in the three Ecuadorian largest cities: Quito, Guayaquil and Cuenca; 67 companies of a sample 
of 104 answered the questionnaire. 
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 Table 7.11 Corporate Governance makes it easier to be accountable to stakeholders  
 
CG helps accountability to stakeholders 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 45.5% 9.1% 22.7% 9.1% 13.6% 100.0% 
  Adviser 55.0% 22.5% 12.5% 5.0% 5.0% 100.0% 
  Student 50.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7%   100.0% 
  Other 40.0% 50.0%   10.0%   100.0% 
Total 50.0% 21.8% 14.1% 7.7% 6.4% 100.0% 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher 
 
Similarly 85.8% of the survey participants agree to some extent that management is 
accountable to all stakeholders, and also answers research questions 1 and 2 (Table 7.12). 
 
Table 7.12 Management accountability to stakeholders 
 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher 
 
In addition to the above definitions there are those that see corporate governance as a 
wider concept which includes all the activities that a company needs to perform to be able 
to show that is well managed. For example, the Corporate Governance Code of Seguros 
Bolivar a Colombian insurance company that took part in CAF’s Pilot Study, reads: 
“Corporate governance standards are a set of rules built-in of existing national 
laws on the subject, the companies statutes and their relevant amendments, the 
Code of Good Governance, the rules for the General Shareholders Meeting, the 
Board of Directors rules, the Code of Conduct, the Manual on Prevention of 
Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Handbook, rules for dealing 
with Conflict of Interests, use of inside information, and the other provisions for 
ethical and conduct issues set out in Code corporate governance” (p 1).   
 
Equally, members of CAF staff stress that good corporate governance practices contribute 
to better transparency and mitigate the problems of asymmetric information that 
characterise the financial markets. In these circumstances, good corporate governance 
practices are essential for companies’ to access to capital markets. However, it was 
mentioned by several individuals that for many reasons companies find difficult to be 
Management accountability to stakeholders 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 27.3% 31.8% 18.2% 18.2% 4.5% 100.0% 
  Adviser 51.3% 20.5% 20.5%   7.7% 100.0% 
  Student 33.3% 33.3%   33.3%   100.0% 
  Other 60.0% 30.0%   10.0%   100.0% 
Total 44.2% 26.0% 15.6% 9.1% 5.1% 100.0% 
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transparent or show their accountability. Similarly, Interviewee C3 expressed that 
corporate governance projects the idea of: 
“…. accountability, transparency, clarity, presentation and access to 
information, which are things that add value to the business, making it more 
profitable, more productive, having more clients, better functioning, having 
more access to credit”. 
 
Interviewee B2 feels that this does not occur in practice. He notes that company senior 
management do very little to be accountable to the boards of directors and in turn board 
members have very little accountability to the shareholders. This low accountability leads 
– to mismanagement or inappropriate management of the resources of companies. Also, 
he considers that, in general, Latin American countries are not transparent, that there is a 
lot of corruption and this is not conducive to the handling of governance problems. 
 
An additional issue is the perception by company stakeholders on whether the existence, 
activities and impact of an organisation on society are justifiable. This is associated by 
some participants with corporate legitimacy or the state of having valid socially 
acceptable and trustworthy authority.  However, there is no evidence to prove whether 
disclosures actually work in terms of changing the perceived legitimacy of an 
organisation. Juan Carlos Herrera43 argues that: 
“A company should clarify all the interrelationships in which is involved, and 
distinguish between those that are due to what is within its habitual activity and 
those that  are needed to improve the community in which it conduct its 
operations. The proposition is to combine business ethics to get better results for 
stakeholders”. 
 
Some interviewees argue that corporate governance and corporate legitimacy are 
necessary for stable economies. However, there is some understanding and a growing 
acceptance of the subject. Interviewee B2 suggests that:  
“The issue of legitimacy has to do with accountability. The challenge for those 
working on the development of corporate governance practices in the region, is 
the need to insist on legitimacy, accountability, and transparency, all these 
things are good and do not represent any danger for organisations”. 
 
Additionally, Interviewee B1 presents a relationship between the terms transparency and 
legitimacy when he states that: “Transparency and legitimacy are both shown in the same 
                                                 
43 Juan Carlos Herrera, independent consultant, speech at the “Why Corporate Governance & CSR 
Workshop” – Superintendence of Companies, Bogotá, 17-09-2008 
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way; legitimacy comes from the transparent handling of things”. Interviewee B1 also 
mentioned the procedures used by companies to earn their legitimacy. For example, he 
pointed out that: 
“When companies do the right thing they increase their reputation, there are 
different initiatives such as the ‘best place to work’. All these activities generate 
a good image among employees, customers, suppliers, and the community. This 
translates into good results”. 
 
In the same way Interviewee B2 argued that: 
 
“Corporate governance might improve company legitimacy and credibility, 
especially for those companies which have problems derived from bad 
administration/management or bad business practices. After implementing good 
practices, stakeholders may see a company as an organisation that has solved its 
problems and can start trusting the company again”. 
 
Equally, Table 7.13 shows that 83.2% of the survey respondents agree with the view that 
implementing corporate governance principles help to improve a company’s legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, a sizeable proportion disagreed, especially the entrepreneurs or company 
owners who do not believe that corporate governance legitimates corporate actions. This 
is also another strong indication that corporate governance implementation is 
recommended as a way to legitimise company activities and answers the third research 
question. 
Table 7.13 Corporate Governance and company legitimacy 
CG helps company legitimacy Economic 
activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 36.4% 22.7% 9.1% 13.6% 18.2% 100.0% 
  Adviser 56.4% 17.9% 17.9% 2.6% 5.1% 100.0% 
  Student 16.7% 66.7%   16.7%   100.0% 
  Other 40.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0%   100.0% 
Total 45.5% 23.4% 14.3% 9.1% 7.8% 100.0% 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher.  
 
An example of a company wanting to show its legitimacy is EMCALI44 a Colombian 
organisation which has been subject to the country’s bankruptcy law (Law 550). For this 
                                                 
44 Empresas Municipales de Cali – EMCALI is a utilities company from the second largest city in 
Colombia. EMCALI manages energy, water supply and telecommunications to a south western region of 
Colombia, serving over half a million of families. EMCALI is owned by the Municipality of Cali. On April 
2000, due to cumulated losses, the Superintendence of Public Services ordered its intervention. As part of 
management efforts to strengthen the organisation, and facing is return to the Municipality’s control 
EMCALI requested CAF’s technical assistance to implement Good Corporate Governance Principles. 
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reason the organisation is under the control of a ‘state administrator’ and will only be 
handed back to the local administration when the central government considers that the 
organisation has paid all its credits and can be run efficiently. Managers have decided that 
the organisation can prove its viability to the government by implementing corporate 
governance principles. In this case a legal procedure states the rules that apply to civil 
servants, politicians or whoever is in charge of the administration of the municipality. 
This will require the compromise of actual and future administrators to follow the rules 
and not intervene in the running of the company45. 
 
7.4.1 Attitude towards corporate governance   
 
CAF’s counterparts have been assisting in the dissemination of its corporate governance 
principles through regional forums, seminars, conferences, and workshops, and leading 
the discussion on corporate governance issues. Ignorance of what it means to have good 
corporate governance has been the main obstacle stopping or slowing its implementation. 
As mentioned by Interviewee B1, some perceive the principles, norms and practices 
associated with corporate governance as a bureaucratic process that reduces the freedom 
of management to enact necessary reforms and do not see the benefits. Equally, 
Interviewee C1 argues that management may consider that a board of directors and a set 
of standards for decision-making conspire against their ability to control the company. 
Moreover, as mentioned by interviewee B4, managers of successful companies may be 
suspicious of attempting to change the “winning recipe” and therefore tend to stick to 
practices that have led to good performance in the past. In relation to the business cycle, 
during a period of economic crisis, concentration on corporate governance may seem like 
an extravagance and attention should focus on the imminent dangers arising from the 
crisis; while, in a period of expansion risks may not be detected in the medium term, but 
appear to be seemingly endless opportunities. Thus, managers may always find arguments 
to delay the implementation of corporate governance. 
 
There is some agreement that the obstacles are still significant and that the structure of 
ownership, except in specific cases, still allows the administration of corporate affairs to 
                                                 
45 In Colombia, for example, there are laws and administrative policies which included regulations ensuring 
accountability for action taken and decisions made by public officials in the performance of their duties; 
these provisions also included measures to prevent those public officials take advantage of their office 
(Constitution, V.1 Art. 13; Law 1994 from 1994). 
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remain close to the owners. However, increasingly, the business dynamics and challenges 
of globalisation have become more permeable and managers are giving greater 
consideration to the adoption of governance standards. In this regard, interviewee C2 
mentioned:  
“There is the conviction that receptivity resembles the sky, because everyone 
wants to get there, but they are not there yet”. 
 
Interviewee C2 also suggested that the main challenge is to decide in the first place to 
support the adoption, perform a diagnosis, and then design a timetable for 
implementation. 
 
One difficulty is the assessment of the corporate governance implementation process. 
When, for example, information about corporate governance developments is needed, in 
particular for specialised meetings and corporate governance round tables, consultants are 
hired to write documents. A systematic evaluation is replaced by a consultant’s opinion. 
Thus, there has not been any attempt to identify the practices needed, the practices that 
have been implemented, or the problems that have arisen in the implementation. This may 
be why Interviewee C1 suggests, as a viable option, the work that is currently being done 
in Colombia by one of CAF’s counterparts:   
“Confecámaras has taken as its own the process of training consultants and 
companies working with the ones that are interested in disclosing what they 
have learned and their experiences as a business. Thanks to this it has been 
possible to complete an academic activity with a panel where the speakers are 
entrepreneurs talking about how the implementation has worked and what 
happened because they did not incorporate good practices in time. Someone 
described the cases of family businesses that have had serious family conflicts 
which have had an impact on the squandering of their companies’ funds. This is 
an indication that there is progress, but a lack of a systematic way of recording 
the experiences in most cases. It would be good to have a scheme incorporating 
practices. Missing is an organised way of systematising cases – ‘knowledge 
management’, as it is called. This would help not only to record experiences, 
but to use these many experiences as written and documented, for example, in 
business schools in Colombia”. 
 
Surveys such as the ones by CAF (2006), Salvador (2007), Confecámaras and the 
Colombian Superintendence of Companies (2008) have been carried out evaluating data 
from companies and their experiences of implementing good practices. Indeed, a 
questionnaire jointly administered by the Superintendence of Companies and 
Confecámaras en Colombia, included questions on corporate governance practices and 
 205 
social responsibility. The study raised questions on whether social responsibility or 
corporate governance was foremost in practitioner minds. This is an issue worthy of 
consideration, as well as an assessment of the organisations that have been involved as 
sponsors in corporate governance in the region, such as CAF, the Inter-American 
Development Bank (BID), the World Bank, the OECD, and the Centre for International 
Private Enterprise (CIPE) as, these assessments have not gone far enough to determine 
whether or not practices have been implemented successfully. The Superintendence of 
Companies in Colombia and Confecámaras surveys do not provide much empirical 
information and only give general descriptions of some of the practices companies have 
adopted; an assessment of the lessons learned to identify how some practices have added 
value in the management component of companies would be valuable. 
 
Generally, corporate governance in organisations is related to management views, so 
business people need to see that the incorporation of these practices will add value; 
otherwise they will not implement them. In this regard, interviewee B4 notes:   
“When talking to a manager about corporate governance it also means talking 
about risk analysis, or the construction of an economic environment in which 
they can develop their business in a positive way. But with the discourse of 
corporate governance alone, usually, it has been more difficult to convince 
them”. 
 
The above statement stresses the importance of addressing the need for empirical research 
in the implementation of the principles of corporate governance in the Andean region and 
the difficulties and benefits that this implementation represents. This thesis attempts to 
address this issue. 
 
According to some of the interviewees, there are people who are genuinely interested in 
the implementation of corporate governance standards in organisations, including 
investors, securities issuers and companies that want to list their shares in a stock marke. 
Further, the interviewees argue that corporate governance is not only for listed 
companies; rather, it may be used as a tool to create greater value and increase the value 
of shares to raise a company’s market value. Many now feel that corporate governance 
affects everyone. This is the view from a very influential organisation, CIPE which has 
been financing corporate governance projects through out the region: 
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“Corporate governance is applicable beyond listed companies – it is relevant for 
small and medium-size businesses, family firms, state-owned companies, and 
others” (CIPE, 2008, Booklet, p 1). 
 
This demonstrates that corporate governance is not only for listed companies. According 
to this view Interviewee E15 mentioned that: 
“We believe that investors in one way or another are demanding compliance 
with corporate governance practices and companies must meet the issue; we’re 
on that path and we continue to have investors who rely on us”. 
 
Equally interviewee E11 argued that: 
“The implementation of these practices is part of a natural process that must 
continue; we want our business to be included in a global movement that 
promotes transparency, credibility and values in corporations to their 
shareholders, to potential investors who are increasingly institutional investors 
and the market in general”. 
 
The implementation of corporate governance may be taken as a way to show the desire to 
be accountable to company stakeholders to demonstrate the legitimacy of organisation 
activities. Some, such as Alfredo Ibargüen46 has highlighted the importance of 
determining the sort of corporate governance standards needed in a country and how 
those standards should be implemented by a company. Additionally it is important to 
consider why individuals want to implement the standards in their organisations. As 
stated by some of the Interviewees there are many reasons why companies in the region 
decide to adopt corporate governance principles.   
 
Some of the interviewees point out that it is generally accepted that corporate governance 
should provide the necessary mechanisms to balance each of management’s organs of 
control and supervision to ensure that decisions taken are conducted in accordance with 
the best interests of the company and its stakeholders. Interviewees B1, B2, B4, C1, and 
C4 suggested that, although the decisions made by a company affect all the stakeholders, 
only a limited number have an influence on companies’ decision-making processes. 
These stakeholders, such as controlling shareholders, large institutional investors and 
executive directors, have a greater influence on company decision-making and can protect 
their own interests without having sufficient regard for the interest of all other 
                                                 
46 Alfredo Ibargüen, is a consultant for the Spanish organisation IAAG, which has been working with CAF 
in the development, implementation and training on corporate governance issues in the Andean Region. 
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stakeholders, or the collective interests of the company. For example interviewee B2 
mentioned: 
“More Stakeholders do not have the power to exert influence in an organisation 
decision-making process, and I not sure whether that many are interested on 
having that power”  
 
Interviewee C2 explained how the Superintendence of Finance, a regulator in Colombia 
who was in charge of the design of ‘Código País’ the country’s corporate governance 
code, decided that the focus of corporate governance applied in Colombia would be based 
on the different types of relationships between individuals in an organisation. One 
consideration was that the relationship between shareholders and managers, or the agency 
problem, is not important in Colombian firms as they generally have a high degree of 
concentration of ownership in a few family shareholders. According to the Colombian 
Superintendence of Finance, the relationship between majority and minority shareholders 
is more important as the treatment given to minority shareholders as providers of capital 
may have less influence on company decision-making than large family shareholders. 
This is the main problem, as in many companies ownership is concentrated in a few 
shareholders who control the company, which creates conflict when minority 
shareholders feel they can not exercise effective control in the organisation.  
 
Those interviewees who believe corporate governance should be about more than the 
agency problem suggest that a stakeholder approach can assist managers by promoting an 
analysis of how the company fits into its larger environment. Equally, a stakeholder focus 
may help to clarify how operating procedures affect stakeholders within the company 
such as employees, managers and owners or shareholders; and immediately beyond the 
company such as customers, suppliers, and creditors. It was suggested that taking 
stakeholders into account is very important, both because of their responsibilities to the 
organisations and for the benefits they expect from companies. For example, Interviewee 
D1 mentioned that: 
“A couple of ways to make this program is to get companies that currently have 
good governance practices to begin to link suppliers and customers, showing 
them the benefits of corporate governance and start asking them to adopt the 
principles of good governance”. 
 
Equally, Interviewees B2, D1, and D2 noted that the corporate governance framework 
should recognise the rights of stakeholders established by law or through mutual 
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agreements, encouraging the cooperation between companies and their stakeholders 
in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainable and financially sound companies. In 
addition, there is the need for mechanisms to ensure that the individual and collective 
interests of each stakeholder are served and protected. No stakeholder should be 
allowed to expropriate the interest of other stakeholders, and no single stakeholder 
should enjoy a monopoly over the decision making process of a company. For some 
participants this mechanism is corporate governance. This may be why interviewee 
B1 defines corporate governance as: 
“The mechanism used to conduct the affairs of a corporate body in order to 
serve and protect the individual and collective interests of all its stakeholders”. 
 
Besides, some of the individuals involved in this research believe that corporate 
governance standards, that promote the principles of integrity, transparency, and 
accountability, will protect and enhance a company. It is assumed that the good business 
practices, such as transparency in corporate financial reporting, and high levels of 
corporate governance are essential components of company’s success. As pointed out by 
Juan Carlos Herrera47 :  
“Being accountable generates value to the company not only economic value 
but also social and environmental”. 
 
A broad corporate governance approach is also recommended by some in Ecuador. This 
can be taken as an indication that some Ecuadorian participants share a broad stakeholder 
perspective. It has been suggested that practices need to go beyond the regulations issued 
by the stock exchange, the superintendent of companies and national banks, and rather 
look to the interests of society in businesses and the generation of economic development, 
and capturing public resources for the benefit of all. For example, according to Francisco 
Ribadeneira48, given that the corporate structure is where listed companies are 
outweighed by families or groups of people who have come together to perform a 
particular business activity, investing their own capital or borrowing from the financial 
system, but without offering in the capital market participation to shareholders or 
investors other than those that form the founding group corporate governance should not 
                                                 
47 Why Corporate Governance & CSR Workshop – Superintendence of Companies, Bogotá, 17-09-2008 
48 Francisco Ribadeneira S. is a Board member at the Ecuadorian Superintendence of Companies, “Analysis 
of the Code of Good Corporate Governance of the Andean Development Corporation against Ecuadorian 
law”, Successful Corporate Governance Experiences in the Andean Region – CIPE, Confecámaras, AVE, 
and BVQ, 2007 Booklet (p 94). 
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be about the relationship between owners and managers but it should involve a broad 
group of stakeholders.  
 
According to interviewee C4, in Venezuela corporate governance has been promoted as 
part of a social responsibility agenda, as it is believed this is a good way to focus 
companies’ commitment to their stakeholders. Organisations such as AVE (Venezuelan 
Association of Executives) and CONAPRI (National Commission for the Promotion of 
Investment) with the support of CAF have been promoting an initiative called 
‘Transparency Revolution’ also known as ‘Responsible Competitiveness’ which aims to 
promote good corporate governance practices.   
 
In Peru, according to PROCAPITALES, corporate governance originates with the idea of 
the modern company, which was initially, concerned with the delegation of power over 
decision-making to managers others than the owners of companies. However, now good 
corporate governance practices have become recognised as a source of business value and 
PROCAPITALES with the help of CAF promotes good practices through its competition 
referred to earlier. 
 
In Bolivia according to the National Institute of Statistics – (INE) micro-enterprises49 
account for 92% of the total of companies in the country, small enterprises 7%, and with 
medium-sized and large enterprises comprising just 1%. Similarly in other counties in the 
region, the high number of very small businesses in the country influences the approach 
to corporate governance (see Table7.14).  
Referring to the size of companies in Bolivia, Interviewee B4 mentioned that the 
Superintendence of Companies, which is the corporate governance regulator in that 
country has decided to centre corporate governance on rules, traditions, behaviour 
patterns and characteristics of the national economy and the country’s legal system and 
not just on an imported western model or imitating what has been done elsewhere. Table 
7.14 shows the proportion of companies in each Andean country according to the size of 
                                                 
49 A micro-enterprise is defined in Bolivia as an economic and productive unit where the owner is involved 
in the production process. Its activities imply coordinating a wide range of functions, such as money 
handling, market dealing, and management for an economically productive activity. According to the 
Bolivian National Chambers of Commerce classification of companies by number of employees a micro has 
less than 10 employees, a small between 11 and 20, a medium between 21 and 120, and a large more than 
120 employees.     
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the company and table 7.15 introduces the classification of companies in the Andean 
region according to the number of employees.   
 
Table 7.14 Number of companies in the Andean region by country according to the size of 
the company 
 
Type Bolivia (1) Colombia (2) Ecuador (3) Peru (4) Venezuela (5) 
Micro 92% 96% 52.3% 95.8% **** 
Small 7% 3% 38.8% 2.1%  64.4%  
Medium 1% ** 5.9%  2.1%  25.7% 
Large * 1% 3.0% *** 9.9% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: this table shows the proportion of companies by size in each Andean country  
(1) Information taken from the National Institute of Statistics (INE), 2008 
(2) Source: Colombian Association of Small Entrepreneurs (ACOPI), 2008 
(3) Source: National Federation of Chambers of Small Manufacturers (FENADI), 2007 
(4) Source: National Institute of Statistics and Information (INEI), 2008 
(5) Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE), 2008  
* Medium and large percentages are added to 1%. ** A figure for Small and Medium (3%). *** Medium 
and large percentages are added to 2.1%. ****There is not separate information for Microenterprises     
 
 
Table 7.15 Classification of companies in the Andean region according to the number of 
employees  
 
Type Bolivia (1) Colombia (2) Ecuador (3) Peru (4) Venezuela (5) 
Micro < 10 ≤ 10 ≤ 10 < 10 1 – 4 
Small 11 – 20 11 – 50 11 – 50 10 – 20 5 – 9  
Medium 21 – 120 51 – 200 51 – 150 21 – 100 10 – 99 
Large > 120 > 200 > 150 > 100 > 100 
Note: this table shows the classification of companies in the Andean Region by size according to the 
number of employees. In  
(1) Classification according to the Bolivian National Chambers of Commerce 
(2) In Colombia the classification is according to Law 905 of 2005       
(3) Classification done by the National Federation of Chambers of Small Manufacturers (FENADI)   
(4) In Peru Classification according to Decree 1086 by Ministry of Industry 28-06-2008    
(5) Decrees with scope, value and force of law for the promotion and development of a microfinance system 
– Official Gazette Mach 2001    
 
This view of corporate governance shows that, in Latin America, a problem may not exist 
between managers and owners, but between majority owners and minority shareholders. 
Corporate governance must take into account the fact that the region has a different legal 
framework from ‘Common Law’, as four of the countries (except Ecuador) have a legal 
framework consistent with civil law. The broad legal framework of a country highlights 
the degree to which stakeholders’ rights are protected and judicial decisions are enforced. 
Some of the interviewees suggest that corporate governance should go beyond legislation 
 211 
to give it greater meaning and try to be more transparent by going beyond what is in the 
law. For example, Interviewee E12 pointed out:  
“We understand that our responsibility to stakeholders should go far beyond 
what is in the rules and behave in an exemplary manner for society”.  
 
A view that takes into account a wider responsibility toward stakeholders is also 
acknowledged by special interest groups such as trade unions, consumer associations, 
political party associations and business roundtables, among others. The idea is that the 
principles of corporate governance apply to both public companies, and to small 
businesses. In this respect, opinions vary widely and some small businesses 
misunderstand what corporate governance means. For example, a taxi driver in Colombia 
(Mauricio) with a business consisting of just five taxis employing four drivers expressed 
his desire to implement corporate governance to the researcher.  
 
Nevertheless, in the Andean region many issues still remain to be addressed in this 
regard, as it is a long process and there is a need for the “awakening of companies’ 
consciousness” (Interviewee B1). For this reason there are different corporate governance 
arrangements for each type of company and no rules should be applied as if they are 
straitjackets. Corporate governance needs to be flexible and able to change when needed 
and match the peculiarities of each organisation. It is also difficult to judge whether an 
organisation has fully adopted corporate governance standards as there is always 
something new or something changing and therefore the rules must be able to adapt to all 
these features, as interviewee C1 points out:  
“Corporate governance is not implemented from one day to another. It should 
be studied, understood, decisions tested, and changed, and if this fails, then 
make adjustments. It may be pulled off with an internal consultant or external 
legal adviser, or a Board member assumes the responsibility to make changes, 
etc. there is not a single mechanism for advancing the issue”. 
 
A decade ago it was unknown as to what the benefits of the implementation of corporate 
governance would bring, and there was a conception that it would cost too much. As this 
negative view started to be overcome and people perceived that the value of the 
implementation would enhance their companies, there has been a better attitude towards 
the process. However, there is some agreement that this is something that should not be 
rushed, as people need to adapt to new conditions, as Interviewee C3 explains:  
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“The adoption of corporate principles is a process that takes time. This fact 
makes it even more possible that companies enter in the process honestly and 
with the aim to make a genuine implementation”. 
 
The idea among corporate governance promoters is that there is a need to present good 
examples to companies to convince them about the benefits of adopting good practices, as 
Interviewee C1 says:  
“Documenting such cases and showing the benefits and profits that are 
generated from these processes is how it is possible to make companies and the 
wider community aware of the importance of these processes. It is also 
important that the processes are well supported and well-argued. This will make 
it more difficult each time those issues of a political nature or exogenous 
interventions exert pressure on companies against adoption”.  
 
Indeed, 90.8% of the respondents to the researcher’s survey agree to some extent that the 
implementation of CAF’s Corporate Governance Guidelines bring benefits to companies 
and to stakeholders (Table 7.16). 
 
Table 7.16 CAF's Corporate Governance Guidelines are beneficial 
 
Note: This Table shows the extend to which the respondents agreed that CAF’s Corporate Governance 
Guidelines are beneficial    
 
An additional motivation for listed companies to adopt corporate governance standards is 
given by the market; it is expected that ‘good’ governed companies would have a higher 
market valuation. However, this has not been conclusively proven. 
 
In Ecuador, as argued by Ribadeneira50, a country with a weak administration, good 
corporate governance is believed to be critical to increase business access to sources of 
funding, especially in the stock market. As Patricio Peña, Quito Stock Exchange 
President explains: 
                                                 
50 Francisco Ribadeneira S. is a Board member at the Ecuadorian Superintendence of Companies (Revista 
Derecho Económico, No.2, 2010). 
CAF's CG Guidelines are beneficial 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 40.0% 35.0% 5.0% 10.0% 10.0% 100.0% 
  Adviser 52.5% 32.5% 10.0% 5.0%   100.0% 
  Student 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%     100.0% 
  Other 40.0% 40.0% 10.0% 10.0%   100.0% 
Total 47.4% 34.2% 9.2% 6.6% 2.6% 100.0% 
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“The aim is that Ecuadorian companies compete on equal conditions with 
regional and global organisations, creating a culture of good corporate 
governance in the business environment, no matter whether this is industrial, 
commercial, agricultural, service, or any other. This is the key to optimise 
management and obtain the best results for shareholders, directors and 
employees which would undoubtedly have a positive impact for customers, 
suppliers, society, and of course, Ecuador”. 
 
This concurs with the idea that a wider variety of goals are suggested for companies. 
These include the traditional objective of profit maximisation. However, other goals 
include numbers employed, measures of employment welfare, manager satisfaction, 
products and services quality, environmental protection, and many others. A major reason 
for taking a stakeholder approach in setting company objectives is the recognition that 
organisations are affected by the environment in which they operate. Organisations come 
into regular contact with customers, suppliers, government agencies, families of 
employees, and special interest groups. Decisions made by a company are likely to affect 
one or more of these stakeholders groups. Companies are accountable to them and need to 
legitimate their activities. 
 
The findings discussed in this section reinforce the view that there are three main 
approaches to corporate governance through the region; a narrow view, where all 
concerns are only about the relationship between owners/shareholders and managers; a 
broader view, proposing the engagement of a wider group of stakeholders; and a more 
recent approach which involves a CSR focus, which asks for social responsible 
organisations within the corporate governance framework. These findings help answer the 
research questions. 
 
7.4.2 Voluntary versus mandatory corporate governance principles 
 
There has been an increase in the number of groups dedicated to improving the levels of 
corporate governance in the region and there is now a more active role played by 
institutions in this area. However, adoption continues to be considered as a voluntary 
initiative and the main concern over introducing methods to increase levels of compliance 
with the principles enforced by law is that it may result in large increases in just box 
ticking exercises. This is the view of Salvador (2007), when she presented the results of 
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the Survey about Demand and Supply of Corporate Governance practices in Ecuador51; 
she argues that: 
“…in respect of the fact that these practices are mandatory, there is a law 
requiring companies to adopt the Code of Corporate Governance 63% of the 
survey respondents did not share the idea of additional regulation which 
indicates that some would apply corporate governance principles as a 
conviction, or because it is considered important and not because it is an 
obligation”.  
 
Individuals in the Andean region share different views about a mandatory or a voluntary 
approach. Interviewees A1, B3, C2 and C4 explain that there are rules that say what 
should be done, and if a company believes that it is not affected by a specific standard, for 
example management decides that due to the size of the company it should not subscribe 
to those rules, then they should explain why they are not applying them. It is for the 
potential investors or stakeholders to decide whether explanations are satisfactory. It is 
expected that companies should be transparent in explaining the reasons why certain 
principles do not apply to them. Interviewee C2 clarified: 
 “Whether this should be made mandatory or voluntary is going to depend on 
the laws of the countries or the companies’ statutes; in any case the degree of 
binding is not going to stop people showing something that is not the truth. And 
it could end up having many companies with corporate governance codes which 
are only in appearance and will not be very useful”.  
 
This is something which has been discussed intensively around the negotiation table, 
according to Interviewee B3: “To what extent people might be forced to comply”. There 
are many rules in the commercial codes of the five countries that make the 
implementation of corporate governance principles very difficult as expressed by 
interviewee C4 when he states that: 
“What happens is that codes of commerce in any way represent a direction of 
good governance for companies. Usually when one starts to talk to 
organisations of good corporate governance, and it comes to the issue of rules of 
trade, it is not so unknown that on the issue of corporate governance the 
commercial code proposes many things that go in that direction”. 
 
According to Alfredo Ibargüen52, at an event attended by the researcher, implementing 
corporate governance practices must begin with a discussion of the internal processes in 
                                                 
51 The survey was carried out by Maria Soledad Salvador a BVQ’s (Quito Stock Exchange) official. 
52 Alfredo Ibargüen, is a consultant for the Spanish organisation IAAG, which has been working with CAF 
in the development, implementation and training on corporate governance issues in the Andean Region. 
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which the implications of adopting certain practices should be assessed. This process can 
be divided into two categories: one ‘meaning and effective’ the other cosmetic in nature. 
The former corresponds to the conviction of the managers of the importance of 
complying with the principles. The second responds to “fashion”, or how little importance 
is given to the process. In a ‘meaning and effective’ process the decision to adopt the 
principles is taken by the owners, the implementation is done via statutes, regulations, and 
shareholders’ agreements. This inclusion of the principles in the documents of the 
company then requires reporting compliance with the principles adopted. Further, there 
should be a report disclosing the practices that were not adopted or have not been 
temporarily complied with. On the other hand, in a cosmetic process the decision to 
implement the practices might not have been taken by someone who does not own the 
company nor has sufficient authority to make that decision to implement the principles. 
Moreover the implementation becomes ambiguous and corporate documents do not 
oblige it, but only comply with the minimum legal requirements, nor is there a clear and 
objective process of informing stakeholders about the measures that were not met or the 
reasons for this omission. Again, much effort is put on organisations to engage with all 
their stakeholders which can be taken as an indication that there is no a broad stakeholder 
perception in the region answering the second research question. However, there are signs 
that organisations are only willing to implement corporate governance in order to show 
their legitimacy answering the third research question.   
 
The evidence from this case study shows that there is a wide agreement that the 
implementation of corporate governance should be voluntary. However, the effect of 
improving the regulatory framework should result in more investment and a lower cost of 
financing for companies, but strict regulations cannot entirely replace a management’s 
real commitment to the essence of corporate governance which is believed to be 
important for the success of an organisation. As Interviewee C4 points out:  
“There should be nothing that obliges [a company] to implement the guidelines 
of corporate governance. Certainly what we support is that companies comply 
with the principles of corporate governance on a voluntary basis. So it is fair to 
say that a corporate governance culture is more a matter of believing in such a 
way of doing things, it implies that organisations participate voluntarily in these 
subjects, in other words whether they have to show good corporate governance 
is to do so voluntarily”.  
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In Colombia, for example, the Country Code establishes minimum standards that are 
above the mandatory rules established by law and these standards were set by 
stakeholders. As explained by Cesar Prado V., Colombia’s Superintendence of Finance’s 
Chief53 at an event attended by the researcher:  
“This code is not the product of a unilateral imposition of authority; this code is 
the product of a consultation that took about 2 years. Discussion meetings were 
held to which were invited all stakeholders and they were accompanied by the 
Superintendent. In particular, those aspects which they considered highly 
relevant were identified, such as the election of board members, board meetings, 
the proportion of independent board members needed, disclosure of 
information, and so on”. 
 
The issue is very important because what can be seen is that sometimes a country’s law 
does not promote corporate governance, but to the contrary prevents or hinders its 
implementation. Besides, the recommendation is to promote the participation of all 
shareholders in company affairs; this may be a way to overcome the narrow stakeholder 
perception (the first research question). Therefore, to promote these issues, a thorough 
review of the law is needed because there may be certain rules which in some cases go 
against good practices, as explained by Interviewee B2: 
“In Colombia, for example, it is not a written rule, not in the commercial code, 
but it is a case law, a circular of the Superintendence of Companies, that says 
that no member of the board of directors can directly request information from 
an officer of the company54”.  
 
Additionally, Interviewees B1, B4 and C1 argue that the voluntary adoption of best 
practice is also associated with quality standards. Interviewee B1 mentioned how a few 
years ago these ISO55 quality norms were developed, which have never been compulsory. 
The implementation of the norms started as something voluntary; today a company which 
has an ISO certification has an advantage over any other company in the same sector 
which is not certified.       
                                                 
53 “Corporate Governance Forum”; sponsored by Javeriana University, Superintendence of Finance, 
Colombian Stock Exchange, and Colombia Capital, Bogotá, 3 September, 2008. 
54 A Directive issued by the superintendence of companies: Judicial Concept (Concepto Juridico) 220-
18869 (17, November 2000) expresses the arguments related to the obligation that assist managers to 
respond positively to requests for information submitted by an individual member of the Board of Directors.  
55 The International Organisation for Standardisation, widely known as ISO is an international-standard-
setting body composed of representatives from various national standards organisations. The organisation 
promulgates worldwide proprietary industrial and commercial standards. While ISO defines itself as a non-
governmental organisation, its ability to set standards that often become law, either through treaties or 
national standards, makes it more powerful than most non-governmental organisations. In practice, ISO acts 
as a consortium with strong links to governments. 
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7.5 Corporate governance in SMEs and family-owned businesses   
 
CAF has been providing corporate governance information to companies in the Andean 
Region interested in the adoption of corporate governance principles in their 
organisations.  CAF has also developed additional guidelines to assist companies such as 
family-owned businesses in the adoption of corporate governance principles, as pointed 
out by interviewee B1: 
“What CAF did was a conceptual contribution to closed capital businesses56, 
and issued a new document which is the Code of Good Corporate Governance 
for Closed Capital Businesses – This document is available at CAF’s website. 
According to CAF estimates Closed Capital Businesses are between 93% and 
94% of all businesses in Colombia, these are SMEs, family businesses, which 
may be in first, second or third generation”. 
 
The CAF Corporate governance Code for Closed Capital Businesses was issued to be the 
basis for small and family-owned companies to implement codes specially tailored to 
their needs.  The code is based on the Guidelines for the Andean Code of Corporate 
Governance (LACGC), but it is supplemented in those areas where there are concerns 
related to the nature of closed capital companies.    
 
According to Interviewee B4 closed capital companies constitute the vast majority of 
companies in the Andean region and make the greatest contribution to GDP and 
employment. They are considered as ‘learning institutions’ for employers and creators of 
innovation and economic growth in the region; regional close equity firms are 
characterised, in most cases, as being family-owned with little separation between 
ownership and management. 
 
The emphasis is different in the case of family businesses, where one of the main 
problems is mixing family issues with the running of the business. Those organisations 
supporting the implementation of good practices in the five countries are helping families 
prepare family protocols to regulate issues affecting family relationships with their 
companies; for many this is a form of corporate governance. Thus the principles are as 
valid for SMEs as they are for listed companies, although different approaches are taken. 
The aim is to make SMEs aware that they are able to engage with all their stakeholders. 
                                                 
56 This tool is targeted at small, medium and large companies where there are restrictions on the free 
transfer of shares or participation in shares. 
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According to Eugenio Marulanda57 - Confecámaras President at an event attended by the 
researcher: 
“The running of family businesses has added features such as the relationship of 
family - business - property.  The idea is that managers should have the ability 
to implement policies and use the necessary tools to organise and strengthen 
family businesses, make them sustainable over time… Corporate governance 
grants tools to management for risk prevention, has a positive impact on board 
members, improves leadership, results in increased transparency, and optimises 
the process of decision-making”. 
 
The implementation of corporate governance principles is considered very important for 
the development of the Andean region as mentioned by Ramiro Pizarro58. While the 
concept of corporate governance has been known for some time in the region, there are 
many difficulties still being encountered in the implementation process. At the very 
beginning there was disagreement and opposition to CAF’s role, as mentioned by 
interviewee B2: 
“CAF, at first, was not very interested in the project until its executives began to 
see the benefits of ‘this’, the CEO did not understand the issue therefore he was 
not interested in it; to the contrary, many companies were very interested in the 
issue, this made it a good topic to work on, however it was particularly 
difficult”. 
 
There was also opposition from other sectors as pointed out by interviewee B1: 
“There is a normal resistance from politicians towards the implementation of 
corporate governance as it is always to something new. To overcome this is 
needed a continuous effort from public and private organisations.  This needs to 
be broken little by little”. 
 
However, the process has moved forward, as affirmed by Confecámaras president:  
“Slowly, good corporate governance has been assimilated by various actors in 
the economy as a strategy to enhance corporate performance, proving, along 
with the progress, the impact generated in the productivity and competitiveness 
of the countries in the region” 59. 
 
7.6 State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) versus non SOEs  
Many of the participants in this research agree that having good governance is not just 
about having a code but then abiding by it. This is especially important for state-owned 
                                                 
57 Eugenio Marulanda, speech at the ‘La Republica’ Forum, “Making Management more Professional and 
Effective”, Bogotá, 07 October 2008.   
58 Ramiro Pizarro, Latin America Expert, International Labour Organisation (ILO), speech at the DNP, 
LEED and CAF Conference, Bogotá, 16, 09, 2008.   
59 Eugenio Marulanda, 2007, Preface in Experiencias Exitosas de Gobierno Corporativo en la Región 
Andina (Successful Corporate Governance Experience in the Andean Region), Confecámaras booklet (p 9). 
 219 
companies where the principles of corporate governance are also being implemented. As 
pointed out by Interviewee B1: 
“To have good governance practices means shielding these [state-owned] 
companies from political interference. Caution is needed because just having a 
code does not guarantee everything. Corporate governance fails or may fail 
because of corrupt mentality, which often is very creative. Therefore, it is very 
difficult to foresee adverse contingencies that may occur in a company”.  
 
There is some agreement among the participants that corrupt politicians can do many 
things against the interests of state-owned organisations even for a watched over 
company60; this is why it is important to be very careful.  As Interviewee B1 states: 
“Today politicians are more caring – because they know it is costly for all the 
heritage of the city or country, and then there may be a benefit in reputation, for 
companies that do good things in practice and demonstrate that through well-
being”.  
 
The difference between the corporate governance of state-owned companies and family-
owned businesses are that, the latter have less strict controls than the former. As noted by 
interviewee B2: 
“Many companies want to reform the way that they are managed. Companies 
need to attract capital, especially from abroad, and importing or exporting 
partners from abroad are beginning to ask: do you have corporate governance? 
Then these firms are more likely to implement good practice, and this is 
happening now to many companies”. 
 
Another important aspect to be taken into account is the case of a particular sector of 
Colombian state-owned companies which are now able to implement corporate 
governance due to changes in the market and the way they trade their products; alcoholic 
drinks. In the past these companies enjoyed a monopoly for trading their products within 
their geographic regions. Today, government rules allow companies to trade their 
products freely across the country, therefore, to face competition in an efficient way, 
these companies needed to improve the way they managed and controlled their 
businesses, as pointed out by interviewee B4:  
“Of course, there should be a legal framework; we have the civil code, 
commercial code, etc. But it is assumed that corporate governance goes beyond 
what is the law itself, otherwise it would have no meaning. Corporate 
governance is to be more transparent by going beyond what is in the law, if this 
                                                 
60 Throughout Latin America state-owned companies in particular are under the supervision for special 
bodies normally called superintendence, such as Superintendence of Public Services, Superintendence of 
Health, Superintendence of Public Expending, and so on.  
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is true or not this should be acknowledged by the monitoring done by special 
interest groups. Additionally, minority shareholders should demand that their 
rights are met. Financial providers should ensure that the board of directors are 
doing their job, and in principle, it should be the market which punishes 
companies if these things are not met”. 
 
Additionally is family businesses, according to Interviewees B1 and B3, it is the owner 
who makes most decisions. Therefore, is the owner who needs to be convinced about the 
benefits for their businesses of implementing corporate governance principles and in 
these cases it is not possible to do very much when these individuals decide not to adopt 
the principles. However, as companies go from one generation to the other, the new 
owner (the successor) changes, and for this reason there are a good number of examples 
of family businesses that are very well managed and where efficient governance 
processes are running successfully today. Some such cases are the companies that took 
part in CAF’s Pilot Study. An example is given by Interviewee as D3 he mentioned: 
 “Before, we just made decisions. It did not matter whether those decisions were 
right or wrong. Now the implementation of corporate governance principles has 
given us flexibility in managing the company. This is an advantage; I think it 
has given us the ability to make good decisions”. 
 
Today different organisations are promoting corporate governance as a means to improve 
or as a tool that might help or change the way family-owned businesses are managed. An 
important part of the process is focused especially on the separation of companies from 
families’ wealth.  
 
Regardless of the country in which the participants are located it can be said that there 
appear three approaches to corporate governance. First are those who think that it is only 
about owners and managers or majority and minority shareholders. Therefore, it related to 
all those who share a narrow stakeholder perspective and helps to answer to the first 
research question. Second there are differences on whether accountability is owed just to 
shareholders or to every stakeholder answering the first and second research questions. 
Third there is a widespread perception that the implementation of good practices makes 
an organisation and its managers more trustworthy to society and helps to answer to the 
third research question with a need to show a company’s legitimacy. However, measuring 
such legitimacy is a more difficult matter. According to some participants, legitimacy is 
assumed to be influenced by disclosures of information and not simply by changes in 
corporate actions. 
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7.7 Overlap of CSR and corporate governance 
 
The perspective of corporate governance emerged from the case study: that CSR connects 
to governance either determining the limits and accountabilities of an organisation in 
relation to a broad universe of stakeholders and its social responsibilities and 
opportunities, as an operational issue. However, some do not have clear idea about the 
relationship between the two issues; as Interviewee C1 explained:  
“Management in general have much confusion, such as what are their social 
responsibility and the relationship to corporate governance. There are some who 
believe that corporate governance is less important and focus on social 
responsibility. Others reject social responsibility and they focus on corporate 
governance”.  
 
There are, thus, some misunderstandings in the business community with regard to the 
issue of corporate governance and its relationship with social responsibility. The 
confusion is not just among businessmen but also among many of those who are 
considered experts in corporate governance and social responsibility. According to 
Enrique Oliveros, PROCAPITALES’ Chairman today’s businesses operate in an 
environment of intense media, regulatory and public scrutiny. At the same time, 
increasing public and stakeholder concerns about the social and environmental impact of 
business practices is pushing companies to come to terms with a much broader set of 
interests and expectations. This has resulted in approaches to corporate governance, 
corporate social responsibility and corporate sustainability that are increasingly being 
integrated into the business strategy of successful companies. As a result, the field of 
responsible business strategy and practice is becoming a dynamic and challenging issue 
that managers are facing today. Interviewee C1 links the three subjects together when he 
states:  
“Corporate governance sets the legal framework to protect a company’s 
stakeholders, the relative emphasis being dependent on national approaches. 
Corporate Social Responsibility focuses on extending the legal requirements to 
promoting ethics, and philanthropic and social reporting to satisfy stakeholders 
concerns. Corporate sustainability concentrates on long-term economic and 
social stakeholder expectations”. 
 
7.8 Corporate governance structures  
 
The case study also examined particular corporate governance issues such as the board of 
directors, its size and structure, the need for independent directors, the recommended 
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remuneration for board members, and the need for board committees. Additionally, issues 
related to internal control and risk management are addressed, all within the parameter set 
by the provisions of the Guidelines for the Andean Corporate Governance Code 
(LCAGC). Evidence from this sections support the answers for the three research 
questions, which this study set to answer.    
 
7.8.1 Board of directors61 and board size 
 
According to Interviewee E1, political and regulatory developments are clearly 
significant at the moment, and affect the nature and scope of the board of directors and 
non-executive directors’ roles.  
 
Some of the CAF case interviewees suggested that improved corporate governance and 
accountability means: to have an active board with a well proportioned executive versus 
non-executive members; representatives from all groups of stakeholders; the separation of 
the role of CEO and chairperson; the creation of board committees; and changing audit 
firms regularly. Companies stand to gain by adopting a system that strengthens 
stakeholders trust through transparency, accountability and fairness. However, with the 
high number of family-owned businesses, the reality in the Andean countries is that many 
of these businesses do not have a board of directors. Moreover, while Andean 
institutional investors have greater relevance than a few years ago, their portfolios are 
concentrated in government securities so there is little or minimal involvement of 
institutional investors with boards. 
 
Information provided in annual reports of companies that took part in CAF’s pilot study 
indicates that companies that have been nationalised tend to reduce the size of their board 
of directors. It is different at privatised organisations where boards of directors have been 
strengthen with the appointment of a higher number of independent directors.   
 
The presence of a board can assist in better decision making by businesses, particularly 
those owned by families. For this reason, the Corporate Governance Guidelines 
(Provision No. 19 in Exhibit 7.1) establishes the need for a Board, defining its size and 
                                                 
61 Andean Regional names: Directory (Bolivia, Venezuela and also used in LCAGC); Board of Directors 
(Colombia, and Peru); Governing Body, Administrative Council (Ecuador). 
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establishing some of its functions which cannot be delegated (Provision No. 20 Exhibit 
7.1). However, the existence of a board by itself does not guarantee that better decisions 
are taken; as Cadbury (2002) states:  
“The effectiveness of a board depends on its composition, the balance between 
its members and its chairman capabilities”. 
 
Exhibit 7.1 
 
LCAGC, Extract of Provision No 19: Companies whatever their type of association must 
have a directory [Board of Directors] with a number of members sufficient for the proper 
discharge of their duties…  
LCSGC, Provision No. 20: Company’s Statutes shall determine the functions of 
monitoring, evaluation and strategy of the board, which shall not be handed over… 
Note: This exhibit shows two provisions from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean Code 
of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
 
The election of board members tends to dominate corporate governance issues in the 
region (Interviewee B1). However, the role of non-executive directors, the audit function 
and board committees are currently receiving considerably more attention, given the 
support for the adoption of corporate governance standards after corporate failures in the 
US and Europe. Interviewee B1 provides a broad explanation of a board structure:  
“The electoral system is something that has been questioned a lot by investors, 
who see it as a waste of time, the biggest problem being the election of 
independent directors, where there is a special table to calculate the ratio of 
elected members after votes have been cast in election processes. This is 
controversial because it demonstrates that it is almost impossible for some 
shareholders to participate on the board. Since this is something aimed to ensure 
the participation of minority shareholders, or that there are at least independent 
board members to act in the interests of all shareholders equally; although it 
does not guarantee that it will work, just because they are independent, or 
external or with no links with the company and does not mean that it is not 
controlled by the majority shareholders. The selection procedures for the 
appointment of independent directors should be always fair and must consider 
all the relevant parties. For family owned businesses it is necessary to engage 
the interest and participation of family members”. 
 
According to interviewee B2, issues such as the legislation of a country have a substantial 
influence in shaping the board of directors. There are different voting mechanisms62, 
electoral quotient, and appointment of members by minority shareholders, closed lists, 
                                                 
62 According to Colombian law those who may not be on the boards either form a majority among people 
connected by marriage or kinship within the third degree of consanguinity or second of affinity, except in 
the recognised family-owned company. If a board is elected contrary to these provisions, it may not 
continue in office and is to convene immediately to the Assembly for new elections.  
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individual choice, and the combination of options to propose candidates to be directors.  
The board is the only body that has the resource to verify compliance with the 
requirements demanded of each director and in particular the expected requirements for 
independent outside directors. These requirements must be made clear in the statutes and 
regulations of the board. It is recommended that companies have a nomination and 
remuneration committee, although it is possible that such a committee is only present in 
large organisations; other companies may delegate this function to an independent 
external director. 
 
In Colombia, the company Board should have a minimum of five, and maximum of nine 
members63, however according to interviewees C1 and C2 some companies may need 15 
members, so this limit does not fit all circumstances. ‘Codigo Pais’ (The Country Code) 
also requires that Boards have an odd number of members to ensure effective decision-
making. In addition, boards of listed companies tend to include shareholders or their 
directly elected representatives; these boards do not often include independent directors 
that could contribute their experience and expertise to the board. 
 
Interviewee B1 mentioned that in the case of family-owned business, the structure, role, 
and composition of the board of directors varies from one family business to another. 
These features are normally determined by the size and complexity of the business and 
generation of the owning family. Board membership is kept to members of the family 
and, in some cases, to trustworthy non-family managers. This is usually done with the 
aim to preserve family control over the direction of the company and most decisions are 
taken by family-member directors. At the start of a new company, boards are elected to 
comply with legal requirements alone, but as the business develops, it is expected that the 
board will take charge of the company’s strategic plans and decision-making process. 
Interviewee A3 thought that the mere existence of a board of directors sends a clear 
message to staff and other stakeholders that the family is interested in ensuring the 
continuity of the business. However, the reality of the family-owned business shows that 
boards do not always know the best way to bring value to the company, as the 
Confecámaras’ Presidents at an event attended by the researcher points out: 
                                                 
63 Colombia: the “Principles and Framework for the development of a Code of Good Corporate 
Governance” of Confecámars states that have at least five (5) and not more than nine (9) Directors. 
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“It is also important to note that depending on the function, size and needs of 
the business the board need not be the sole organ of the family business. The 
usual help is complemented by other bodies, such as: an advisory committee, a 
committee of financial affairs, and training and selection committee, whose 
mandate is to support referral and training of family members who choose to 
work in the company, respectively”. 
 
It is also important to consider state-owned enterprises’ boards which, according to 
Interviewee A4, in most cases tend to be too large, lack business knowledge and 
independent judgement. They may include a majority of members from the state 
administration. Furthermore, they may not be entrusted with the full range of board 
responsibilities and can therefore be overruled by senior government officials and by 
governments themselves. In addition, in some cases their function may also be duplicated 
by specific state regulatory bodies. 
 
According to some participants state-owned enterprises’ boards, in principle, have the 
same responsibilities and liabilities under company law in the Andean region. However, 
in practice, board members may have a reduced liability, particularly those individuals 
nominated by the state. The responsibility of state-owned enterprises’ boards, in most 
cases, is articulated in relevant legislation and regulations, the government’s ownership 
policy and company statutes. Usually, all board members have a legal obligation to act in 
the best interests of the company and to treat all shareholders equitably and according to 
Interviewee C2 to encourage board responsibility, and that they should follow best 
practices as adhered to in the private sector and have a limited number of members. 
Analysing the above statement against the research questions; it may be possible to 
suggest that SOE boards are accountable to a small group of stakeholders. 
Recommendations about board size are explained by the Provision 23 of the Guidelines 
for the Andean Corporate governance Code (LCAGC), (Exhibit 7.2). 
Exhibit 7.2 
LCAGC, Provision 23: Corresponds to the General Assembly decide the number of 
directors within the minimum and maximum limits set by the company statutes. A 
recommendation on the optimal size of the Board will depend on the size of the company, 
which a good number of cases that would justify a fixed number of five or seven 
members, but the Board should have normally not more than eleven members. For large 
companies this number can be increased up to fifteen. In any case it is desirable to have 
the appropriate number of members to form Audit committees, Remuneration and other 
committees deemed necessary. 
Note: This exhibit shows two provisions from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean Code 
of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
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In relation to the recommended size of the board of directors, some participants at an 
event attended by the researcher agree that it depends up on the size of the company. For 
example, Herrera64 mentions that for a small company in its early development stage it 
does not make much sense to have a board because the company is at a stage where the 
decisions are taken by one or two people and the numbers affected in terms of employees, 
suppliers or customers is very small. However as organisations grow, there is a greater 
need for professionalism and they should then review their governing bodies. With the 
change of conditions, there is a need for a board and independent directors to provide 
knowledge that can serve the organisation, and for rules so that all shareholders are 
adequately represented. Experience indicates that smaller boards allow real strategic 
discussion and are less prone to become rubberstamping entities. Interviewee C1 also 
mentions that: 
“Boards are not professional by a certain degree, and a process is needed to 
make board structures more formal. There are currently no guidelines for 
independent directors. For example if an independent director is needed for a 
board, then the initial search is among friends. As a result some people hold too 
many appointments. Directors therefore end up not having enough time to study 
all the reports and assist their companies in strategic decision-making. When a 
person is a member of too many boards he might end up having not enough time 
to develop plans or assess the strategic direction of all the companies this person 
is working for. Board members should have their own ‘staff’ to prepare board 
meetings for them; someone explaining and pointing out important issues such 
as investment plans, financial matters, profiles of persons to be hired, and assess 
other board members”. 
 
The role of the board is to guide the company’s policy, and to control management and 
liaise between the management and stakeholders. CAF’s (2006) manual of corporate 
governance for companies with closed capital recommends compliance with the duties of 
the board, as well as the nature of team work for senior management on their decision-
making processes, where the size and composition of the board are key processes for its 
operation. However, there is no agreement on an optimum board of directors’ size. A 
large number of members represent a challenge in terms of using them effectively and/or 
having any kind of meaningful individual participation.  
 
                                                 
64 Juan Carlos Herrera, independent consultant, speech at the “Why Corporate Governance & CSR 
Workshop” – Superintendence of Companies, Bogotá, 17-09-2008. 
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The size of the board varies a lot from one company to the other; among the companies 
that answered the BVQ’s survey the smallest Board has just three members while the 
largest board has seventeen members. According to the results of the survey carried out 
by the Colombian Superintendence of Companies, 68.8% of those who answered the 
questionnaire said they had a board of three members; only 1.7% of the companies had a 
Board of Directors of seven or more members (See Table 7.17).  
 
Table 7.17 Number of members on Boards of Directors in Colombia 
 
Number of Members % 
3 Members and their deputies 68.8 
4 Members and their deputies  7.3 
5 Members and their deputies 17.4 
6 Members and their deputies 3.4 
7 Members and their deputies 1.3 
More than seven members and their deputies  1.7 
Note: this table shows results taken by the 2008 survey carried out in Colombia by the 
Superintendence of Companies. 
 
Views vary from one country to the other, for example the Ecuadorian survey carried out 
by the Quito Stock Exchanges’ (BVQ) shows that the preferred number of board 
members raises different opinions. Among the respondents there was a company that 
declared it had an even number of board members, a practice which could create 
problems in decision-making when there is a tie.  
 
In addition, information taken from the financial statements for the year 2007 of the 
companies that took part in CAF’s pilot study, show that six of the companies had a board 
consisting of seven members, two companies had five members on its board, and two 
other companies had a nine member board. Only one company had three members on its 
board, while another company had a board consisting of seventeen members. There was 
no information from three companies. 
 
These results are not unlike those of a study conducted by CAF through the Spanish 
consulting firm IAAG65 in 2006, which found that on average boards in the Andean 
region are made up of seven members with an average age of 50.7 years. The LCAGC 
recommend that board members have an average age between 55 and 65 years (LCAGC, 
                                                 
65 Diagnosis of Corporate Governance Practices in the Andean Region, CAF, 2006 
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Provision 25). Table 7.18 shows the overall results from the different surveys used in this 
study, such as the BVQ study, the Colombian Superintendence of Companies survey, the 
annual reports of the companies that took part on CAF’s pilot study, and the Andean 
measurement carried out by IAAG.  
 
  Table 7.18 Average number of members on Board of Directors in Andean Countries 
(percentages) 
 
No of Directors BVQ(1) 
 
Super-
Companies (2) 
CAF’s Pilot 
Companies (3) 
IAAG (4) 
3 63.5 68.8 8.3 11.6 
4 - 7.3 - - 
5 19.2 17.4 16.7 9.5 
6 - 3.4 - - 
7 9.6 1.3 50.0 64.7 
Between 7 - 15 5.8 1.7 16.7 7.4 
More than 15 1.9 - 8.3 6.8 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Sample size (5) 67 7.414 13 189 
Note:  this table shows a summary of the results of various surveys carried out in the Andean region which are 
used in this study 
(1) Quito Stock Exchange; (2) Colombian Superintendence of Companies; (3) Information from annual 
reports from companies in CAF’s Pilot Study; (4) Andean survey by IAAG, financed by CAF; (5) 
Sample size: number of companies that answered the survey 
 
7.8.2 Independent non-executive Directors  
CAF highlights the importance of having independent directors on company boards. In 
particular, there is a need for non-executive directors to provide meaningful and effective 
contribution to the governance of companies and investor protection as outlined in the 
Corporate Governance Guidelines. LCAGC, Provision 19 (Exhibit 7.3) suggests two 
categories of members, external and internal directors. Internal are those who have an 
employment contract with the company and external directors are subdivided into two 
subcategories: (i) external non-independent; and (ii) external independent, whose 
decisions are not subject to, or subordinate to, the interests of a controlling shareholder. 
 
Exhibit 7.3 
LCAGC, Extract of Provision 19: The board of directors may consist of internal and 
external directors that may be independent or not independent. The appointment of 
directors should reflect the capital structure of the company. The board may be 
incorporated wholly by outside directors, except for closed Capital businesses, where it is 
preferable that independent directors will always be a large majority.... 
Note: This shows a small part of a provision from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean 
Code of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
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Equally, the number of independent directors should be related to the size of the company 
and to the number of members on the board of directors. Interviewee C2 stressed that “a 
company should have not a thirty director board, just because is a large business”; and the 
same for the need of having a separate CEO and Chairman. 
 
Some of the interviewees agree that the choice of independent directors has its flaws, 
because occasionally they are recommended by the president or the directors, as in so 
many cases boards end up choosing individuals linked by friendship or family, thus the 
independence of directors is questionable. To avoid this it is suggested that organisations 
include in their statutes or internal rules selection procedures and establish controls to 
prevent the intervention of internal directors, or limit their possible intervention in the 
appointment of independent directors so that the choice is subject to a formal and 
transparent procedure with proposals supported by members of the nomination and 
remuneration committee, or the board’s independent directors.  
 
Additionally, LCAGC in its Provision No. 26 says that individuals elected as independent 
board members should state their independence both from the company and from its 
shareholders and directors with the duty to declare any act likely to question their 
independence. Similarly, the board must declare that it considers candidates to be 
independent based on their own statements and the findings from enquiries that the board 
may have done. 
 
The results from the CAF’s 2006 diagnosis on Corporate Governance for the Andean 
region show that on average boards have four directors who are shareholders or represent 
shareholders and have no ties with companies’ executives. This number represents 57% 
of the average number of members of the boards (seven). On average the firms surveyed 
for this study with 3 members on the board had two independent board members and one 
that belonged to management or had a contract signed by the company. 
 
Furthermore, the study in Ecuador by the Quito Stock Exchange66 found only 46% of 
companies had any independent directors. There may thus not be enough openness on the 
part of companies to include outsiders on their boards who can add value and be able to 
participate in decision-making from an objective point of view. In some cases 
                                                 
66 The survey was carried out in2007 by Maria Soledad Salvador a BVQ’s (Quito Stock Exchange) official. 
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entrepreneurs see the opinion of external Board members as interference in the 
company’s affairs. 
 
Similarly, the study carried out in Colombia by the Superintendence of Companies (Table 
7.19) found that 22% of companies have only internal members on their boards, 18.6% of 
companies have Boards shaped entirely by independent external members, 17.8% have 
internal and external independent members, equally 17.8% of the boards have internal 
and dependant external members, 17.2% of companies have a Board with a membership 
of internal, external and independent external directors on their boards, 4.4 % have a 
combination of external dependent and independent board members, and 2.2% of the 
respondent companies have a board composed only of dependent external members.  
 
Table 7.19 Category of Board Members  
 
Class of Board Members % 
Companies with only internal board members (Executive directors) 22.0 
Companies with only independent members in their boards 18.6 
Boards with a mix of independent and executive directors 17.8 
Boards integrated by external dependent and executive directors 17.8 
Boards with a mix of executive directors, external dependent and 
independent members 
 
17.2 
Boards with a mix of external dependent and independent members  4.4 
Boards integrated only by dependent external members   2.2 
Source: Colombian Superintendence of Companies – September 2008 national survey 
 
According to the results of the mini survey conducted by the author of this research, only 
8.8% of participants strongly agree that a board should have non-executive directors 
(Table 7.20). 60% agreed to some extent with the inclusion of non-executive directors 
(NED) on the board. However, 50% of the students who answered the survey express 
some disagreement with the inclusion of independent NED in the board. Equally, 36% of 
others strongly disagree with the idea of having independent directors, this contrary to the 
believe that the inclusion of independent NED is an indication that companies intend to 
be transparent, and safeguard the interest to all their stakeholders, this provides evidence 
to answer the first research question. Some of the research participants manifest their 
scepticism about the benefits of having NED as they argue that some times is difficult to 
determine their true independence, or what interests they are representing. Equally, in 
some cases is impossible stop the creation of grouping of NED who operates on their own 
and to the exclusion of executive directors. Nevertheless, most of the research participants 
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believe that providing there is an appropriate balance between executive and NED and 
roles and responsibilities are adequately defined, the appointment of suitable NED to the 
board can only bring advantages to the board of an organisation.        
 
In addition, information from the annual reports and other documents obtained from 
companies that participated in CAF’s Pilot study, the majority of which are family-owned 
businesses, shows that board members in most cases are individuals belonging to the 
same family that owns the company. 
Table 7.20 Independent non-executive directors on the Board  
 
Independent NEDs on the Board 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 9.1% 9.1% 40.9% 18.2% 22.7% 100.0% 
  Adviser 9.8% 26.8% 29.3% 24.4% 9.8% 100.0% 
  Student   33.3% 16.7% 50.0%   100.0% 
  Other 9.1% 18.2% 18.2% 18.2% 36.4% 100.0% 
Total 8.8% 21.3% 30.0% 23.8% 16.3% 100.0% 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher 
 
7.8.3 Board committees 
In addition to the formal structures of a board, they also should have provisions for board 
committees, especially audit committees as in Provision No. 40 (Exhibit 7.4). It is 
considered that this should be the way corporate governance is exercised, regardless of 
the type of organisation. For example, in a large organisation, a state-owned enterprise, a 
small company, or a family business it is important to be transparent and accountable. 
Therefore, a company needs to have particular features in place; a board structure 
including an audit committee, a remuneration committee and any other required 
committees to provide the appropriate level of compliance of corporate governance 
standards. However, some companies may not need to be so formal and may use 
alternative ways to implement procedures to interact with stakeholders of the 
organisation, which involves the exercise of good governance for the organisation. 
Exhibit 7.4 
LCAGC, Provision No. 40: the Board of Directors should form committees to exercise 
certain functions in particular audit, nomination and remuneration, consisting exclusively 
of outside directors. The board allocates powers in different areas to each of the 
directors, who will be responsible for monitoring and control. 
Note: This shows a small part of a provision from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean 
Code of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
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Opinion about board committees varies depending on the organisation. For example, 
there are boards operating without committees because individual members cover all the 
functions often entrusted to committees. However, when an organisation grows there is a 
need to develop the necessary committees. Table 7.21 shows the findings from the 
author’s own survey on Corporate Governance Developments in the Andean Region, and 
only 28.6% of the entrepreneurs strongly agree with the view that boards should have 
special committees; this policy is better seen by the advisers as 90.2% of them agree that 
board committees are necessary.  
 
Table 7.21 Respondents’ views on whether a Board should have special Committees 
 
Board Committees 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 28.6% 33.3% 14.3% 14.3% 9.5% 100.0% 
  Adviser 63.4% 19.5% 7.3% 4.9% 4.9% 100.0% 
  Student 50.0% 33.3% 16.7%     100.0% 
  Other 36.4% 18.2% 36.4% 9.1%   100.0% 
Total 49.4% 24.1% 13.9% 7.6% 5.1% 100.0% 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher  
 
According to CAF's Diagnosis of Practice for Corporate Governance in the Andean 
Region, 34% of boards do not have committees, regardless of their status as listed or not. 
Fifty-two percent of the companies surveyed have an audit committee, 34% of them have 
a risk committee, and 16% have a nomination and remuneration committee. The Survey 
also found that only 19% of listed companies but 8% of non-listed companies have one 
audit committee. Similarly 31% of companies claim to have other committees such as 
credit, investments, planning, ethics and environmental management committee. CAF’s 
Diagnosis of Corporate Governance Practices in the Andean Region clarifies that a large 
number of companies that have an audit committee is probably because a high percentage 
of the study sample are financial institutions in countries that observe all or part of the 
principles of Basel I and II67, which already requires this.  
 
 
                                                 
67 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision – issued the Core Principles for Effective Bank 
Supervision (BCPs), a document summarising best practices in the field. 
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7.8.4 Remuneration policies 
 
Corporate governance policies should be decided by each organisation. However, at the 
level of Board of Directors there should be clarity in regard to directors’ remuneration 
Provision 32 of the LCAGC presents suggestions about board remuneration (Exhibit 7.5).  
 
Exhibit 7.5 
LCAGC, Provision No. 32: The Board should be adequately remunerated; the 
remuneration should be consistent with company and director performance. The 
remuneration will be transparent, for which the board shall include in its annual report 
information on the total remuneration received by its managers. 
Note: This shows a small part of a provision from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean 
Code of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
 
Interviewee B1 mentioned that in some countries people believe that individuals want to 
be directors of large organisations only for the prestige it gives of being a director, and 
the greater the organisation the greater the prestige. However, in reality directors are 
expected to fulfil the roles of a director, and this is a job that takes time and dedication. 
Therefore, their remuneration should be commensurate with the duties performed and 
must be defined within the corporate governance arrangements. 
 
In Peru, despite the LCAGC’s recommendations a company is free to decide how to 
compensate its directors. For example COPEINCA a Peruvian Company that took part in 
CAF’s Pilot Study that is also listed on a European Stock Market, has determined that 
company directors should not be awarded share options as a part of their remuneration 
package. COPEINCA’s annual report reads:  
“The remuneration of the board of directors should reflect the board’s 
responsibility, expertise, time commitment and the complexity of the company’s 
activities. The remuneration of the board of directors should not be linked to the 
company’s performance; the company should not grant share options to 
members of its board” (p 63). 
 
Equally, many entrepreneurs do not appreciate the need to offer and pay a proper 
remuneration to attract independent directors with the skills and experience necessary to 
perform the duties of a board of member as Interviewee C2 mentioned: 
“Colombian companies still do not understand that the remuneration of an 
executive board member must be high. That is not in the consciousness of 
Colombians; the entrepreneur believes he is paying too much if he pays a 
million pesos [just over 400 US dollars] for attending board meetings”. 
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According to CAF's Diagnosis of Practice for Corporate Governance, the remuneration of 
directors is generally passed by the General Assembly in 62% of cases. In the case of 
listed companies, this figure rises to 77%. In 14% of the companies there is no 
remuneration for directors, and this is more frequent in non-listed companies. It is also 
noted that the practice of unpaid directors is not advisable as these individuals have 
responsibilities on the effective running of a company. Some participants argue that is 
more feasible when there is a contract to provide a sound return for the services a board 
member provides. Additionally, CAF’s report highlights that 12.5% of the companies 
base directors’ remuneration on the results of the company, and that this practice is more 
common in listed companies. In 8% of companies the board members decide their own 
remuneration, while in 4.7% of the cases this is exercised by the Chief Executive. 
 
Companies are free to decide the amount and the way directors are remunerated, for 
example, the following statement is taken from the bylaw of BancoSol one of the 
companies in CAF’s Pilot Study.  
“Remuneration of Board members shall be fixed by the General Assembly of 
Shareholders of the Company, pursuant to the criteria of entrepreneurship. The 
remuneration will be transparent, and for this purpose will be made known their 
amount, expressed in “Unidades Tributarias Mensuales (UTM)”68. The value set 
for the remuneration of members of the Board will be paid in a monthly basis, 
with prior attendance at meetings, which will appear in the respective minutes” 
(p 21). 
 
An additional example is taken from 2007 Annual Board Report from Bancaribe’s69 
Chairman regarding the maximum amount of remuneration to directors and senior 
executives: 
“The total amount of salaries, allowances and other remunerations paid to the 
President of the Bank, the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, the Executive 
Chairman and the senior executives of the Bank during the period of the 
account, is determined in connection with the provisions of the General Law on 
Banks and Other Financial Institutions70, and for 2007 correspond to the 
equivalent to 5.4%71 of the cost of processing for that period”.  
                                                 
68 The UTM are units determined by law and continually updated, which serve as measures or references 
for tax purposes.  
69 Bancaribe is Venezuelan Bank that took part in CAF’s Pilot Study 
70 In Venezuela, the Constitution allows the country’s president (Hugo Chavez Frias) to issue Decrees with 
‘scope, value and force of law’ in matters which are delegated at Ministers meetings. Among the decrees 
issued by the president is this which regulates certain banking operations, and is mandatory for financial 
institutions such as Bancaribe. 
71 Maximum allowed is 20% 
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Some interviewees mention that this matter is handled differently from the U.S., where 
companies offer ‘share options’. They also have a higher instance of variable pay than 
fixed pay, to align directors’ interests with the interests of the company and the 
shareholders. Members work for the company and when the company is successful, they 
are also successful. Another problem in Latin America is that to save costs, board 
alternate members do not attend meetings. This may affect their performance in the case 
they are called to the place of a principal member as generally alternate member do not 
get involve in the normal running of the board. 
 
7.8.5 Disclosure of information 
 
Disclosure pays an important role in corporate governance. Disclosure of information is 
necessary to allow investors and company owners to make informed decisions. Almost all 
corporate governance codes around the world, including the OECD, the Cadbury Report, 
the King II, and the CAF’s corporate governance guidelines, specifically require the 
board of directors to provide shareholders and other stakeholders with information on the 
financial and operating results of an organisation to enable them to properly understand 
the nature of the business, its current state of affairs and how it is being developed for the 
future.  
 
However, despite an increasing awareness through the world that stakeholder 
requirements must be met in order to attract and retain long-term low-cost capital, many 
Andean companies still oppose disclosing information. For example, there is some 
agreement that the Colombian market is not growing because companies are afraid to 
disclose information. The lack of disclosure for example of names of board members and 
information about board members’ remuneration are related to the armed conflict that 
prevents the disclosure of information about individuals and their capital as they might 
then become candidates for kidnapping. Kourt Shalker in his presentation at the seminar 
of corporate governance for Small business72 in Colombia attended by the researcher 
explains the importance of disclosures and transparency for all businesses: 
                                                 
72 “Good Practices for Small and Family Businesses Seminar” Universidad Minuto de Dios, Bogotá 05-06 
October 2008 
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“As for relations with investors and interest groups [stakeholders], credibility is 
a product of transparency. And basically it happens when it is possible to verify 
the information given by the company to its investors and to the market in 
particular as sufficient, realistic, reliable and timely. This facilitates the review 
of company’s standards and financial policies. The appointment of auditors also 
pays and important role in this matter”.  
 
In CAF’s 2006 manual for close capital companies it states that “A general principle for 
the smooth running of a company, board members should be adequately remunerated” (p 
46). Some interviewees argue that shareholders expect the remuneration of board 
members to attract competent people, so that remuneration is in line with directors and 
company performance. This would be expected if accompanied by measures to ensure the 
disclosure of sufficient information to enable shareholders to assess that the remuneration 
offered to its directors is reasonable and meets appointees’ expectations.    
 
An additional matter mentioned for some participants is that companies normally do not 
disclose amounts paid to their executive directors. As explained by Cesar Prado, the 
Colombian Superintendent of Finance at an event attended by the researcher on the 
results of its Corporate Governance survey73:  
“It seemed odd that companies do not comply with Provision 32, as it appears 
elemental disclosure, general policies applicable with the market; companies 
need to be transparent regarding any economic benefit to be granted to directors, 
tax advisers, outside consultants and specialised audits. It is possible that there 
are linked to issues of confidentiality for security reasons, but in any case, this is 
an issue that is also worth thinking about”. 
 
Equally, Interviewees B1, and B4 mentioned that disclosure on related party transactions 
remains one of the weakest areas in the region, however, despite its being highly relevant 
to investors. This clearly does not fit with stakeholder engagement and a desire to show 
directors accountability; it also provides evidence to answer research questions one and 
two. The next section discusses important corporate governance issues as are internal 
controls and risk management. 
 
7.8.6 Internal controls and risk management 
 
Internal controls protect businesses and create an environment to increase shareholder 
value, and increase the level of compliance with rules and regulations. An effective 
                                                 
73 The Colombian Superintendence of Finances distributes annually a questionnaire which is of compulsory 
completion by companies under the Superintendence supervision.  
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system of corporate governance should enable both compliance and performance to be 
achieved to meet the reasonable expectations of stakeholders. Using internal controls and 
risk management systems. These should constitute part of its framework of accountability 
and regular reporting to shareholders. Accordingly interviewee B4 pointed out: 
“An internal control system encompasses the policies, processes, tasks, 
behaviour, and other aspects of a company that taken together facilitate its 
effective and efficient operation by enabling it to respond appropriately to 
significant business, operational, financial compliance, and other risks in 
relation to achieving the company objectives”.  
 
This includes the safeguarding of assets from inappropriate use or from loss or fraud, and 
ensuring that liabilities are identified and managed and to help ensure the quality of 
internal and external reporting. This requires the maintenance of proper records and 
processes that generate a flow of timely, relevant and reliable information from within 
and outside the organisation. This helps ensure compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, also with internal policies with respect to the conduct of business. 
Interviewee B2 argues: 
“The process of risk management involves the understanding of organisational 
objectives identification of the risks associated with achieving or not achieving 
them and assessing the likelihood and potential impact of particular risks; 
developing programmes to address the identified risks; and monitoring and 
evaluating the risks and arrangements in place to address them”. 
 
Reviewing the effectiveness of internal controls is an essential part of the board’s 
responsibilities. Some participants agree that management is accountable to the board for 
designing, operating, and monitoring the system of internal controls and for providing 
assurance to the board. The board needs to form its view on the effectiveness after due 
and careful enquiry based on the information and assurance provided to it. 
 
The board of many companies carry out their duties through functional committees. The 
various committees can each bring different perspectives to the components of internal 
controls and may be in a position to advise or assist the board on relevant policy issues. 
An example of an internal audit function can be taken from Seguros Bolivar’s74 Corporate 
Governance Code: 
                                                 
74 Seguros Bolivar is a Colombian insurance group of companies that took part on CAF’s Pilot Study. 
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“The company has an ‘Area of Internal Audit’ in charge of developing the 
activity of internal control. This area is also responsible for overseeing risk 
management activities”.  
 
In the absence of an internal audit function, management needs to apply other monitoring 
processes in order to assure itself, and the board, that the system of internal control is 
operating as intended. In these circumstances, the board will need to assess whether such 
processes provide sufficient and objective assurance. As suggested by Interviewee B3:  
“An important issue in relation to a company’s internal controls is the role 
played by internal audit. It is advisable that companies that do not have an 
internal audit function should review the need for one on an annual basis and 
should disclose the outcome of such review in the company’s corporate 
governance report”. 
 
Interviewees B3 and D1 suggest that where there is good corporate governance, internal 
controls and risk management should be integrated; Interviewee C1 pointed out: “Good 
corporate governance in one way or another has to do with the management of risks 
facing the organisation”. Thus the board should have control mechanisms, for example, 
there should be regular audits, with appropriate arrangements for managing conflicts of 
interest. There should also be the right people in place. For example, if the 
internal/external auditor communicates any concern to the general manager who is 
responsible for the organisation these concerns should be dealt with according to 
standards previously established at the company. So it is advisable that the auditor reports 
to the board, and the board takes the necessary measures in accordance with the auditor’s 
recommendations. 
 
A company must ensure that it has clear objectives that are agreed by the board and 
understood by all employees, starting with senior management. Companies should 
identify, assess, and prioritise the risks that could prevent them from achieving their 
objectives, and establish processes to manage them effectively. There is a need to have a 
good system of communication in place not only internally, but also with external parties 
such as auditors and regulators.  
 
In addition LCAGC Provision No. 51 (Exhibit 7.6) deals with the guidelines related to the 
resolution of conflicts. This is an important corporate governance issue. Table 7.22 shows 
that 88.8% of the researcher’s survey participants agree to some extent that companies 
should implement procedures for the resolution of conflicts of interest. 
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Exhibit 7.6 
LCAGC, Provision No. 51: The lack of flexible mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts 
within the company in general is a concern, both for shareholders and for a range of 
stakeholders [suppliers, customers, banks, etc.. ], it is recommended to look at the 
experiences of other a similar company in which the quick resolution of such conflicts did 
contribute to such  stability. 
Note: This shows a small part of a provision from Chapter V: The Board of the Guidelines for the Andean 
Code of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) as translated by the author. 
 
 
Table 7.22 Procedures for resolving conflicts of interest  
 
Conflicts of interest resolution 
Economic activity 
  
Strongly 
agree 
Some 
agreement Agree 
Some 
disagreement 
Strongly 
disagree Total 
 Entrepreneur 63.6% 13.6%   4.5% 18.2% 100.0% 
  Adviser 82.9% 4.9% 4.9%   7.3% 100.0% 
  Student 83.3%   16.7%     100.0% 
  Other 72.7% 18.2%   9.1%   100.0% 
Total 76.3% 8.8% 3.8% 2.5% 8.8% 100.0% 
Note:  this table shows results from the ‘mini’ survey carried out in Colombia by the researcher 
 
Some interviewees agree that enhancing corporate governance is not simply a matter of 
imposing rules and laws, but rather, about promoting and developing an ethical and 
healthy culture. This evidence helps to answer research question three as these measures 
may add to the perceive legitimacy of the activities of organisations. This is Interviewee’s 
B4 view when stating:  
“The development of a sound system of internal controls and reviewing its 
effectiveness is not a learning exercise to comply with unwelcome rules, but, 
rather, it is about implementing mechanisms that will help to achieve corporate 
objectives and fulfil the expectations of company stakeholders”. 
 
In fact, companies do indeed follow these recommendations. This can be seen across the 
annual reports, for example COPEINCA in its annual corporate governance report, states: 
“The main objective of the Board regarding internal control is to ensure the 
efficiency and efficacy of internal processes and oversee the fulfilment of rules, 
policies and objectives, including applicable laws and regulations in force. It 
must also be thoroughly informed about financial and operating information, the 
company’s business model, the risks associated with its economic activities, and 
its long-term sustainability. In summary, the Board must make sure that the 
company has the necessary control systems in place in all fields and that these 
systems are permanently updated to guarantee their optimum operation. 
COPEINCA annually identifies and evaluates risks that could affect the 
attainment of the Company’s objectives and establishes control and monitoring 
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activities to mitigate these risks accordingly. The company has an internal audit 
department of four people. The internal control activities are detailed in the 
Company’s internal rules and procedures and the vast majority is done through 
SAP” (p 30).  
 
An additional example is taken from Seguros Bolivar’s Corporate Governance Code, 
where the company sets out, among others its internal control rules: 
“The internal control system of the company includes the organisation and all 
methods and procedures which provide to shareholders and the various interest 
groups, reasonable assurance regarding: 
1. Reliability of the processes through which financial information is generated 
from the Company, 
2. No mobilisation of funds of illicit origin through the Company and 
3. Assessment and monitoring of specific risks 
Analysis and monitoring of the Internal Control System of the Company in 
areas of particular relevance is done through ‘committees’ that provide the 
Board and management information, evidence and suggestions to ensure that the 
Internal Control System adjust to the Company’s needs so that it can properly 
perform its objectives and achieve its goals” (p 9). 
 
Unfortunately, there are a good number of companies where some or most of the 
elements of a control system have been lacking and indeed, some have failed because of it 
as noted by B2. Despite having good business prospects on paper, some companies have 
grown too fast and their internal control and risk management systems have failed to cope 
with the expansion. Others have failed to install proper check and balance mechanisms, 
and thus failed to identify early signs of problems, and yet others have succumbed under 
the personalities of dominant board members and controlling shareholders. Interviewee 
B2 states:  
“While a good internal control system may not prevent all a company’s 
problems, they can help to provide reasonable assurance that a sound business 
in the hands of decision makers with good sense and judgement will succeed in 
their objectives”. 
 
Managers are aware of the benefits that a sound system of internal controls brings to a 
company, and this is the view of interviewee D2 who mentions: 
 “It is a good practice for companies to establish an internal function to 
undertake regular monitoring of key controls and procedures. Such regular 
monitoring is an integral part of a company’s system of internal control and 
helps to ensure its effectiveness”.  
 
Further, some interviewees pointed out that internal audits can make a significant and 
valuable contribution to the company by providing advice on risk management, especially 
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design, implementation and operation of internal control systems; enhancing efficient and 
effective risk control management by identifying opportunities to save costs of control; 
and promoting risks and control concepts within the company, such as by running or 
facilitating control-self-assessment programmes. 
 
In addition some interviewees mentioned the role played by audit committees in the 
control and risk management framework of a company, including the review process. The 
duties of the audit committee include those relating to the overview of the company 
financial reporting system and internal control procedures. This is clear for some 
companies as can be seen from COPEINCA and Seguros Bolivar Corporate Governance 
Reports, respectively: 
“COPEINCA has established an audit committee that assists the Board by 
reviewing, valuating and where necessary proposing appropriate measures in 
respect of the group’s internal and external auditing” (p 67). 
 
“It is the duty of the company’s internal auditor submits regularly reports about 
its activities to board of directors, its Chairman and the audit committee” (p 9).  
 
Equally, some interviewees suggested that company personnel such as senior managers 
may be assigned responsibilities for guiding the development and implementation of 
internal control policies and procedures, and ensuring that these are consistent with the 
company’s general objectives. Unit managers are usually more hands-on in planning and 
executing internal controls, monitoring their application, and reporting to senior managers 
the functioning of relevant controls. This reasoning reflects the participants’ expectations 
of management and companies’ accountability toward their stakeholders.                
 
7.8.7 Auditors’ appointment 
 
CAF Guidelines for the Andean Corporate Governance Code (LCAGC) recommend the 
external audit as an essential practice to facilitate third-party financing for companies. It 
cannot be said that an external audit should be a requirement only for large listed 
companies. LCAGC statement defines: “the audit of any company as the first clear sign 
of discipline and transparency” (p 23). 
 
Some interviewees mentioned the importance of maintaining the independence of the 
external auditor; to do this they suggested that measures should be taken to ensure it. 
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Among the most noteworthy aspects is the duration of the service contract that links the 
auditor with the company and their independence must be for the period of their 
appointment. As a general premise, the independent auditors should be hired for a fixed 
term contract that may be renewed after evaluating the performance and professional 
independence demonstrated during the course of their duties. 
 
LCAGC recommends, as a minimum standard rotating the partner and audit teams 
responsible for a company’s audit at end of the fifth year (Provisions). A higher standard 
of corporate governance would be to establish maximum periods for carrying out the 
auditing functions, including an initial period and a maximum number of extensions, 
which might be between seven and nine years from the start of their services. After this 
the audit firm should be rotated. This is an area that generates conflicts of interest, as the 
auditor’s income comes from the organisation, and it may be the case that if unfavourable 
reports are issued about the organisation, they may risk losing the appointment, and 
Interviewee D1 mentioned: 
“Some of the practices of good governance are auditor rotation after a certain 
period of time working for the company, the anticipation of the number of 
periods an audit firm’s appointments may be renewed and when the auditors’ 
team should be changed. Having new people coming every year to perform the 
audit work, may probably result in asking question about matters management 
would seem as normal under the previous audit team”. 
 
The remuneration received by the external auditor is usually is approved by the General 
Assembly of Shareholders, and should be included in public reports of the company. Also 
the board should report, on an annual basis, to the Assembly both the policy and decisions 
of the recruitment and replacement of external auditors and the percentage that represents 
the salary paid to the auditor as a percentage of the turnover of the company.  
 
According to the results of the Diagnosis of Corporate Governance Practices in the 
Andean Region, in 47% of cases auditors are appointed by the General Meeting of 
Shareholders, 37% are appointed by the board, while only 7% are appointed by the Chief 
Executive in certain non-listed companies. It was also found that a large number of 
companies do not recognise that the appointment of the external auditor is one of the 
powers that must be retained by the General Meeting. 30% of auditors provide audit only 
services, others in addition to audit services provide information processing services 
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(30%), legal services (4%), consulting services for listed companies (18%), and 13% for 
non-listed companies which is against the code. As for the remuneration of the external 
auditor, the Diagnosis of Corporate Governance Practices in the Andean Region found 
that in 43% of cases the value of services and economic conditions agreed with the 
auditors are known only by the Board of Directors or senior executives. In only 2% of 
cases this value is published on the website of the company, 6% in public by circulated 
media and 19% in an internal circulation of media. By contrast in 20% of cases this 
information is not disclosed. 
 
7.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presents the research findings from the case study of CAF, which has been 
working with different organisations in each of the five Andean countries to implement 
corporate governance. Among CAF’s counterparts are governmental, private and public 
organisations and some of them have special powers to enforce rules within its respective 
countries. CAF’s work is normally focused on technical and financial contributions to the 
activities designed for each counterpart.   
 
The case study findings provide different attitudes towards corporate governance through 
the Andean region, and provide some of the reasons why companies have taken the 
decision to implement the principles; the benefits expected from the implementation; and 
opinions about voluntary adoption and the need for more regulation. The analysis also 
includes other issues affecting corporate governance developments in the region, 
including the impact that the political situation in the Andean region has on corporate 
governance; and the effect of privatisation and nationalisation processes. In addition, the 
analysis includes the findings related to particular issues such as board of directors’ 
structures, board committees, non-executive directors, internal controls and risk 
management. 
 
Companies in each country have different reasons for the decision to implement 
governance practices. However, there is some agreement that corporate governance is 
about the ‘formal and informal practices’ that govern relationships within a company and 
all its stakeholders. This concurs with the idea that the long term success of any 
organisation is a function of the extent to which the needs and requirements of its various 
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stakeholders can be balanced, without sacrificing any one to the other. The stakeholder 
concept suggests that organisations can benefit significantly from cooperating with 
stakeholder groups, incorporating their needs in the decision-making process. 
Additionally there is a shared view that corporate governance is essential for the 
economic development of large, small, family-owned, private, state-owned and public 
companies. There is also general agreement that the adoption of good practices will 
positively affect growth for the whole region.  
 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is one area in which the stakeholders theory has 
been commonly applied (Ullmann, 1985; Davenport, 2000) because the changing nature 
of the business environment creates a demand for organisations to acknowledge their 
responsibility to a broader constituency than their shareholders/owners and to help solve 
important social problems especially those they may have created. 
 
Promoters of corporate governance in the region agree that there are different factors to 
consider when recommending that companies implement the principles. For example, 
there should be a different emphasis in the case of family businesses, where one of the 
main problems is dealing with family matters. It is also important to understand the 
importance of corporate governance principles for SMEs; many believe that what it is 
needed is a different emphasis for SME family-owned businesses that are a key part of 
the Andean region’s economy. 
 
The case study results are very similar to the findings from the interviews. The results 
show that there are three different views of corporate governance as shown in Table 7.23, 
which summarises to whom organisations are accountable and whether corporate 
governance is adopted to show the legitimacy of organisations’ activities. These views go 
from the narrow shareholder model, whose objective is to protect the interests of owners 
and shareholders to a broader view, which according to Freeman (1984) takes into 
account a wide range of groups who can, or are affected by, an organisation, to a CSR 
view. The summary presented in this table provides evidence that can be to answer the 
three research questions. Overall, the views taken from the case study participants 
coincide to a greater extent to those from interviewees from Colombia presented in 
chapter six. Therefore, is possible to say that not all research participants see corporate 
governance from a broad stakeholder perspective, accountability is not normally to all 
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stakeholders, however it is widely accepted that the adoption of corporate governance 
principles helps organisations in the Andean region to show the legitimacy of their 
activities.  
 
Table 7.23 Summary of the Corporate Governance Views from the Case Study Participants 
 
Case Study 
Participants 
RQ 1 RQ 2 RQ 3 
G5: CAF staff 
 
Support a broad 
stakeholder perspective 
However it is very 
different  in reality 
 
 
Accountability should 
be to all company’s 
stakeholders 
 
Corporate governance 
principles are also 
promote as a way to 
show the legitimacy of 
company activities 
G6: CAF 
Counterparts 
 
Promote a broad 
stakeholder approach, 
however in practice is 
difficult 
 
 
Support the idea that 
accountability should 
be to all company’s 
stakeholders  
 
Supporting SOEs and 
newly privatised 
organisations to show 
the legitimisation of 
their activities 
 
G7: CAF Pilot Study 
Companies 
 
Making efforts to 
engage no only with the 
company owners or 
shareholders  
 
 
There is a culture that 
lacks accountability and 
transparency 
 
Companies show a 
growing interest in CSR 
issues and appearing 
that there are doing the 
right thing  
  
Mini-Survey   
respondents 
 
The majority have a  
have a narrow view, 
also some with a broad 
view or a CSR focus 
 
 
Accountability is mostly 
to Shareholders or 
company owners 
 
 
 Majority (of students 
and company advisers) 
believe corporate 
governance helps to 
improve company 
legitimacy 
   
Documents (Annual 
reports) 
 
Companies express the 
at least the intention to 
engage with all their 
stakeholders   
 
Accountability in annual 
reports is addressed to 
the organisation 
shareholders and 
governmental entities 
 
Growing interest in 
show that companies 
are social responsible, 
this is also aimed to 
legitimate company 
activities 
 
Others (i.e. Events) 
 
Most of the events’ 
speakers have a broad 
(stakeholder) view  of 
corporate governance 
 
 
Accountability should 
be towards all the 
stakeholder of an 
organisation 
 
Support a CSR focus, 
agreeing that the 
adoption of corporate 
governance help an 
organisation to show 
their legitimacy 
  
This table summarises the evidence gathered from the Case Study and which helps to answer helps to 
answer the three research questions: 
• Research Question 1 (RQ1) – Is corporate governance viewed from a broad stakeholder 
perspective? 
• Research Question 2 (RQ2) – Is corporate governance implemented to enhance accountability to 
stakeholders? 
• Research Question 3 (RQ3) – to what extent corporate governance is adopted to legitimate 
company activities?     
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Regardless of the different rules within and between countries, as well as the different 
kinds of companies that exist, the principles that form the basic concepts on which some 
CAF counterparts have been working on and that make up the basic Guidelines for an 
Andean Code of Corporate Governance (LCAGC) are recommended to be applied on 
voluntary basis, not only for listed companies, rather for all sort of organisations always 
taken into account each country, laws, needs and economic characteristics. Moreover, the 
rules and mechanisms that enforce corporate governance vary across the Andean 
countries; the variations arise for the interplay of political, legal and economic factors. 
 
Further, there are some practices which are undoubtedly of great importance to corporate 
governance among these are the different categories of board members, and the 
proportions that should exist between these categories, certain requirements on the 
candidates to be elected as directors, a suggested limited number of board members, also 
the importance of having independent members in the board, grouping those members in 
specific board committees, it is also important the freedom to perform in order to be 
efficient, and the appropriate economic compensation for directors services. For the same 
reason it is recommended that each country find a solution that enables an effective 
implementation for these practices. 
 
In addition, there is some agreement among the research participants about the benefits 
and the need for companies of having a sound system of internal control and risks 
management. There is also evidence of the role the auditor play on risk control activities 
and engaging with audit committees.   
 
The chapter also describes accountability and legitimacy and the case provided a view on 
how companies in the Andean region show whether they are accountable or need to 
demonstrate legitimacy toward their stakeholders. In this sense it is suggested that the 
implementation of good practices could improve or restore the trust in a company or that 
a company can show its legitimacy being transparent. Accountability is associated with 
transparency; it also involves an expectation or assumption of account giving behaviour; 
it is also focused on specific duties owed to stakeholders. Legitimacy refers to perceptions 
by stakeholders that the organisations’ activities are appropriate in terns of expectations 
for good practices. Standards of accountability and legitimacy may come from sources 
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such as policies, laws and norms. The evidence shows a consistent pattern of narrow 
stakeholders’ perspective, no very strong accountability approach and some desire to 
implement corporate governance to legitimate company activities.   
 
Table 7.23 presents a summary of the findings from the case study and which are used to 
answer the three research questions. Overall, the views taken from the case study 
participants coincide to a greater extent to those from interviewee from Colombia 
presented in chapter six.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction  
 
This thesis examines a number of issues relating to the development of corporate 
governance principles in the Latin American Andean region and explains some of the 
reasons why organisations in the region want to implement them, such as whether they 
want to engage with their stakeholders, to be accountable to their stakeholders or because 
they want to legitimise their activities. To introduce the thesis Chapter two provides a 
context of the history, culture, political, economic and financial environment in the Latin 
American Andean region and Chapter three presents the literature review on the subject 
of corporate governance to give an understanding of the topic. Chapter four outlines the 
theoretical framework relating to this thesis and the research methods and methodology 
employed in this thesis are described in Chapter five. Specifically, interviews and a case 
study are used to address the research questions. Chapters six and seven present the 
results of the empirical work.  
 
This chapter summarises the previous chapters, drawing together the principal findings 
from the analysis of the data gathered through interviews with stakeholders in Colombia 
and a case study based on the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). In particular the 
analysis investigates specific issues related to who is promoting and supporting the 
implementation, how this work is done and the reasons why companies are adopting the 
principles. The research findings are interpreted within a theoretical framework that 
comprises stakeholders, accountability and legitimacy. As mentioned in Chapter one, the 
following research questions are examined in this thesis: 
1. Is corporate governance viewed from a broad stakeholder perspective? 
 
2. To what extent do companies in the Latin American Andean Region implement 
corporate governance principles to enhance their accountability to stakeholders?   
 
3. To what extent does the implementation of corporate governance by organisations 
in the Latin American Andean region reflect their need to legitimise their 
activities to stakeholders? 
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The chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.1 summarises the empirical findings; 
Section 8.2 introduces the contribution to knowledge; the limitations of the study are 
discussed in section 8.3; section 8.4 includes some avenues for further research; and 
section 8.5 presents some concluding comments. The following sections introduce a 
summary of the study’s key findings answering the research questions and providing a 
general understanding of corporate governance developments in the Latin American 
Andean region. It is important to mention that a piece of evidence can be used to answer 
more that one of the research question set for this study, therefore to avoid duplication a 
section may contain findings that help to answer several research questions.   
 
8.1 Summary of empirical findings 
 
This section summarises the two strands of the empirical analysis, highlighting 
differences but also drawing together common themes from the interviewees and the case 
study, providing answers to the three research questions. The structure of this research 
centres on examining, comparing and evaluating CAF’s efforts in promoting the 
implementation of corporate governance in the Latin America Andean Region, the 
activities organisations are doing to improve corporate governance standards in the 
region, and in identifying the reasons why Andean companies decide to implement 
corporate governance principles.  
 
From the results of this thesis there are three main corporate governance approaches in 
the region based on the views of different stakeholders. A summary of these three 
corporate governance approaches can be seen in Table 8.1 which analyses the extent to 
which corporate governance is viewed form a broad stakeholders perspective or a narrow 
one (St), enhances accountability to stakeholders (A) and the legitimacy of corporate 
activities (L). To facilitate the interpretation of the measurement, three criteria were set: 
strong (S), medium (M) and weak (W). Different stakeholders think that corporate 
governance is implemented for different reasons.  
 
Table 8.1 shows that regulators and promoters have a very narrow view of corporate 
governance, where stakeholder, accountability and legitimacy approaches to corporate 
governance are weak and an agency view is taken that only shareholders are important. 
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SME managers and independent directors have a wider view and think that corporate 
governance is implemented from a stakeholder and accountability perspective but 
legitimacy is weak. Managers from large companies, SOE officials, auditors and 
academics have a CSR focus. This approach considers corporate governance frameworks 
to balance the different and sometimes competing interests, of a broad range of 
stakeholders that enhance accountability to stakeholders and legitimate companies 
activities. The next section considers the answers to the three research questions. 
 
Table 8.1 Corporate governance approaches 
 
View/focus Groups Results St A L 
Narrow 
 
o Regulators 
o Promoters 
 
• Only shareholders 
rights are important  
W W W 
Wider 
 
o SME’s Managers 
o Ind.-Directors 
 
 
• Engage Stakeholders 
• Accountability to all    
stakeholders 
S S W 
CSR 
 
o Large Company 
Managers  
o SOE’s Officials 
o Auditors 
o Academics 
 
• Engage Stakeholders 
• Accountability to all    
stakeholders 
• Legitimise company 
activities 
S S S 
This figures summarises the three corporate governance approaches discussed in this study 
St Engagement with Stakeholders; A Accountability to stakeholders; L Implementation to 
demonstrate Legitimacy of company activities. S Strong; M Medium; W Weak  
 
8.1.1 Corporate governance viewed from a stakeholder’s perspective  
 
The first research question concerns the issue of whether corporate governance is viewed 
from a broad stakeholder perspective. The answer to this question provides a general 
understanding of how corporate governance is seen in the Andean region including issues 
such as the definition, promotion of the principles and attitudes towards the issue. 
Evidence gathered through the interviews and the case study agrees with Freeman’s 
(1984) view that an organisation is a gathering of various stakeholders, like owners, 
investors, management, employees, customers, government and society. The concept of 
stakeholders is built around interested groups and the make-up of their relations helps 
with the company and the effect that these relations have in organisational processes. To 
answer research question one it is important to consider the different corporate 
governance approaches individuals have through the region. The evidence shows that 
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among the research participants there are three approaches: first are those who believe 
that, because managers are agents of the company’s ownersa the shareholdersa managers 
should always act in the best interest of the company’s owners. For the second approach, 
businesses have an obligation to conduct themselves in a way that treats each stakeholder 
fairly. This view does not disregard the preferences and claims of shareholders, but takes 
shareholders interests into consideration to the extent that their interests coincide with the 
greater good. The third approach is that organisations cannot function independently of 
the stakeholder environment in which they operate.  
 
Different sets of corporate governance definitions were obtained from the interviewees 
and case study participants. Some of these definitions related corporate governance to 
‘control’ as provided by Cadbury’s frequently quoted or paraphrased: “Corporate 
governance is the system by which businesses are directed and controlled” (Cadbury. 
1992). In addition, a number of definitions related corporate governance to the legal 
framework, rules and procedures and private sector conduct. Also common in the 
definitions were relationships between shareholders, boards and managers. This is a 
narrow view, which considers that a company is run in the interest of shareholders. It is 
also deemed that this view incorporates accountability only to shareholders.  
 
In general, those who see corporate governance related just to majority and minority 
shareholders, tend to believe that corporate governance structures should protect and 
enhance accountability to, and ensure equal financial treatment of, shareholders. And 
action should not be taken if its purpose is to reduce accountability to shareholders.  
 
Second, there is a wider focus where companies pursue the interests of a wide variety of 
stakeholders; this agrees with the view of Allen and Gale (2000). A definition given by 
the President of Ecuador stock exchange (BVQ), one of CAF’s counterparts in the 
Andean region, adopts a wider stakeholder approach which includes accountability to 
stakeholders but it does not consider the legitimacy of company activities.  
 
Third, some of the participants provide a definition which adopts a CSR focus; under this 
view corporate governance is concerned with ensuring that companies are run in such a 
way that society’s resources are used efficiently. It is about commitment to values, about 
ethical business conduct and about making a distinction between personal and corporate 
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funds in the management of a company. Ethical dilemmas arise from conflicting interests 
of the parties involved. In this regard, managers make decisions based on a set of 
principles influenced by the values, context and culture of the organisation. Ethical 
leadership is good for business as the organisation is seen to conduct its business in line 
with the expectations of all stakeholders. This focus takes into consideration 
accountability to all stakeholders and the legitimacy of company activities; among these 
there is the definition taken from the annual report of ‘Seguros Bolivar’, one of the 
companies that took park on CAF’s Pilot Study.  
 
The view of some participants, who believe that corporate governance, to some extent, 
has to do with the acceptance by management of the inalienable rights of shareholders as 
the true owners of an organisation and of their own role as trustees on behalf of the 
stakeholders, also helps to answer research question one. Participants also believe that 
corporate governance deals with the conduct of the affairs of a company in a way that 
there is fairness to all stakeholders and that its actions benefit the greatest number of 
stakeholders. In this regard, management needs to prevent asymmetry of benefits between 
various stakeholders, especially between the owner-managers and the rest of the 
stakeholders. 
 
CAF and its counterparts have been promoting the implementation of corporate 
governance practices in Small and Medium Enterprises (SME). Support for corporate 
governance originates in these succession processes in family-owned businesses and in 
the companies attracting capital especially from foreign investors. However, some of the 
participants questioned whether owners and managers of SMEs are prepared to 
implement corporate governance principles in their organisations, and this takes into 
consideration cultural issues. There is not a culture of group ownership in most of the 
Andean countries and people are generally very individualist. This evidence also opposes 
a broad stakeholder perspective. 
 
The majority of the interviewees and case study participants were aware of CAF’s 
Corporate Governance Program, which focuses on the development of rules, as well as 
dissemination, implementation, and measurement in the application of corporate 
governance practices in the Andean region. They also knew that CAF had published 
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Corporate Governance Guidelines and has made available a corporate governance 
practice evaluation software application. Similarly, it was known that CAF provided 
support for public and private-sector institutions in the region to carry out local-level 
projects. Thus, CAF has been directly involved in awareness raising events, including 
international seminars on the topic in several cities throughout the Andean region. This 
shows a desire to include all stakeholders in the processes of corporate governance, at 
least from the point of view of those who are promoting the adoption of good practice in 
the region; this in part answers the first research question. However, the existence of high 
ownership concentration in the region and the large number of family-owned business 
and SMEs has not been favourable to the adoption of a stakeholder approach. 
Nevertheless, gradually more organisations are prepared to take into account the rights 
and obligations of all stakeholders of a company. Equally, across the five countries there 
is some agreement that corporate governance may be a valuable tool for running state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) since they face equal, or even more, challenges than private 
companies. Evidence was found that suggests that a SOE cannot go bankrupt and cannot 
have its board or management removed by a takeover or proxy contest. In addition, they 
may have very low-cost subsidised loans. Table 8.2 summarises the responses of all the 
individuals that were interviewed in Colombia and in the case study participants’ views 
on the stakeholders of the Andean companies. 
Table 8.2 Stakeholders Responsibilities 
 
Note: This table summarises who interviews consider to be the stakeholders of companies 
 (1) Percentage based in 32 interviewees (21 interviews with Colombian stakeholders, 11 
interviews for the Case study)   
Stakeholders  Responsibilities № % (1) 
Shareholders Sustain long-term relationships that generate 
mutual benefits 
29 91 
Regulators Act with responsibility in the management of 
company resources 
26 82 
Society Contribute to sustainable development and 
welfare 
23 73 
Customers Act fairly with the competition 
 
18 55 
Suppliers Advance procurement and contracting 
processes with transparency and accountability 
14 45 
Competitors 
 
Provide quality goods at competitive costs  14 45 
Employees Compensate for their service and contribute to 
their wellbeing 
12 36 
Government  Contribute to the country’s economic 
development 
9 27 
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The table shows that shareholders are the most important stakeholders group but the 
regulator and society, are also important. Interestingly, employees and the government 
were not seen to be stakeholders so there is clearly a stakeholder perspective by including 
society; however, there is some confusion when including all stakeholders in this 
stakeholder new point  
 
As well as different views of corporate governance by different stakeholder groups the 
approach also differs from one country to another. In Bolivia, there appears to be a wide 
spread view of engagement with stakeholders, and this is assessed as strong (S). This to 
some extent agrees with Gonzalez-Vega (1997, 1998), who argues that, due to the high 
number of micro-enterprises and poor households and the importance of such entities in 
the country’s economy, there have been numerous activities aimed to engage 
stakeholders’ interests during the process of transformation of non-profit institutions into 
commercial entities with clear ownership and governance structures. The people involved 
in the transforming process are general managers, board members, staff, and clients, all of 
whom have personal stakes in the outcome of the transformation. 
 
There is some evidence showing that the private sector has played a key role in the effort 
to implement corporate governance practices in the region. In Bolivia the promoter of 
corporate governance has traditionally been the Bolivian Stock Exchange (Bolsa 
Boliviana de Valores – BBV); the BBV has received the help of the Chamber of Industry, 
Commerce and Services of Santa Cruz and Bolivian private universities. According to the 
National Institute of Statistics – (INE for its name in Spanish) the majority of businesses 
are micro-enterprises75. Due to the high number of very small businesses, the 
Superintendence of Companies, the corporate governance regulator in the country, has 
decided to centre corporate governance on rules, traditions, behaviour patterns and 
characteristics of the national economy and the country’s legal system and not just on an 
imported western model or imitating what has been done elsewhere. 
                                                 
75 A micro-enterprise is defined in Bolivia as an economic and productive unit where the owner is involved 
in the production process. Its activities imply coordinating a wide range of functions, such as money 
handling, market dealing, and management for an economically productive activity. According to the 
Bolivian National Chambers of Commerce classification of companies by number of employees a micro has 
less than 10 employees, a small between 11 and 20, a medium between 21 and 120, and a large more than 
120 employees.     
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Equally, a representative of the Bolivian Superintendence of Companies defined 
corporate governance as a system of accountability and responsibility among 
shareholders, the board of directors, management, and other stakeholders of an 
organisation. He also mentioned that it encompasses both the decision making process 
and the accountability structure for achieving company strategic objectives. He also noted 
that corporate governance is fairness, transparency, accountability and responsibility and 
are the minimum standards that provide legitimacy to an organisation, reduce 
vulnerability to financial crises, and broaden and deepen access to capital. However, he 
noted that applying these principles across a wide variety of legal, economic, and social 
systems is not easy as issues such as capacity and vested interests prevail, particularly in 
the Andean region. 
 
In Colombia ‘Código País’ (p 3) recommends corporate governance principles primarily 
to be applied by listed companies. However this should not stop non-listed companies 
adopting them. An important feature of the corporate governance code is the regulation of 
conflicts of interest and the measures to protect the interests of minority shareholders. 
Accordingly, there is no clear intention to engage with all stakeholders; and the approach 
in Colombia to stakeholders is Medium (M). In addition the programs coordinated by 
Confecámaras and the Colombian Stock Exchange (BVC) to promote corporate 
governance have had a great impact on the Colombian business community. 
Confecámaras programs are stakeholder focused, supporting the idea that organisations 
have responsibilities towards all their stakeholders. At the same time, BVC has been 
promoting a more shareholder/owner corporate governance approach. 
 
In Ecuador, one of the reasons SMEs and family owned business have been reluctant to 
implement corporate governance principles is because, in many cases, the owners are the 
managers or are able to work closely with them and can exert direct control. Therefore, 
from the view of the participants the stakeholder engagement approach in this case has 
been graded as Weak (W). Moreover, a National Executive committee on Good 
Corporate Governance was established in July 2004. This was integrated by the 
Superintendent of companies; the Superintendent of Banks and Insurance (both corporate 
supervisory and regulatory agencies in Ecuador); chambers of industry, commerce, small 
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industry, and construction; associations of private banks; fund management companies; 
stock brokerage firms; the and Quito (Bolsa de Valores de Quito – BVQ) and Guayaquil 
Stock Exchanges; several universities; media groups; and consulting firms. The 
committee appointed the BVQ as the Technical Secretariat, and in January 2005, it 
adopted the Andean Corporate Governance Code (Codigó Andino de Govierno 
Corporativo – CAGC). Ecuador was the first country in the Andean region to adopt the 
CAGC) as a national standard. Adopting the CAGC is taking a stakeholder approach. 
However, the evidence shows that a narrow view, where shareholders are the main 
stakeholders, is widely accepted in the country. 
 
In Peru the regulators promote a shareholder focus while many company managers take 
an approach that also takes into account the rights and obligations of all company 
stakeholders. For this reason this approach has been graded as Medium (M). Further, the 
traditional corporate governance supporter has been the Peruvian Promoter of Capital 
Markets Development (Asociación de Empresas Promotoras Del Mercado de Capitales, 
PROCAPITALES), also with the help of the Peruvian University of Applied Sciences 
(Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas, UPC) and the National Supervisory 
Commission of Enterprises and Securities (Comisión Nacional Supervisora de Valores 
Del Peru CONASEV). People from PROCAPITALES, In Peru, it is believed that 
corporate governance originates with the idea of the modern company, which was 
initially concerned with the delegation of power over decision-making to managers other 
than the owners of companies. However, currently corporate governance practices have 
become recognised as a source of business value. Thus, corporate governance begins with 
a narrow view, but with the role played by interested parties such institutional investors a 
wider approach is increasingly being accepted by most stakeholders in Peru. 
 
In Venezuela the regulations protect the rights of shareholders and the idea of 
stakeholders is very new. Consequently, this approach has been graded Weak (W). 
Additionally, in Venezuela the promotion of corporate governance implementation has 
been led by the Venezuelan Association of Executives (AVE), which has joined forces 
with the country regulator, the National Securities Commission (Comisión Nacional de 
Valores, CNV) and several private institutions such as the Venezuelan association of 
issuers, the Caracas Stock Exchange (Bolsa de Valores de Caracas – Bvc*), the National 
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Commission for the Promotion of Investments (Comisión Nacional para la Promoción de 
Inversiones, CONAPRI), and the Venezuelan Federaction of Industrialist, and 
Businessmen (Confederación Venezolana de Industriales CONINDUSTRIA). AVE’s 
slogan for its corporate governance program has been “Promoting a local agenda based 
on ethics, transparency and accountability”; the corporate governance program is 
addressed to all sorts of companies, as according to AVE, the Venezuelan economy 
mainly consists of non-listed closed-capital companies, family-owned, state-owned, SME, 
and a low percentage of large non-listed companies. Corporate governance has been 
promoted as part of a social responsibility agenda, as it is believed that this is a good way 
to focus companies’ commitment to their stakeholders. Organisations such as AVE and 
CONAPRI with the support of CAF have been promoting an initiative called 
‘Transparency Revolution’ also known as ‘Responsible Competitiveness’ which aims to 
promote corporate governance practices. Evidence shows that there is the desire to have a 
stakeholder perspective for the implementation of corporate governance, however in 
reality engagement with all stakeholders is a different matter. 
 
Overall, corporate governance in the Andean region has a stakeholder focus in Bolivia but 
not in the other countries. Table 8.3 summarises the degree of engagement with 
stakeholders in the corporate governance of each Andean country.  
 
Table 8.3 Corporate governance: engagement with stakeholders 
Country Description St 
 
Bolivia 
 
Microfinance activities, educating individuals to be able to 
exercise their rights   
S 
 
Colombia 
 
Especial attention given to resolution of conflicts of interest M 
 
Ecuador 
 
Shareholders are the primary stakeholders W 
Peru Regulators: shareholders focus. Managers: stakeholder focus M 
Venezuela 
 
Engaging with stakeholders is only made as a reference rather 
than a direct commitment to them – the primary concern is 
towards shareholders 
W 
Note: this table summarises the treatment given to stakeholders in each Andean country 
 St Engagement with Stakeholders; S Strong; M Medium; W Weak 
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For many of the interviewees having a stable economic environment may have influenced 
the views of corporate governance. This is reflected in the importance given to features 
such as: having a fair board structure; the separation of the Chair from the Managing 
Director’s function; training and induction of directors; the appointment of a higher 
number of independent directors; regular board meetings; board committees; regular 
audits; and risk management. Based on the evidence presented in chapters six and seven it 
is possible to say that there is general agreement that the adoption of corporate 
governance principles may enable organisations whether private, publicly traded, or state-
owned to understand their rights and obligations better. 
 
Ownership changes also place pressure on regulators. For example, changes in the 
political orientation of the countries bring privatisation or nationalisation waves. This is 
the case of Colombia where, as a result of partial or whole privatisation of some state-
owned entities, both the Superintendence of Finance and the Superintendence Companies 
have issued corporate governance guidelines for newly privatised companies to encourage 
the protection of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. However, there is not a 
clear stakeholder focus. 
 
In Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela changes in the political leadership have led to a 
different political and economic environment. Some of the research participants argued 
that in some cases it seems that the state does not have a positive attitude towards private 
organisations. The perception of some participants was that the legal system prevailing in 
these three countries is a comprehensive legal framework which tries to provide for 
everything, regulating most relevant issues in detail. Some also pointed out that 
government ownership and control are not known for promoting transparency and 
accountability. The belief among the participants, from both the interviews and the case 
study is that privatised organisations face daunting challenges, including the poor 
qualifications and lack of appropriate professional experience of state-appointed CEOs 
and board members.  
 
Moreover, evidence from annual reports from some of the companies analysed for this 
study showed that after nationalisation the size of the board of directors was reduced and 
fewer independent directors were appointed to the board, proving a negative impact of 
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nationalisation on corporate governance practices. There is also a tendency to disclose 
less information after nationalisation. The opposite occurs on privatised companies where 
the structure of the board of directors has been strengthened with the appointment of 
independent directors. Despite these political problems and looking at governance 
changes especially in nationalised organisations, the empirical results suggest that there 
has been an increase in the overall level of corporate governance practises in the Andean 
Region. 
 
Figure 8.1 shows some of the results of this thesis and how changes in specific factors 
and pressures from related parties may shape a particular corporate governance approach 
and provides evidence to answer the first research question set for this study. To some 
extent most of the participants agree with the available literature (Handy, 2002; Zedek, 
2006; Solomon, 2007) that there are a series of factors pushing for the adoption of a 
stakeholder focused corporate governance approach. Among these are general factors 
such as stakeholders’ increasing requirements for organisations to pursue ends that go 
beyond the single interest of shareholders and that directors and officers should care for 
the interests of others involved in company activities.  
 
Figure 8.1 Corporate Governance:  Stakeholder Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  This figure includes some of the issues influencing a corporate governance stakeholder approach. 
These factors are taken from evidence answering the first research question (1). 
General Factors 
• Awareness of CG among 
stakeholders  
• Trade agreements 
• A country’s culture and 
legal system 
• Eradicating poverty 
Ownership changes 
• Founder’s succession  
• New investors 
Other factors 
• Long-term poor 
performance 
• Low ethical scandals 
• Ignoring the  
community  
 
*CG Practices with a 
Broad Stakeholder 
perception (1) 
Political factors 
• Privatisation 
• Nationalisation 
 261 
 
Most of the interviewees also agree that, currently, customers prefer to buy goods from 
companies they trust; suppliers are interested in business partnerships with companies 
they can rely on; employees would rather work for companies they can respect; and 
institutional investors tend to favour socially responsible firms. There are also pressures 
for the signing of trade agreements as companies in the area have the need to be more 
competitive. The same requirement is put on companies by governments as they are 
supporting their countries, sustainable development and eradication of poverty. 
Additional pressures come from factors causing organisations’ lose of legitimacy. This 
has been the case of state-owned enterprises, which have been put in bankruptcy and as a 
result their officials have taken the decision to implement corporate governance principles 
as a response to calls for more transparency and accountability to constituencies.  
 
Clearly, the political environment is very important to corporate governance in the region. 
Figure 8.2 summarises the modifications in corporate governance practices due to 
changes in the political environment. According to some of the research participants, the 
economy of countries such as Colombia and Peru have benefited from several factors, 
including stable political environments, flexible economic policies and inflows of foreign 
direct investments. These two countries have benefited from a few years of sustained 
economic growth, with a steady increase in GDP growth rates since 2003, although the 
governments have often been criticised for state intervention into economic development 
(Perry et. al., 2003; CIA, 2008, 2009).  
 
The existence of a political structure that encourages the state withdrawal from economic 
activities and the privatisation of state-owned enterprises improve the scope for private 
business organisations (Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). These research results agree with 
the view of Roe (2003), who argues that corporate governance arrangements inside an 
organisation interact with a nation’s politics. Political forcesa party systems, political 
institutions, political orientations of governments and coalitions, ideologies, and interest 
groupsa are the primary determinants of the relationships among managers, owners, 
workers, and other stakeholders of the organisation. Whatever the formal specifications of 
corporate law, politics shapes on a daily basis the impact on all stakeholders helping to 
answer research question one. 
 262 
 
Figure 8.2 Political Frameworks in the Andean Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Bolivia Peru Colombia 
 Ecuador 
Venezuela 
 
 
 
 
 
Nationalisation    Very Few changes  Partially/whole 
of Companies          Privatisation  
                         of SOEs 
 
 
 
 
 
Changes in CG Strengthening of   
Standards (1)       Boards of Directors 
         
• Reduction in size of      Higher proportion of  
Boards of directors      Independent 
Members on the  
• Less Independent       Board 
Directors on the Board      
 
Note: this diagram summarises the changes in corporate governance practices due to changes in 
the political environment in the Andean countries. 
(1) A conclusion reached from some Venezuelan companies that substantially reduce the size of 
their board of directors after nationalisation. 
 
Some participants suggested that improved corporate governance and accountability 
requires an active board of directors with a good proportion of non-executive directors in 
relation to executive members; representatives from all groups of stakeholders; the 
separation of the role of CEO and chairperson; the creation of board committees; and 
rotating audit firms regularly. It is also believed that companies will gain from adopting a 
system that strengthens stakeholders trust through transparency, accountability and 
fairness. However, in reality in the Andean countries many businesses do not have a 
Political Trends 
 
Left wing Moderate Left Right wing 
Effect on businesses environment  
Effects in Corporate governance 
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board of directors. Moreover, while Andean institutional investors have greater relevance 
than a few years ago, their portfolios are concentrated in government securities so there is 
little or minimal involvement of institutional investors with boards. This view of some of 
the participants, partially answers research question one that companies should design 
their corporate strategies to consider the interests of their stakeholders – groups and 
individuals that can be affected by the organisation’s purposes (Freeman, 1984).  
 
In relation to the recommended size of the board of directors, some participants agree that 
it depends upon the size of the company. For example, a Colombian independent 
consultant mentioned that for a small company in its early development stage it does not 
make much sense to have a board because the company is at a stage where the decisions 
are taken by one or two people and the numbers affected in terms of employees, suppliers 
or customers is very small. However as organisations grow, they should then review their 
governing bodies. As conditions change, there is a need for a board and independent 
directors to provide knowledge and relationships that can serve the organisation, and for 
rules so that all stakeholders are adequately represented. This view can be taken as a 
wider stakeholder approach, helping to answer research question one. 
 
8.1.2 Implementing corporate governance to enhance company accountability to 
stakeholders   
 
The second research question examines the extent to which companies in the Latin 
American Andean region implement corporate governance principles to enhance their 
accountability to stakeholders. This section highlights the main findings regarding 
accountability in the Andean region. The evidence suggests that the adoption of corporate 
governance principles may influence company’s objectives, the degree of accountability, 
transparency, or the level of perceived corporate morality. However, an accountability 
focus also varied across the five Andean countries, as shown in Table 8.4. These views 
are based on the idea that successful companies are those that recognise that they have 
responsibilities to a range of stakeholders and the focus should not only be on enhancing 
shareholder value, but on engaging stakeholders for long-term value creation. The process 
of engagement creates a dynamic context of interaction, mutual respect, dialogue, change, 
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and groundwork for transparency and accountability. Besides, such diverse stakeholders 
make competing accountability claims. 
 
The findings show that in Bolivia there is little information available regarding the 
specifics of governance practices; therefore the grade for the country’s approach to 
enhance accountability to stakeholders is Weak (W). For example the Inter-American 
Development Bank Report (2006) points out that the Stock Exchange is in an early stage 
of development and there is an “adverse business culture” that lacks transparency and 
accountability.  
 
In Colombia, accountability is normally discharged through annual reports. Only recently, 
with the growing interest in the country for CSR issues, have individuals started to realise 
that organisations are also accountable to a wider group of stakeholders. However, there 
is not a stakeholder culture to hold organisations accountable thus the accountability 
approach in this case has been graded Medium (M). 
 
In Ecuador the evidence shows that managers are accountable to boards of directors and 
discharge their accountability to the Superintendence of Companies through annual 
reports. However, the situation is not entirely clear. To some extent this is supported by 
the findings by Salvador (2007). She reports that the degree of protection provided by 
traditional mechanisms of internal and external corporate governance is not enough; in 
these circumstances controlling shareholders tend to expropriate the other stakeholders. 
To some extent the only clear thing is that management is accountable primarily to 
shareholders, therefore the issue of accountability towards all stakeholders has been 
graded weak (W). 
 
The situation in Peru is quite similar to Colombia. Accountability is primarily owed to 
shareholders and investors. However, traditionally Peru scores better than its fellow 
Andean countries in transparency and the professionalism of its governmental 
organisations (Standard Forum, 2009); but as there is no accountability to all stakeholders 
the grade for the accountability approach is Medium (M).    
 
The evidence also shows that under the administration of President Hugo Chavez, 
Venezuela’s transparency practices have deteriorated, even as certain areas have seen 
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improvements. The government increasingly relies on its ‘parallel’ public sector, as 
exemplified in the creation of the non-accountable, non-transparent National 
Development Fund (financed by oil windfall revenues and the central bank) and the 
relatively recently created government Treasury Bank. At the private company level 
accountability is primarily towards shareholders. Although there are several 
accountability laws available, there are no indications that corporate governance is to 
enhance accountability to stakeholders thus this approach has been graded Weak (W).  
 
Table 8.4 summarises the evidence about whether the implementation of corporate 
governance principles is to enhance companies’ accountability towards stakeholders. 
From this table it is clear that corporate governance is not seen from an accountability 
perspective. 
Table 8.4 Corporate governance: accountability to stakeholders 
 
Country Description A 
 
Bolivia 
Adverse business culture that lacks transparency and 
accountability (1) 
 
W 
 
Colombia 
Accountability discharged in annual reports – primarily 
to shareholders and governmental institutions  
 
M 
 
Ecuador 
Accountability to owners primarily 
‘Comply or disclose’  (2) 
 
W 
Peru 
Accountability is primarily to shareholders and investors   
M 
 
Venezuela 
Accountability toward stakeholders primarily. It is 
regulated in the commercial code, civil code, and ‘Public 
Notary Registration Law’  
 
W 
    Note: this table summarises the accountability approach in each Andean country 
    A Accountability to stakeholders 
   S Strong; M Medium; W Weak 
(1) Overall, there is insufficient publicly available information directly addressing 
Bolivia’s compliance with OECD’s, CAF’s or any principles of corporate 
governance; but the evidence suggests it is weak. 
(2) Comply with the corporate governance standards or disclosed the reasons why 
a company took the decision not to follow (apply) certain rule or principle. 
 
Some of the research participants recommend having large boards as they may provide a 
range of expertise to help make better decisions control a strong CEO. However, some 
prefer smaller boards of directors as they may be more effective than large ones, with 
greater participation by each board member, and more effective and efficient decision-
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making and greater individual accountability. This provides evidence to answer research 
question two, as boards of directors are requested to be more accountable.   
 
In addition to the formal structure of a board, the findings support provisions for board 
committees, especially an audit committee. This is a recommendation for all companies 
irrespective if they are a large organisation, a state-owned enterprise, a small company, or 
a family business as any company needs to be transparent and accountable. There is no 
requirement in the corporate law of any of the Andean countries to elect board members 
to represent stakeholders. According to some regulators, in Colombia the 
Superintendence of Finances, for the proper performance of the board requires the 
establishment of specialised committees integrated by some of its members to facilitate 
detailed analysis of certain issues that due to their nature are of great importance for the 
company. These committees act as a filter and reinforce the objective analysis of the 
decisions that correspond to the board. An Independent Director mentioned that it is 
considered a good corporate governance practice to have the existence an audit committee 
incorporated by independent board members and a nominating and compensation 
committee. Thus, having board committees increases accountability, and provides 
evidence to answer research question two.  
 
According to some interviewees, most companies with an audit committee have decided 
that this committee needs to have at least three board members and that all the members 
on the committee shall have a working familiarity with basic finance and accounting 
practices. One of the principal roles of the audit committee is oversight of the accounting 
of the organisation. Audit committees should also have the ability to engage outside 
advisers to assist them with their corporate governance responsibilities. The evidence 
gathered in this study helps to answer research questions two and three; audit committees 
facilitate the accountability and the next research question; the legitimacy of the board. 
  
8.1.3 Implementing corporate governance to legitimate company activities 
 
Evidence from both the interviews and the case study stress the importance that some 
cultural factors have over corporate governance practices in the Latin American Andean 
region; for example for many the way others perceive their actions or expect them to 
conduct themselves is very important. This is probably one of the reasons why it is 
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important to show that the operations and actions of an organisation are legitimate and a 
way to demonstrate that legitimacy is through the adoption of corporate governance 
principles. This section provides the evidence gathered in order to answer research 
question three. 
 
 The findings suggest that, under a relatively unregulated environment, corporate 
management will react to community and stakeholder expectations by revealing 
personally sensitive information when their company is placed in a situation of higher 
stakeholder awareness and public scrutiny and when it is structured to meet the 
expectations of good corporate governance. Many companies have created so called 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes that aim to balance their operations 
with the concerns of external stakeholders such as customers, unions, local communities 
and governments. Social and environmental consequences are weighed against economic 
gains as companies must be aware that sound corporate governance practices are 
important in order to be considered ethical and socially responsible businesses. This is 
one of the reasons the majority of participants argued that the corporate governance 
agenda and the ongoing corporate social responsibility arrangements are especially linked 
by the issue of ethics. Companies want the public to believe in the ethical organisation 
and at the same time do not want to provide new legal backing for tighter ethical 
behaviour.  
 
An additional issue is the perception by company stakeholders on “whether the existence, 
activities and impact of an organisation on society are justifiable”. This is associated by 
some participants with corporate legitimacy of having valid socially acceptable and 
trustworthy authority. Measuring such legitimacy however is a more difficult matter. 
According to some participants, legitimacy is assumed to be influenced by disclosures of 
information and not simply by changes in corporate actions.  However, there is no 
evidence to prove whether disclosures actually works in terms of changing the perceived 
legitimacy of an organisation. Some participants mentioned the procedures used by 
companies to earn their legitimacy such as conforming to demands, building reputation, 
and communicating honestly.  
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Individuals in the Andean region share different views about a mandatory or a voluntary 
approach. Several of the participants explained that there are rules that say what should be 
done, and if a company believes that it is not affected by a specific standard, for example 
management decides that due to the size of the company it should not subscribe to those 
rules, then they should explain why they are not applying them. It is for the potential 
investors or stakeholders to decide whether explanations are satisfactory. It is expected 
that companies should be transparent in explaining the reasons why certain principles do 
not apply to them.  
 
It may be assumed that all social actors are seeking legitimacy, and/or reinventing 
legitimacy norms, within the corporate environment (North, 1990). In this study the 
cross-national forces are important which might explain the perceived legitimacy of 
corporate governance practice within a nation; and legitimacy must be taken as a 
condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant 
rules or laws (Scott, 2001).   
 
The results show that in Bolivia, the introduction of changes in the way businesses are 
managed has led to the increase in the credibility of these organisations in the eyes of 
government policy makers, debt equity investors, existing and potential new clients, and 
other stakeholders. Thus, the thesis find that the implementation of corporate governance 
creates the conditions that meet stakeholders’ interests and a corporate governance 
approach that seeks the legitimacy of a company’s activities and is thus graded as Strong 
(S). 
 
In Colombia the legitimacy of company activities approach is commonly used by state-
owned enterprises which have been under financial difficulties. Officials from these 
entities or their constituencies believe that to continue in operation these organisations 
must present the firms as acting within the boundaries of the social contract, i.e. 
organisational legitimacy is the motivating force. As there is no evidence that this is the 
case for other non-state-owned enterprises, the corporate governance approach to 
legitimise company activities is graded Medium (M). Also, in Colombian, according to a 
company director, people get confused when told they must disclose information about 
their business, even if it is non-confidential information; individuals refuse to reveal even 
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numbers that they are obliged to show to the government; they feel threatened if they 
have to show any sort of information to their suppliers, their customers or any other entity 
external to the company. Another executive director mentioned, however, there are some 
companies which have a culture of transparency, and the adoption of best practices is a 
legitimisation process. 
 
In Ecuador, the government is currently negotiating free trade agreements with the US 
and the EC, and governmental organisations such as the Superintendence of Companies 
and the BVQ have been promoting the implementation of corporate governance 
principles with the argument that organisations might be in a better commercial position it 
they are able to show the deployment of management activities which are transparent and 
visible to engender greater organisational legitimacy. Moreover, according to some 
interviewees the companies that voluntarily have decided to implement the principles are 
doing so because they are convinced of the benefits of being transparent, trustworthy and 
ready to disclose all the necessary company information. For this reason Ecuadorian 
companies’ approach to legitimacy has been graded strong (S).  
 
In Peru, PROCAPITALES is CAF’s counterpart promoting the implementation of 
corporate governance. As part of the contest used as one of the means to convince 
organisations to implement the principles, PROCAPITALES rewards companies that 
demonstrate a greater commitment to legitimacy on the basis of transparency and ethics. 
According to some participants there is also support for the adoption of CSR. This 
approach to legitimacy has been graded Strong (S)   
 
In Venezuela, SMEs are progressively looking for strategic associations and are better 
prepared to disclose their financial information and are the subject of public scrutiny. 
According to this thesis, these companies see the implementation of corporate governance 
principles as an opportunity to line up the legitimacy of their operations with 
stakeholders’ expectations. There is a different situation for family-owned business 
which, in the majority of cases, keep their equity interests restricted to a limited group of 
owners/shareholders, usually members of the same family. These companies have always 
been reluctant to implement corporate governance practices. Only recently after a process 
of awareness carried out by one of CAF’s counterparts, family-owned business have 
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started the implementation of the principles as transparency and reliability values are 
increasingly appreciated as adding to the company reputation. For Venezuelan SOEs the 
decision to implement governance practices is related to a specific public policy 
framework in which these organisations operate. Based on the above, the implementation 
of corporate governance to legitimise company activities have been graded Medium (M).          
 
Table 8.5 shows a summary of the five countries’ companies desires to legitimate their 
activities by implementing corporate governance standards.  
 
Table 8.5 Company approach to legitimacy of activities  
 
Country Description L 
 
Bolivia 
 
Line up organisations’ behaviour with the expectations of 
society (microcredit) 
 
 
S 
 
Colombia 
 
SOEs – to justify their actions  
Voluntary disclosure ‘if comply explain (1) 
 
M 
 
Ecuador 
 
Improve transparency and strengthen management 
practices (2) 
 
S 
 
Peru 
 
Companies that demonstrate a greater commitment to 
legitimacy on the basis of transparency and ethics are 
rewarded 
 
 
S 
 
Venezuela 
 
Transparency culture regarding the disclosure of information  
(resistance to disclose) 
 
M 
Note: this table summarises the legitimacy approach in each Andean country 
L Implementation to demonstrate Legitimacy of company activities 
S Strong; M Medium; W Weak 
(1) An explanation is requiring for those elements complied with, while 
recommendations for complied with do no warrant explain. 
(2) The country is negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with the US – Requiring 
additional efforts by its business sector to improve management standards if 
competitiveness is affected, among other things by corporate performance. 
 
 
Figure 8.3 outlines the evidence in answering the research questions, it also summarises 
the approaches given by the research participants to corporate governance in the five 
Andean countries.  
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Figure 8.3 Systems of Corporate Governance 
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              Legitimacy 
 
         Accountability           Accountability 
    Just to Shareholders           and 
        No legitimacy   Legitimacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Manager versus          Concentrated Ownership     Stakeholder 
         Owner/Shareholder           & Control Orientated 
 
    
Note: This figure summarises the corporate governance approaches expressed the research participants. 
 
In summary, the legitimisation of corporate activities for adopting corporate governance 
is a more valid reason than for any accountability reason or engagement with stakeholder 
reasons. This legitimisation maybe a selfish motivation in companies appearing to be 
caring organisations, but in reality it seems that there is no real concern for stakeholders 
or any accountability. 
 
8.2 Contribution to Knowledge 
 
This thesis investigates developments in the implementation of corporate governance in 
the Andean region. The empirical findings described in this study contribute to a better 
understanding of the state of corporate governance in each of the five countries in the 
Andean region.  
 
First, the study contributes to the limited body of Andean literature on corporate 
governance and of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in particular. The 
study added to the overall understanding of important issues such as stakeholders’ 
engagement and accountability to broad stakeholders.  
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A broad consensus exists on the active role played by the financial sector in promoting 
economic growth and sustainable development and in particular the importance of 
efficient running of organisations; in this context the study makes several contributions. 
By investigating CAF and the perceptions of stakeholders regarding the importance, 
benefits and attitudes towards the implementation of corporate governance standards, this 
study will be of potential importance to policymakers, regulators, and promoters of good 
practices and help assist in deciding the areas in need of improvement and exposure of 
their meaning and benefits for stakeholders. In addition the timelines of this study, in 
terms of recent financial global turbulence, the Andean region political and economic 
changes, the constant debate over whether to have more regulated governance standards 
versus voluntary compliance, and attempts to harmonise accounting regulations, enhances 
the importance to regulators in the Andean countries and all those promoting the 
implementation of corporate governance standards in the region.  
 
The thesis shows that the understanding of corporate governance is limited to very few 
stakeholders, and some cases some of those at higher levels of management do not have a 
clear idea of what corporate governance really means. This is also compounded by the 
fact that terms such as ‘corporate governance’, ‘accountability’, ‘stakeholder’, and 
‘legitimacy’ do not have a clear translation into Spanish. The cultural background 
prevents the understanding of the need and benefits of disclosure, having independent 
members in board of directors, or even allows external investors in close hold capital 
organisations.   
 
The study will also offer both local and foreign investors an objective analysis of the 
current implementation of corporate governance standards in the Andean region; such 
information is undoubtedly important to investors wanting to make informed financial 
decisions before investing in organisations located in the region. This need is likely to be 
highlighted by recent events in international credit markets. Such investment is 
paramount to the success in the regulatory framework of some of the Andean counties.       
 
A popular committee among Andean companies, according to the case study is a 
corporate governance committee. This committee has among its functions: to help the 
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board identify individuals qualified to become board members; develop and recommend 
to the board the corporate governance guidelines applicable to the company; lead the 
board in its annual performance review; recommend who will serve on each board 
committee; and serve as the primary committee overseeing company’s compliance with 
established programs such as ethics, conduct and so on. This provides evidence to answer 
research questions two and three as, through these committees, companies in the region 
are expressing their desire to be accountable to their stakeholders and also to demonstrate 
the legitimacy of their operations.     
 
An additional contribution to knowledge is that the corporate governance structure relies 
on the internal control system and risk management. Internal controls are there to protect 
the business; they can also increase the level of compliance with rules and regulations. 
According to this research an effective system of corporate governance should enable 
both compliance and performance to be achieved meeting the reasonable expectation of 
stakeholders. As found in the case study, those in charge of internal control systems are 
accountable for initiating, approving, processing and reviewing business transactions; 
they are also responsible for the validity, correctness and appropriateness of their actions. 
Managers are accountable for negative results attributable to their failure to maintain 
reasonable internal control activities. Also, in the absence of an internal audit function, 
management needs to apply other monitoring processes in order to assure itself, and the 
board, that the system of internal control is operating as intended. In these circumstances, 
the board will need to assess whether such processes provide sufficient and objective 
assurance.  
 
8.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
Although the thesis attempts to provide a fairly comprehensive and systematic 
examination of these issues, it is, nevertheless, incomplete, and remains subject to some 
limitations. First, the study is hampered by a lack of data covering some of the countries; 
the analysis has been restricted in its coverage to only a few companies, industries and 
sample period. For example only companies that took part in CAF’s pilot study are 
examined. Data from listed companies could be used to explore a number of issues 
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studied in this thesis in greater depth; these avenues for future research are detailed in 
section 8.4. 
 
Second, cost and time constraints associated with the collection of data resulted in some 
limitations to this study. The research was completed solely by the author, and the cost 
refers to the funding needed to travel, accommodation and other expenses to be able to 
meet the participants in three of the five Andean countries. The research also coincided 
with the time a number of corporate governance issues were currently developing in the 
Andean region. While the findings provide important insights for regulators, investors, 
company managers, policy developers and other stakeholders, there was not enough time 
to investigate the effect of these new changes in great detail. Once again, though, further 
work in the area would be insightful.    
 
Third, although the interviews were conducted with individuals from different sorts of 
companies and across all the countries, this research is limited by the small number of 
interviews carried out, also by the fact that those interviews were based in no more than 
two cities of each country. Therefore local issues may have influenced the findings of this 
study, making generalisations difficult to be made.     
 
Fourth, dealing with foreign languages brings added difficulties of translation and 
interpretation which have implications for the research process. For example the concept 
of accountability is not a universal concept. In fact the term does not exist in Spanish, and 
it is replaced by a three word sentence rendición de cuentas. There are various forms of 
the term, “responsibility”, for example is used in lieu of the English accountability; 
“responsibility” is used in a way that reflects a duty or obligation, which is at least close 
in meaning to accountability. An additional difficulty is the difference in meaning of 
words from one country to the other. For example, in Colombia the term board of 
directors has a literal translation, Junta Directiva. However, in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, 
the term used for board of directors is Directory, in Spanish Directorio; in Colombia a 
Directorio is a Phone book.       
 
8.4 Avenues for Further Research      
Some areas for further research are evidence from the empirical work presented in this 
thesis. From the literature review on corporate governance, it is clear that the Andean 
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region is under-researched. Thus, the research agenda is large and includes, but is not 
limited to, the quality of internal and external monitoring, the effectiveness of boards, the 
transparency of financial statements, stakeholder activism, ownership and control and the 
development of institutional regulatory capacity to meet rapid change and progress in 
organisations in the Andean region.  Future work needs to examine the issues addressed 
in this thesis using a more comprehensive set of data which incorporates: (i) corporate 
governance structures; (ii) board of directors’ composition; (iii) board committees; (iv) 
remuneration policies; (v) internal controls and risk management; (vi) potential benefits 
companies in the Andean region will get from the implementation of the principles.  
 
Other issues of growing interest are the adoption of social responsible practices. Research 
could be undertaken to look at CSR issues and their interrelation with corporate 
governance issues.  
 
Research could take advantage of the attitude towards the adoption of corporate 
governance principles not just in the Andean region, but through all Latin America, using 
the willingness of individuals to talk freely about the issues, and the interest show from 
some international organisations on funding corporate governance activities in Latin 
America; it may be helpful to carry out studies comparing the implementation of 
corporate governance in the Andean region with similar activities in other South 
American geographical regions. 
 
Knowing the cultural and legal characteristics of the Andean countries and the 
involvement of the private sector on corporate governance development, research could 
be addressed to find out how can enforcement be improved in weak environments, how 
can a better environment be engineered? More generally, what factors determine the 
degree to which the private sector can solve enforcement problems on it own, and what 
determines the need for public sector involvement in enforcement?   
 
This research has had a glance into some matters related to privatisation; however, 
comprehensive research may be undertaken looking at issues such as: corporate 
governance issues in cooperatively owned firms; the interaction of privatisation and 
corporate governance frameworks; specific forms of privatisation that might be more 
attractive in weak corporate governance settings; and the relationships between corporate 
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governance changes and changes in the degree of state-ownership of commercial 
enterprises.   
 
Considering the predominance of family-owned firms in the region, there are issues that 
can be looked at such as: liquidity and transition to a more widely held organisation; also 
internal control management, such as intra-familial disagreement, disputes about 
succession, and exploitation of family members. Where family-owned firms dominate, as 
in many emerging markets, they raise system wide corporate governance issues. Also as 
there are successful family owned or controlled businesses in the Andean region a more 
in-depth empirical study on the merits and demerits of family ownership structure is 
warranted. If so, how corporate governance may evolve in these companies and what can 
be done to better align the interest of controlling family ownership and other 
stakeholders? 
 
Most of the corporate governance research has been directed at listed firms. However, 
very few empirical studies have been focused to document specific channels through 
which improved corporate governance can help the poor. This is an important area of 
research, considering much of the job creation in developing countries and emerging 
markets comes from small and medium-sized enterprises. These require different 
approaches, which so far have not been researched very much. 
 
Political interference in organisations decision-making is a constant in some of the 
Andean countries. This may be detrimental to corporate performance. Therefore an 
important part of the research is to examine how political interference affects corporate 
performance of state-owned enterprises compared with the performance of non-state-
owned enterprises. 
Finally, more can be done to know about the dynamic aspects of institutional change, 
whether change occurs in a more evolutionary way during normal times or more abruptly 
during times of financial or political crises. 
 
In this context, it is important to mention that enhancing corporate governance will 
remain very much a local effort. Country-specific circumstances, cultural and local 
features mean that findings do not necessarily apply directly to each and every country 
and situation. Local data need to be used to make a convincing case for change. Local 
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capacity is needed to identify the relevant issues and make use of political opportunities 
for legal and regulatory reform. As such the progress with corporate governance reform 
depends upon local capacity, in terms of data, people, and other resources.  
 
8.5 Concluding Comments  
 
Corporate governance has become a necessary tool for improving corporate performance 
and advancing the development of market-oriented democracies. Governance practices 
preserve the integrity of business transactions and in doing so strengthen the rule of law 
and democratic governance. This study has provided a framework for examining the 
implementation of corporate governance principles in the Andean countries. After 
thorough analysis and discussion of the findings in the light of the literature, methods and 
theories chosen it was possible to conclude about the reasons  why Andean companies 
decide to implement corporate governance.    
 
Currently, the Andean business community is accepting corporate governance as an 
important part of its operations. As companies realise that they can benefit from the 
implementation of the principles, and as the organisations that support the implementation 
of the standards are solidly in place, corporate governance is becoming institutionalised, 
as part of the Andean countries’ economic and political structure. Supporters of corporate 
governance in the region such as CAF, CIPE, IFC, World Bank and others are constantly 
organising meetings and bringing together financial market regulators, stock exchanges, 
business leaders, and pension fund managers to focus on corporate governance through 
enforcement, effective boards of directors, transparency and responsibility, rule of law 
and disclosure. Those attending the meetings share lessons learned and exchange 
successful strategies for further efforts to advance corporate governance across the region, 
as these promoters remain committed to improving company’s corporate governance. 
 
It is possible to conclude that legal reforms may be necessary; that there is no particular 
governance system that is necessarily the best for all countries and that these systems 
have to be analysed in light of each country’s history and development. Also, institutional 
investors may play an important role in Andean region corporate governance, particularly 
ADR holders and pension funds. An effective regulatory and legal framework is 
indispensable for the proper and sustainable growth of a company. In a rapidly changing 
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national business environment, it has become necessary that regulation of organisations is 
in tune with emerging economic trends, encourage corporate governance and enable the 
protection of the interests of stakeholders. 
 
At the same time the corporate governance frameworks in the Andean countries’ are 
based on statutory law and regulations; voluntary standard contracts and self-regulation; 
and implicit rules, social norms and business culture. Similarly, applicable voluntary 
standard contracts and self-regulation are more than those covering stock exchanges, 
public trading and accounting standards. In addition, there is no particular governance 
system that is necessarily the best for all countries. Therefore, the challenge has been to 
find the best combination of rules, regulations and laws that best suit the countries’ 
current and future comparative advantages. There is a need to analyse the results in the 
light of each country’s history and development. Similarly, institutional investors are 
playing an important role in corporate governance; particularly, mutual and pension funds 
in countries which have implemented pension reform such as Colombia and Peru.  
 
A stakeholder approach acknowledges the intertwined nature of economic, political, 
social and ethical issues. Centred in the management, it provides the manager with a 
pragmatic framework for action. The stakeholder focus varies by stakeholder group and 
also varies by country. The participants were largely circumspect about the degree to 
which stakeholders will be addressed at the governance level. However, there is some 
agreement across countries that shareholders are not just another stakeholder group; they 
also receive preeminent status as the owners of the business. Only the participants from 
Bolivia are sympathetic with the idea that organisations should engage with all 
stakeholders in addition to those of shareholders. Among the five countries, the 
Colombian and the Peruvian participants are less sympathetic with the idea of stakeholder 
engagement and The Ecuadorian and the Venezuelans are even less sympathetic with 
stakeholder perspective.      
 
In relation to the second approach: implementation of corporate governance to enhance 
company’s accountability to stakeholders. It is possible to say that accountability is weak 
in all the countries. Participants in three of the countries did not show much interest for it 
and the participants in the two remaining countries only showed some concern about the 
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issue. The interesting case among the participants in the five countries is Bolivia, where 
despite being sympathetic with stakeholder engagement there is a known lack of 
accountability in the country.         
 
In relation to the third approach, some differences were noted as well in the perception 
among the participants in the five countries about the decision to implement governance 
principles to legitimise their activities to stakeholders. However legitimacy can be taken 
as more of a reason that companies adopts corporate governance. Participants in Bolivia 
and Ecuador think this is most plausible. The participants in the three remaining countries 
(Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) to some extent agree with the view that companies 
implement good practices in order to legitimise their activities to stakeholders. 
 
Summing up the findings reveal that in the view of the participants most Andean 
organisations disregard all those who affect, or affected by, a company’s actions and the 
interests of all stakeholders are not taken in to account. In addition there is not a 
widespread view that companies should be accountable to stakeholders beyond the 
company owners or shareholders. However, all those activities that generate a good 
‘reputation’ for an organisation are important. This ‘reputation’ is no more than the 
overall estimation in which an organisation is held by its constituents, customers, 
investors, employees, and the general public.     
 
The foundation of corporate governance varies according to the policy approaches aimed 
to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance by regulating managerial power 
(Davis, 2005). Much of the policy prescriptions protected in codes of ‘good’ corporate 
governance rely on universal notions of ‘best practice’, which often need to be adapted to 
the local context of organisations or ‘translated’ across diverse national institutional 
settings (Ahmadjian and Robbins, 2005). By contrast, within the field of corporate 
governance, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) comes closer to an ‘open system’ 
approach by recognising that the effectiveness of corporate governance depends on a 
wider set of company-related actors. Stakeholder theory shifts attention from efficiency 
arguments toward a broader understanding of effectiveness in terms of goal attainment in 
relation to the multiple objectives of different constituencies. Equally, it is important to 
look at the accountability owed to parties beyond the shareholders or owners of a 
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company; also to the efforts to legitimate the activities of an organisation. Surprisingly, 
very little corporate governance research has been built on the large and robust body of 
theories that examine the alignment between organisations and their broad environment. 
This research has closed this theoretical gap.  
 
A theoretical framework integrated by stakeholder, accountability and legitimacy theories 
was created to approach the interdependencies of corporate governance practices within 
diverse technical, managerial, and institutional environments. The conceptual framework 
used suggests that the corporate governance issues outlined by the stakeholder, 
accountability and legitimacy theories must be challenged to better capture the variations 
in corporate governance from interdependencies between organisations and their 
environments. 
 
The evidence from this study confirms that legitimacy is not enhanced by clear lines of 
accountability to a wide number of stakeholders. In an environment such as of the 
Andean region, there is a narrow stakeholder approach and week accountability, the 
current approach to organisational legitimacy can be used to achieve a meaningful 
stakeholder engagement. A way to make the policy process more dynamic is by 
supporting stakeholder engagement and accountability. By taking into account the views 
of wider stakeholder groups and providing these with relevant information, these groups 
will become empowered and will be able to hold organisations accountable for their 
actions. Additionally, policy-makers may take advantage of the importance given to 
legitimacy in the process of adopting corporate governance standards, as this legitimacy 
appears to be derived from the relationship with different groups of stakeholders and from 
the integrity of the decision-making process belonging to any corporate governance 
system. 
 
Further, if accountability is devised as a way of creating trust in the governance of 
institutions, there is the possibility to promote accountability as a means of strengthening 
relations between organisations, delineating responsibilities, controlling power, and 
ultimately enhancing legitimacy. As recommended by Fischer (2004) the above 
proposition will tie together a wider stakeholder approach, accountability, legitimacy and 
regulation in an unbreakable manner.  
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Finally it is possible to say that there is general agreement that the adoption of corporate 
governance principles may enable organisations, whether private, publicly traded, or 
state-owned, to understand their rights and obligations better. However, the 
implementation of good practices will not work if the necessary laws and regulatory 
instruments do not apply in a consistent culture of enforcement and compliance that is 
also credible and well understood, both internally and across borders. 
 
Despite the rather strong results, the conclusions must be interpreted with care. These 
results may be tested with other measures of corporate governance practices within and 
between national contexts. Nonetheless, this study offers powerful new insights into the 
comparative corporate governance literature and also offers important policy implications 
for public officials.   
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Appendix 1.1 
Código Andino Gobierno Corporativo - CAGC 
 
rante el último tiempo, a nivel 
mundial y latinoamericano, se 
vienen debatiendo sobre temas 
de Buen Gobierno Corporativo. 
La importancia de la 
administración y gestión de las 
empresas debe asentarse en 
principios de transparencia,  
responsabilidad, eficiencia y 
protección de los interés de los 
accionistas; al respecto se han 
elaborado en los últimos años, 
códigos y medidas de buen 
gobierno. Es por esta razón, que 
en esta edición de la hoja 
bursátil les brindamos un 
resumen sobre el tema y sobre 
los lineamientos que se 
proponen para la región andina.  
¿Qué es Gobierno 
Corporativo?         
Se puede definir al Gobierno 
Corporativo como un sistema un 
sistema mediante el cual as 
compañías son dirigidas y 
controladas. En otras palabras, 
es un conjunto de principios y 
normas sistemáticamente 
ordenadas, referidas a la 
dirección interna de las 
sociedades. Este conjunto de 
normas, abarca desde la 
protección a los derechos de los 
accionistas minoritarios, hasta 
las prácticas y deberes de los 
directores, incluyendo la 
fiscalización externa por parte 
de entidades ajenas a la 
sociedad. 
Lineamientos para un 
Código Andino de 
Gobierno Corporativo  
 
Consciente de la importancia de 
promover las mejores prácticas 
de gobierno corporativo en la 
región, la Corporación 
Andina de Fomento (CAF) 
contrató una firma española 
para elaborar lineamientos de 
gobierno corporativo. El objetivo 
de estos lineamientos es 
brindar, a un amplio espectro de 
empresarios de la región, una 
guía que les permita incorporar 
buenas prácticas en esta 
materia.  
 
Las 51 medidas contenidas en 
los lineamientos para un  
 
Código Andino de Gobierno 
Corporativo (LCAGC) abordan 
las siguientes materias: 
(1)  Derechos y trato equitativo 
de los accionistas 
(2) La Asamblea General de 
Accionistas 
(3)  El Directorio 
(4)  La información financiera y 
no financiera 
(5)  La resolución de 
controversias 
 
A continuación se enumeran las 
51 medidas: 
 
1. Derechos y trato 
equitativo de los 
Accionistas 
 
1. Los Estatutos Sociales 
recogerán el principio de una 
acción un voto, salvo las 
acciones privilegiadas sin voto. 
2. En operaciones que puedan 
afectar negativamente a los 
derechos de los accionistas 
minoritarios, como ampliaciones 
de capital, fusiones o escisiones, 
la propuesta de los 
administradores deberá estar 
necesariamente respaldada por 
informe de un auditor externo, 
designado por los directores 
independientes distinto del 
propio de la compañía. 
3. Las sociedades tendrán que 
implementar mecanismos 
permanentes de comunicación 
con los inversores y accionistas, 
a través de los cuales éstos 
puedan requerir información, 
salvo la confidencial o 
irrelevante, plantear cuestiones 
de interés corporativo o 
asociadas a su condición de 
accionistas, más allá de la 
información a proveer con 
ocasión de la Asamblea General 
de Accionistas, y cuya respuesta 
será difundida al mercado, no 
privilegiando al accionista 
solicitante respecto a los demás. 
4. Las grandes compañías y las 
empresas listadas con amplia 
difusión de su accionariado, con 
al menos 500 accionistas, 
deberán contar con una página 
Web corporativa, que actúe 
como mecanismo de 
participación e información con 
los accionistas y los mercados. 
5. Las sociedades deben 
garantizar el derecho de todos 
los accionistas a conocer los 
quórum para la constitución de 
la Asamblea General de 
Accionistas, el régimen de 
adopción de acuerdos sociales y 
la posible exigencia de quórum 
reforzado para aquéllas 
operaciones que afecten de 
manera significativa a los 
derechos de los minoritarios, así 
como las limitaciones al derecho 
de asistencia. 
6. Los estatutos de la sociedad 
no cotizada en Bolsa, deberán 
prever el derecho de coventa de 
los accionistas minoritarios en el 
caso de operaciones que 
supongan el cambio de control 
de la sociedad. 
 
 2. La Asamblea   
General de Accionistas 
 
7. Los estatutos de las 
sociedades deben reconocer a la 
Asamblea General de 
Accionistas su condición de 
órgano supremo, definiendo con 
claridad sus funciones 
exclusivas, entre las que no se 
pueden omitir, el nombramiento 
de los auditores o la probación 
de la política de retribución de 
los directores. 
8. Las grandes compañías, las 
empresas listadas y las 
anónimas y abiertas con una 
gran base accionarial, deberán 
tener un Reglamento de 
Régimen Interno de 
Organización y Funcionamiento 
de la Asamblea General de 
Accionistas, de carácter 
vinculante, y cuya transgresión 
acarree responsabilidad. 
9. Las sociedades determinarán  
estatutariamente el derecho de 
los accionistas que representen 
una participación significativa 
del capital social, a promover la 
convocatoria de una Asamblea 
General de Accionistas, que 
deberá celebrarse en un plazo 
razonable y respetando 
íntegramente la agenda 
propuesta por los promotores. 
10. Los estatutos fijarán el 
plazo, los medios de 
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convocatoria, el contenido 
mínimo del anuncio, y el detalle 
de los puntos contenidos en la 
agenda, de modo que se facilite 
al máximo la asistencia del 
mayor número de accionistas y 
la comprensión de todos los 
asuntos contenidos en la 
agenda, evitando menciones 
genéricas. 
11. La compañía debe 
establecer los medios para 
facilitar el ejercicio del derecho 
de información de todos los 
accionistas con carácter previo a 
la celebración de la Asamblea y 
durante el desarrollo de la 
misma, teniendo siempre en 
consideración que la 
información debe ser completa, 
correcta y transmitida a todos 
los accionistas por igual y con 
tiempo suficiente para su 
análisis. 
12. Las sociedades que deban 
mantener página Web 
promoverán y ofrecerán a los 
inversores institucionales y a los 
accionistas con una 
participación significativa la 
posibilidad de hacer pública su 
política de participación en la 
Asamblea General de 
Accionistas así como el sentido 
de su voto en relación con cada 
uno de los puntos de la agenda. 
13. Las sociedades, a través de 
los Estatutos y/o el reglamento 
de la Asamblea, implementarán 
los  procedimientos necesarios 
para promover la  participación 
activa de los accionistas en la 
Asamblea General. 
14. Se fomentará la utilización 
de medios electrónicos, tanto 
para la convocatoria de las 
asambleas como para la emisión 
del voto a distancia de los 
accionistas sobre los puntos de 
la agenda. 
15. El Directorio establecerá 
mecanismos necesarios para 
computar como presentes a los 
accionistas que emitan su voto a 
distancia. 
16. Las sociedades  promoverán 
mecanismos transparentes de 
delegación del voto, admitiendo 
la agrupación de los 
minoritarios, y expresamente 
prohibirán la delegación de voto 
a favor del Directorio, sus 
miembros, y miembros de la 
alta dirección. 
17. Las sociedades promoverán 
que las delegaciones de voto 
incluyan la agenda de la 
Asamblea General de 
Accionistas y el sentido del voto 
para cada propuesta, y prohibirá 
las delegaciones del voto en 
blanco. 
18. Se fomentará y facilitará la 
asistencia a la Asamblea 
General de Accionistas de todos 
aquellos ejecutivos o asesores 
externos que con su presencia y 
explicaciones a los accionistas 
contribuyan a facilitar la 
comprensión y clarificación de 
los temas a tratar. 
 
3. El Directorio 
 
19. Las sociedades, cualquiera 
que fuera su tipo societario, 
deberán tener un 
Directorio con un número de 
miembros que sea suficiente 
para el adecuado desempeño de 
sus funciones. 
20. Los estatutos deberán fijar 
las funciones de supervisión, 
evaluación y estrategia del 
Directorio, que serán 
indelegables. 
21. El Directorio deberá velar 
por la integridad de los sistemas 
de contabilidad, el 
establecimiento de sistemas de 
control de riesgos y, en 
particular, las operaciones off-
Shore. 
22. Las sociedades deberán 
contar con un Reglamento de 
Régimen Interno de 
Organización y Funcionamiento 
del Directorio, de carácter 
vinculante para sus miembros y 
cuya transgresión acarree su 
responsabilidad. 
23. Los estatutos determinarán 
el número mínimo y máximo de 
miembros del Directorio que 
permita una eficaz 
administración y gobierno de la 
compañía, y la participación 
activa de los directores que 
representen a los accionistas 
significativos (directores 
externos no independientes). 
24. El Directorio podrá estar 
integrado por directores 
internos y externos, que podrán 
ser independientes o no 
independientes. 
En el nombramiento de los 
directores se tratará de reflejar 
al máximo la estructura 
accionarial de la sociedad. El 
Directorio podrá estar formado 
en su totalidad por directores 
externos, que en todo caso 
serán siempre una amplia 
mayoría. 
25. Los directores deberán 
elegirse por un procedimiento 
formal y transparente, definido 
por el Reglamento de Régimen 
Interno de Organización y 
Funcionamiento del Directorio, 
correspondiendo a la Comisión 
de Nombramientos y 
Retribuciones la propuesta 
inicial de los candidatos. 
26. La sociedad únicamente 
podrá designar como directores 
independientes a aquellas 
personas que cumplan con los 
requisitos de trayectoria 
profesional, honorabilidad, y 
absoluta desvinculación con la 
compañía o su personal, y 
promoverá su carácter 
independiente mediante 
declaración pública suscrita 
tanto por el propio director 
designado como por el 
Directorio en relación a su 
independencia. [Pág. 48 - 
Epígrafe 
27. Los Estatutos fijarán las 
causales por las que se  pueda 
cesar a los directores así como 
su obligación de  dimitir 
inmediatamente cuando dejaran 
de cumplir las condiciones para 
su designación o puedan causar 
un daño al prestigio o buen 
nombre de la compañía. 
28. El alcance de los  deberes 
de fidelidad, lealtad, no 
competencia y secreto quedarán 
recogidos en los estatutos 
sociales. 
29. Los directores tendrán que 
declarar todas las relaciones, 
directas o indirectas, que 
mantengan entre ellos, con la 
sociedad, con proveedores, 
clientes o cualquier otro grupo 
de interés de las que pudieran 
derivarse situaciones de 
conflicto de interés o influir en 
la dirección de su opinión o 
voto. 
30. Los estatutos de la sociedad 
deberán prever el manejo de las 
situaciones de conflicto de 
interés incluyendo la obligación 
de los directores afectados de 
ausentarse o inhibirse en las 
deliberaciones y en las 
votaciones sobre este tipo de 
situaciones u  operaciones 
asociadas a estas.  
31. Se reconocerá 
expresamente el derecho del 
director a recibir con antelación 
suficiente la  información 
concreta de los asuntos a tratar 
en las reuniones del Directorio, 
así como la posibilidad de 
recurrir al posible auxilio de 
expertos externos o internos. 
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32. Los estatutos recogerán las 
reglas para la fijación y 
transparencia de la retribución 
de los directores. La Asamblea 
General de Accionistas fijará la 
política de retribución, siempre 
previa propuesta razonada del 
Directorio, que, como norma 
general, deberá contemplar 
mecanismos mixtos, vinculando 
una parte de la retribución a 
componentes variables en 
función del desempeño 
empresarial. La Comisión de 
Nombramientos y  Retribuciones 
fijará la retribución concreta de 
cada director. 
33. La retribución de los 
directores será transparente. El 
informe anual de gobierno 
corporativo incluirá la 
información de la remuneración 
por todos los conceptos 
percibida por el conjunto de los 
directores. 
34. No podrá existir ningún otro 
tipo de retribución distinta de la 
publicada en el informe anual de 
gobierno corporativo, sin que 
pueda darse ninguna otra 
retribución adicional o 
encubierta, ni asunción de 
gastos, ni prestaciones en 
especie no contemplada en el 
mismo. 
35. El Presidente del Directorio 
y, en su caso, el Vicepresidente 
deberán ser elegidos de entre 
los miembros externos del 
Directorio y sus funciones y 
responsabilidades estarán 
fijadas con detalle en los 
Estatutos Sociales y el 
Reglamento de Régimen Interno 
de Organización y 
Funcionamiento del Directorio. 
36. El Presidente del Directorio 
no podrá tener voto dirimente, 
salvo que excepcionalmente 
fuera imprescindible para 
formar la mayoría en caso de 
cese de los directores, siempre 
y cuando no existan directores 
suplentes. 
37. El Directorio deberá 
nombrar un secretario que 
velará por la legalidad formal, 
material y estatutaria de las 
actuaciones del Directorio y la 
observancia de los principios de 
buen gobierno. 
38. Los estatutos fijarán las 
funciones y competencias del 
ejecutivo principal, que podrá 
ser director, y en todo caso, 
estará sujeto a su mismo 
régimen de responsabilidad. 
39. El Directorio deberá ser 
convocado periódicamente y 
siempre que lo requieran los 
intereses de la sociedad a 
instancia del presidente, del 
vicepresidente, o de más de un 
director. 
40. El Directorio conformará en 
su seno comisiones para ejercer 
ciertas funciones 
y en particular, la de auditoria y 
la de nombramientos y 
retribuciones, constituidas 
exclusivamente por directores 
externos. 
41. Las operaciones con partes 
vinculadas deberán ser 
autorizadas por el Directorio, 
con informe y propuesta de la 
Comisión de Nombramientos y 
Retribuciones, con una mayoría 
cualificada de, al menos, las 
tres cuartas partes de los 
miembros del Directorio y 
deberán ser publicitadas. 
42. El Directorio deberá evaluar 
con una periodicidad al menos 
anual el cumplimiento por su 
presidente, vicepresidente, 
secretario y las comisiones 
delegadas que se hayan 
constituido, de sus funciones y 
las medidas reconocidas en este 
Código así como otras 
recomendaciones que puedan 
adoptarse de gobierno 
corporativo. 
 
4. Información 
financiera y no 
financiera 
 
43. El Directorio deberá 
formular los estados financieros 
mediante la adecuada utilización 
de los principios contables 
contenidos en las normas 
internacionales de contabilidad, 
de manera tal que no haya lugar 
a salvedades por parte del 
auditor y que los riesgos 
asumidos por la compañía 
queden totalmente identificados 
sobre la base de criterios de 
prudencia. 
44. La Asamblea General de 
Accionistas nombrará al auditor 
externo independiente a 
propuesta del Directorio, previa 
recomendación del Comité de 
Auditoría, que no podrá 
proponer auditores que hayan 
sido objeto de inhabilitación o 
cualquier otro tipo de sanción. 
45. La sociedad no podrá 
contratar con su auditor, o 
personas o entidades a él 
vinculadas, servicios  distintos al 
de auditoria. 
46. En el caso de grupos 
consolidables, el auditor externo 
deberá ser el mismo para todo 
el grupo incluidas las filiales 
off Shore. 
47. Los Estatutos Sociales 
fijarán un periodo inicial y el 
número de prórrogas para la 
contratación del auditor, que no 
podrá exceder de seis años, 
plazo a partir del cual será 
obligatorio rotar a la firma 
auditora. [Pág. 56 a] 
48. El Directorio informará a la 
Asamblea del porcentaje que 
supone la remuneración 
abonada por la sociedad al 
auditor externo respecto a la 
facturación total de éste. 
49. Los pactos entre accionistas 
de sociedades cotizadas, que 
afecten a la libre 
transmisibilidad de las acciones 
o al derecho de voto en las 
asambleas, habrán de ser 
comunicados con carácter 
inmediato a la propia sociedad y 
al mercado. 
50. Anualmente, el Directorio 
deberá aprobar y publicar un 
informe de gobierno corporativo 
que deberá incluir el grado de 
cumplimiento de estas medidas, 
así como el detalle de la 
información corporativa y la 
información sobre las partes 
vinculadas y conflictos de 
interés. 
 
5. Resolución de 
Controversias 
 
51. Los Estatutos incluirán una 
cláusula compromisoria que 
establezca que cualquier 
disputa, salvo aquellas 
reservadas legalmente a la 
justicia ordinaria, entre 
accionistas relativa a la 
sociedad, entre accionistas y el 
Directorio, la impugnación de 
acuerdos de la Asamblea y el 
Directorio, y la exigencia de 
responsabilidad a los directores 
deberán someterse a un 
arbitraje ante una institución 
local independiente. 
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The Superintendence of Finances identifies the new Country Code as a common effort as 
is objective is gather public and private sector actors in the same group in order to get to a 
unified code with the consensus of everyone. The Country code was conceived as a 
document that gathers all previous voluntary recommendations accorder by consensus 
and therefore it is intended to not only to unify the different standards of the market in 
this subject, but to elevated them in order to eliminate asymmetries created by past 
regulation that only made obligatory these measures to companies wanting to receive 
investments from institutional investors.  
 
The model chosen was “comply or explain” with some particularities. The Country Code 
practices are voluntary adopted by the securities issuers, who shall report periodically 
their level of adhesion to these measures. In case of not complying whit any practice, the 
issuer can report its reasons. Three elements require special attention on the new system: 
• The code practices are completely voluntary. This means that every issuer can 
adopt its own model of corporate governance using or not the practices proposed. 
• The Superintendence of Finances created a compulsory mechanism to report 
annually the level of adoption of these practices. The objective is having more 
information regarding the issuer’s governance and more important unified 
governance reports. 
• Finally, “explaining” is also voluntary. There is no obligation to report issuers’ 
reasons to not comply with any of the practices. However the disclosing 
requirement is supposed to create a strong incentive to improve corporate 
governance practices within Colombian issuers.  
 
The code is organised in four chapters and includes forty-one practices. The code is 
mainly based on practices included in the Andean Corporate governance Code issued by 
CAF in 2006. Special consideration was also given to other national codes, the OECD 
White Paper on Corporate Governance in Latin America as well as country experiences 
of Mexico, Peru, Spain and UK. 
 
The chapters of the new Country Code are: 
 
I. Shareholders meetings 
 
This is a company steering organism conformed by the holders and/or proxies of 
subscribed equity shares, pursuant to the provisions established by current legislation and 
Company’s Social By-Laws. The company statutes or bylaws of Colombian organisations 
are to include provisions for mechanisms designed to ensure the rights and fair treatment 
of shareholders/owners at regular or special meetings of their top governing body. At a 
minimum company statutes or bylaws are to address specific issues such as: notice of 
meetings, agenda, representation and voting mechanisms, and qualified majorities.   
 
II. Board of directors 
 
The board of directors is the supreme company’s steering organism and acts on behalf of 
shareholders seeking the company’s sustainability and business growth. The board 
members must act in corporate faith and with enough information to exercise its own 
rights and obligations. Directors should also avoid incurring in situations that could lead 
to conflicts of interest, they commit to handled with prudence confidential information to 
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which they have access in course of normal of normal business for internal purposes only, 
and promote the best treatment and attention to shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
The board of directors of Colombian firms should be structured in such a way as to ensure 
that they have the proper capabilities and experience and independent decision-making 
authority. They should have an odd number of members and include at least one outside 
and/or independent director. 
 
Members of the board of directors must have knowledge and experience about the 
activities inherent to the Company’s business objectives, an/or knowledge and experience 
in the field of the industry, commercial, financial, stock exchange, and management, legal 
or related sciences. They also need to have a corporate standing and recognition for their 
professional suitability and moral integrity. A board member cannot be a member of more 
than five (5) different and simultaneous boards of directors.  
 
To address their responsibilities directly, is recommended that board of directors must 
have a number of permanent committees to establish guidelines and to follow-up specific 
actions, assesses results and submit proposals for the improvement of the management of 
the different aspects under their responsibility. These committees are integrated by 
members of the board of directors designated by the board itself. For its functioning, 
besides relying on applicable current provisions, the committees have their own internal 
regulations establishing their objectives, functions and responsibilities. Common board 
committees are: 
 
Audit committee: is the supreme control body of a company in charge of overseen and 
controlling the effectiveness of the Internal Control System. Is preferable that all the 
committee members must be independent and have knowledge of issues related to their 
function and at least one of them must be an expert in financial and accounting issues. 
 
Nomination and compensation committee: the main purpose of this committee is to revise 
and make recommendations to the board of directors about the compensation system and 
selection criteria for the company’s key employees and high executive or directors. At 
least one (1) of the committee members must be independent. 
 
Corporate governance committee: this is a management support organism for the board of 
directors in respect to its performance for the corporate government of an organisation. Its 
purpose is to make recommendations to the board of directors about systems for the 
adoption, follow-up and improvement of practices for the corporate governance of the 
company. At least one (1) of the committee members must be an independent. 
 
Another popular committee among Colombian companies is a Business committee: this is 
a consulting and advisory body for the board of directors in respect to the way they 
manage study and approve new business. At least one (1) of the committee members must 
be an independent member.  
 
III. Disclosure of Financial and non-financial information 
 
Disclosure of financial and non-financial information is the main mechanism companies 
have to approach stakeholders and the market as a whole. The aim of providing 
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Information is to enable a proper understanding by such groups on the running and 
situation of the company and allow them to have sufficient evidence for making informed 
decisions. The measures contained in this chapter are applicable to information different 
to these that shareholders have the right to request exercising their right of inspection. 
 
IV. Mechanisms to resolve conflicts within corporate actors  
 
Companies are to establish effective mechanisms to help prevent and to facilitate the 
handling and disclosure of any eventual conflicts of interest between shareholders, 
executives, interest groups and members of the Board of Directors. 
 
Company executives, members of the Board of Directors and employees are to be barred 
from engaging in conflicting practices. At the same time they are to disclose any conflicts 
of interest they may be experiencing and to refrain from voting either for or against the 
matter in question.    
 
With these mechanism companies seek to solve speedily, economically and in a 
specialised fashion all controversies derived from relationships between: the company 
and its stakeholders, among employees and between them and the company key 
executives, among shareholders and generally to solve controversies derived from 
corporate government. 
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ASBANC – BVL – CONASEV – CONFIEP – MC&F – MEF – PROCAPITALES – SBE  
 
Introduction 
 
Corporate governance explains the rules and procedures for taking decisions in matters 
such as the equal treatment of shareholders, the handling of conflicts of interest, capital 
structure, remuneration schemes and administrative incentives, the acquisition of control, 
the disclosure of information, the influence of institutional investors, among others, that 
affect the process through which company income is distributed. 
 
Peru is not unaware of the progress and discussions carried out regarding good corporate 
governance of companies. Over the years, the control framework has been adapting to 
these tendencies, concentrating efforts in achieving that Peruvian companies succeed to 
reach international standards and are able to offer more confidence to domestic and 
foreign investors, in particular minority shareholders. 
 
With this in mind, a high level committee was formed, with the participation of the public 
and private sectors, to establish good corporate governance principles applicable to 
Peruvian companies. For this, the Principles of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), approved in April 1999, were considered. Given 
that the said Principles enjoy worldwide recognition, having been considered as a point of 
reference in the preparation of reforms and recommendations applicable to various 
company structures at the international level, it was considered to maintain as far as 
possible, its structure and content. Nevertheless, certain changes have been made, taking 
into account the characteristics of Peruvian companies, their shareholding structure and 
the legal framework in which they are developed. 
 
These “Principles of Good Governance for Peruvian Companies” should be considered as 
a company guide, in such a way that their implementation evidences a clear capacity for 
self-determination and self-control, thus promoting the development of a culture of good 
corporate governance practices. Furthermore, they will act as a frame of reference by 
which the various interest groups can measure the degree of adherence of Peruvian 
companies to such principles. 
 
Corporate Governance Principles 
 
I. Shareholders’ Rights 
 
The Corporate governance framework should protect shareholders’ rights.  
 
Basic shareholder rights include the right to: (1) secure methods of ownership 
registration; (2) convey or transfer shares; (3) obtain relevant information on the 
corporation on timely and regular basis; (4) participate and vote in general shareholder 
meetings; (5) elect members of the board; and (6) share in the profits of the corporation. 
 
II. Equal Treatment of Shareholders 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should have 
the opportunity to obtain effective redness for violation of their rights.  
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All shareholders of the same class should be treated equally. (i) Within any class, all 
shareholders should have the same voting rights. All investors should be able to obtain 
information about the voting rights attached to all classes of shares before they purchase. 
Any change in voting rights should be subject to shareholders vote. (ii) Votes should be 
cast by custodians or nominees in a manner agreed upon with the share’s beneficial 
owner. Trading based on privileged information is prohibited. Related-party transactions 
should also be immediately disclosed as “material events”.  
 
III. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders as 
established by law and encourage active cooperation between corporations and 
stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and sustainability of financially sound enterprises.  
 
(a) The corporate governance framework should ensure that the rights of stakeholders that 
are protected by law are respected, such as workers, suppliers, and creditors. (b) Where 
stakeholders’ interests are protected by law, stakeholders should have the opportunity to 
obtain effective redness for violation of their rights. (c) The corporate governance 
framework should permit performance-enhancing mechanisms for stakeholder 
participation. (d) Where stakeholders participate in the corporate governance process, 
they should have access to relevant information. 
 
IV. Disclosure and Transparency   
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate disclosure 
is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership and governance of the company.  
 
Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: (1) The 
financial and operating result of the company. (2) Company objectives. (3) Major share 
ownership and voting rights. (4) Members of the board and key executives, and their 
remuneration. (5) Material foreseeable risk factors. (6) Material issues regarding 
employees and other stakeholders. (7) Governance structures and policies. (8) Important 
facts related to the issuing company, the value and offer which is being made. (9) 
Economic groups. 
 
Material information includes that which could influence economic decisions taken by 
those who used it. Information should be prepared, audited and disclosed in accordance 
with high quality standards of accounting and auditing, including a description of the 
financial and non-financial risks confronting the company. 
 
V. Responsibilities of the Board of Directors 
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board’s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders. 
 
 313 
Peru has a single board structure with a minimum size of three directors. The law includes 
the concept of regular and “substitute” director. Directors are expected to perform their 
duties carefully and loyally. They are bound to confidentiality. Each director has the right 
to be informed of all relevant information, in order to act wit full knowledge. 
 
(a) Board members should act, in good faith, with due diligence, care and confidentiality, 
in the best interest of the company and the shareholders, on a fully informed basis. (b) 
Where board decisions may affect different shareholders groups differently, the Board 
should treat all shareholders fairly. (c) The board of directors should take into account the 
interest of stakeholders, always ensuring compliance with applicable law. (d) The board 
of directors should fulfil certain key functions.   
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Appendix 3.1 
 
Summary of evidence taken from Corporate Governance Practices in Colombia: Survey 
by the Superintendence of Companies, 2008 
 
Table 3.1 Companies that answered the survey 
 
Size of the company No. % 
 Large 1.396 18.8 
  Medium 2.838 138.3 
  Small 2.807 37.9 
  Micro 291 3.9 
 Did not answer 82 1.1 
  Total  100.0 
This table presents the number of companies which answered the survey grouped by 
company size.  
 
Figure 3.1 Companies with a board of directors by size  
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This figure shows the companies which said the have a board of directors distributed by the 
size of the company. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Board of Directors Composition 
 
Class of Member % 
Average No of 
Members 
 Executive Directors 70.5 3 
 External Dependent Directors  37.4 1 
 External Independent Directors 58.0 2 
    
This table includes information about the composition of the board of directors grouped by 
class of the members. 
 
 315 
Figure 3.2 Size of the Board of Directors 
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This figure shows the proportion of board of directors according to the number of members. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Board Committees 
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This figure shows proportion and class of board comities companies have in Colombia.  
 
 
 
Table 3.3 Board committees by size of the company 
 
Size of the Company (%) 
Committees 
Large Medium Small Micro 
 Audit 21.1 14.9 15.1 11.1 
 Nomination & Remuneration 12.1 9.0 9.1 6.0 
 Corporate Governance 8.1 5.0 5.4 1.1 
     
This table summarises the board committees companies have distributed by size of the company. 
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Figure 3.4 Accountability Report  
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This figure shows the proportion of board members who said they hand an accountability 
report at least within the following month they finish their appointment. 
 
Table 3.4 Disclosure of non- financial information  
 
Characteristics of the Management Report % 
 The management reports have been discussed at ordinary meetings  88.2 
 Reports disclose dealings between the company and its shareholders 75.7 
 The remuneration policies are included in the reports 49.5 
 
The company have documented procedures to answer requests, 
suggestions and comments from shareholders   
32.4 
 
There are mechanisms for disclosing the rights and obligations of 
shareholders 
51.5 
 
There are mechanisms for disclosing information that may affect the 
value of the company (shares) capital 
63.7 
 
The board of directors approves the remuneration of the Revisor 
Fiscal 
61.1 
 The company have a Webpage  38.3 
This table summarises the answers to questions about established mechanisms for the disclosure 
of non-financial information   
 
Figure 3.5 Procedures for dealing with conflict of interest 
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This figure shows the answer to the question to: Whether companies have procedures for 
dealing with conflicts of interest.  
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Appendix 4.1 
 
Summary of evidence taken from Ecuadorian survey: Enhancing Corporate Governance 
Practices in Ecuador – BVQ and IMF (FOMIN) by Maria Soledad Salvador (2007) 
 
 
Table 4.1 Interviewees 
 
 
Professional 
Activities 
 
Quito  Guayaquil Cuenca Total  % 
 Executive 
Director 
11 2 0 13 25.0 
 Director 2 0 0 2 3.8 
 Vice-president 5 0 0 5 9.6 
 CEO 14 1 3 18 34.6 
 CFO 1 3 4 8 15.4 
 Other 6 0 0 6 11.5 
 Total 39 6 7 52 100 
       % 75.0% 11.5% 13.5% 100%  
This table shows the distribution of the interviewees included in the study by city 
 
 
 
Table 4.2 Classification of companies by sector 
 
 
Sector 
 
Quito  Guayaquil Cuenca Total  % 
 Industry 24 7 7 38 73.1 
 Media 5 0 0 5 9.6 
 Financial intermediaries  5 0 0 5 9.6 
 Banks 4 0 0 4 7.7 
 Total 38 7 7 52 100 
       % 73.1% 13.5% 13.5% 100%  
This table shows the classification of the companies by economic sector 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Additional information 
 
Facts % 
 Corporate governance may be beneficial for a company 83 
 It is important for a company to adopt good practices 67 
 Deal with corporate governance issues through the board of directors   69 
 High level managers manifest their interest in receiving training in 
corporate governance issues 
96 
 Disclose timely information to their shareholders 85 
 Have board committees especially an audit committee 75 
This table includes additional information taken from the survey 
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Figure 4.1 Type of Company 
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This graph shows the proportion of listed and non-listed companies included in the survey  
 
Figure 4.2 Corporate governance and the economy 
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This graph shows the interviewees opinion about the effect of corporate governance on the 
economy 
 
Figure 4.3 Structure of the Board of Directors  
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This graph shows the composition of the board of directors among the respondent companies 
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Figure 4.4 Awareness of Corporate Governance Principles 
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This graph shows the awareness of corporate governance among the respondents  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Corporate governance should be voluntary 
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This graph shows the view among the interviewees on whether the adoption of corporate 
governance principles should be voluntary or no 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Company sources of finance 
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This graph show the preferred sources of finance for companies 
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Appendix 5.1 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN 
ANDEAN REGION 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
(Master) 
A. Personal details 
 
Name  ____________________________________________________ 
 
Gender    M       □  F      □ 
 
Organisation ____________________________________________________ 
 
Qualifications ____________________________________________________ 
 
B. Corporate Governance Definition 
 
1. How do you define corporate governance? 
 
2. What do you think makes for good corporate governance? And what 
practices/arrangements and structures should there be? 
 
3. Do you think a system of CG should be strengthened through more legislation     
beyond the voluntary CG codes? Which are more relevant to regulators requirements? 
 
4. Do you think that CG principles should be about all stakeholders not just shareholders?  
 
5. How do you rate the /regulators/government/companies’ attitude with respect to CG?  
 
6. Where do you set the priorities for CG? And in which areas do you think that there is 
room for improvement? 
 
7. In which areas would you like to see stricter CG principles? 
 
8. Do you believe that a company benefits from the implementation of CG principles? 
And if so how? 
 
9. Are you aware of your country’s CG code or CAF’s code? And what is it? 
 
10. Are you aware of what CAF is doing about improving CG? 
 
11. Are you aware of any difficulties in following CAF’s CG guidelines? And if so what 
are they? 
12. What do you think are the reasons for companies implementing CAF’s CG 
guidelines? 
 
13. Apart from CAF who else is influencing the development of CG principles in your 
country? 
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14.  Why might companies want to implement CG guidelines? 
 - Pressure from stakeholders 
 - Accountability 
    - Legitimacy 
 
15. How have CG developments affected organisations such as? 
 - BBV? 
 - Confecámaras? 
 - BVQ? 
 - Procapitales? 
 - AVE? 
 
16. How do think the process of nationalisation of public traded companies has affected 
CG practices in the region?  
 
17. Does a privatisation process need to take into account CG? 
 
18. Do you think that the political trend in the region has affected the development of CG 
in your country and in the region? 
 
19. How does the legal framework and enforcement tradition in Andean countries affect 
the effectiveness of good CG practices?  
 
20. Should factors such as fraud and corruption be taken in account when developing CG 
standards? 
 
21. Have you received training on CG related issues? If so who provided that training? 
 
22. Do you feel that the training received has influence the way you approach CG issues?  
 
C.  Particular CG Issues  
 
Board of Directors  
 
23. What is the best form of ownership structure for companies? 
 
24. Do you think that ownership concentration could be an obstacle for the 
implementation of CG principles? And if so how?  
 
25. Should companies have a board of directors? If so, what is there a recommended size 
and who should be members? 
26. Should there be particular requirements on the number of independent directors on 
boards or their committees?  
 
27. What should be the ratio of independent to executive directors on a board? 
 
28. Should there be a separate CEO and chairman? 
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29.  Is it important for a board to have an independent director as chairman? 
 
30. How long should directors serve on the board? 
 
31. What remuneration policies should companies have? (i.e. bonus, incentives, share 
options etc.) 
 
32. Should laws, regulations, guidance or self-regulation be established to address 
conflicts of interest that are applicable to members of the Board of Directors? 
 
Board committees 
 
33. What board committees are necessary to ensure a sound and effective system of CG? 
 
34. How should the member of these committees be nominated? 
 
Internal control and Risk management 
 
35. How have internal control and risk management systems and practices of companies 
evolved in recent years? 
 
36. To what extent have these changes been in response to regulatory developments and 
CAF guidelines? 
 
37. Are specific internal controls and risk management needed in a company? If so, which 
ones? 
 
38. Do companies’ ownership structures affect their systems of internal control and risk 
management? 
 
39. What should the audit committee involvement be in internal controls?  
 
40. Who should be on the audit committee? 
  
D.  The organisation and its Stakeholders?  
 
41. Who are the stakeholders of an organisation and what involvement should 
stakeholders have in a company? 
 
42. Should organisations treat all their stakeholders equally? 
 
43.  How do organisations decide which responsibilities to stakeholders it will attend to 
and which of them should ignore? 
 
44. Should companies explain/disclose how their governance structure takes into account 
the interests of their stakeholders?  
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45. Should there be communication with stakeholders and, if so, what and from whom are 
they likely to come?  
 
E. Accountability and legitimacy of Companies  
 
46. To whom are a company’s management accountable? 
 
47.  To whom are organisations accountable? 
 
48.  Are organisations accountable to the government? 
 (i)  Through commercial law? 
 (ii) Through company statutes?  
            (iii) Through CG principles? 
 
49. What are the reasons that make an organisation accountable to stakeholders?  
 
50. Do you think that this accountability relationship has changed due to the adoption of 
CG guidelines?  If yes what has been the change? 
 
51. What accountability mechanisms do companies have? 
 
52.  How is this accountability discharged?  
  (i)  Annual Reports?  
  (ii) Press Reports? 
  (iii) Other?  
 
53.  How may the Board hold senior management accountable? 
 
54.  Does good CG help to legitimate an organisation’s operations?  
 
55. Do you have concrete examples of cases in which your organisation’s involvement in 
community or environmental projects has been good for the company as a business? 
 
56. Do you think, if an organisation loses or is seen to have lost its legitimacy 
organisational survival is threatened?   
 
57.  Would you like a copy of the results of this study? 
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SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
 
G1 (Managers/Executive directors/CEO) 
 
1. Are you a director in another company? Is this as an independent director? 
 
2. Do you or one of your relatives own shares in the company? 
 
3. Are your duties and authority defined? 
 
4. Are you a member of the board and are you on any board committees? If so which 
ones? 
 
5. What are your responsibilities on the board/committees? 
 
6. What remuneration structure for directors do you have in place?  
 
7. How are directors’ actions monitored?  
 
8. To what extent are managers free from the influence of major shareholders? 
 
9. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
G2 (Regulators) 
 
1. Are any of CAF’s guidelines incompatible with current laws and regulation in your 
country? If so, how is it dealt with? 
 
2. Do you enforce/regulate the CAF’s CG code? If so how? 
 
3. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
4. How does your organisation implement the guidelines?  
 
5. Do you need to negotiate the issue of CG principles with the political establishment in 
your country? 
 
6. Do you think that there are special CG principles which have are specific to companies 
in the Andean Region? 
 
7. What form of ownership structure offers more challenges for the implementation of CG 
principles? 
 
G3 (Independent directors) 
 
1.  How many boards are you on as an independent or executive director? 
 
2. How did you get appointed? 
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3. Are you on any board committees? If so which ones?  
 
4. What are your responsibilities on the board/committees? 
 
5. Do independent directors meet separately as a group?  
 
6. How much time should an independent director spend on Board matters? 
 
7. Do you find that you make an effective contribution in board discussions? If no, how 
can more effective discussions are encouraged? 
 
8. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
G4 (Others: Auditors/Firms of accountants)    
 
1. Are auditors in your country/jurisdiction required/expected to play a role in CG? 
 
2. What matters do you discuss with your clients regarding CG? 
 
3. What is the degree of your participation in the design, implementation and reporting on 
your clients internal control systems? 
 
4. What is your involvement with your clients’ audit committee?  
 
5. What do you do if a client does not have an audit committee? 
 
6. To what extent are auditors accountable to stakeholders? 
 
7. Should external auditors inform, shareholders, the Board of Directors or regulators 
about any involvement of board members or senior management in illegal activities, 
fraud or insider abuse? If so, please explain briefly 
 
8. To what extent do auditors’ legitimate their clients’ operations? 
 
9. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
10. Do you consider company/management attitudes to stakeholders when making 
investment decisions?  
 
11. Do you assess a company’s accountability practices before you invest in it? 
 
12. What on CG information do you consider important to make an informed decision? 
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CASE STUDY: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
G5 (CAF’s Staff) 
 
1. CAF development of its guidelines & IAAG help 
 
2. CAF stakeholder’s involvement in the development of the CG Guidelines 
 
3. CAF implementation of its guidelines 
 
4. CAF implementation of CG in the Andean region 
 
5. CAF’s plans for the future 
 
G6 (CAF’s counterparts) 
 
1. What involvement did CAF stakeholders have in the development of the CG 
Guidelines? 
 
2. Are any CAF’s guidelines incompatible with current laws and regulation in your 
country? If so, how is it dealt with? 
 
3. Do you enforce/regulate the CAF’s CG code? If so how? 
 
4. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
5. How does your organisation implement the guidelines?  
 
6. Do you need to negotiate the issue of CG principles with the political establishment in 
your country? 
 
7. Do you think that there are special CG principles which have are specific to companies 
in the Andean Region? 
 
8. What form of ownership structure is best for the implementation of CG principles? 
 
G7 (CAF’s Pilot study companies) 
 
1.  How did you get involved with CAF? 
 
2. How was this process managed, and by whom? 
 
3. What involvement did CAF stakeholders have in the development of the CG 
Guidelines? 
 
4. How does CAF deal with the implementation of CG in the Andean region? 
 
5.  How difficult was it to implement the CAF Corporate Governance Guidelines? 
 
6.  Which were the most difficult parts to implement? 
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Appendix 5.2 
 
AVANCES DEL GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO EN LA REGIÓN ANDINA DE 
LATÍN AMERICA 
ENTREVISTA SEMI – ESTRUCTURADA 
(Básico) 
A. Datos Personales 
Nombre 
Genero    M       □  F      □ 
 
Posición 
Grado Académico 
B. Definición de Gobierno Corporativo 
1. ¿Como define usted Gobierno Corporativo? 
2. ¿Cómo se conforma el buen Gobierno Corporativo? ¿Que practicas, estructuras, lo 
deben integrar? 
3. ¿Cree usted que el sistema del Gobierno Corporativo debe ser reforzado con legislación 
más allá del código voluntario del Gobierno Corporativo? ¿Cuáles serian los 
reglamentos más relevantes que se requieren? 
4. ¿Cree usted que los principios de gobierno corporativo deben incluir también a los 
(interesados) beneficiarios y no solamente a los accionistas? 
5. ¿Cómo valora usted la actitud de los reguladores/gobierno/compañías con respecto al 
gobierno corporativo? 
6. ¿Qué cree usted debe ser lo prioritario en el gobierno corporativo y en que áreas cree 
que se puede mejorar? 
7. ¿en que áreas le gustaría contar con principios más estrictos? 
8. ¿Cree usted que una compañía se beneficia con la implementación del código de 
gobierno corporativo y como se beneficia? 
9. ¿Qué conocimientos tiene del código de gobierno corporativo de 
Bolivia/Colombia/Ecuador/Perú/Venezuela? 
10. ¿En pocas palabra, que es lo que esta haciendo la CAF para mejorar las practicas de 
gobierno corporativo en su área? 
11. ¿Esta enterado de si alguna compañía ha experimentado dificultades en la aplicación 
del código de gobierno corporativo? ¿Cuales son esas dificultades, si existieron?    
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12. ¿Cuales cree usted que son las razones para que una compañía decida implementar el 
código de gobierno corporativo Andino? 
13. ¿Además de la CAF quien esta promoviendo la implementación de los principios del 
gobierno corporativo en la región?  
14. ¿Por qué las compañías desean implementar los principios del gobierno corporativo? 
• Presión de sus stakeholders 
• Para rendir cuentas 
• Para legitimar sus actividades 
 
15. ¿En que forma los avances en materia de gobierno corporativo han afectado 
organizaciones como: 
• BBV? 
• Confecámaras?  
• BBQ? 
• PROCAPITALES? 
• AVE? 
 
16. ¿Cómo cree usted que el proceso de nacionalización de compañías ha afectado las 
prácticas del gobierno corporativo en la región Andina? 
17. ¿Cómo se reflejan en el gobierno corporativo los procesos de privatización (e.g. 
Colombia y Perú)?   
18. ¿Cree usted que las tendencias políticas en la región han afectado el desarrollo del 
gobierno corporativo (en un país en particular o en la región)?  
19. ¿En que forma el marco legal y la ejecución de la justicia afectan la efectividad de las 
buenas practicas del gobierno corporativo? 
20. ¿Cree usted que la ejecución de la ejecución/implementación de los estándares del 
gobierno corporativo deben considerar factores tales como fraude, corrupción, etc.? 
21. ¿Ha recibido usted entrenamiento en temas relacionados con el gobierno corporativo? 
¿Si lo ha recibido quien fue el encargado de impartir ese entrenamiento? 
 22. ¿Cree que el entrenamiento recibido ha influenciado la forma como usted maneja el 
tema del gobierno corporativo? 
 
C. Asuntos Particulares del gobierno corporativo: Juntas Directivas 
23. ¿Cuál es la mejor forma de capitalización de una empresa? 
24. ¿Cree usted que la concentración de la propiedad en una empresa puede afectar la 
implementación de los principios del gobierno corporativo? ¿Cómo? 
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25. ¿Deben las compañías tener una junta directiva/directorio: en caso de tenerlo cual es 
la forma y tamaño recomendado? 
26. ¿Qué recomendaciones particulares en lo que se refiere al numero de directores 
independientes en una junta directiva? 
27. ¿Cuál es el porcentaje recomendado de directores independientes en relación con 
ejecutivos en una junta directiva? 
28. ¿Debe estar separad la función de gerente general y la de presidente de junta 
directiva? (¿si porque?) 
29. ¿Qué tan importante es para una junta directiva el tener un miembro independiente 
como presidente? 
30. ¿Cuál es el periodo/# de años recomendados para que un director sirva en una junta 
directiva/directorio?  
 31. ¿Cuales son las políticas de remuneración para directores recomendadas? 
32. ¿Deben las reglas, leyes, lineamientos, auto-regulación, estar enfocadas a la 
resolución de conflictos de interés entre los miembros de la junta directiva? 
 
Junta directiva/directorio: comités 
33. ¿Qué comités son necesarios para asegurar un efectivo y estructurado sistema de 
gobierno corporativo? 
34. ¿Cómo se deben nominar los miembros de esos comités? 
 
Control Interno y administración de riesgos 
35. ¿En que forma han avanzado los sistemas de control interno, y administración de 
riesgos? 
36. ¿En que medida esos cambios son una respuesta a los avances en las regulaciones y 
los lineamientos de la CAF? 
37. ¿Cuáles serian los sistemas de control interno y políticos para el manejo del riesgo 
necesarios en una compañía? 
38. ¿Cree usted que la estructura de capital de una compañía afecta el diseño de los 
controles internos y el manejo de riesgos. 
39. ¿Cuál deben ser la participación del comité de auditoria en el control interno de una 
compañía? 
40. ¿Quién debe ser miembro del comité de auditoria? 
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D. Las partes interesadas (stakeholders) de la compañía  
41. ¿Quiénes son los stakeholders de una organización y que participación tienen ellos en 
las operaciones de la compañía? 
42. ¿Deben lar organizaciones tratar igual a todos sus stakeholders? 
43. ¿Debe una organización informar cuales son las obligaciones con sus stakeholders 
intenta atender y cuales ignora? 
44. ¿Deben las compañías publicar como sus estructuras toman en consideración los 
intereses de sus stakeholders? 
45. ¿deben las compañías mantener constante comunicación con sus stakeholders? 
¿Cuáles son los stakeholders que normalmente están en contacto?   
 
E. La rendición de cuentas y la legitimidad de las operaciones de las compañías 
46. ¿A quien deben rendir cuentas los administradores de una compañía? 
47. ¿A quien deben rendir cuentas las compañías? 
48. ¿Deben las compañías rendir cuentas al gobierno? ¿Cómo?  
• Por intermedio del código de comercio; 
• Por intermedio de los estatutos; 
• Por intermedio de los principios del gobierno corporativo. 
 
49. ¿Cuáles son las razones que hacen que una organización deba rendir cuentas a sus 
stakeholders? 
50. ¿Cree usted que la necesidad de rendir cuentas a cambiado debido a la 
implementación del código de gobierno corporativo? ¿Cuál ha sido el cambio? 
51. ¿Qué mecanismos de rendición de cuentas tienen las compañías? 
52. ¿Cómo se realiza esta rendición de cuentas? 
• Estados financieros anuales 
• Reportes de prensa 
• Otros 
 
53. ¿Cómo rinden cuentas los altos directivos a la junta directiva? 
54. ¿Cree usted que la implementación/seguimiento del código de gobierno corporativo 
ayuda a una compañía a generar/incrementar su legitimidad? 
55. ¿Sabe usted de casos en los que la participación de una organización en proyectos a 
favor de la comunidad o el medio ambiente han sido beneficiosos para dicha 
organización? 
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56. ¿Cree que cuando una organización pierde o parece que ha perdido su legitimidad su 
continuación como una empresa viable es amenazada? 
57. ¿le gustaría recibir una copia de los resultados de este estudio?    
 
CUESTIONARIO PARA ENTREVISTAS SEMI-ESTRUCTURADAS 
G1 (Gerentes/Directores/representantes legales) 
1. ¿Es usted director en otra compañía? ¿Director independiente? 
2. ¿Alguno de sus familiares o usted tiene acciones en la compañía? 
3. ¿Están sus obligaciones y autoridad definas? 
4. ¿Es usted miembro de algún comité o de alguna Junta directiva? 
5. ¿Cuáles son sus responsabilidades como miembro de junta o de comité? 
6. ¿Tienen ustedes una estructura de remuneración para los miembros de la Junta? 
7. ¿Cómo son supervisadas las funciones de los directores? 
8. ¿En que forma los gerentes/directores están libres de la influencia de los accionistas? 
9. ¿Sabe usted algo de la implementación de los Linimientos para un Código Andino de 
Gobierno Corporativo (LCAGC) de la CAF en la región Andina? 
 
G2 (Reguladores) 
1. ¿Cree usted que alguno(s) de los LCAGC son incompatibles con las regulaciones en 
su? ¿Como manejan ustedes estas diferencias si las hay? 
2. ¿Regulan ustedes los LCAGC? ¿Como? 
3. ¿Sabe usted como se implementan los LCAGC en la región Andina? 
4. ¿Cómo implementa su organización los LCAGC? 
5. ¿Deben ustedes negociar la emisión de los principios del gobierno corporativo con los 
políticos en su país? 
6. ¿Cree usted que hay principios que son especiales para las compañías que operan en la 
región Andina? 
7. ¿Qué forma de estructura de capital es la que ofrece más reos a la implementación de 
los principios del gobierno corporativo? 
 
G3 (Directores independientes) 
1. ¿A cuantas Juntas directivas pertenece usted, como independiente o como director 
ejecutivo?  
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2. ¿Cómo fue su nombramiento? 
3. ¿Es usted miembro de algún comité? 
4. ¿Cuáles son sus responsabilidades como miembro de la junta directiva o comité? 
5. ¿Los directores independientes se reúnen como tales en grupos separados de los 
directores internos/ejecutivos?  
6. ¿Cuánto tiempo emplea usted como director independiente en asuntos de la junta 
directiva?   
7. ¿Cree usted que los directores independientes tienen la oportunidad de contribuir 
efectivamente en las discusiones de la junta directiva? ¿Si no es así como se pueden 
promover discusiones más efectivas? 
8. ¿Sabe algo de la implementación de los lineamientos de la CAF en región Andina? 
 
G4 (Otros: Auditores/contadores, inversionistas, académicos) 
1. ¿Es esperado que los auditores en su país desempeñen un papel en el gobierno 
corporativo? 
2. ¿Qué discute usted con sus clientes en materia del gobierno corporativo? 
3. ¿Cuál es el grado de su participación en el diseño, ejecución y presentación de 
informes sobre sus clientes sistemas de control interno? 
4. ¿Cual es su participación en el comité de auditoria de sus clientes? 
5. ¿Qué hace uste si uno de sus clientes no tiene comité de auditoria? 
6. ¿Qué grado de responsabilidad tienen los auditores con los stakeholders? 
7. ¿Deben los auditores externos informar a los accionistas, a la junta directiva, o a los 
reguladores sobre la participación de un miembro de la junta en actividades ilícitas, 
fraude, o abuso de información privilegiada? ¿Si es así porque? Explique brevemente. 
8. ¿Hasta que punto los auditores legitiman las operaciones de sus clientes? 
9. ¿Cómo hace frente la CAF a la aplicación del gobierno corporativo en la región 
Andina? 
10. ¿Tiene en cuenta la actitud de una empresa hacia los stakeholders cuando toma la 
decisión de invertir en esa compañía? 
11. ¿Evalúa las practicas de rendición de cuentas se una empresa antes de invertir en ella? 
12. ¿Qué parte de la información en materia de gobierno corporativo considera 
importante para tomar una decisión bien informada?     
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ESTUDIO DE CASOS: QUESTIONARIO PARA ENTREVISTAS SEMI- 
ESTRUCTURADAS 
G5 (oficiales de la CAF) 
1. ¿Cómo fueron creadas los lineamientos del gobierno corporativo, cual fue el papel de 
la IAAG?  
2. ¿Cuál fue la participación de los stakeholders de la CAF en la creación de los 
lineamientos?  
3. ¿Cómo la CAF implementa sus lineamientos? 
4. ¿Cómo la CAF administra la implementación de los lineamientos en la Región Andina? 
5. ¿Qué tiene planeado la CAF para el futuro? 
 
G6 (las contrapartes de la CAF) 
1. ¿Cuál fue la participación de los stakeholders de la CAF en la creación de los 
lineamientos? 
2. ¿Alguno de los lineamientos del gobierno corporativo es incompatible con alguna de 
las reglas/leyes de su país?   
3. ¿Están ustedes encargados de regular y hacer cumplir los CAF lineamientos? ¿Cómo? 
4. ¿Cómo la CAF administra la implementación de los lineamientos en la Región Andina? 
5. ¿Cómo su organización implementa los lineamientos? 
6. ¿Deben ustedes negociar los principios del gobierno corporativo con representantes 
políticos? 
7. ¿Cree usted que hay principios especiales diseñados a la medida de la situación en la 
región Andina? 
8. ¿Cuál es la mejor forma de distribución de capital para la implementación de los 
principios del gobierno corporativo? 
 
G7 (Directores de compañías en CAF estudio piloto)  
1. ¿Cómo se involucraron ustedes con la CAF? 
2. ¿Cómo fue manejado este proceso y por quien? 
3. ¿Están ustedes encargados de regular y hacer cumplir los lineamientos de la CAF? 
¿Cómo? 
4. ¿Cómo la CAF administra la implementación de los lineamientos en la Región Andina? 
5. ¿Qué tan difícil fue la implementación de los lineamientos de gobierno corporativo? 
6. ¿Cuáles fueron las partes más difíciles de implementar? 
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Appendix 6.1 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATIN 
AMERICAN ANDEAN REGION 
 
1.  Please indicate whether you are: 
Entrepreneur    Adviser         Academic     Student       
  
2. To what extent do you agree with the following, where a 1 is strongly agree and 5 
strongly disagree  
 
Concepts   
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Corporate governance is defined as the 
system by which the activities of a company 
are managed and controlled. 
     
Corporate governance is about the 
relationship between the board and 
management 
     
Management is accountable to the 
owners/shareholders 
     
Management is  accountable to all 
stakeholders 
     
Corporate governance helps a company 
improve its legitimacy 
     
Corporate governance makes it easier for 
companies to raise capital 
     
CAF is helping to implement good CG 
standards. 
     
Confecámaras is helping to implement good 
CG standards     
     
CAF’s CG guidelines are beneficial to 
companies and stakeholders 
     
 
3.  To what extent do you agree where a 1 is, strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree      
that companies should. 
 
Questions  1 2 3 4 5 
Split the CEO and Chairperson functions       
Have non-Executive directors on the board      
Have independent non-executive directors on 
the board 
     
Have board Committees      
Implement procedures for resolution of 
conflicts of interest  
     
Implement procedures to deal with related 
party transactions 
     
Any comments please email Maria Cristina Mina: mcmina@dundee.ac.uk 
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Appendix 6.2 
 
DESARROLLO DEL GOBIERNO CORPORATIVO EN  
LA REGIÓN ANDINA 
 
1. Por favor indique cual de los siguientes aplica a usted: 
 
Empresario            Consultor              Profesor       Estudiante   
 
2. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con cada uno de los siguientes planteamientos?, donde 1 es 
muy de acuerdo y 5 totalmente en desacuerdo 
 
Conceptos  1 2 3 4 5 
El Gobierno Corporativo se define como el 
sistema mediante el cual se administran y 
controlan las actividades de una empresa 
     
El gobierno corporativo es la forma como se 
manejan las relaciones entre la Junta Directiva y 
las gerencias en una empresa 
     
El gobierno corporativo mejora la 
responsabilidad de los administradores con los 
accionistas o dueños de la compañía  
     
El gobierno corporativo mejora los derechos y 
responsabilidades de los stakeholders 
     
El gobierno corporativo hace mas fácil la 
rendición de cuentas a todos los interesados 
     
El gobierno corporativo mejora la legitimidad de 
una empresa 
     
El gobierno corporativo facilita  la obtención de 
capital 
     
La CAF está promoviendo la implementación de 
buenas prácticas de Gobierno Corporativo 
     
La adopción de buenas prácticas de Gobierno 
Corporativo de la CAF son beneficiosas para las 
empresas y stakeholders  
     
Confecámaras está promoviendo la 
implementación de buenas prácticas de Gobierno 
Corporativo 
     
 
3. ¿En qué medida está de acuerdo con cada uno de los siguientes aspectos del Gobierno 
Corporativo?, donde 1 es muy de acuerdo y 5 totalmente en desacuerdo 
Si tiene un comentario por favor email María Cristina Mina: M.C.Mina@dundee.ac.uk 
Aspectos 1 2 3 4 5 
Una compañía debe tener cargos separados para 
Gerente general y Presidente de la Junta 
directiva 
     
La Junta directiva debe tener sólo ejecutivos       
La Junta debe tener Directores Independientes       
La Junta directiva debe conformar sus 
respectivos comités 
     
Es necesario implementar procedimientos para 
la resolución de conflictos   
     
Es necesario adoptar procedimientos para hacer 
frente a transacciones con partes vinculadas 
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Appendix 6.3 
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATIN 
AMERICAN ANDEAN REGION 
 
1.  Please indicate whether you are: 
Entrepreneur    Adviser         Academic     Student       
  
2. To what extent do you agree with the following, where a 1 is strongly agree and 5 
strongly disagree  
 
Concepts   
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Corporate governance is defined as the 
system by which the activities of a company 
are managed and controlled. 
 
24 
 
21 
 
11 
 
12 
 
11 
Corporate governance is about the 
relationship between the board and 
management 
 
21 
 
19 
 
18 
 
13 
 
8 
Management is accountable to the 
owners/shareholders 
 
38 
 
17 
 
13 
 
7 
 
4 
Management is  accountable to all 
stakeholders 
 
34 
 
20 
 
12 
 
7 
 
4 
Corporate governance helps a company 
improve its legitimacy 
 
35 
 
18 
 
11 
 
7 
 
6 
Corporate governance makes it easier for 
companies to raise capital 
 
31 
 
23 
 
11 
 
7 
 
6 
CAF is helping to implement good CG 
standards. 
 
34 
 
24 
 
9 
 
5 
 
3 
Confecámaras is helping to implement good 
CG standards     
 
44 
 
18 
 
6 
 
5 
 
5 
CAF’s CG guidelines are beneficial to 
companies and stakeholders 
 
36 
 
26 
 
7 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3.  To what extent do you agree where a 1 is, strongly agree and 5 strongly disagree      
that companies should. 
 
Questions  1 2 3 4 5 
Split the CEO and Chairperson functions  59 5 7 3 6 
Have non-Executive directors on the board 7 17 24 19 13 
Have independent non-executive directors on 
the board 
 
30 
 
23 
 
10 
 
6 
 
6 
Have board Committees 39 19 11 6 4 
Implement procedures for resolution of 
conflicts of interest  
 
61 
 
7 
 
3 
 
2 
 
7 
Implement procedures to deal with related 
party transactions 
 
54 
 
13 
 
3 
 
3 
 
7 
Any comments please email Maria Cristina Mina: mcmina@dundee.ac.uk 
 
